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Abstract  
 
Islamic banking, a niche financial sector that has captured the imagination of the financial elite 
and ordinary consumers alike, is unique in its regulation through the shariah. Primarily, it 
presents an added-value derived from its prohibition of riba (interest) in favour of profit from 
trade (al Bay) or leasing (ijarah).  
 
This thesis aims to explain Malaysia’s success in promoting Islamic banking products to a 
critical mass of consumers. More specifically, it seeks to explain the development and growth in 
everyday Islamic banking practices amongst the Malay community in Kuala Lumpur. The thesis 
is based on a sociological framework that does not aim to explain the development and growth 
of Islamic banking in terms that are principally about religion.  
 
I argue that the development of Islamic banking in Malaysia is the result of a top-down strategy 
driven by the economic and political interests of Malaysia’s ruling elites. Following the crisis of 
trust in the political-economic model of development deployed up to the crisis of 1997-1998, 
Islam’s vast repertoire of ideas, language and symbols are a powerful and dexterous foundation 
of a strategy that simultaneously problematises ‘conventional’ banking and offers an alternative 
course through Islamic banking. Nevertheless, Islamic banking practices are not given and 
cannot be taken-for-granted. Thus, in seeking to understand why increasingly consumers trust 
Islamic banking’s promise of economic advantage with the added value of religious compliance, 
the study seeks to interpret Islamic banking practices from the perspective of the ‘ordinary’ 
consumer. Everyday Islamic banking practices are viewed in this thesis, as embedded within 
broader, historically determined, closely intertwined, social, economic, cultural and political 
circumstances. This study views the aforementioned circumstances that consumers find 
themselves in, on the one hand, and the banking practices they participate in, on the other, as 
interacting elements of a socially determinate whole. Trust, I suggest, is the common thread 
underpinning the everyday banking practices within the interacting elements of a socially 
determinate whole.  
 
Three ideal types that emerged from the data, the virtuoso, pragmatist and sceptic, are a used 
as a heuristic device to characterise the various interests driving trust in Islamic banking, and 
illustrate the heterogeneity of Islamic banking practices. More specifically, based on an analysis 
of the consumers’ account of their Islamic banking practices, the choice of Islamic over 
‘conventional’ banking is based on two important factors. First, for those who perceive and are 
attracted to the added value of Islamic banking, trust in the shariah regulation and expertise, as 
underwritten by the state, is the first condition to their choice. Trust lubricates their choice by 
reducing complexity, mitigating risk and bridging the gap between knowledge and faith. Second, 
the personalised trust that characterises thick social ties bolsters confidence in Islamic banking. 
In rating Islamic banking as the most socially acceptable choice, family and peers are signalling 
confidence in the value and values of Islamic banking and are unwitting allies of the state and 
banks. Last, the study notes that shariah regulation has contradictory corollary effects: it is both 
functional and dysfunctional. Whilst it functions in enabling the growth of Islamic banking, it also 
contributes to social fragmentation within Malaysian society.  
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Glossary 
 
Allah     God. 
Bumiputera Literally Princes or sons of the earth is used 
to describe the indigenous Malays. 
Dakawah    Missionary activities (literally, ‘call’). 
Fatwa     legal opinion, ruling. 
Fiqh     Islamic jurisprudence. 
Fiqh muamalat Islamic commercial and transaction 
jurisprudence. 
Gharar    excessive uncertainty. 
Hadith     prophetic traditions 
Haj     pilgrimage.  
Halal     lawful or permissible. 
Haram    unlawful or forbidden. 
Hadiah/Hibah   gift. 
Ijmaa      consensus. 
Ijtihad  decision in fiqh that comes about through 
personal jihad, independently of fiqh. 
Kampung    village or hamlet. 
Madarah     harm. 
Madhab Schools of juridical thought. The Sunni branch 
includes: Hanbali, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i.  
Madrasa    educational institute for religious teaching. 
Mafasid    disutility.  
Manhaj     methodologies used by jurists of fiqh. 
Masalih    public interest as in public welfare. 
Masjid     Bahasa Malay word for mosque. 
Maysur    gambling. 
Qiyas      reasoning by analogy or by logical inference. 
Qur’an Central holy book of Islam and considered to 
contain the word of Allah (literally ‘recitation’). 
Riba     interest or usury (literally ‘increase’). 
Salafi Islamic practice revivalist movement modelled 
on the practices of the early ‘pious ancestors’. 
Usually includes the Prophet Mohammed and 
the first four ‘rightly guided’ caliphs. 
Shariah    Islamic (divine) jurisprudence 
Shariah Board Regulatory board predominantly composed of 
ulema. They oversee the halal regulatory 
process of Islamic commodities. 
Shia One of the two main branches of Islam. The 
Shia reject the first three Sunni caliphs and 
regards Ali, the fourth caliph, as the Prophet 
Muhammad's first true successor. 
Sunnah legally binding precedents established by the 
rulings of the Qur’an and the tradition of the 
Prophet Muhammad. 
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Sunni Most widespread branch of Islam. Their 
adherence to the Sunnah gives rise Based on  
Generally considered the orthodox b 
Surau Muslim prayer room or chapel. 
Tajjib Wholesome and healthy. 
Takaful    Shari’ah compliant insurance. 
Ulama (ulema plural) religious scholar (literally the knowledgeable 
or learned one). 
Ummah    Muslim community. 
Usul al-fiqh    legal reasoning. 
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ACRONYMS  
 
AAOIFI  Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions 
BN      Bank Negara 
GCC      Gulf Cooperation Council   
IMF     International Monetary Fund 
IPE     Islamic Political and Economy 
IFSB      Islamic Financial Services Board 
INCEIF  International Centre for Education in Islamic 
Finance 
MENA     Middle East and North Africa 
MIHAS     Malaysian International Halal Showcase 
SAC      Shariah Scholar Council 
SEA      South East Asia 
KSA     Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
PAS     Islamic Party of Malaysia 
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Chapter 1: Islamic banking: global and local 
 
 
1.1 Preamble: relevance of the author’s background 
 
Growing up in Malta, a country that is at least as Roman Catholic as Ireland and 
Poland, I attended a Catholic school as well as effectively compulsory lessons 
in Catholic doctrine after school hours for a decade. Religious indoctrination in 
the second half of the 1980s and first half of the 1990s in the Catholic world was 
less internationally uniform than it is today. Work on a definitive Catechism of 
the Catholic Church (CCC) only began twenty-one years after the conclusion of 
the path-breaking Second Vatican Council, in 1986. The final and official edition 
was published in 1997. Even then, it was emphatically not intended to replace 
local national catechisms and left some margin of freedom to local churches.  
 
I remember quite vividly that a recurring trope of Catechism lessons was the 
good Christian who diligently and industriously deposited the moral equivalent 
of money – obeying parents and teachers, doing good deeds, in short being and 
doing ‘good’ – in a virtual bank that would one day ensure her eternal salvation. 
The image of God that emerged from this narrative was that of an infinitely good 
banker – who cannot be cheated because he is omnipresent and omniscient – 
who rewards us in the afterlife to a measure that is infinitely munificent. In other 
words, or so we understood, if you obey and are good (whereby our goodness 
amounted essentially to obedience), God will pay you back in another life 
infinitely more than what you will have deposited in this life. The interest rate is, 
as it were, infinitely generous but it does require us to earn it in this life. 
 
One critical occasion for teachers to elaborate on this leitmotif is the ‘Parable of 
the Talents’ in Matthew (25: 14–30). A master goes on a journey and before he 
does he entrusts a considerable sum of money (expressed in talents, the talent 
being an ancient eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern unit of mass with a 
corresponding value in terms of a mass of precious metal). When the master 
	  	   14	  
returns he richly rewards the two enterprising servants who made profitable use 
of the funds and severely punishes the one that did nothing with it. This lesson, 
could appear to contradict, in the mind of the child, Jesus’ warning that ‘it is 
easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for someone who is 
rich to enter the kingdom of God’ (Matthew 19: 25, Mark 10: 25, Luke 18: 25). It 
therefore takes considerable rhetorical skill for the catechist to weave this 
negative image of wealth with the apparent praise of capital accumulation of the 
parable of the talents into a unified and coherent narrative fabric. 
 
The CCC instructs the catechist to approach materials from the Scripture 
through ‘spiritual exegesis’ and the ‘four senses’ of Scholasticism. Whereas, on 
the one hand, Scripture should be interpreted (1) literally (as intended by the 
author, as the Verstehen of my intention, albeit in an historical context), on the 
other, it should also be read (2) allegorically, (3) morally, and (4) analogically. 
The CCC considers the allegorical dimension as foundational. The moral 
interpretation extends the allegorical reading to the field of action and the 
analogical reading seeks the meaning of the specific scriptural passage for the 
meaning of existence. 
 
The narrative flexibility of this four-dimensional hermeneutic that enables the 
catechist to weave together elements that appear to contradict each other and 
convincingly present them as facets, or as different levels of the same 
interpretation. This narrative flexibility is evident in the utilisation of the ‘talent’. 
In Part 3 of the CCC, Life in Christ1, the concept of talent is precisely that, a 
natural aptitude or skill received as a gift from God: ‘A society is a group of 
persons bound together organically by a principle of unity that goes beyond 
each one of them. As an assembly that is at once visible and spiritual, a society 
endures through time: it gathers up the past and prepares for the future. By 
means of society, each man is established as an ‘heir’ and receives certain 
‘talents’ that enrich his identity and whose fruits he must develop. He rightly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See: Section 1 Man's Vocation: Life in the Spirit, Chapter 2 The Human Communion, Article 1 
The Person and Society: i. The Communal Character of the Human Vocation, Paragraph 1880. 
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owes loyalty to the communities of which he is part and respect to those in 
authority who have charge of the common good’ (Vatican City 2003).2 The 
‘Parable of the Talents’ may also, however, be read in a contemporary 
‘economic’ sense as a justification of profit. In Part 3 of the CCC3, we read that: 
‘Profits are necessary, however. They make possible the investments that 
ensure the future of a business and they guarantee employment’ (Vatican City 
2003).4 
 
The margin of interpretation permitted by the CCC (not to be understood as a 
limitless free-for-all) authorises in practice the catechist to expound themes and 
to draw prescriptive conclusions therefrom that would be quite compatible with 
Weber’s (2001) interpretation of the ‘Parable of the Talents’ in Chapter V 
‘Asceticism and the Spirit of Capitalism’ of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism: ‘The parable of the servant who was rejected because he did not 
increase the talent which was entrusted to him seemed to say so directly. To 
wish to be poor was, it was often argued, the same as wishing to be unhealthy; 
it is objectionable as a glorification of works and derogatory to the glory of God’ 
(108-109). As a matter of fact, at convent school we were taught by the nuns, 
that this parable emphasised the importance of hard work – at school and in our 
place of employment later on. They also emphasised that this was proof of the 
applicability of the Catholic doctrine to the modern world. Trade and commerce 
were a testament to God’s glory and our superiority, compared to the starving 
developing world, was evidence of our hierarchy in the divine order. 
 
More radical interpretations are also perfectly possible and easily 
accommodated within the broad range of ‘meanings’ of the ‘parable of the 
talents’. During one catechism lesson, a host teacher, who was a Maltese priest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See: www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P6G.HTM 
3 Life in Christ, Section 2 The Ten Commandments, Chapter: You Shall Love Your Neighbour as 
Yourself, Article 7 The Seventh Commandment: iv. Economic Activity and Social Justice, 
Paragraph 2432 
4 2432 Catechism of the Catholic Church. See: www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P8D.HTM 
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who had recently returned from Latin America and advocated a variant of 
Liberation Theology, extracted a different moral story from this parable. 
According to him, the ‘economistic’ reading of the parable was not how the pre-
modern Jew, to whom this parable was addressed, would understand it. Usury, 
as well as other forms of commercial activity, was frowned upon by Jesus and 
his followers. The talent symbolised the grace of God and the debt that man 
owes him. As servants of God, we were expected to share and double this 
grace, in order to continue enjoying its fruits. We were certainly not expected to 
engage in usurious behaviour and the only kind of productive work that God 
expected from us was charitable works that multiplied and shared the grace of 
God with others, particularly those who had less material wealth than us. He 
added that, in any case, we were all brothers and sisters as we worshiped the 
one true God. He emphasised that the same moral lessons were found in other 
religious texts too and not necessarily Christian ones. 
 
This introductory excursus is intended to alert the reader to the my cultural 
sensitivities, especially in view of the significant ethnographic component of this 
study. Although I was brought up in a Catholic cultural environment, this very 
experience and my reflection on it- on the effectiveness of narratives that 
attempt to defuse contradictions between religion and economic life, 
contradictions that are potentially disruptive of political and social structures – 
has, firstly, sensitised me to the conditions of possibility and existence of such 
narratives in other cultures, in this case the narrative that justifies Islamic 
banking generally and in Malaysia in particular. Secondly, it has alerted me to 
the danger of seeing the dialectic between religious and economic rationality as 
being a peculiarly Islamic issue, and to reduce it simplistically according to 
Western ignorance and to Western stereotypes of Islam. As I argue in this 
study, the complex configurations that this dialectic takes, not less complex than 
those in other Abrahamic religions including Islam, vary according to specific 
historically determined circumstances.  
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1.2 The historical preconditions 
 
Having revealed some of the themes that run throughout the thesis, the rest of 
the chapter will set the context for the rest of the chapters. This chapter consists 
of four sections. The next (second) section will illustrate the trajectory of Islamic 
banking: from a political reaction to Western Imperialist encroachment in 
‘Muslim’ societies to its current form as a niche of global finance. More 
specifically, it will link the emergence of the Malaysian Islamic banking sector 
with crises in the political, social and economic spheres – particularly the 1997-
1998 South East Asian financial crisis. The following (third) section offers a 
statement on the emergence of the research aims and questions that inform this 
project. In the fourth section, I show how the main theme of this project: the 
growth of the Islamic banking practices in Malaysia reflects the research 
agenda of economic sociology literature and particularly the scholarly body of 
literature concerned with financialisation (the ubiquity of finance in all aspects of 
modern society). I highlight how my project fits in with this literature concerned 
with financialisation – the literature as well as implications of financialisation for 
the political and social life of the non-elite.5 The final section offers chapter 
outlines for the thesis overall.  
 
 
1.2.1 The historical prohibition of interest in Abrahamic religions 
 
The raison d’être of Islamic banking6 is to conduct financial transactions that 
avoid interest. Islam, like all three Abrahamic religions, has throughout history 
pronounced itself on the proper conduct of economic practices, especially 
lending and borrowing. Historical evidence suggests that originally all three 
faiths shared similar views on debt and especially the evils of interest (Warde 
2000; Kuran 2004; Tripp 2006; Lewis 2007; Graeber 2011). Historically, all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The term denotes people who are not part of elite groups. See Chapter 3 for a detailed 
explanation. 
6 The term Islamic finance is used to denote all branches of Islamic financial activity, whilst the 
term Islamic banking is used to specifically denote retail Islamic banking. 
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three Abrahamic religions (Christianity, Judaism and Islam)7 raised 
philosophical and ethical objections to the growth of money from self-generation 
and for a long time, all interest was considered usurious (Lewis 2007; Kaleem 
and Lewis 2014).8  
 
Nevertheless, economic historians inform us that even during times when 
guardians of the faith imposed this prohibition, economic historians inform us 
that there was often a gulf between orthodoxy and praxis. In Catholic Europe 
penalties for engaging in usury were harsher and dictated by the Lateran 
councils. At the very least, lenders and borrowers who engaged in usury, and 
their families were excommunicated. As a result, as economic activity grew, 
they were able to circumvent the prohibition through techniques borrowed from 
the Muslim world. Five techniques were available. These included interesse, 
using foreign exchange transfers to conceal loans during international trade 
transactions, legal fictions and partnerships, including instruments like 
murabaha which are used in contemporary Islamic banking (Lewis 2007 :72–
76). Eventually, the Vatican would succumb to the pressures of the emergence 
of the money-economy and the challenges of Protestant Europe. Canon law 
was revised to match widespread praxis. On the contrary, in the Ottoman 
Empire, there were no strict penalties for those who contravened the prohibition. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 That historically Catholicism espoused a harsh attitude towards usury and even commerce is a 
fact that is well known amongst theologians and lay Catholics alike. In ‘Debt: A historical study 
of worldview on debt’, Graeber makes this point emphatically. He states the following: ‘Usury 
was seen above all as an assault on Christian charity, on Jesus’s injunction to treat the poor as 
they would treat the Christ himself, giving without expectation of return and allowing the 
borrower to decide on recompense (Luke 6, p.34–35)’ (Graeber 2011: 283). Judaism’s 
opposition to interest might not be as renowned as that of the other two faiths. Since Jews 
believed that Gentiles fell outside the scope of the scriptural prohibitions, and they were banned 
from many trades, the Jewish community in Europe became associated with moneylending and 
usury.  Nevertheless ambivalence with regard to interest is present in some of its sacred texts. 
Consider Ezekiel 18: 13: 'He who lends at interest, and takes profit; shall he then live? He shall 
not live. He has done all these abominations; he shall surely die; his blood shall be upon 
himself’. 
8 Interestingly enough, these debates are derived from even more ancient Greek philosophical 
inquiries about interest and the meaning of money. Famously, Aristotle described interest 
(tokos) as the ‘most hated’ and ‘unnatural’ art of making a gain from money itself, whether from 
speculation or the creation of debt. For Aristotle, ‘money was intended to be used in exchange, 
but not to increase at interest. And this term interest, which means the birth of money from 
money, is applied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the parent’ 
Aristotle, part X- http//classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html) 
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Indeed, enforcement ebbed and flowed according to the exigencies and 
expediencies of the situation and jurists or rulers were able to regulate 
according to the political temper of the times (Lewis 2007: 72). Therefore, what 
should interest sociologists is that it is only Islam, and only at a late particular 
historical juncture, in very specific and few (majority-Muslim) locations, that 
moralising about money, and specifically interest, would gain enough salience 
on an everyday basis to provide a foundation for a fully-fledged financial sector 
that claims extra value based on religious difference. In the next section, we will 
locate the intellectual origins of this turn.  
 
 
1.2.2 European capitalist incursions of ‘Muslim societies’  
 
The intellectual foundations of Islamic finance would only emerge as a reaction 
to Europe’s capitalist penetration of the Middle East in the 19th century. As 
economic historian Rogan notes, ‘The single greatest threat to the 
independence of the Middle East was not the armies of Europe but its banks’ 
(Rogan 2011: 130). Like falling dominoes, Ottoman rulers surrendered to 
European states or financial commissions controlled by them. The last, but 
perhaps most dramatic, crisis due to the upheaval it caused within its borders 
and around North Africa, was the Egyptian bankruptcy in 1876. Egypt 
contracted several foreign loans and a ‘debt of £68.5 million ($376.75 million) 
but only £11 million ($60.5 million) to invest in its economy’ (Rogan 2011: 132). 
Following several attempts to stem the haemorrhage, the viceroy tried to 
postpone the payments which was ‘tantamount to a declaration of bankruptcy, 
and the repo men of the international economy descended on Egypt like a 
plague’ (Rogan 2011: 132). The community of international economic experts 
imposed austerity measures on the Egyptian taxpayers in an effort to protect 
the foreign bondholder’s interests. Eventually, following failed attempts to 
secure payment and concerned about political turmoil, Britain felt compelled to 
invade Egypt in order to assure ‘the security of the Suez Canal and repayment 
of Egypt’s debts to British creditors’ (Rogan 2011: 161). 
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In turn, Muslim political activists and intellectuals attempted to formulate with a 
Muslim response based on a return to Islamic principle. Unlike the message of 
the Qur’an which is taken to be eternal, its interpretation, a science or an 
intellectual discipline developed by scholars, was not taken to be historically 
contingent. This response would later inspire various other reformers around 
the world including political activists in Pakistan.  
 
What these movements had in common is that they rejected the alienation, 
humiliation, and domination of the capitalist system, which in the eyes of many 
was intrinsic to European dominance. They would turn to Islam to solve modern 
economic developmental problems and create a homo Islamicus based on a 
utopian Islamic political economy (Kuran 2004; Tripp 2006). Central to this 
Islamic political economy was the idea that riba, the self-growth of money, was 
the gravest sin of all and would lead to grave consequences such as the ones 
that they had witnessed. 
 
It was the first serious attempt in modern history to develop an Islamic political 
economy that would serve as a basis for Islamic political and economic 
institutions that would enable Muslims to carve out an authentic space for 
political, economic, and social means of determination. Despite their best 
attempts, there was no momentum to create any substantial economic 
institutions from below, amongst the people. It would be left to the secular 
nationalist reformers that would capture the state institutions and the hearts and 
minds of people.  
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1.2.3 The establishment of Islamic finance  
 
With the founding by Ahmed Al-Najjar of the Mit-Ghamr Savings Bank in 1963,  
an experimental credit provider to peasants in rural Egypt, the first modern 
Islamic financial institution was born.9 The aims of this profit-sharing institution 
were modest: to provide interest-free capital to locals who wanted to start a 
business. More robust Islamic financial institutions would appear in the late 
1970s and 1980s. Aware of the Arab street’s disillusion with Nasser’s Pan-
Arabist dream, the Gulf Monarchies hoped to swing the balance of power with 
their petrodollars.10  
 
One of the ways in which Gulf rulers capitalised on their oil rents was through 
the dissemination of their conservative brand of Islamic politics through various 
Islamic business ventures and charities. However, these same ruling and 
business elites shied away from establishing Islamic banking at home. In the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Islamic finance is a recent development. 
Although the ruling elite were sensitive to the possibility that some would 
suggest that they were allowing conventional banks that were unIslamic.11 
Instead they established Islamic financial institutions outside their jurisdictions, 
in countries like Egypt. Aware of the appeal of Islamic revivalism, galvanised by 
the spectacle of the Iranian revolution, the Malaysian ruling elite also pledged to 
include the shariah as a guiding principle of the state. This was carried out with 
the help of the shariah scholars who were co-opted into state institutions and 
helped establish the first commercial Islamic bank. Malaysia had started to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 This was later incorporated into the Nasir Social Bank in 1971, both institutions preferred not 
to emphasise their shariah principles for fear of attracting the displeasure of the Nasser and 
Sadat regimes respectively, with the country’s first openly shariah-based institution, the Faisal 
Islamic Bank, only appearing in 1979. 
10 The transfer of control of the Gulf oil fields from international firms to the native ruling families 
re-calibrated the global balance of power in terms that were more favourable to the oil-
producing states of the region. The political strength of this shift was reflected by the 
Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), five-month embargo that jolted the 
West and consequently generated lucrative rents. Between 1973 and 1974 alone, oil prices 
quintupled (Wilson 2004: 9; Tripp 2006: 139–40). 
11 The political sensitivity of the government to Islam is also evident in other countries like 
Turkey. For example, Islamic Banks in Turkey are called Special Finance Houses. For further 
reading, see Başkan (2004).  
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experiment with Islamic banking in the 1940s and would eventually create 
Tabung Haji, which was set up in 1963 to help Malaysians save for performing 
the Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina). In 1969, this body evolved into the 
‘Pilgrims Management and Fund Board’ (Lewis and Algaoud 2001: 6). This 
would provide the foundation for the Islamic Banking Act of 1983 and the Bank 
Islam Malaysia Berhad, a fully-fledged commercial operation. 
 
Despite the effort to make Islamic finance viable, by shifting from a social 
purpose to a commercial one, the sector registered little interest from 
consumers and mainstream financial institutions. Interest in the sector did 
increase, as did its deposits and profits, however it was only amongst a devout 
minority buoyed by the euphoric wave of Islamist revivalist politics (Warde 
2000). Nonconformity with global standards had positioned Islamic finance as 
an ‘exotic’ financial sector depending on a miniscule demand from a niche 
clientele. Islamic banking remained the choice of a handful of aficionados.  
Also, the FIRE (finance, insurance and real estate) sectors formed a minor part 
of the Malaysian economy, and finance was not part of the Muslim-Malay 
middle class way of life. On the other hand, consumption of halal commodities 
such as food and clothes was always increasing. Both state and consumer 
would continue to neglect Islamic finance, preferring instead to focus its shariah 
regulation and Islamic everyday practice on food and clothes. As my informants 
from the Malaysian Islamic financial sector confirmed, it was only after the 
1997-1998 financial crisis that Islamic finance became a viable proposition for 
state, banks and ordinary people alike. 
 
 
1.2.4 The 1997-1998 South East Asian financial crisis 
 
The South East Asian financial crisis started in Thailand, and then tipped into 
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the rest of the region, including Malaysia.12 Savers saw the Malaysian ringgit 
spiralling out of control. The effect on currency and stock markets was a 20–
50% devaluation (Glassman 2003: 32) and borrowers’ interest rates shot up to 
as much as 20%. Although financial activity was restricted to the politico-
business spheres (Rethel 2011), the extensive cross-ownership between banks 
and companies and intensification of financial activities in the ‘80s and early 
‘90s would make Malaysia vulnerable to global financial markets when the crisis 
erupted. So what caused the crisis? For the advocates of the Washington 
consensus, who did not yet enjoy the hindsight of the 2007/8 credit-crunch, the 
faults were two. First, they accused South East Asian countries, including 
Malaysia, of specific Asian immorality. They argued that the crisis was caused 
mainly by ‘weak enforcement of bank regulations and government-directed 
lending’ (Vithiatharan and Gomez 2014:603) that was a result of cronyism and 
corruption.13 Second, the problem, as far as they were concerned, was not 
liberalisation and deregulation of the financial markets, but the lack of it. Neo-
Marxist interpretations did not agree. The crisis resulted from an inevitable 
systemic fault of the global financial system, and was triggered by a slowdown 
in global and regional demand underpinning the region’s export-led growth. This 
was intensified by China’s emergence and the rise in value of dollar, to which 
most currencies were pegged. (Glassman 2003: 53–54).  
 
For Malaysians, ‘the political crises of capitalism in the 1980s and the 1990s 
were shocking symptoms of a model of Malay modernization turned moral 
malaise’ (Khoo and Hadiz 2010: 23), thus affecting the legitimacy of the ruling 
forces (Arrighi 2005). This crisis resulted in a breakdown of trust in institutions 
and a depletion of confidence in the political and economic governance of the 
country by the Mahathir administration. Even their most loyal of constituents, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Many referred to this crisis as the ‘East Asian crisis’. But in reality it was a crisis of South East 
Asian countries, with the exception of Singapore and the inclusion of South Korea (from the 
North East Asian area). 
13 Thomas (2002: 603), for instance, supported this argument by noting that the links between 
the government and both the corporate and banking sectors facilitated political intervention. 
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the Malays would shift their allegiance elsewhere, thus increasing the popularity 
of Islamic politics (Khoo and Hadiz 2010: 22).  
 
People lashed out against what they perceived to be a corrupt political and 
business class. Still, people’s anger at the government’s role in this catastrophe 
did not deflect their attention from foreign speculators. They joined Mahathir in 
his condemnation of Western capitalism. Several politicians also expressed this 
outrage on behalf of their citizens. In his autobiography, former Prime Minister 
Mahathir lamented the wanton destruction of the crisis. He described how 
‘trillions of dollars of hard-earned assets and economic capacities have been 
destroyed, lives have been lost, governments have fallen, and racial animosities 
have intensified’ (Mitton 2000). Ordinary people agreed with their political 
leaders: the West and its gatekeepers (such as the International Monetary 
Fund) had allowed its greedy speculators to wreak havoc on their lives and 
livelihoods. The human and social devastation wrought by the crisis was 
immense. Many Malaysians lost their assets and businesses as well as their 
jobs. Many workers experienced the stagnation of their purchasing power as 
their real wages lagged behind inflation. Previous to the Asian financial crisis, 
during the high growth period of 90s, wages were increasing at 6.2% annually. 
Following the crisis, wages increases were at 1.6%. After accounting for 
inflation, real wages had declined even further (Abidin 2011: 70-80; Glassman 
2003). As the respondents would reveal during fieldwork, many would literally 
pay with their lives as families broke down, and they frequently heard of 
suicides. 
 
Echoing Polanyi’s double movement, from this crisis a political force to 
counteract the devastation emerged. Led by a coalition of Islamists and secular 
non-Malay parties, the reformasi movement demanded an end to the ethnic 
distributive/welfare policies of the state. They agitated the people against the 
developmental trajectory followed by the government. More specifically, they 
demanded an end to the patronage networks, which dispensed with property 
and funds to people, and advocated a shift to a united Malaysia (Rethel 2011). 
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1.2.5 Response to the crisis: Islamic finance as a political and economic 
fix 
 
Their hegemonic hold14 over the country having vanished overnight, the political 
and business elites equally had to formulate a political and economic response 
for self-preservation (Arrighi 2005). They would reject calls to completely open 
up their markets to the forces of global finance. Instead they would contain the 
damage by restricting capital flows (Glassman 2003). 
 
Later, the state would embark on a structural transformation of its economy 
marked by liberalisation, privatisation, and mass financialisation (Gomez and 
Jomo 1999; Rethel 2011). These reforms were conceived as an economic and 
political solution to the decline in export-led growth and the battering recevied at 
the hands of the global financial markets, as well as the resulting political 
backlash. The ruling political and economic elite had recognised that the 
‘Malaysian capitalism of old was clearly politically increasingly more difficult to 
sustain’ (Rethel 2011: 492) and had to find new strategies for survival. 
 
The 2001 Bank Negara’s ‘Financial Sector Master Plan’ encapsulated the 
state’s strategy to carve out a niche for Malaysia in the global marketplace by 
prioritising knowledge-based sectors, including finance. Islamic Finance was the 
cornerstone of its ‘Master Plan’ to enable the necessary growth that would 
transform Malaysia as a ‘high value-added high-income country’. The state, 
through its central bank and with Islamic scholars and financial industry would 
devise a top-down strategy to develop Islamic banking. The securitisation 
observed in the USA and the UK, ‘allowing retail lenders to sell on their 
receivables’ (Erturk and Solari 2007: 381) and spurring the expansion of lending 
for car and housing financing was also observed in Malaysia, both within the 
conventional and Islamic financial sectors. For instance, Cagamas Berhad, the 
National Mortgage Corporation, ‘the single most important provider of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Very simply, hegemony is defined as domination without force.  
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securitisation products in Malaysia’ (Rethel 2010: 500), is symbolic of the 
connection between innovations at the higher-end of the financial markets and 
consumption patterns in the retail market. Cagamas’ market innovations have 
led it to become simultaneously the largest issuer of asset-backed securities in 
Malaysia and through the Islamic housing financing and Islamic hire purchase 
loans, the driver behind Malay homeownership and household debt (Rethel 
2010: 498–500). They would develop a range of Islamic banking products that 
fulfilled similar economic functions to their conventional counterparts. The 
market would be liberalised to allow several Islamic banks, including foreign 
institutions and Islamic windows of conventional banks, to operate in Malaysia. 
 
Malaysia’s capital, Kuala Lumpur, has come a long way in terms of Islamic 
banking. It began with one solitary Islamic bank but it is now a global hub for 
Islamic banking, hosting 31 Islamic financial institutions and several global and 
national regulatory institutions including the Shariah Scholar Council (SAC), 
controlled through the Bank Negara. Islamic banking assets accounted for 25 
per cent of the Malaysian banking system’s assets in 2013, up from 19.6 per 
cent in 2009, while Islamic financing accounted for 27.5 per cent of total 
banking financing in 2013, up from 21.6 per cent in 2009. The Islamic banking 
system’s total deposits also constituted 26.6 per cent of the Malaysian banking 
system’s deposits in 2013, an increase from 20.7 per cent five years before 
(International banker.com 2014:92). Islamic banks controlled US$120bn in 
assets in 2012, the period during which I conducted my fieldwork, and it is 
expected that they will increase to US$390bn by 2018 (Ernst and Young 
2014: 73). Islamic banking is expected to account for 40 per cent of total 
financing by 2020. 
 
Islamic banking simultaneously accommodated the global financial markets and 
reached a compromise with its citizens on a domestic front. From a global 
economic perspective, the ascendancy of Islamic finance is part of the 
Malaysian state’s two-pronged strategy to increase its competitive advantage. 
Firstly Malaysia wants to exploit its cultural difference in the global financial 
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markets. In a region dominated by hubs of global finance such as Hong Kong 
and the neighbouring Singapore, the state aimed to carve out a niche based on 
cultural difference.15 The aim was to bump up Malaysia from second tier Newly 
Industralised Countries (NICs) to the first tier status of high-income economies, 
such as Singapore, that had largely avoided the crisis. In the aftermath of a 
crisis, business elites counter heightened international competition through a 
shift from production to finance (Arrighi 1994). One of my expert informants 
confirmed that the governing elite reasoned that through Islamic banking, 
Malaysia would be well positioned to tap lucrative funds of the global financial 
markets.  
 
Their prime targets were the cash-rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. 
In addition, this also complemented more traditional halal industries by 
providing a package of completely integrated shariah compliant commodities for 
the global halal economy. The indications are that, by providing ‘an end-to-end 
shariah compliance in the suppliers’ operations … and funding options’, (MIFC 
2014: 1) the state will seal Malaysia’s standing as the global home of the halal 
industries including Islamic finance. As the cover of a brochure advertising the 
Malaysian halal industries states: ‘The global halal economy and the Islamic 
finance industry are natural economic partners’. On the domestic front, they 
hoped that a consumer-led expansion of the financial markets, marked by a 
‘new politics of debt’ (Rethel 2011: 494) would appease its constituency.  
 
Another tool available to states and financial institutions is the capacity to 
generate credit (Arrighi 2005: 42–43). The purpose of unleashing an 
unprecedented flow of credit, through the liberalisation and the expansion of the 
Islamic Financial sector, was threefold. The first was to harness the 
consumption power of its emerging middle class. The extension of Islamic 
consumer credit to the middle classes would fix the tensions that arose from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The 2001 Bank Negara’s ‘Financial Sector Master Plan’ was detailed during an interview with 
one of the practitioners who has connections to the Malaysian political and economic elite. See 
Chapters 4 and 5 for further detail. 
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suppression of wages and spur consumption-led growth. Similarly to the Anglo-
Saxon world, Islamic banking practices in Malaysia are also dominated by 
borrowing, particularly those related to consumption and home ownership 
(Langley 2008). Credit would kick-start the economy and address people’s 
grievances. Politically, this strategy renewed the state’s commitment to its 
primary constituency, Muslim-Malays. It reaffirmed the shariah and Islam – the 
primary identity marker of the Malay community – as an authentic source of 
Malaysian state’s developmental trajectory.  
 
Reviews of the politics of Islam in the early 2000s are inseparable from the 9/11 
attacks on the World Trade Centre. The global economy was affected, but 
Muslim majority countries also had to contend with the responses and reactions 
that these attacks would spur amongst their citizens and in the international 
community. Malaysia sought to overcome the economic downturn with a 
message of ‘patriotic consumption of domestic goods’ that is inseparable from 
the political reactions to 9/11. These attacks were understood in contradictory 
ways and Islamic finance became one of the ways that the state could express 
Malaysia’s moderate Islam (Fischer 2008: xii; 35). 
 
Islamic Finance harks back to an Islamic ‘golden age’ (Kuran 2004: 3; 94–97), 
by ‘involving historical mythologies,’ that emphasise a difference of identity 
(Zubaida 2011: 16), but also looks forward to a future where the Muslim world 
can teach the rest how to embrace economic modernisation without losing 
values that are intrinsic to a ‘good’ (Muslim) society.16 For many, this seems like 
a particularly poignant lesson at a time when the West seems to be plagued by 
economic and political decay. Despite the far-reaching reforms, the core 
political and economic power structures prevailed (Gomez and Jomo 1999; 
Rethel 2011). These shifts were endogenous to the ‘centre of the power 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The ‘golden age’ usually refers to the 39-year period, 622–61 CE, during the last ten years of 
the Prophet Muhammad’s leadership and the later the tenure of the four rightly guided Caliphs, 
over the original ummah. It is suggested that the Islamic code of behaviour enjoyed widespread 
adherence and, as a result, led to great prosperity and spirit of brotherly cooperation (Kuran 
2004: 3).  
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structure’ and the political ‘establishment’ (Scott 2012: 35). In conclusion, 
Islamic banking helped restore hegemony by buoying people’s confidence in 
the political economy and neutralising contestations from Islamist parties and 
movements who had been using Islam as their call to arms.  
 
 
1.3 Explaining the growth of Islamic banking practices 
 
So far, we have outlined the circumstances that led the state, ruling elite and 
banks in Malaysia to establish Islamic banking: it made developmental, political 
and economic sense. We have also emphasised that Islam alone cannot be 
invoked as the sole explanatory factor. Its salience needs to be understood in 
relation to the motor of global financial capitalism that is constitutive of and 
constitutes national political economies. Although I will be discussing a very 
specific local story, it is but a mere occurrence in a very specific juncture within 
the framework of the longue durée of financial capital expansion.   
 
What remains unclear, and what this thesis aims to explain, is why Muslim-
Malays are increasingly choosing Islamic banking. Muslims are not under legal 
duress by the Malaysian state to choose Islamic banking, and there are no 
obvious financial advantages in using Islamic banking products. The credit risk 
system used by Islamic Malaysian banks is based on the conventional model, 
and the borrowing terms offered to their clients depend on the same type of risk 
assessment as that of a conventional bank. Some scholars (see Kuran 2004 
and El Gamal 2006) and a number of the respondents interviewed suggest that 
in some cases, costs to the consumer might actually be slightly higher. This 
raises the principal question of this thesis: How can we explain the growth in 
everyday Islamic banking practices? 
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1.3.1 Everyday Islamic banking practices 
 
This project explores the Malaysian state’s success in conveying the promise of 
economic advantage with added halal value to a critical mass of receptive 
consumers. More specifically, the aim of this research is to understand the 
growth of Islamic banking practices from the perspective of ordinary Muslim-
Malay17 consumers.18 The approach taken by this project, a microanalysis in the 
vein of Weber’s verstehende Soziologie (interpretive sociology), that prioritises 
the meaning that people give to their own actions, enables us to understand 
how culture and identity, trust and confidence, respectively embedded in 
shariah regulation and social ties, underpin the growth of everyday Islamic 
banking practices. 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to develop a sociological framework with which to 
understand the growth and development of Islamic banking practices in 
Malaysia. As I explain at the end of Chapter 2, the theoretical framework of this 
dissertation seeks to follow sociological traditions that ‘de-sacralise’ social 
practices that have attached to them the adjective ‘Islamic’ (Zubaida 2003: 1). 
Invoking Islam as an all-explanatory factor to explain Islamic banking practices 
is tautological. ‘It must, rather, involve a sociology of how religion interacts with 
other ethnic, cultural and political forces’ (Halliday 1995: 75). This is not to deny 
the independent role of Islam in the growth of Islamic banking. But one must  
‘keep in mind that “culture” is a process intertwined with the dynamics of 
economy and power, and not a fixed essence working itself out through history’ 
(Zubaida 2011: 6).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 As I will explain in Chapter 4, in Malaysia the state identifies ethnic groups along religious 
lines. These ethno-religious categories are widely accepted and are prevalent in everyday life 
and on an institutional level. In particular, since Islam is one of the primary signifiers of the 
Malay ethnic, all Malays are expected to be Muslim. From a sociological perspective, this is 
problematic. For this reason, I use the term Muslim-Malays to illustrate that I reject the 
assumption that all Malays are automatically Muslim from birth. 
18 In this project, the consumers whose everyday Islamic banking practices we will be 
investigating, will be referred to as laypeople or ordinary people or consumers. The aim is to 
emphasise that the aim of this project is priorities people who use Islamic banking products but 
who are not experts nor elite who can manage Islamic finance ‘from above’. See chapter 3 for a 
more detailed explanation. 
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This means that although the banking practices under investigation are 
expressed through an Islamic ‘tag’, they must be understood in connection to 
‘economic, political, cultural, ideological and historical’ forces (Warde 2000: 
226). In particular, this project seeks to explain the economic actions of ordinary 
individuals from a sociological perspective that views culture, politics and history 
as endogenous. Consequently, the dissertation develops a framework that 
borrows from the ‘tool-kit of economic sociology’ (Swedberg 2004), particularly 
the Polanyian (2001) notion of embeddedness, bolstered by the longview of 
historical comparison.  
 
The aim of my introductory excursus concerning the original shared hostility of 
all three Abrahamic religions towards interest was to alert the reader to the 
importance of the longview of history. It remains instrumental in warning us of 
the perils of ignoring unsound clichés about the inevitability of Islamic banking 
practices amongst the predominantly Muslim, Malay community. As I explain in 
Chapter 5, the development and growth of Islamic banking practices rests on a 
complex historical process of negotiation of cultural, political, economic interests 
between the Malay community and the state, governed by an elite that looks to 
Islam as a ‘fix’ for crises in the political economy. It’s within these preconditions 
that the research questions, as outlined below, must be contextualised.  
 
 
1.4 Research Questions  
 
The project, driven by the principles of grounded theory, is based on a 
combination of methodological tools, including four months of fieldwork in Kuala 
Lumpur. The Malaysian capital city is home to Muslim-Malay middle class 
families as well as to several Islamic financial and regulatory institutions. I 
conducted in-depth interviews with Islamic banking consumers and 
supplemented with participant observation at sites of economic activity such as 
Islamic banks, shopping malls, markets and leisure venues. Additionally, the 
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focus on the everyday is complemented by an investigation into the objective 
structures of the Islamic banking sector as defined by the Malaysian state, 
shariah regulation, and Islamic banks. This aim is achieved through archival 
work and the documentation of elite perspectives, including through interviews 
and participant observation with elite members of the Malaysian and global 
Islamic banking community such as CEOs, lawyers, journalists, shariah 
scholars, politicians, as well as with consumer-facing bank clerks. The purpose 
of this approach is to contextualise the everyday practices ‘from below’ within 
the broader objective parameters of the Islamic banking sector, as set ‘from 
above’. The research questions of this project were not suggested directly by 
the literature, instead they emerged from the data (the gathering of which was 
informed by the literature). For this reason, a discussion on how the research 
aims of this project tie-in within the agenda of economic sociology: ‘the 
application of the sociological perspective to economic phenomena’ (Swedberg 
2004: 2), is detailed in the next chapter. This section will outline the emergence 
of the main research questions from the data.  
This project was driven by a methodological approach sensitised by the 
principles of grounded theory. Developing both the research questions and the 
theoretical framework for this project required digging deep into the empirical 
and building analytical structures that reach up to the hypothetical (Charmaz 
2008). As the initial data from the research process started to emerge, three 
sets of sub-questions were developed, with the aim of addressing the principal 
question of this thesis: How can we explain the growth in everyday Islamic 
banking practices? 
 
1.4.1 The crystallisation of Islamic banking as an objective category. 
 
The first set of questions examine how Islam is used as a cultural toolkit for the 
construction of Islamic Banking as an objective category of banking practices in 
Malaysia. The aims were threefold: establishing the cultural components on 
which Islamic banking was justified and spaces for contestation, the encoding 
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process within formal shariah regulation and the signalling and communication 
of its shariah added-value. Thus, the questions raised were: 
 
a. What are the core values and ethical principles, drawn from sacred Islamic 
sources, that characterise Islamic banking? How are the doctrinal and 
definitional controversies linked to the drive for efficiency and debt-based 
products, on one hand, and the pressures to retain authenticity, justice and 
equity-based products within the Islamic banking sector, on the other?  
 
b. How are these values interpreted and codified into the shariah regulatory 
system by experts? 
 
c. How do the boundaries of Islamic banks link to other Islamic commodities 
such as halal food and how are the standards that delineate the boundaries of 
permissible/forbidden communicated? 
 
1.4.2  Generalised trust, shariah regulation and expertise 
 
The next two sets of questions sought to understand how the symbolic 
boundaries set by the objective Islamic banking sector became material and 
regulated everyday banking practices. Since the fiduciary relationship between 
consumers and shariah regulation emerged as the crucial link between ‘supply’ 
and ‘demand’ the rest of the research questions focused on understanding how 
trust and confidence shape Islamic banking practices. The questions include: 
 
a. How does generalised trust underpin everyday Islamic banking practices, 
how is it different from personalised trust, what are its functions and how does it 
vary according to the ideal types? 
 
b. How does the expertise of shariah scholars shape everyday Islamic banking 
practices and how do they act as trust agencies? Why are they considered 
legitimate authorities on Islamic banking practices?  
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 c.  How is the state’s underwriting of the Islamic banking sector viewed by 
Muslim-Malays? What are the implications of the boundaries set by shariah 
regulation - are they always functional? 
 
1.4.3. The role of family and peer relations in creating confidence in 
Islamic banking  
 
Although trust in shariah regulation emerged as the primary embedding 
mechanism, social ties also emerged as important means of shaping everyday 
Islamic banking practices. Family members and peers enable the growth of 
Islamic banking by signalling confidence in the sector. The questions asked 
included: 
 
a. Why and to what extent is familial and peer influence relevant to  everyday 
Islamic banking practices? How is confidence in Islamic banking 
communicated? 
 
b. How do personal ties communicate confidence in Islamic banking and what 
are the instances, junctures or events in which they proved especially salient? 
 
c. Why and in what ways is the participation of family and peer considered of 
value to Muslim-Malays? 
  
 
1.5 Islamic banking practices and the sociology of everyday finance 
 
This section considers how the broader aims and questions raised by the 
project fit in within the wider scholarly literature dedicated to the increasing 
importance of finance in modern society. The financial industry’s 
‘disproportionate role in allocating wealth around the world’ is also being 
reflected in the ‘special place’ it occupies in anthropology and sociology (Hart 
and Oritz 2014). There is a burgeoning field of literature, commonly known as 
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financialisation studies, that addresses the shift from industrial to financial 
capitalism. There is no single research agenda and the interdisciplinary 
approaches cover all the various levels of analysis, from macro to mezo and 
micro. ‘What unites these studies is a view of finance beyond its traditional role 
as provider of capital for the productive economy. Instead, “studies of 
financialization interrogate how an increasingly autonomous realm of global 
finance has altered the underlying logics of the industrial economy and the inner 
workings of democratic society’ (van der Zvan 2014: 99–100). 
 
The financialisation literature can be broadly carved between three main 
traditions. The classic tradition focuses on the broader macro processes related 
to the finance capital as a systemic cycle of accumulation. It views financial 
capital in epochal terms as it shifts across geo-political space in tandem with 
swings in the balance of hegemonic power and/or the monopolistic power of the 
rentier class. The second body of work falls under the umbrella the ‘shareholder 
value’, and stems from a concern with how shareholder profits have became the 
measure by which to gauge success or failure of a firm. Consequently, the 
pressure to increase shareholder value has also transformed the norms of 
industrial and trade operations. The last and most recent stream, and the main 
focus of this project, regards the financialisation of everyday life of the majority 
– the people located at the bottom of the hierarchy. Traditionally, this was not 
the ontological starting point of social scientists studying financialisation. 
Financial activity was once perceived as the exclusive domain of the elite such 
as the rentier class or expert communities.  
 
The so-called democratisation of finance, which heralded the proliferation of 
financial products and services amongst the mass of the population, altered 
scholars to the myriad ways in which finance is constituted in everyday practice. 
Everyday finance attempts to provide a grounded alternative to perspectives 
that make ‘modern finance look exceedingly abstract, impersonal and 
disembodied’ (Carruthers and Chul-Kim 2011) and positioned ‘above and 
beyond and differentiated from society in general, and the “real” economy in 
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particular’ (Langley 2008: 6). In reality, as the respondents will attest in this 
project, financial markets, and practices are connected to the very concrete 
personal decisions of ordinary people and intimate facets of their everyday life.  
 
The financialisation of ‘everyday life’, compounded by its ‘culture of 
neoliberalism’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001), describes the profound 
experiential and discursive transformations of finance in the everyday life of 
individuals (Martin 2002; Langley 2008). Martin describes this process as the 
following: 
 
‘Financialisation integrates markets that were separate, like banking for 
business and consumers, or markers for insurance and real estate. It asks 
people from all walks of life to accept risks into their homes that were hitherto 
the province of professionals. Without significant capital, people are being 
asked to think like capitalists’ (Martin 2002: 12) In an unprecedented 
transformation, huge swathes of the population are buying into a new paradigm 
of property: the rethinking of their possessions as investment. This approach 
has been framed around the notion of the rise of the citizen as investor, 
generating a cluster of issues at the centre of which is the hub-issue of the 
extent to which the citizen’s savings are mobilised by the financial system. This 
is linked to spoke-issues concerning the impact of finance on the daily life of the 
minute investor/debtor. With a few notable exceptions, such as Rethel (2010; 
2011), this scholarly work is generally restricted to an Anglo-American core.19 
 
In fact, many peripheral countries have followed in the economic trajectory set 
by core countries. Consumption has replaced production as the most important 
financing aim of retail banks. According to the Bank Negara, the Malaysian 
Central Bank, Malaysian households are among the most highly leveraged in 
Asia. In Malaysia, household debt now exceeds 80% of GDP (The Economist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 In the face of speculation about the tipping of the balance of power from West to East and the 
unravelling of American hegemony (Arrighi 1994), this gap suggests an element of 
ethnocentrism.  
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2013c) and the debt-to-household-income ratio stands at 140%, which means 
that the amount owed stands at 1.4 times income. Mortgages,  accounting for a 
quarter of bank lending assets, continue to drive growth in household debt. The 
bulk of this debt is for house financing, followed by car loans, ‘personal use’, 
and credit cards (Bank Negara Annual Report 2013).20 Despite this obvious 
transformation, evident in our high streets, shopping malls and advertising, the 
implications of consumption of credit by ordinary consumers has been largely 
ignored by sociologists (Erturk and Solari 2007; Botterill 2010; Langley 2014). 
 
In the face of the billions circulating through global financial markets, the 
focus on retail banking practices might appear exaggerated. However, although 
a separate focus on the everyday banking practices is necessary for analytical 
and in this case, practical methodological purposes, in reality the bifurcation of 
the two realms – global and local – is a false one. As I’ve demonstrated in the 
first section, even the specific localised counter-reactions, whether in colonial 
Egypt or independent Malaysia, based on the encroachment of financial capital 
in the everyday lives of people, are not separate from the circulation of global 
capitalism. Empirically speaking, the various levels of analysis and the distinct 
approaches are complementary.  
 
Second, the interconnectivity of ‘high’ and ‘low’ finance is of special significance 
to Islamic banking. Its emergence as a commercially viable financial sector is 
the result of the deregulation or rather, reregulation of the financial markets. The 
removal of regulatory barriers between the two previously detached realms 
(investment and retail banking) benefitted Islamic banking and marked its 
renaissance as a niche market of the global economy. ‘Whereas the traditional 
world of finance, dominated by commercial, interest-based banking, could raise 
potentially troublesome theological issues, the new world of finance 
characterised by the blurring of distinctions between commercial banking and 
other areas of finance, the downgrading of interest income, and financial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See, The Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report 2013 
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innovation, has been rife with opportunities for Islamic financial instruments’ 
(Warde 2000: 1–2). 
 
The boom of Islamic banking in Malaysia is also linked to the erosion of the 
clear distinctions between the respective traditional roles of retail banks and 
merchant banks. It was the birth of the 'new economy' with an emphasis on 
finance-driven accumulation that spurred linkages between global finance and 
Islamic banking. The connectivity of households to capital markets has been 
heightened due to deregulation and also because of the increasing dependency 
of households on financial income through the securitisation pool. In fact, for 
some, this shows that the financial products in retail markets are not only 
connected to but also constitutive of the global financial markets (Langley 
2008: 10). Lastly, I believe that there are compelling political questions that can 
be raised and addressed by a study of everyday Islamic banking practices. 
They will be discussed in the next section. 
 
 
1.6 The veiled politics of Islamic banking practices 
 
For the financialisation literature, finance is not the neutral allocation of capital 
linked to the mechanisms of supply and demand. Its practice is as ‘a political 
movement’ (Montgomerie 2006: 306) charged with questions of power. More 
specifically, the politics of finance is perceived as ‘an expression of class, a 
control mechanism, or even a rationality associated with late twentieth-century 
capitalism’ (van der Zvan 2014: 102). Whilst these broader concerns are 
addressed in this project, for instance in the emphasis on the coalescence of 
the political and economic interests of political and business elites, a different 
set on concerns, grounded in the asymmetries of power of credit unique to 
Islamic banking are also addressed.  
 
The first query regards the moral economy of debt versus credit. As many have 
noted, in the Anglo-US core the predominant moral narrative surrounding the 
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democratisation of finance has proved pernicious in its obfuscation of the 
unequal social relations underpinning credit. As Dodd notes, ‘debt supports and 
is reinforced by a moral economy that is often used to justify the social, 
economic, and political asymmetries of power that exist between creditors and 
debtors’ (Dodd 2014: 136). Put more simply, it avoids asking political questions 
about who controls credit and who has access to it and on what terms in a 
democratic society. Generally speaking, this is linked to the pervasive neo-
liberal discourse that emphasises the ‘unsustainability’ of the welfare state and 
the responsibility of the individual to manage his way in life in a fiscally sound 
manner. On a more basic level, it harks back to the ascetic Protestant morality, 
illustrated in the parable of the talents that has become pervasive in everyday 
discourse. In a curious reversal of roles, the powerless and the poor, those 
most likely to be buried under mountains of unmanageable debt, are 
‘stigmatised’ and condemned as individually responsible for their lax behaviour, 
with little attention paid to how the game is rigged against them. Conversely, 
creditors, once maligned as evil and subject to penalties that, according to 
Dante even fellow occupants of the seventh circle of hell - catamites and 
blasphemers - were allowed to partially avoid, are now the masters of the 
universe/paragons of virtue.  
 
Special attention is dedicated to the moral discourse imbued in the construction 
of the Islamic banking sector and about the asymmetries of power and risk 
between debtors and creditors. First, such discourse assumes moral clarity by 
virtue of its superior ethical embeddedness in the Islamic value system. 
Second, it makes claims of alterity vis-à-vis the conventional system, insisting 
that unlike its conventional counterparts it is not constitutive of the logic of the 
global financial markets. Not all social scientists investigating Islamic finance 
delve into this issue. Maurer redirects the question to the debate about alterity 
within practitioner circles (Maurer 2005; 2006; 2012). Others, such as Pollard 
and Samers (2007), fear replicating Eurocentric knowledge. 
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The advocates of Islamic finance insist that its difference and advantage arises 
from its embeddedness in Islamic rules and mores. Unlike conventional finance, 
its raison d’être is derived from God’s instructions for society, and as with any 
practices that are adherent to Islamic rules its results can only be just. In fact, 
for these advocates the sector’s adherence to Islam makes it different and by 
default superior to the conventional.21 They argue that its regulation by Islam 
results in a technically superior system by embedding the financial system 
within the productive economy. They argue that by simultaneously furnishing 
goods and services with credit, Islamic finance prevents both the decoupling of 
the financial from the real economy and the execution of speculative 
transactions. As a result, bubbles associated with excessive credit are avoided.  
 
On an everyday level, its advocates sustain that due to its prohibition of interest, 
Islamic finance alleviates the imposition of unfair risks and burdens of the 
debtor. Its banking products are underpinned by legal contracts that encourage 
mutuality of risk amongst all actors involved in the transaction. Also, due to its 
predilection for equity instead of debt (and thus its emphasis on the viability of 
the venture and not the credit-worthiness of the individual), it employs a system 
of equity allocation that is beneficial to entrepreneurial individuals and small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) and, by extension, to the community-at-large.  
 
However, not everyone is convinced of Islamic finance’s claims of authenticity 
and alterity, are a constant thread in ‘everyday’, journalistic and scholarly 
discussions about the topic. Each milieu articulates its own questions, from the 
technical discussions about the form versus substance, shariah-compliant 
versus Islamic-based finance or shariah-based versus shariah-backed products 
within professional circles, to the savers and borrowers discussions about the 
‘purity’ of the sector. There is an ambivalence directed at the turn taken by 
Islamic finance, in particular its accommodation of global finance. Many ordinary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Zubaida argues that the basic premise behind communal ideas that emphasise difference is 
based on the superiority of one’s own religion and hence the inferiority of other religions 
(Zubaida 1993: 152–54). 
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Muslims, Islamic finance advocates and other observers are not pleased with 
the shift from its idealistic and experimental origins to its current pragmatic and 
corporatised form. There is a growing sense of unease amongst advocates of 
Islamic finance as an ethical-political project aimed at ensuring equal 
distribution of wealth and social justice, that they are losing ground to the more 
business minded pragmatists. The advocates of Islamic social justice perceive 
Western modernity as the ungodly ‘other’ to be resisted. The pragmatists, on 
the contrary, would agree with Wilson: ‘it may be misleading, and indeed 
mistaken, to take the view that there is an inevitable conflict between western 
capitalism and an Islamic economic system and that the two represent 
competing alternatives’ (Wilson 2004: 144). Alternatively, as one of my 
respondents who solicited my opinion on numerous occasions asked, ‘is Islamic 
banking really Islamic, or is it all a scam?’ Thus, since Islamic banking partly 
builds its ethical claim on the promotion of equity over debt, I investigate 
whether risk assessment is linked to the commercial viability of the venture or 
the creditworthiness of the individual. Chapter 5 is dedicated to the moral 
narrative in the construction of Islamic banking and the contrasting and 
comparison of theory against practice 
 
 
1.7 Outline of the thesis 
 
Chapter 2: Theorising Islamic banking  
 
This chapter charts the intellectual methodology of this project. Despite the 
increasing interest in Islamic finance, there is as yet no distinct field such as the 
sociology or social studies of Islamic banking. The various literatures that are 
relevant to my line of enquiry are not usually in systematic dialogue with each 
other; too often they function independently. Thus, the framework incorporates 
theoretical tools from sociological, historical and anthropological approaches, to 
further the analysis of Islamic banking. This project will draw upon sociological 
perspectives that view economic action as constituted by social relations, as 
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opposed to the asocial and ahistorical individualist and utilitarian homo 
economicus of neo-classical economic theory. Economic sociology views social 
surroundings as being constitutive to economic action. In contrast, orthodox 
economic models conceive of economic action as being individualistic – 
detached from its social, political and cultural contexts. Consequently, orthodox 
economics gives rise to undersocialised conceptualisatons of Islamic banking 
practices, focused on what what is narrowly defined as demand, that cannot 
reflect the empirical reality of observed respondents in Kuala Lumpur, nor 
capture its nuance. This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first 
section positions the project within the broader debates of economic sociology 
and explains why the theoretical point of departure of this dissertation is 
Polanyi’s notion of embeddedness – an analytical tool to explain how Islamic 
banking system is shaped ‘from the inside’ by Islamic normative frameworks. 
The second section turns towards the substantive aspects of Islamic banking 
and the theoretical tools that aid the analysis throughout this dissertation. I 
explain how Islamic banking is shaped by regulatory boundaries that 
communicate to its consumers its unique character or culture. I then go on to 
carve out a space for trust and confidence in this dissertation and explain their 
role in the growth of Islamic banking practices. In the third section I explain why, 
in the case of any phenomena accompanied by the adjective Islamic, a 
researcher has to invoke factors other than Islam. Despite post-9/11 efforts from 
both sides of the divide to present Islam as a culture based on a ‘fixed essence 
working itself out through history’, this project is based on the first belief that any 
study of social phenomenona with the tag Islamic attached to it must examine 
how Islam as a culture, is ‘intertwined with the dynamics of economy and 
power’. (Zubaida 2011: 6). 
 
Chapter 3: Methodological orientations  
 
This chapter sets out the methodological orientation of this project; it is divided 
into four sections. The first part explains the case site,  outlining the suitability of 
the single case and explaining why Malaysia, particularly the urban domain of 
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Kuala Lumpur, was the ideal choice. The second part sets out the main 
characteristics of the methodological orientation of the research design. More 
specifically, it includes a justification for an interpretative investigation based on 
the grounded theory approach and the ontological perspectives that underpin 
the research. The third section focuses on the research techniques and 
methods used to extract and analyse data as well as a research biography that 
outlines the various steps undertaken during fieldwork in Malaysia. Critical 
reflections on my positioning as a researcher conclude the chapter. 
 
Chapter 4: The preconditions of Islamic banking in Malaysia  
 
The unique surge in Islamic banking practices cannot be isolated from the 
broader economic and political historical conditions that enabled this difference 
to emerge and become significant. Notably, these state-driven shifts shaped, 
and in turn were shaped by, the publics/constituencies that were potentially 
available to them. This chapter charts the emergence of Islamic banking 
through four historical vignettes. The aim is not to construct a linear history of 
Malaysia from the colonial to the contemporary era, but to contextualise the 
multidimensional categories analysed in this project: structure, agency and 
culture. The vignettes display the contingences that enabled the conditions for 
‘supply’ as well as ‘demand’.  
 
The first concerns the colonial legacies of the ethnic division of labour which 
initiated the reification of Malay identity as fixed and eternally Muslim and 
instigated anxieties between the ethnic groups. The second examines the 
political economy of the postcolonial state. The state would initiate an 
affirmative policy that alleviates the Malay community out of poverty, based on 
an ethnic definition that would redeploy the aforementioned colonial 
‘knowledge’. This policy would be the basis of the social contract forged 
between UMNO and the Malay community. The state would protect their 
economic and political interests under a cultural banner and they would 
reciprocate with their loyalty and trust. The third vignette focuses on the 
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Islamisation of the state. It illustrates how the insitutionalisation of Islamic 
knowledge and expertise, as exemplified by the state’s use of the shariah and 
ulema for its own ends is based on a legacy of bureaucratisation of Islam, 
spurred by the challenges raised from the Islamic opposition and movements. In 
the fourth vignette I suggest that political and social events, in particularly the 
dakwah Islamic revivalist movement(s) ‘from below’, also contribute to the 
salience of Islam as an expression of solidarity, identity and community 
amongst the Malays. Last, I explain the events leading up to the 1998-1998 
financial crisis. In particular, how the state opened up the economy, restricted to 
the business sphere to the capital markets, and how it would invoke Islamic 
discourse to entice Malaysians to save and work like Protestants but consume 
like Catholics. 
 
Chapter 5: The Crystallisation of the Islamic banking sector 
 
The aim of this chapter is to establish how the states and banks have crafted 
Islamic banking as a ‘tradition’ (Hobsbawm 1983) that diverges from the original 
implications of the prohibition of riba and instead support neo-liberal practices 
that are part of the state’s developmental strategy. The first section of the 
chapter includes a discussion of the core principles, drawn from sacred Islamic 
texts and fiqh, upon which Islamic banking is premised. Islamic finance is 
‘underpinned by a host of definitional, language and doctrinal debates’ (Pollard 
and Samers 2007: 315) and translations’ (Maurer 2005; 2012: 419). The aim in 
this chapter is to critically assess how components of the Islamic repertoire 
have been crystallised into a contemporary banking sector that through claims 
of Islamic distinctiveness can shape people’s banking practices. Although it has 
been argued that Islamic banking is not about the implementation of Qur’anic 
prohibitions, but the debates surrounding riba (Maurer 2005; 2006), I contend 
that, on the contrary, the Islamic banking sector in Malaysia is driven by the 
state’s attempt to frame one type of correct Islamic banking practices that are 
politically and economically expedient. For this reason, tracing the historical 
contours of the numerous controversial debates about riba and the concrete 
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endeavours that led to the creation of Islamic financial institutions, highlights the 
contestations surrounding the drive for efficiency, debt-based products, and 
standardisation versus the pressures to retain authenticity, social justice, and 
equity. The second half will focus on how the values and practices discussed in 
the first half of the chapter have institutionalised and codified the regulatory 
boundaries of Islamic banking. It is the Malaysia state that underwrites the 
Islamic banking sector. In, order to mediate questions of legitimacy, which arise 
from the state’s dual management of conventional and Islamic finance and 
secular and Islamic law, shariah scholars are co-opted to regulate Islamic 
banking. Shariah scholars are integral to the ‘shariahisation’ of Islamic banking 
products which are submitted to a regulatory process to that of halal food – the 
first mass commodity to be produced under shariah regulations. Scholars filter 
undesirable elements and enact specific rituals and practices that create 
boundaries between halal and haram food – labelling one as permissible and 
clean and the other as forbidden and polluted (Douglas 1996).  
 
Chapter 6: Trust, Shariah regulation and expertise  
 
Islamic banking is unique in its reliance on formal regulation informed by 
religious norms and rules. The state-driven development of shariah regulation is 
central to its purported Islamic value and its position as an alternative financial 
sector. It is the generalised trust in the values underpinning shariah regulation, 
and the shariah experts who give it their ‘blessing’, that enables Muslim-Malay’s 
affinity to Islamic banking. This chapter develops the analysis of shariah 
regulation and expertise by examining the relationship between generalized 
trust and ordinary people’s Islamic banking practices. My findings, based on 
three ideal types that emerged during fieldwork in Kuala Lumpur, reveal that for 
those who perceive Islamic value, trust in the shariah regulation is the first 
condition to their choice of Islamic banking. Trust has a significant purpose: it is 
the ‘glue’ underpinning Malays’ everyday Islamic banking practices. Thus, trust 
in shariah regulation and its experts is a primary embedding mechanism of 
everyday Islamic banking practices. I will then go on to show that the trust in 
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shariah regulation, depends on two main factors: trust in the workings and 
underlying values of the shariah regulatory regime, and trust in the ‘competence 
and cognitive intensions’ (Nooteboom 2007: 35) of the shariah scholars as 
‘flesh-and blood’ expert intermediaries of shariah regulation (Giddens 1990). 
Last, I suggest that the flipside of religiously inspired regulation based on 
boundaries of halal/haram and pure/impure might have dysfunctional 
repercussions for the broader Malaysian society as the effort to maintain purity 
requires strategies of exclusion. 
 
Chapter 7: Social ties, confidence in Islamic banking  
 
This chapter is split into two main sections; the first half will focus on the 
relationship between social ties and Islamic banking. The discussion starts by 
examining the role of social ties vis-à-vis choice in modernity. In particular, how 
do new social forms contribute to the confidence that underpins the growth of 
Islamic banking practices? The second part of the chapter considers and 
presents the grounded theory that emerges from analysis of the data collected 
in the field, through three ideal types. The discussion then shifts to the 
characteristics of the personal social ties under discussion: family members and 
peers and how in encouraging the growth of Islamic banking practices they are 
inadvertent allies of the state and Islamic banks. Last, we examine how these 
strong social ties that promote confidence in halal consumption broadly and 
Islamic banking specifically, can also contribute to broader social dysfunction 
within Malaysian society. On one hand, close social ties function to enhance 
cohesion and coordination of Islamic banking practices amongst Muslim-
Malays. The flipside of this outcome is that by encouraging group identity 
around the ideas of halal/haram as underpinned by shariah regulation 
discussed in the last chapter, it enforces a heightened sense of risk in the 
interaction with ‘others’ whose everyday practices fall outside the halal 
boundary as they are identified with impurity and ‘dirt’. 
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Chapter 2: Theorising Islamic banking practices 
 
The main focus of this project is the development and growth of everyday 
Islamic transactional banking practices, with special attention to contemporary 
Malaysia. More specifically, the aim is to understand how the growth in 
everyday Islamic banking practices is embedded within broader, historically 
determined, closely intertwined, social, economic, cultural and political 
circumstances. These circumstances are not once-for-all givens but are 
themselves dynamic processes and operate both at the local as well as at the 
global level. This project is framed within a ‘historiographical research 
programme’22 that views the broader social, economic, cultural and political 
circumstances that actors find themselves in, on the one hand, and the banking 
practices they participate in, on the other, as interacting elements of a socially 
determinate whole. Within this framework, all elements (circumstances and 
practices) are endogenous in relation to the whole, with the exception of 
external (exogenous) inputs, such as a global recession, that are not generally 
themselves impacted by events in any one particular national economy other 
than that of a global economic power. Furthermore, I suggest, that trust is the 
common thread underpinning the everyday banking practices within these 
broader interdependent processes. 
 
In the first chapter, I positioned this project within the body of scholarly literature 
concerned with financialisation. I explained that this project is part of a recent 
shift of attention towards the effect of finance on the everyday lives of ordinary 
people – non-experts and non-elites. More specifically, this project follows the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 I find Lakatos' alternative to Popperian falsificationism and Kuhn's paradigm's, namely of 
clusters of research programmes characterised by a core of ultimately revision-resistant 
theories buttressed by a wall of less revision-resistant theories, a better way of illustrating the 
epistemology of sociological theorising generally and the corpus of economic sociology. 
Economic sociology has shown itself to be more 'progressive' (Lakatos' own criterion) by 
extending sociology into a new domain, that of economic practices. Extending economic 
sociology into a new domain (economic practices in Islamic societies) and thus contributing to 
the theoretical reach of the research programme of economic sociology constitutes theoretical 
progress in Lakatos' terms. 	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lead of other scholars seeking to dedicate critical attention to the often-
neglected ‘consumption of credit’ (Langley 2014). The shift in conceptualisation 
raises its own set of questions that differ from, yet complement, the ones raised 
by the established financialisation literature. This research agenda is 
characterised by a call to pay attention to ‘the marketing and sale of consumer 
credit; the method in which debt is being repositioned as a consumption 
problem for institutions and individuals alike; the cultural economy of the 
consumption of credit’ (Langley 2014: 418).  
 
This chapter will review the theoretical approaches within the economic 
sociology literature and review the economic sociology theoretical frameworks 
and literatures that are referenced throughout the thesis in order to address the 
research aims. It should be noted that despite the increasing scholarly interest 
in Islamic Finance, there is as yet no such field as the sociology or social 
studies of Islamic banking. This project benefits from contributions from 
sociological, historical, and anthropological approaches. As Beckert suggests, 
the commensurability of all three disciplines means that a scholar’s ability to find 
a common ground for the analysis can only be of benefit to the analysis of 
economic phenomena (2007: 15). The literatures that are relevant to my line of 
enquiry are not usually in systematic dialogue with each other; too often they 
function independently. Whenever it was deemed relevant, an effort was made 
to extract elements from various theoretically disparate sources and integrate 
them into my theoretical framework. This analytical framework led to the 
formulation of questions that were not directly given by the literature 
 
 
2.1 Economic Sociology’s toolbox and Islamic Banking 
 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section positions the 
project within the broader debates of economic sociology and explains why the 
theoretical point of departure of this dissertation is Polanyi’s notion of 
embeddedness. His fundamental insistence that economic practice is 
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embedded in social institutions and that the defining distinction between 
different types of economies lies in how economic practices are socially 
embedded, is a powerful conceptual tool to explain how the Islamic banking 
system is shaped ‘from the inside’ by Islamic normative frameworks. On the 
other hand, I have heeded Granovetter’s warning not to swing excessively away 
from the undersocialised neo-classical paradigm of economic practice thereby 
totally rejecting the role of rational choice. Although Muslim-Malays, in 
Granovetter’s own words, ‘do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social 
context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script written for them’; it is rather that 
their “attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing 
systems of social relations” (1985:487). I would, however, add that the very 
notion of what is a rational choice is itself not independent from the historically 
determined social and cultural context. 
 
The second section turns towards the substantive aspects of Islamic banking 
and the theoretical tools that aid the analysis throughout this dissertation. I 
explain how Islamic banking is shaped by regulatory boundaries that 
communicate to its consumers its unique character or culture. I then go on to 
look at the role of trust and confidence in the development and growth of Islamic 
banking practices. In the third section, I explain why in the case of any 
phenomena accompanied by the adjective ‘Islamic’, a researcher has to invoke 
factors other than Islam. Despite post-9/11 efforts from both sides of the 
ideological divide to present Islam as a culture based on a ‘fixed essence 
working itself out through history’, this project is based on the belief that any 
study of social phenomena with the tag Islamic attached to it must examine how 
Islam as a culture, is ‘intertwined with the dynamics of economy and power’ 
(Zubaida 2011: 6). 
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2.2 Economic Sociology, consumption and culture  
 
In the previous chapter, I explained that the consumption of credit has been 
neglected by social scientists. This inattention towards the role of consumption 
reflects the division of labour that has characterised economic sociology. ‘There 
is a division of labour between students of culture and specialists of economic 
processes’ (Zelizer 2001: 332), which since the interplay between culture and 
the economy is often studied vis-à-vis consumption, is further compounded by 
the neglect of consumption by economic sociologists. Reviewing the disregard 
towards consumption by economic sociologists, Zelizer remonstrates with the 
editors of economic sociology’s most prominent reader The Sociology of 
Economic Life (2001) for paying scant attention to consumption. This blindspot 
is regrettable as ‘in fact, all consumption (like all economic life) builds on culture 
in the sense of shared understandings and their representations. The secret to 
understanding consumption lies in careful observation of how culture, social 
relations, and economic processes interact’ (Zelizer 2001: 332). In fact, as we 
shall discover, money and credit, particularly the consumption of Islamic credit 
through mass banking products is the perfect vehicle for observing how these 
forces interact. But first we will discuss why it is only through economic 
sociology that we can begin to capture the rich complexity of Islamic banking 
practices. 
 
 
2.3 The limitations of orthodox economics 
 
My use of the conceptual tool-box offered by economic sociology is based on 
the premise that orthodox economics23 is theoretically inadequate as means 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 What is considered mainstream, i.e. orthodox, in economics includes more than neo-classical 
paradigms. In fact, nowadays the mainstream includes strands of many economic schools, one 
of which is the neo-classical, that are not based on neo-classical assumptions. Nevertheless, it 
is the case that most of these schools are not reflected in undergraduate teaching of economics 
(Becker 2004), famously referred to as ‘Econ 101’ (principles of macro economics). For this 
reason, for the purposes of this dissertation, orthodox is used as shorthand for neo-classical.  
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towards a satisfactory understanding of the development and growth of Islamic 
banking practices and that conversely, ‘sociology over the years has developed 
a series of theories and techniques that are well suited to the study of 
economics’ (Swedberg et al.1990: 57).  
 
Orthodox economics and economic sociology are based on fundamentally 
oppositional world-views of economic phenomena. The use and growth of 
Islamic banking products cannot be meaningfully explained by neo-classical 
economics as their models are based on unquestioned assumptions that are 
often problematic to sociologists. According to the orthodox economic 
paradigm, economic behaviour is asocial, ahistorical, individualistically 
utilitarian. For economic sociologists, these are models that do not stand up to 
empirical scrutiny. In fact, as I shall suggest in this thesis, Islamic banking 
practices are constitutive of contemporary cultural values that are mediated 
through the trust and confidence enabled by personal relations and the 
Malaysian state. In effect, the consumption of Islamic credit is not the result of 
spontaneous individualistic utility maximisation. It is a site, cause, and symbol of 
changes in Malaysian society and political economy. Therefore, orthodox 
economic models cannot interpret the empirical reality as narrated by Muslim-
Malay respondents in Kuala Lumpur, nor capture its nuance. 
 
Take for instance the conventional wisdom on money. It dictates that it has 
three functions: money is a means of exchange, a store of value, and a unit of 
account (Stiglitz 1993: 880–83). This wisdom is based on Menger’s barter 
theory of money’s origins (1982) which emphasises that money’s origins are ‘to 
be found in the market, not the polity’ (Dodd 2014: 19). Quite simply, money 
overcomes the ‘double wants’ problem that is caused by the limitations of barter 
by enabling multilateral exchange. Money emerged as people’s economic 
actions spontaneously sought the most stable and re-saleable commodity. 
Therefore, the orthodox position is that money emerged as a result of people 
realising their self-interested drive. The market spontaneously produced a 
‘transactions-cost-efficient medium of exchange that becomes the standard of 
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value and numerical money of account’ (Ingham 2004: 24). Similarly, orthodox 
economics approaches consumption through an analogous lens. The ‘social-
use value’ (Marx 1990)24 or subjective meaning of the commodity, is solved 
through utility maximisation at the time of consumption. Ethical investments are 
treated as a personal choice alongside others, one which can be satisfied 
‘simply by purchasing products that are marked as ethical’ (Aldridge 1998: 15). 
Similar money, consumption is viewed as autonomous of historical legacies, 
future repercussions or the behaviour of others.  
 
Orthodox economic paradigms are inherently flawed since they ‘deliberately 
avoid asking the right questions’ (Hirsch et al. 1990: 47) because they are bereft 
of the appropriate analytical tools that are capable of ‘unpacking’ the social 
factors that can explain Islamic banking practices. This is evidenced in orthodox 
economists’ attempts to account for the ‘Islamic tag’ of Islamic banking 
practices. The explicitly cultural vocabulary of Islamic banking poses a problem. 
As a result of its explicit expression of its substantive values, they can intuitively 
discern the Islamic value of the banking products and cannot deny its cultural 
distinction. Yet, ‘unpacking’ its meaning remains an impossible task. A review of 
research (see chapter 3 for a detailed discussion) based on neo-classical 
economistic assumptions as well as my own interviews with practitioners 
reveals how ‘variables’ that cannot be deconstructed are swept under the carpet 
as exogenous or simply ‘reified as an assumed and unquestioned practice’ that 
is customary to Muslims (Hirsch et al. 1990).  
 
Therefore, when orthodox economists adjust the model to account for Islamic 
preference, individual rational maximisation is nevertheless maintained. By their 
account, Islamic preference is not linked to Malaysia’s colonial legacy of 
institutionalising Islam as the main symbol of the Malaysian ethnie. They also 
cannot account for the signalling of confidence through sociality, which 
promotes the use of Islamic banking amongst family and friends. Last, despite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See Section 1: The Measure of Values of Chapter 3: Money, or The Circulation of 
Commodities, of Marx’s Capital, Volume 1 
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the evidence, their assumption of dualism between state and markets cannot 
account for the market’s embeddedness in the state through shariah regulation 
and expertise. The idea that western modern markets are autonomous ‘is a 
utopian fantasy on the part of market liberals’ (Krippner and Alvarez 2007: 229). 
All goods ‘must not only fulfil a need but must also find legitimation as being 
tradable in market terms’ (Aspers and Beckert 2011: 7) that depend on political 
exigencies as much as shared values of consumers. Although Islamic credit-
money is ‘dematerialised’, and does not literally have the mark of the 
government on its ‘head’, as I explain in Chapter 5, it is still marked by its 
culture or durable qualities of ‘character’ (Hart 2000: 233–48), assigned to it by 
the Malaysian state.  
 
In conclusion, the messy relationship between culture, i.e. Islam, as mediated 
through social and political forces, and Islamic banking practices that is outlined 
in this project cannot fit a parsimonious model that views historically 
determined, social, economic, cultural and political circumstances as 
exogenous. Orthodox economic theory glosses over social factors that 
constitute consumer choice in favour of models that might or might not explain 
the reality on the ground. On the contrary, ‘sociologists (having minimal 
assumption to begin with) must investigate, empirically, the nature of 
preferences, values, behaviour, and motivation’ (Hirsch et al. 1990: 45). In the 
next section, I will ‘unpack’ the toolbox of economic sociology and start by 
explaining why the theoretical point of departure is the concept of 
embeddedness.  
 
 
2.4 Embeddedness 
 
Orthodox Economics’ domination of the study of all economic phenomena in 
modern market societies can be traced back to a historical paradigm shift. 
Classical economic sociology, as expounded by social theorists such as 
Durkheim and Weber as well as Marx, was characterised by an analysis on the 
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role of economy in society from an angle that was markedly different to that of 
economists, especially in its focus on the socio-political consequences of 
capitalism (Swedberg 2003: 6).25 Whilst historical and social approaches were 
accepted as appropriate for the study of markets, for instance by political 
economists, sociology’s concern with the market remained legitimate. 
The resolution of the Methodenstreit in Germany and Austria delegitimated the 
market as an object of historic-sociological investigation. Henceforth the market 
was exclusively conceptualised as an abstract, universal principle and not as a 
product of social life, culture and politics (Swedberg 2003: 105–-12). 
Possibly to prevent further imperialist encroachment on an already ailing 
discipline, this division was also later given the blessing of sociologists. Both 
parties arrived to an implicit agreement that economists would claim the 
economy and sociologists would be satisfied with studying the social relations in 
which economies are embedded. Parsons sealed a pact that shaped a rarely 
transgressed heuristic divide, ‘value on the economists’ side, values on the 
sociological side’ (Stark 2000: 2; Krippner and Alvarez 2007: 222). It was 
Granovetter’s seminal paper Economic Action and Social Structure: The 
Problem of Embeddedness (1985) that broke this stalemate and encouraged 
sociologists to cover previously inaccessible territory.26 He broke new ground by 
designing a paradigm which transcended the bifurcated debate on economic 
behaviour. He consolidated a critique of both the substantivists’ 
oversocialisation claims and the formalist and mainstream economics’ atomised 
utilitarianism,27 and developed a revised notion of embeddedness. He re-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 The most important classical texts in this regard include Durkheim’s The Division of Labour in 
Society (1893), Simmel’s The philosophy of Money (1950), Weber’s Economy and Society 
(written between 1908 and 1920), Democracy in America (1835-40) and The Old Regime and 
the French Revolution (1856) by de Tocqueville. See Swedberg (2003: 5-7) 
26 According to David Stark (For a Sociology of Worth October 2000), it was Harrison White’s 
(1976), argument that markets are not simply embedded in social relations, but they are social 
relations, which first turned the table on the pact.  
27 The substantivist and formalist debate was a pivotal dispute that had its roots in an 
intradisciplinary debate within economic anthropology. The former focused on the social 
institutions as primary organisers of the economy, whilst the latter camp argued for the universal 
validity of the neo-classical model. The formalists were criticised for assuming that 
‘economising’ behaviour was universal and the substantivists were criticised for assuming that 
non-maximising behaviour occurred only in pre-modern societies, and for essentialising and 
romanticising pre-modern economies. For instance, there is evidence that pre-market 	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introduced the idea that in modern economies, society and culture are integral 
to economic behaviour.  
 
Granovetter, forged a new analytical trajectory in which debates about the role 
of social life in economic processes were no longer marked by the 
aforementioned bifurcation. There is general consensus that although there is 
no single paradigm underpinning economic sociology, the idea ‘“that there exist 
complicated links between an economic actor and other actors as well as the 
social environment in general is something that all strands of economic 
sociology can agree on’ (Swedberg et al. 1990). The notion of embeddedness 
has come a long way since Polanyi’s introduced it as a broadly defined social 
anchoring of the economy, in his The Great Transformation (2001),281. 
Following its resurrection in a less one-sided incarnation as a golden mean 
between undersocialised and oversocialised concepts of economic practices in 
Granovetter’s above mentioned paper of 1985, the term has tended to become 
a cliché, becoming surrounded by ambiguity and confusion (Block 2003; 
Krippner et al. 2004; Beckert 2007; Krippner and Alvarez 2007). In a broader 
sense, Granovetter followed Polanyi by rejecting the instrumental depiction of 
the market and advocating the view that in modern economies, society and 
culture are also integral to economic behaviour. Both camps critique the 
assumption that the market is self-regulating or that social structure is 
exogenous to the market, but each intellectual project incorporates significant 
analytical differences.  
 
The difference between the Granovetter’s and Polanyi’s concepts of 
embeddedness is often thought to be linked to the fact that each one is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
economies also subjected certain groups such as women and ethnic minorities to exploitation 
and the rules were often subjected to systemic controls that reflected the values or the ruling 
elite (Hefner 1998: 8–12). Both parties arrived to an implicit agreement that economists would 
claim the economy and sociologists would be satisfied with studying the social relations in which 
economies are embedded. 
28 Polanyi himself did not use the term frequently and often used synonyms such as 
‘intermeshed’. Nevertheless, what remained crucial were the theoretical implications rather than 
the word itself (Block 2003; Beckert 2007a; Krippner and Alvarez 2007).	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concerned with different levels of the economy, Granovetter: micro and meso, 
Polanyi: macro (Beckert 2007a; Krippner and Alvarez 2007), but in actuality the 
differences are more profound. A succinct way of summing up the differences is 
that: ‘Granovetter’s notion of embeddedness is based on network 
embeddedness and Polanyi’s could be defined as political economy 
embeddedness’ (Mignione 2006: 234). Indeed, the former is concerned with 
developing a theory based on relational bases or networks of social action in 
the economy, and the latter is concerned with how the economy is enmeshed in 
the broader social systems. This points to a divergent conception of 
relationships between the social and economic. Network theory sees social 
relationships as shaping economic outcomes from the outside, whilst in the 
political economic sense of embeddedness the economy is anchored in social, 
cultural and political institutions, causing social and economic relations to be 
viewed as mutually constitutive (Krippner and Alvarez 2007).  
 
In addition, embeddedness for the Granovetter camp represents different types 
of networks between different entities, whether individuals, firms, organisations 
or governments and whilst rejecting homo economicus, is compatible with 
rational choice theory. Self-interest is seen as variable, being informed by social 
relations and depending on social relational bases, often neglecting the political 
or cultural institutions. For Polanyi, people’s market orientation is historicised 
and not considered universal, and embeddedness refers to the market’s 
dependence on institutions (Block 2003; Beckert 2007a; Krippner and Alvarez 
2007). In order to counter the most common complaint made against the use of 
its embeddedness, namely its ‘theoretical vagueness’, (Krippner and Alvarez 
2007: 220),29 I define it as ‘the integration of the economy into broader social 
systems’ (Krippner and Alvarez 2007: 222). This means that following the 
Polanyian tradition, instead of viewing the market as an epiphenomenon that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Even Granovetter has disowned the use of the term, whilst maintaining the agenda 
associated with his 1985 resurgence of the term (Krippner and Alvarez 2007: 220). During an 
open conversation at a Polanyi Symposium, Granovetter said ‘:I rarely use embeddedness 
anymore, because it has become almost meaningless, stretched to mean almost nothing, so 
that it therefore means nothing’ (Krippner et al. 2004: 113).  
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references itself, developments in the markets must be recontextualised within 
particular normative frameworks. It is a ‘categorical instrument’ (Beckert 2007a) 
that describes ‘the connections between economic activity and the social, the 
political, the institutional, the historical, the cultural elements that economic 
activity mixes up with’ (Granovetter cited in Krippner et al. 2004: 133). For the 
reasons outlined above, the Polanyian perspective allows for a broader 
approach towards embeddedness by looking at different types of 
embeddedness and their mutual interdependencies, that are enmeshed in 
politics, culture and ideology (Beckert 2007a; Krippner and Alvarez 2007). 
Having said this, I accept Granovetter’s warning against an oversocialised 
concept of embeddedness whereby individuals are merely actors following a 
practically predetermined script. 
 
 
2.5 Embedding Islamic banking  
 
Money exhibits a fluidity and malleability that circumvents any attempts to ‘fix it’ 
theoretically or practically (Dodd 2014). As Hart explains, ‘money is not one 
static thing or idea’ (Hart 2001: 233). The absence of theoretical or empirical 
fixity leads many to use statements on money’s function, that it is a medium of 
exchange, a unit of account, a store of value, as a statement on the nature of 
money. In doing so, they exclude its defining feature: its social life. 
 
There is no agreement amongst sociologists as to what money is. Not 
surprisingly therefore, there are competing sociological theories of money (Dodd 
1994; 2014; Hart 2001; Zelizer 1994). Many confuse money’s function as a 
statement on the nature of money. Besides its ordinary economic functions, 
money is a symbol that conveys social information (Hart 2000: 17) and social 
meaning (Zelizer 1994). Classical sociological conceptualisations of money 
stripped it of its human imprint (Dodd 2014; Zelizer 1997; Hart 2001; Carruthers 
2005). Marx, Simmel and, later, Polanyi’s pessimism, echoed Jesus’s distaste 
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of money during the ‘Cleansing of Temple’.30 As Dodd points out, their view of 
money was ‘malevolent… alien and alienating force that … corrupts social 
relations’ (Dodd 2014: 273) and strips money of its social imprint. The negative 
attitude towards money was partly coloured by its quantifying ability, which 
seems able to overcome and erode cultural and social barriers.  
 
However, as contemporary sociologists suggest, people have never lost the 
ability to counter moneys allegedly unlimited ability to flatten and abstract 
society and ‘in demonising money, they come close to endowing the institution 
with an evil power all of its own’ (Hart 2005). As a more recent body of research 
suggests, ‘the use of money is highly uneven and differentiated. The perfect 
fungibility that modern money possesses in principle becomes in practice 
domesticated and restrained’ (Carruthers 2005). For instance, Zelizer’s work 
(1978; 1985; 1994; 2005; 2010), which demonstrates money’s multiple 
characters and diversity, runs counter to claims that market-money flattens 
social relations through its impersonal, abstract, neutral and homogenous 
nature. Her empirical research suggests that people’s cultural values restrain 
money through social processes from within. People earmark it, restrict its 
unseemly origins and allocation, demonstrating that market-money is just as 
embedded in its social surroundings as pre-modern money.  
In The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time 
(2001: 79-80 & 136-139), Polanyi also identified processes, albeit macro and 
from ‘outside’, through which society will resist and restrain attempts to break 
society’s social interdependence. He described how, similar to the movements 
of an oscillating pendulum, the economic policy would swing back from the 
extremes of a market-driven swing to a second civil society-driven reverse 
swing. This ‘double movement’ would keep tensions in check by restricting the 
market through an anchoring in its socio-political surroundings. More to the 
point, what matters for our discussion is that for Polanyi, despite the violence of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 This parable illustrates one of the most renowned moral lessons on money and Christianity’s 
(original) distaste of money. In a show of force and anger, Jesus and his disciples accuse the 
moneylenders of turning God’s house into a den for thieves, before violently ejecting them from 
the temple.  
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market-money’s swing, it can never be completely disembedded.31 What all 
these perspectives have in common is the belief that ultimately, each society 
will be able to shape money through its own socio-political restrictions. What 
they don’t emphasise though, is that these restrictions can be co-opted by 
market forces to further promote its interests. As I shall explain in the next 
section, in an interesting twist, it is the shariah-based boundaries, earmarking it 
as Islamic, that make Islamic banking an attractive commodity to Muslim-Malay 
consumers. The construction of boundaries, earmarking its provenance or 
restricting its use, particularly explicit in Islamic banking, shows how money, 
even in its most invisible forms such as credit, is constituted by social and 
political relations and culture attitudes and values.  
 
 
2.6 The unique cultural character of Islamic banking 
 
Culture’s shared and public aspect makes it one of the most powerful means to 
imprint what Hart (2001) calls ‘character’ on money. ‘Culture is a strong way to 
standardise values in a community and it is impossible for anyone not to receive 
this influence’ (Douglas 1996: 40).32 In particular, these restrictions are useful in 
times of crisis when society’s established sense of order starts fraying at the 
seams. Boundaries that separate impure from pure, clean from polluted (or, in 
our case, halal from haram) can provide moral clarity in a situation 
characterised by confusion, by making sense of order and providing a source of 
recourse (Douglas 1996: 134). The 1997-1998 financial crisis, which created 
‘intense mass-level mistrust’ (Case 2005: 96) was one of the catalysts of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 As mentioned earlier, intense debates surround his works. This ambiguity was partly due to 
his later works being at odds with The Great Transformation by suggesting that modern money 
is disembedded from its social surroundings and could be accounted for by orthodox economic 
views. In Polanyi (1968), he would distinguish between earlier non-market special purpose 
money and later market general purpose money.  
32 Although Polanyi rejected classification as a Weberian, he drew great inspiration from 
Weber’s word. Although Polanyi was the first to coin the term ‘embeddedness’, it encapsulates 
an approach that is compatible with the perspectives of classical economic sociologists like 
Weber (1978), in his analysis of the economy vis-à-vis its social surroundings including culture, 
institutions, and other economic actors (Mingione 2006; Dale 2011).   
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spread of Islamic banking practices. A crisis can create a space for new 
practices to emerge. Organised meaning systems can enable new ‘strategies of 
action’ (Hays 2000: 278) that re-organise taken for granted habits and common 
sense. As I shall go on to illustrate in Chapters 5 and 7, Islam, through the 
boundaries of shariah regulation, provided a means to make sense of the 
violence inflicted on society and a way for the social and political to reconcile 
with the financial market.  
 
The ability of culture, as shared ideas, values and beliefs, to mediate and resist 
the hegemony of markets and money is well established - it is a force driving 
Polanyi’s double movement. Less commonplace is the study of how culture can 
be of instrumental use from ‘above’ to capitalise and give direction to, 
favourable extant cultural conditions from below. The state and banks 
assembled an Islamic ‘cultural tool-kit’ based on Islam’s boundaries with the aim 
of exploiting the salience of these shared values amongst the public, which 
values had gained prominence after the crisis, and thus create the impetus for 
demand. ‘In fact, the theoretical misstep of separating “structure” and “culture” 
is one of the principal conceptual problems that keeps sociologists from 
recognizing the power and centrality of culture’ (Hays 2000: 597)) The 
structure/culture dichotomy neglects the messiness of culture and the possibility 
of a shared culture from below and from above. 
 
In discussions about culture and the economy, the focus is often on how 
ordinary people give meaning to their economic practices. As I explained 
earlier, contemporary research has rectified this perception by illustrating the 
various methods in which culture constitutes money. However, most of the 
examples tend to showcase how culture constitutes money ‘from below’ through 
the actions of ordinary people, especially those excluded from consumer 
society. As Hays (2000: 598) argues, culture is valorised as a means to 
‘resistance to hegemony’. She notes that this approach ignores the power of 
culture and how it can be used as a means of co-optation and not always as a 
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means of resistance and nonconformity.33 We often tend to expect money to be 
marked from below as a form of resistance. Here I will discuss how the cultural 
marking found in Islamic banking originates from above. Certainly, this does not 
imply that people accept these markings with no reservations. As I shall go on 
to argue throughout the rest of the dissertation, the three ideal types: the 
virtuoso, pragmatist and sceptic, represent the predominant ways in which 
people negotiate these boundaries. These symbolic boundaries are potentially 
imbued with multivariate meanings contingent to how Islamic banking 
consumers fully accept, partially contest, ambiguously consent or reject its 
cultural significance.  
 
The point is to shed light on how the standardisation of culture through 
boundaries can be used as a tool to capitalise on shared values and create a 
financial niche. As Weber famously said ‘it is interests (material and ideal) and 
not ideas which have directly governed the actions of human beings. But the 
“worldviews” that have been created by ideas have very often, like switches, 
directed the lines on which the dynamics of interests have propelled behaviour’ 
(2003:69). 
 
 
2.7 Consuming Islamic banking products 
 
The cultural character of Islamic banking facilitate its commodification and 
consumption. Although Islamic banking is no more nor less embedded that the 
conventional, its anchoring in social surroundings becomes even more visible 
due to its demarcation at the production and supply point: Islamic banks. The 
boundaries constituting Islamic banking are somewhat unusual because they 
are explicitly articulated and promoted as a ‘selling point’. Second, unlike most 
of the boundaries that economic sociologists usually research, these were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 These glib assumptions were often made during discussions about my research. Due to the 
obvious cultural marking of Islamic banking, some assume that somehow it is a manifestation of 
the subaltern. 
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constructed from the ‘top-down’ and not ‘bottom-up’. Third, the commodification 
of Islamic banking is based on the shariah boundaries. It serves as a means to 
create social-use value and communicate it to consumers. 
 
According to Marx, a commodity is ‘an external object, a thing which through its 
qualities satisfies human needs of whatever kind’ (Marx, Capital 1990:125) and 
is then exchanged for something else. When Marx speaks of commodities, he is 
particularly concerned with the ‘physical properties of the commodity’ (Marx 
1990:126), which he associates closely with the use-value of an object.  
However, use-value does not automatically lead to a commodity: ‘He who 
satisfies his own need with the product of his own labour admittedly creates 
use-values, but not commodities. This does not mean that credit is only defined 
by its use value. Indeed, in order to produce the latter, he must not only produce 
use-values, but use-values for others, social use-values’ (Marx 1990:131). 
Commodities, therefore, ‘possess a double form, i.e. natural form and value 
form’ (Marx 1990:138). It fundamentally remains a social relation whilst also 
reinventing itself in different states based on different conditions of existence,34 
which in this case is credit that is distinctly Islamic.  
 
In addition, for credit to be commoditised/commodified for mass retail 
consumption, it has to be ‘common, saleable and widely exchangeable’ 
(Kopytoff 1986: 69). Commoditized credit’s unique quality, fast conversion from 
one state to another, makes it the ‘perfect’ commodity ‘exchangeable with 
anything and everything else’ (Kopytoff 1986: 69). The differentiation and 
branding based on the symbolic Islamic social-use value is communicated by 
the Arabic names of banking products, images and terminology such as sukuk 
(bonds) takaful (insurance) hibah (literally, a gift, used to describe interest 
payment); the names of banks such as Bank Muamalat (which literally means 
transaction as in life transactions according to Islamic norms), CIMB/Hong 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Including, but not restricted to,: gold, silver and other metals, food, tokens, credit cards, 
commodity money, cheques (Ingham 1996: 526; Dodd 2014). 
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Leong Islamic, HSBC Amanah (the trust or upholding of trust); the state-
endorsed halal logo found in banks and brochures. The 
commodification/commoditisation process of Islamic banking products – 
understood as ‘branding….de-differentiation…the setting of fixed terms which 
are paid for through regular payments….and legal guarantees’ (Aldridge 1998: 
12-14) – is detailed in Chapter 5. In the next section, I will discuss in further 
detail the social function and significance of boundaries that constitute the 
character of Islamic banking. 
 
 
2.8 Constructing regulatory boundaries 
 
The boundaries constituting Islamic credit unfold along restrictions that are 
similar to other halal commodities and ethical finance. Islamic banking is riddled 
with complexities that are unique to its financial character and specific to 
debates about money and finance. A debate about Islamic banking cannot 
ignore its linkages to halal industries, particularly food (as I go on to explain in 
greater detail in Chapter 4). There is a strong institutional link between the 
expansion and growth of the halal industries and the growth and proliferation of 
Islamic banking, which also emerged from the data collected during fieldwork. 
As I shall go on to discuss in further detail in Chapter 5, Islamic banking is 
regulated, marketed and presented similarly to other halal commodities. Halal 
food is intermediated by the state through shariah regulation and expertise.  
 
Regulation is based on a process of boundary creation used by Islamic banks 
and is very similar to those employed by other forms of ethical finance and other 
halal industries, particularly food. Ethical finance includes a diverse array of 
financial sectors, with each sector setting its own unique ethical criteria or set of 
agreed references (Lamont 2012). Despite their diversity in standards, they 
share various aspects that are of mutual interest. Ethical financial products 
mainly rely on negative screening techniques to eliminate ethically undesirable 
elements; are concerned with risks and returns; place funds in firms with similar 
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characteristics (Wilson 1997). Food is another classic and common site of 
boundary marking (see Douglas 1996; Fischer 2008). But, these boundaries are 
also prevalent in modern everyday life. There are myriads of commodities that 
leverage their higher worth purely based on a production process according to 
declared moral, ethical or political values that resonate with the consumer. Food 
that is grown locally or nationally, organically, according to religious standards 
(kosher, halal, vegan, vegetarian), or under fair labour conditions (fair trade)35 is 
one of the most commonplace examples. By their very nature, ‘symbolic 
boundaries are the lines that include and define some people, groups and 
things while excluding others’ (Epstein 1992: 232). These distinctions are 
expressed through rituals based on interdictions for example taboos like halal 
and kosher, vaguely defined cultural attitudes or even institutionalized through 
cultural orders (Lamont and Molnar 2002).  
 
As I shall suggest in Chapter 5, the prohibition of riba can be interpreted as a 
taboo (mortals daring to do what is a divine privilege).  Just like money, its 
production is based on a social process that involves others who are unknown 
and thus increases the risk of becoming tainted and polluted at any stage. What 
Douglas says about food also applies to money: ‘One cannot share the food 
prepared by people without sharing in their nature’ (Douglas 1996: 127). When 
people are suspicious or perceive risk in the nature of others, they employ 
boundaries to define what is pure/impure; permissible and forbidden as 
demanded by the binary of halal and haram. In this respect, shariah is a modern 
way of standardising symbolic boundaries based on a widely accepted moral 
order. It is this wide acceptance, the mechanisms of which are described in the 
next section, which makes them effective. The main function of symbolic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 There is no doubt that in countries where there is a history of a food culture, including 
countries such as France and Italy, for many locals certain products that are produced in their 
country are of a higher worth than for an identical product that is produced elsewhere. In 
addition certain labels are legally protected and also considered of higher value internationally. 
Some examples include denominazione d’origine controllata (DOC), its French equivalent, 
Appellation d’Origine Controlée (AOC) or terroir – a geo-cultural definition that denotes a unique 
way in which people of the area harvest produce from a specific area which is known for its 
geological, hydrological, soil and climate characteristics. 
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boundaries is to divide people into different groups and create the social 
solidarity that results from membership in the group (Epstein 1992; Lamont and 
Molnar 2002).  
 
Whilst boundaries can be functional in allowing people to counter uncertainty, 
increase intra-group solidarity and trust, and make a moral ‘marking’ on their 
economic life, boundaries can also be dysfunctional. By their very nature, 
boundaries divide. Whoever is not within the realm of the permissible and the 
pure is the other in the forbidden and ‘pollution’ (Douglas 1996) or ‘dirt’ (Hacking 
2003). In this context, symbolic pollution or dirt, concepts that I will use in 
Chapters 6 and 7, refers to anything that ‘transmits danger by contact’ 
according to pre-defined symbolic demarcations found in society (Douglas 
1996: 99). The concepts of social pollution and dirt are especially salient as they 
coincids with the Islamic metaphysical concept najis. Although in essence, in 
‘Sunni Islam no human being is unclean’, scholars refer to substances and 
things that are fundamentally impure such as excrement, urine, vomit carrion, 
dogs, pig and semen’ (Guvain 2005 :342), as I discovered during fieldwork, the 
anxiety of coming into contact with these impurities spurs people to engage in 
collective rituals of exclusion from others who fall within these boundaries.  
 
As I explain in Chapter 4, the state’s essentialisation of Malay identity as Muslim 
is performative, and thus as we shall discover in Chapters 6 and 7, in Malaysia, 
the boundaries set by the shariah take a particularly pronounced position in 
relation to ethnic divisions. As I explain in Chapter 4, the colonial legacies of the 
ethnicisation of work – only the Chinese were able to participate in the local 
economy – became a source of anxiety during the decolonisation process. 
These tensions underpinned the pro-Malay affirmative action in postcolonial 
Malaysia, based on religious boundaries as ethnic identifiers that were created 
by the colonial authorities. As a result, the symbolic boundaries are 
institutionalised and have become social boundaries (Lamont and Molnar 
2002: 168) that denote Malay privilege and domination vis-à-vis the other ethnic 
groups. This division is exacerbated by a contemporary politics in Malaysia that 
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is still characterised by a political discourse of anxiety that emphasises the risks 
of transgressing these ethnic boundaries. The expansion of these boundaries 
across various social realms, like food and banking, serves to further entrench 
these boundaries and contribute to the fragmentation of Malaysian society.  
 
 
2.9 Trust and Islamic banking 
 
In the previous section we discussed how boundaries communicate familiar 
value and enhance intra-group solidarity. However the social nature of 
boundaries directs our attention to the social mechanisms and processes that 
enable this functionality. The lack of coercion in the adoption of these 
boundaries and the ensuing use of Islamic banking suggest that they are 
subject to acceptance and trust of people in their credibility and legitimacy. This 
section seeks to understand how boundaries operate by delving into aspects of 
trust and expertise.  
 
‘Trust’ is an elastic concept that has been stretched and manipulated across a 
number of disciplines. The flimsiness of trust is heightened by the extensive 
scholarship on the topic, which includes various diverging definitions of the 
concept36 and confusion with its everyday use.37 Moreover, the notion of trust is 
often used in a self-referential way. CIA agent Pyle, the antihero of Graham 
Greene’s story The Quiet American, unwittingly emphasises the danger of 
referring to trust in a self-referential way when he declares: ‘a man becomes 
trustworthy when you trust him’ (1955: 84). Therefore, instead of embarking on 
a Sisyphean task, I will carve out a space for the concept in this project and 
explain which research questions can only be answered in reference to it.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 It is widely recognized, within and outside sociology, that in modern economies trust, and its 
close relative confidence, ‘carry ‘economic value’. For instance, Putnam (1995) even goes as far 
as to state that desirable economic and political outcomes are preconditioned by a satisfactory 
level of generalised trust (and its outcome: social capital) in society.  
37 Popular sayings include, ‘the circle of trust’, ‘trust is a two-way street’ and ‘trust is a gamble’. 
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Although there is no working definition or sole paradigm for trust (Swedberg 
2012; Mistzal 2006), the discussion of trust in modern and contemporary 
sociology tends to be split into two currents: the interactionist school (why and 
how individuals trust each other) and the functionalist (how trust keeps society 
together). These two currents are often fused into a single position, as two 
poles of a ‘dialectical relationship’. This division is emphasised in most theories 
of trust. For instance, Luhmann (1979) suggests that trust is a solution to 
complexity found in systems. Simmel teases out the difference between 
‘metaphysical an existential trust’ (Lewis and Weigert 1985). The former is the 
faith in the faith of man, whilst the latter is faith in others we interact with - trust 
happens through reciprocal association. Giddens (1990), influenced by 
Simmel’s work on trust, also distinguishes between generalised trust and 
personalised trust. Simply summed up, the former deals with micro and 
individual action – personalised trust found in personal encounters. Personal 
trust and its relevance to Islamic banking will be discussed in further detail in 
the next section. The latter, which we will be focusing on here, is concerned 
with the macro function of trust – predominantly the functioning of society and 
systems. The dynamics of this type of trust can be summed up as the following: 
 
 ‘The purposive actions of individual actors deciding to place or withdraw trust or 
to break or keep trust; the micro-to-macro transition through which these actions 
combine to bring about behaviour of the system; and the macro-to-micro 
transition through which some state of the system modifies decisions of the 
individual actors to place trust and be trustworthy’ (Coleman 1990: 175).  
 
 
2.10 Trust, modernity and Islamic banking  
 
Modern society is characterised by the prevalence of trust. The inextricability of 
trust and modern society is best summed-up by Simmel, who said that ‘Without 
the general trust that people have in each other, society itself would 
disintegrate’ (2005: 177–178). This generalised trust is more complex than 
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personalised trust between different actors. It denotes trust in a system that 
operates independently from the relationship between two individuals and 
carries a generalised meaning accepted by society (Giddens 1990; Simmel 
2005). 
 
Credit functions on the premise of such a system of trust as people expect 
others to pay their debts not on the basis of a personal relationship but due to 
the ‘impersonal trust’ underlying the transaction (Ingham 1996: 524). Simmel, 
from whom Ingham takes cue, describes the process as, ‘the pivotal point in the 
interaction of the two parties recedes from the direct line of contact between 
them, and moves to the relationship which each of them, through his interest in 
money, has with the economic community that accepts money … This is the 
core of truth in the theory that money is only a claim upon society’ (Simmel 
2005: 176). According to Dodd (2014: 4), this statement captures ‘the sense in 
which the monetary system must be underpinned by trust, not merely between 
particular individuals, but also across society as a whole’.  
 
For Giddens, generalised trust in institutions became a fundamental feature of 
modernity as a consequence of the increasing complexity of society as ‘trust 
relations are basic to the extended time-space distanciation’ (Giddens 
1990: 87). In a model that runs parallel to that of Giddens, Beck (1992) 
describes the replacement of ‘traditional ties and social forms (social class, 
nuclear family)’ that would have formed the basis of social action in pre-modern 
times, by ‘secondary agencies and institutions’ (1992: 131). Modern society is 
characterised by institutions grounded on abstract principles that are not within 
the realm of laypeople.  
 
To grapple with the complexity of modernity, people must rely on experts 
possessing this technical knowledge. Besides their trust in institutions and 
expertise, another outcome of modernity is people’s shedding of their reliance 
on traditional, coordinated and integrated social frameworks, recasting their 
existence as highly individualised and reflexive. Whilst this shift creates space 
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for trust, reflexivity and individual choice, it also produce uncertainty and risk. In 
this study, Giddens’ comprehensive definition serves as a useful starting point 
to explore relevant conceptual perspectives. 
 
Trust may be defined as confidence in the reliability of a person or system, 
regarding a given set of outcomes or events, where that confidence express a 
faith in the probity or love of another, or in the correctness of abstract principles 
(technical knowledge) (Giddens 1990: 34). 
 
This definition is relevant to the analysis of trust in laypeople’s everyday use of 
Islamic banking for the following reasons. First, it is in impersonality, the 
absence of direct encounter with people, that the trust discussed in this chapter 
must be understood (Giddens 1990; Beck 1992; Layder 2006). Although it is 
hard to conceptualise a trust that is bereft of a physical presence, as people’s 
confidence in shariah regulation shows, it would be wrong to assume that the 
lack of human connection makes these ties weak (Layder 2006). Islamic 
banking is a contemporary phenomenon that is underpinned by shariah 
regulation – an institution that is thoroughly the product of modernity, combining 
customs as invented traditions and formalising them into a legal body (see 
Chapter 5).  
 
Second, this ‘faceless commitment’ is contingent on faith in the ‘truth’ of the 
epistemological foundations of the institution (Giddens 1990: 88). People’s trust 
in shariah regulation encompasses more than positive expectations of its 
operations. Their trust is tied to the technical knowledge that underpins the 
shariah value of Islamic banking: the principles of shariah law as interpreted by 
experts. The shift from ‘total’ reliance on structuration phenomena and 
dependence on reflexive modern institutions requires a reliance on experts that 
can mediate our ignorance of the technical workings of these systems (Giddens 
1990: 83). Third, it is important to draw our attention to faith, a term that some 
believe to denote the ‘unique explanatory power of trust’ (Giddens 1990; 
Mollering 2001; 2006: 105–10; Simmel 2005). The presence of faith denotes 
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what Simmel (2005: 178) calls ‘an additional element which is hard to describe’. 
As Giddens points out, ‘trust is only demanded where there is ignorance’ 
(Giddens 1990: 89). The existence of full knowledge would eliminate the need 
for trust because there would be no unknowns. However, incomplete knowledge 
flags up the risk of failure and the possibility that expectations are not met. 
People do not know whether the Islamic difference will pay dividends in the 
afterlife. Nor do they know whether during times of crises, the promise of 
Islamic banking products as low-risk financial instruments will hold. As typically 
happens when trust is bestowed, they have to believe that in the future, their 
expectations will be rewarded. This process is facilitated by a reflexive self-
monitoring of behaviour which, although it is not unique to modernity, takes on a 
different meaning in post-traditional societies. The difference lies specifically in 
its contribution to the erosion of traditional social forms. The implications of 
reflexivity for Islamic banking practices are discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 6. 
 
 
2.11 The state, co-optation of religious experts and Islamic banking  
 
For Giddens and Beck, the modern individual’s choice process is bound up with 
trust in expert knowledge underpinning modern institutions – both of which are 
omnipresent and ineluctable. The shariah scholars, experts who have the 
technical knowledge to establish the meaning and value of Islamic banking, are 
the ‘access points’ between laypeople and shariah regulation. Through their 
‘facework commitments’ (Giddens 1990: 88) with laypeople, they generate trust 
that sustains the shariah regulatory system. 
 
Shariah scholars, like other religious experts, have always been involved in the 
regulation of social life. Their influence can be informal and self-regulatory as in 
the case of most Muslim minorities such as the Ahong of the Hui community in 
China (Gillette 2000) or formal and integrated within centralised laws of the 
state as in the case of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Brunei and Malaysia (see Chapter 5).  
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Shariah scholars in Malaysia are co-opted by the state to prevent any political 
contradictions that arise from the state’s creation and management of both 
conventional and Islamic money. As experts representative of an abstract 
system, shariah scholars also bridge the divide between interpersonal and 
generalised trust. As Lin (2006: 611) points out, ‘generalised is the foundation 
for collective action and interpersonal trust is the basis of generalised trust’ yet it 
is often difficult to point out how they intersect. Experts are a strong example of 
this intersection. Their authority as experts is based on their role as translators, 
conduits of information, and boundary enforcers. Inevitably, their position of 
power creates an asymmetrical relationship that, as I note in later chapters, 
leaves some respondents feeling ambivalent. The role of the shariah scholars is 
to create the boundaries and also ensure that they are widely agreed upon. As I 
explain in Chapter 6, according to ordinary Muslim-Malays, the scholars are 
religious experts who posses the legitimacy to create the boundaries of halal 
and haram. They have the institutional authority and societal legitimacy to 
define the boundaries of what is permissible and what is not. Consequently, 
they have the regulatory power to create a strong enough pattern of social 
interaction and therefore the mass consumption that makes the sector viable.  
 
In Malaysia, the state underpins people’s trust in Islamic banking. Although not 
all forms of money depend on the state for legitimacy, my data clearly suggests 
that people’s use of Islamic credit is predicated on the state’s regulation of it. 
People trust Islamic banking because it is underwritten by the state, an 
institution they believe to be an expression of their power and interests. In fact, 
this relationship between money and the state can also be viewed in its 
imagery. Hart explains how the state’s role in the creation of money is depicted 
through the head and tail duality found on coins: ‘One emphasizes that it is 
issued by society in the form of the state, here symbolized by a person; it is a 
token of relations between people. The other stresses that money is itself a 
commodity, lending precision to trade in an infinite range of commodities; it is a 
real thing with an objective existence that is independent of the persons who 
use it’ (Hart 2001: 250). The coin therefore symbolises how the state constitutes 
	  	   72	  
markets as an intermediary of society. Consumption is another site that 
illustrates the interplay between society, states and markets. Cohen (2003) 
argues that consumption became symbolic of the ‘promise of America’, imbued 
with patriotic and political significance. The state encouraged ‘citizens to 
simultaneously fulfilled personal desires and civic obligation by consuming’ 
(2003: 119). Writing about Malaysia, Fischer also argues that the state 
promotes consumption as the patriotic duty of its citizens. The state’s 
management of the halal boundaries of shariah commodities cannot be 
divorced from the politics of ethnicity, identity, and nationalism. In his own 
words, what he terms ‘halalisation’ is an ‘avenue for manufacturing and 
sustaining modern forms of state power’ (Fischer 2008: 44). Therefore, in both 
cases the state constitutes the political and social parameters of the market. It is 
impossible to analyse consumption without raising questions about the alleged 
dualism between state and market. Furthermore, notions of boundaries that 
shape markets emerge. In the case of Malaysia, the state’s mediation of these 
boundaries, on behalf of the Malay national community, is synonymous with 
Malay nationalism and capitalist development. Although Fischer’s monograph 
neglects the role of shariah scholars in securing these boundaries, they are the 
lynchpin simultaneously creating ‘supply’ and ‘demand’. 
 
 
2.12 Personal ties, confidence and Islamic banking 
 
In the previous section, we looked at aspects of trust and its role in enacting 
boundaries that are the foundation of shariah regulation. We examined how 
boundaries are enacted from ‘above’, the backing of authority and the role of 
expertise. In this section, we will look at the interplay between boundaries, 
personal ties and confidence. More specifically, we will discuss the role that 
close family and friends play in the internalisation and communication of the 
norms associated with Islamic banking; thus signalling confidence in the sector 
and promoting its growth. Confidence plays a special role in the banking 
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system. Its long-term loans and short-term deposits make it a confidence 
intensive system (Swedberg 2010; 2014). 
 
Earlier I emphasised the dangers of assuming that cultural restrictions of money 
were necessarily a form of resistance. Equally important is the reminder that the 
emergence of boundaries from above should not lead us to assume that people 
accept them unquestioningly, that people are dupes. The consumption of credit 
is constituted by complex dynamics of meaning that are underpinned by the 
sociality of human association. In this section, we shall examine the interplay 
between personalised trust, confidence and social ties. More specifically, how 
Islamic banking is embedded in social relations. As mentioned earlier, the 
negative attitude that classical social theorists reserved for modern society, 
particularly as a result of the rise of the modern market-money is partly derived 
from their fears that people would be mired in an individualistic way of life, 
alienated and isolated. Orthodox economics is equally entrenched in its 
methodological individualism, if not the negative attitude towards modern 
money. As discussed in the first section, economic action serves to maximise 
the utility of the individual.  
 
Recent work on the consumption patterns and money management of ordinary 
people suggests that, on the contrary, both actions are constituted by social 
relations. Writing about the earmarking process, Zelizer suggests that the moral 
earmarking distinguishing the honest dollar from dirty money were determined 
by broader cultural and social norms. ‘Money used for rational instrumental 
exchanges is not “free” from social constraints but is another type of socially 
created currency, subject to particular networks of social relations and its own 
set of values and norms’ (Zelizer 1994: 19). The starting point is the 
conceptualisation of actors and their economic action as social. Islamic banking 
practices are shaped by the influence of other actors who are part of the 
respondents’ social surroundings. The social ties of familial and peer relations, 
mobilise the individual into responding to the call of Islamic banking and thus 
turning trust and confidence into financial capital for the bank and state. 
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Miller (1998: 35), describing his observations of the shopping practices of 
London households, explains that consumption is ‘an expression of kinship and 
other relationships’. In a discovery that parallels my own findings, he reflects 
that the participation of close family and friends is viewed as positive in 
economic decisions of others and that this participation is viewed as part of a 
meaningful social experience characteristic of thick ties. Thus, rather than 
taking place in isolation, economic action takes place as part of a greater 
collective whether a dyad, triad, or a larger group. Furthermore, instead of 
impeding economic action, social relations serve to enhance and lubricate 
them. Indeed, the embedding of economic action in social relations does not 
impede economic rationality. ‘Shared meanings – their expression in social 
practices and their representation in symbols – actively shape money as a tool 
of calculation, as a material form, and as a means of creating and sustaining 
differences in social hierarchy and rank’ (Dodd 2014: 294–95). 
 
These characteristics were also evident in the sociality of Islamic banking 
practices. Whereas conventional banking requires its clients to trust the banks' 
integrity, in the case of Islamic banking, Muslim-Malays need more than the 
‘secular’ trust in the financial system. They not only trust the banks to be 
financially sound, they also have to trust them to comply with the cultural 
boundaries set by shariah regulation, i.e. to be truly Islamically compliant. 
Additionally, there is also the question of directing their choice towards Islamic 
banking. They have to be instigated into opting for Islamic banking over the 
conventional.  
 
This profound participation depends on trust – specifically the trust located in 
the face-to-face encounters with others with whom they are bound via thick 
social ties. Familiarity is a characteristic of this trust.  People often interact and 
trust others on the basis of familiarity whether through shared space, shared 
‘blood-ties’ or ethnicity or religion (Cook and Gerbasi 2005). In this project we 
see that there is a degree of homophily and circularity. People trust each other 
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because they are similar and then they also trust boundaries that serve to affirm 
and coalesce their similarity and insularity (more on this subject in the next 
section). This systemic approach can be contrasted with studies on social 
actors and their decision-making process, in anticipation that understanding of 
such a process will explain (and allow to model) the emergence of trust. I will 
elaborate more on this subject in the next section.  
 
Confidence, which denotes habitual expectation (Dodd 1994: 138), is another 
aspect of the fiduciary dimension of Islamic banking. ‘Confidence is an actor’s 
readiness to base his or her own decisions to act, not on the best available 
information about some state of affairs (because this is not available to the 
actor), but on proxy signs that signal what this state of affairs is’ (Swedberg 
2010: 74).  
 
As a social construct, confidence is not expected to denote ‘reality’ but people’s 
perceptions, based on socially constructed signs. Swedberg’s use of proxy 
signals was mainly employed for third party institutions such as credit rating 
agencies. As I noted during fieldwork, ordinary people, also ‘look-around’ to 
discern signs of confidence when they’re at a crossroads. Third parties who are 
intertwined with their everyday social life and have strong reputations and 
authority, are looked at as ‘stand-ins’ (Swedberg 2010: 74) for information when 
they need direction. 
 
Confidence is linked to trust but it functions through a different process. For 
instance, it is not direct as trust. In the case of the latter, the actor deliberates 
on the information and reflexively compares and contrasts it. When respondents 
see their close social friends and family choosing Islamic banking, they take it 
as a sign of confidence. The banks’ message works because respondents, who 
have neither the knowhow nor the ability to collect all the related information, 
rely on the trust and opinion and experience of the people they know. Rather 
than impeding economic action, sociality facilitates Islamic banking practices 
and aids the growth of Islamic banking by inspiring confidence. In this respect, 
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close family and friends are unwitting allies of the banks and state as the latter 
literally capitalize on this confidence that they demonstrate in the sector.  
 
The influence of other actors operates on various levels. First, if others did not 
recognise Islamic banking as Islamic, they would not use it. People look to third 
parties for reassurance. Personalized trust is key to understanding the influence 
of other social actors. The respondents trust the intentions of these close family 
and friends, denoting the emotional aspect of confidence (Swedberg 2010; 
2013). As one respondent exclaimed ‘they want the best for me!’ People believe 
that the proxy has no self-interest and they are only ‘objectively’ interested in 
the interests of their family or close friends. This emotional attachment is what 
makes it even more powerful as a symbol. 
 
The empirical evidence contradicts the asocial model of orthodox economic 
models through the evident sociality of economic action. Islamic banking 
practices depend on respondents’ personalised trust in others because quite 
simply, as Weber insisted, ‘social action … takes account of the behaviour of 
others and is thereby oriented in its course’ (Weber 1947: 88). Social ties 
constitute Islamic banking practices through the respondents’ reliance on them 
to authenticate Islamic best practice and for information. Trusted kin and peers 
direct other people’s practices by offering advice, knowledge and information 
about Islamic banking. The main function of such advice and knowledge is less 
about equipping the other person with the required information. Instead, it 
serves to enhance the proxy as a reputable source of confidence. The more 
knowledge and information the proxy possesses, the greater the authority and 
the stronger the aura of confidence. It is the generalised acceptance of the 
Islamic value that enables the mass momentum or collective acceptance of its 
value. Households, the communal space which most respondents shared with 
close family members, are central sites of economic activity: consumption, 
discussions about theories of money, and valuation of different economic 
goods. In addition, as I discovered during fieldwork, the purchase of a home is 
constituted by an intense social process within the family, resonating with 
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Bourdieu’s (2005) experience about the French housing market. The purchase 
of a home is an almost universal rite of passage in modern society. Although it 
is a consumer good, as Bourdieu (2005: 33) explains, its high cost makes it 
‘difficult’ and ‘consequential’, making this purchase a significant moment in 
people’s lives. Not only do some parents act as guarantors, they also advise 
them about the soundness of their purchase and the type of financing. For 
many of the respondents, this rite of passage was characterised by direct 
participation of close family and friends. 
 
Another consequential experience discussed in this study is the experience of 
the financial crisis. Confidence can be both positive and negative. The family 
signalled both negative and positive signs during the crisis. It simultaneously 
signalled negative confidence in the conventional and positive in the financial. 
Since financial burdens are often borne by the whole household, especially 
when the children are financially dependent, calamities are also experienced 
together. In fact, even those respondents who were too young to fully 
appreciate the severity of the crisis absorbed their parents’ memories and 
feelings of it – supporting Hart’s description of money as ‘collective memory’ 
(Hart 2000).  As I explained earlier and will illustrate in Chapter 7, the trauma of 
the crisis increased the salience of the boundaries provided by shariah 
regulation. These boundaries reduce uncertainty. Therefore it is not unusual 
that they became pronounced after a financial crisis. They provided a new way 
this new universe made sense as discredited debauched order was articulated 
as taboo and offering ones that were the divine approved of.  Crucially, this 
salience, which would go on to condition their choice of banking, was 
communicated and received as a family not individually. 
 
Friends also shaped the Islamic banking practices of respondents. Although 
there was no major crisis happening at the time, their participation was 
especially sought during times of uncertainty. Respondents experiencing a rite 
of passage, such as living away from home for the first time or seeking to 
finance a mortgage would ask their friends for advice. Besides the symbolic 
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communication, by encouraging the use of Islamic banking, or professing belief 
in the boundaries of shariah regulation, in some cases, the consumption of 
Islamic was also literally facilitated through the introduction of other friends. 
DiMaggio and Louch (1998) and Lai (2001) in America and Taiwan respectively 
explain how social ties enabled economic transactions to take place as people 
preferred to conduct business with friends and family over stranger - especially 
in times of uncertainty. 
 
 
2.13. Islam, the west and sociological analysis  
 
It’s been thirty-nine years since Turner observed, ‘sociologists are either not 
interested in Islam or have nothing to contribute to Islamic scholarship’ (Turner 
1974: 1–2). The high demand for experts on Islam shows that this is no longer 
the case. Geopolitical tensions have sparked an increase in demand for 
sociological analyses of Islamic issues. As a result, although the sheer 
probability that Islamic finance will get the quality attention it deserves has 
proportionately increased, there is always demand for research that helps 
deconstruct the essentialist paradigm that is a favourite of journalistic discourse 
and Islamic banking practitioners alike. 
 
The West's gaze on Islam has always been coloured by a mixture of 
apprehension and fascination. If, as Rodinson argues, the ‘Western image of 
the Muslim world came into sharper focus in the eleventh century’ (2007: 6), it 
would not be hyperbolic to claim that, in essence, the attitude of the West has 
not changed since then. The cognitive bastion erected by the West between 
itself and Islam, a bastion whose foundations go back ten centuries, explains 
the ease with which contemporary financial discourse has embraced the idea 
that Muslims have a totally ‘other’ understanding of economic life, such as to 
require ‘other’ and fundamentally distinct institutions of its own (Lochman 2004).  
This project was first inspired by the work of brilliant economic historians and 
specialists of the culture, politics and society of the Middle East, including 
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Maxime Rodinson, Roger Owen, Fred Halliday and Sami Zubaida. They sought 
to correct popular misconceptions about the Middle East, in particular the role of 
Islam vis-à-vis capitalist development and politics that reduce all happenings in 
Muslim-majority societies to a timeless and homogenous Islam, by analysing 
how these societies were subject to universal historical processes, including 
colonial rule, the motor of capitalism and political monopolies that are typical of 
the Global South (Owen 2004. As Halliday (1995: 75) insists, research on 
Muslim societies has to ‘invoke other factors outside of Islam’ in order to 
contribute to social scientific scholarship.  
 
The invocation of political and economic processes to explain the growth of 
Islamic banking practices moves the reader away from the idea that they 
require a special explanation that does not have an equivalent in a non-Muslim 
‘elsewhere’ (Zubaida 2011). As Zubaida points out, ‘modern capitalism may 
have originated in England, but it has had distinct effects in France, Germany 
and Italy, not relating specifically to a difference in “cultures”, but to historical 
totalities of economy, class structure, government and patterns of power; as 
well as to cultural processes’ (2011: 5–6). As all four scholars concur, the 
caricature of these societies is aggravated by a view of these societies as being 
eternally fixed and fundamentally unchanging. This perspective tends to be 
advocated by actors, on both sides of the ideological divide, that have an 
interest in emphasising the difference in identity and values of Malaysians 
versus the West. Banking practices that purport an Islamic difference are 
intertwined with identity politics. It is difficult to study the former whilst ignoring 
how the latter have been constructed and contested through history.  
 
It is for this reason that a sociological study that wants to explain any kind of 
change must include a historical analysis. This dissertation therefore operates 
at different speeds and is not straightjacketed by linear concepts of history. This 
approach is strongly evident in Chapter 4, which deals with the construction of 
Muslim-Malay identity, including its institutionalisation in legal codes by both the 
colonial and postcolonial state in an attempt to instil loyalty in the Malay 
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population. The long view of history contextualises the salience of a Muslim 
identity, amongst Malays, within political dynamics from above and below.  
The perils of ignoring the historical longue durée, is evident in the proliferation 
of clichés that embrace ‘Islamic banking’ as an eternal, fixed and exceptional 
characteristic of Muslims that can only be explained through Islam. Even when 
well meaning, journalistic accounts of Islamic banking and many of the sector’s 
advocates (including some social scientists) tend to depict an idealised view of 
Islamic banking practices that inadvertently commit a disservice by depicting 
‘Muslims’ as being fundamentally distinct from everyone else. Their arguments 
imply that, almost mechanically, the presence of Muslims indicates a demand 
for Islamic banking. Take, for instance, Foreign Policy magazine, which 
erroneously states that, ‘today, Islamic finance schemes like murabaha remain 
the only legal way to charge interest in much of the Muslim world’ (Keating 
2011).38 A closer look at the evidence would reveal that in most of the Muslim 
world, banking and finance is carried out through ‘conventional means’ (Zubaida 
2011: 16) and in several Muslim countries such as Morocco and Libya, Islamic 
banking is virtually non-existent. In Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Mauritania it 
represents less than 5 per cent of the total assets. The reason for such an 
absence is due to the lack of social, economic and political conditions for the 
emergence of a successful Islamic banking sector.  
 
Essentialism, the belief that Muslims can be mainly understood through a 
uniquely and fixed Islamic impulse that cannot be understood through concepts 
and modes of social sciences, treats Islam as sui generis and representative of 
totalising cultural zeal that is an ‘adequate reading of the past, a diagnosis of 
the present, and a blueprint for the future of all Muslims’ (Al-Azmeh 2010:26). 
Since the events of 9/11, discussions about Islam have been dominated by the 
Huntingtonian  ‘clash of civilisations’ discourse (Huntington 1996) and the notion 
of Muslim exceptionalism.39 The simplistic idea that an imagined Islamic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/money_market 
39 Political scientist Samuel Huntington’s (1996) ‘Clash of Civilisations’ theory proposes that 
culture and religion will be the main source of conflict in a post-Cold War era. 
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civilisation is battling for supremacy with its Western counterpart is based on an 
assumption of homogeneity and fixity of an Islamic tradition that is renewed 
through an atavistic impulse. The ascendancy of the Huntingtonian paradigm 
amongst American policy circles to explain the proliferation of Islamic terrorist 
cells across the four continents, from London, Indonesia and Kenya to Bali, 
fuelled the theory of Muslim exceptionalism: ‘the view that concepts and modes 
of social sciences do not apply to Muslims, as they do the rest of the world’ 
(Dalacoura 2011: 2), and that their actions can be mainly understood through a 
uniquely Islamic impulse. Although these discursive tendencies were mainly 
contained within the security circles, policymakers’ concerns about the 
connection between shariah resurgence, terrorism and anti-Western feelings 
began to spill over to other aspects of the social life of Muslims. Overt symbols 
pertaining to the Islamic faith, and any activities by Muslims, were viewed with 
increasingly excitable suspicion. Islamic Banking was not an exception to the 
rule (Warde 2004).40  
 
Wikileaks reported that Condoleeza Rice singled out Islamic financial 
institutions as a channel of terrorist funding.41 The Americans had profound 
concerns about the British government’s efforts to establish London as a hub for 
Islamic Finance. It requested information on ‘Islamic financial institutions' 
vulnerability to exploitation for illicit or terrorist purposes, such as structuring 
accounts to mask illicit activity or money laundering’ in the UK and 20 other 
countries to which the cable was sent are Muslim-majority nations in North 
Africa, the Middle East, and Asia (Moore 2011). In the USA, Dar al-Maal al-
Islami Trust (DMI) – a Bahamas-incorporated holding company with a portfolio 
of Islamic banks in Bahrain, Niger, Egypt and Pakistan –- was investigated for 
links with terrorist groups. For the Justice Department’s counterterrorism 
division, and lawyers for 9/11 relatives, DMI’s founder Prince Faisal Al-Saud’s 
links with conservative Islamic political figures who were declared terrorists after 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 For an example of alarmist security reports about Islamic finance see Rammell (2003).  
41 As de Goede argues, the US government’s linking of Islamic finance as terrorist funds 
suggests that the political priorities underpinning anti-terrorist financing ‘are about governing 
practices of social affiliation and mediation’ (2008: 291).  
	  	   82	  
9/11, was proof of the bank’s involvement in terrorism (Landon 2007). 
Complementing this alarmist security-oriented discourse is another type of 
exceptionalist discourse. The mirror image of the Huntingtonians, Islamist 
revivalists, also promote an essentialist culture by ‘elevating an obscurantist 
discourse on the present, past and future of Muslims to the status of 
indisputable knowledge’ (Al-Azmeh 2010: 26). Very often, these myths of 
Muslim otherness are symptomatic of the creation of tradition through ‘the 
folklorisation of classicism, in which elements from the remote past are 
presumed to constitute the lived present, which often results in a more or less 
Disneyfied self-parody’ (Al-Azmeh, 2010: 37) and a static conception of Islam. 
 
During fieldwork I was exposed to several instances of the ‘folklorisation’ of 
Islam that has no basis in history. Many practitioners insist that the natural 
course of Islamic banking’s history was only interrupted by the corrupting 
influence of colonisation. In a nutshell, according to this folkloristic vision, 
Islamic banking is not a modern construct, but a return to the authentic and 
traditional method of Malay banking that was only interrupted by British 
colonialism. ‘Western colonisation destroyed Islamic methods of finance, like 
waqf, in order to undermine Islam. During the golden years of the Caliphate, 
Islamic banking like the waqf was standard practice and people did not pay 
interest’ insisted one senior banker during an Islamic finance workshop in Kuala 
Lumpur. It is typical of Islamic reformers to insist that previous to Western 
domination, Muslims had ‘historically, avoided the sin of riba’ (Zubaida 2003 
:17). These are myths that the Malaysian state and practitioners are happy to 
propagate. These foundational myths are meant to highlight the authenticity of 
Islamic banking and consequently reinforce the state’s position as legitimate 
guardian of Malays and their cultural rights. Despite the sector’s claim to 
continue a pre-modern authentic tradition, as I shall go on to emphasise in 
Chapter 4, Islamic banking is a product of modernity and ironically, the state’s 
appeal for Muslim-Malays to bank Islamically, has its origins in the colonial 
state’s codification and essentialisation of Malay identity as eternally Muslim for 
its political expediency. Historical records show that interest contracts were 
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common and enforceable in the Ottoman Empire and riba was confined to 
classifying excessive interest above some notional rate (Rodinson 2007; 
Zubaida 2011) 
 
Al-Azmeh suggests that relativist postmodernists mirror Islamic obscurantism. 
He declares that ‘such advocacy of singularity invariably results in essentialising 
identity through declaring the irreducibility of difference, and consequently in 
being limited to uttering unassailable clichés’ (Al-Azmeh 2010: 26). 
Unfortunately, one of the by-products of Said’s Orientalism paradigm is a 
‘reverse Orientalism’. The developments in the Muslim world are framed within 
ahistorical and unscientific vignettes that emphasise the particular. It exerts its 
relativist focus on the meaning of values concealing the very universal and 
modern forces, like power-manipulation and capitalism that underpin Islamic 
banking (Halliday 2008). 
 
 
2.14 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to outline the theoretical frameworks used to 
explain why Islamic banking is predicated on (a) generalised trust in the the 
social added-value of the sector, as represented by the shariah regulatory 
system (b) the community of experts who have the authority to regulate and 
represent it (c) the personalised trust of close social ties, family and peers 
whose confidence help shape the choices of respondents. I explained how this 
project rests on the agenda of economic sociology, which seeks to interpret 
economic action in relation to its social context as opposed to the asocial and 
ahistorical individualist and utilitarian homo economicus of neo-classical 
economic theory. This perspective challenges the neo-classical conceptions of 
an economic actor who maximizes utility according to goals that are detached 
from the social environment. The point of departure is Polanyi’s notion of 
embeddedness (Polanyi 2001), which serves as a useful analytical tool that 
captures the anchoring of the Islamic banking system in normative frameworks. 
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The shared values of a culture as understood, both ‘from below’ through 
people’s association with each other, and ‘from above’, as institutionalised 
traditions, can explain how one choice was selected over another.  
  
 In the discussion about trust, I use Giddens’ definition of ‘generalised trust’ 
(1990) to explain why people’s trust in the abstract values represented by 
shariah regulation and the shariah experts who simultaneously regulate supply 
and demand is the ‘glue’ underpinning the system and creating a mutually 
accepted order. This community of experts have the technical knowledge and 
authority to determine what is Islamic and what is not. People trust their 
qualification of an Islamic banking product as halal (allowed), thus reducing 
uncertainty about the authenticity of the product and creating the order 
necessary for the mobilisation of demand and the creation of a market. The 
blessing of shariah scholars imbues Islamic bankings product with a symbolic 
value that is trusted and also legitimises the sector as a mutually accepted 
order. Next, the discussion shifted to the role of social ties in shaping economic 
practices. Islamic banking practices, like other types of economic action, are 
constituted by social ties. Contrary to orthodox economic perceptions, social 
relations serve to enhance and lubricate consumption. In particular, family and 
friends stand in for the state and banks as proxies, by signaling confidence in 
Islamic banking. Last we discussed how due to efforts from both sides of the 
ideological divide to present Islam as a culture based on a ‘fixed essence 
working itself out through history’, this project is based on the first belief that any 
study of social phenomenona with the tag Islamic attached to it must examine 
how Islam as a culture, is ‘intertwined with the dynamics of economy and 
power’. (Zubaida 2011: 6). 
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Chapter 3: Methodological Orientations 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In Laws, Plato’s lesser-known dialogues, the three main protagonists, an 
Athenian, a Spartan, and a Cretan, discuss an ancient Spartan social institution 
known as Krypteia (Plato, Laws, I: 633).42 Historians disagree about the precise 
nature of this institution, but it essentially involved a select group of young men 
who endured a type of military training that was meant to weed out the men 
from the boys. Allegedly, part of this training included an initiatory period in 
which these city boys would roam the wilderness with no support and no tools 
bar a knife, which was the only tool they had to achieve their aim; kill as many 
state-owned slaves as possible. The end goal for these boys was to make it 
back to the Krypteia alive, at which point they would be reintroduced to society 
as men and warriors (Kennell 2013: 387).   
 
Thankfully, PhD students are neither expected nor encouraged, to engage in 
any acts of violence, but there are useful parallels to be made between Krypteia 
and fieldwork. Whilst it might sound dramatic, even for the most worldly of us, 
the idea of venturing into the field, solo, was experienced with the same 
trepidation that I imagine even the bravest of Spartan boys experienced when 
they set off into the wilderness. They had no protection and could only rely on 
their survival skills. Armed with little more than the knowledge acquired from 
texts we’ve studied, we are also expected to undergo this unstructured 
experience and emerge intact. Our end goal is to return to our institution with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 One of the protagonists describes Krypteia in the following manner: ‘The fourth also I may 
attempt to state: it is the training, widely prevalent amongst us, in hardy endurance of pain, by 
means both of manual contests and of robberies carried out every time at the risk of a sound 
drubbing; moreover, the “Crypteia,” as it is called, affords a wonderfully severe training in 
hardihood, as the men go bare-foot in winter and sleep without coverlets and have no 
attendants, but wait on themselves and rove through the whole countryside both by night and by 
day. Moreover in our games, we have severe tests of endurance, when men unclad do battle 
with the violence of the heat,—and there are other instances so numerous that the recital of 
them would be well-nigh endless’ (Plato, Laws, Book I: section 633 b-c).  
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enough data which, once processed, will allow us to be reintroduced to society 
as adults - not students, and bona fide scholars.  
 
Just like this ancient right of passage, no amount of methodological training or 
following of the ethical rules of conduct or pilot interviews can prepare the 
uninitiated researcher for what is ultimately ‘a practical activity’ that requires ‘the 
exercise of judgement in context’ and constant reflexivity (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 2007: 20–21). The fluid nature of research cannot be predetermined. 
Its unpredictable nature is what makes it simultaneously so exhilarating for 
some and potentially disastrous for others. Luckily, my travel experiences 
around Western Africa and South East Asia, often undertaken solo, in risky 
environments which I was unfamiliar with, equipped me with the necessary 
survival skills to emerge from the field more or less unscathed, with reams of 
data and most importantly, to enable me to enjoy fieldwork, which turned out to 
be the most fulfilling aspect of the doctoral process.  
 
What follows in this chapter is an account of the broader methodological 
approach used in this project and the various methods employed to achieve my 
goals. The spontaneous nature of research, whilst requiring ‘reflexivity at every 
stage of a project’ does not remove ‘the need for pre-fieldwork preparation nor 
means that the researcher's behaviour in the field can be haphazard, merely 
adjusting to events by taking the line of least resistance’ (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 2007: 20–21). Consequently this chapter will include a report of 
preliminary desk work, data collection, and processing techniques set against a 
reflexive tone.  
 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first part explains the case site 
which first outlines the suitability of the single case and then explains why 
Malaysia, particularly the urban domain of Kuala Lumpur, was the ideal choice. 
The second part sets out the main characteristics of the methodological 
orientation of the research design. More specifically, it includes a justification for 
an interpretative investigation based on the grounded theory approach and the 
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ontological perspectives that underpin the research. We then move on to the 
third section, which focuses on the research techniques and methods used to 
extract and analyse data as well as a research biography that outlines the 
various steps undertaken during fieldwork in Malaysia. Last, I conclude with 
some critical reflections on my positioning as a researcher. 
 
 
3.2 Single case: Malaysia 
 
The empirical focus of this PhD is Malaysia. Countries with clear, identifiable 
boundaries are archetypal units for case studies. ‘A case study is a method for 
learning about a complex instance, based on a comprehensive understanding 
of that instance obtained by extensive description and analysis of that instance 
taken as a whole and in its context’ (US GAO 1990: 16). As this definition 
implies, the single case is rich in description and its in-depth knowledge and 
requires the researcher’s committed involvement to each minute detail. 
Although the use of a single case is used in both quantitative and qualitative 
research, its detailed examination of a unique example, using a multitude of 
sources creates a natural affinity to the rich style of examination associated with 
the latter method (Baxter and Jack 2008). 
 
This project’s interpretative framework, where the focus is on understanding the 
motivations of the consumer and analysing them in relation to structural 
conditions set by the state and financial institutions, contextualising conditions, 
and recognising a hazy boundary between phenomena is best served by a case 
study (Yin 2003). This research aims to understand the development of Islamic 
finance in Malaysia through the everyday practices of Islamic banking 
consumers. The consumers’ narratives will be contextualised within a detailed 
examination of broader developments and thread links from the micro 
(consumer) to the macro (banks and state). The focus on detail with the aim of 
revealing the ‘essence of the phenomenon’ is central to a case study (Baxter 
and Jack 2008: 545). The multidimensional perspectives, from structure and 
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agency, serves to emphasise the contingent nature of the development of IB, as 
opposed to the universality in behaviour presumed by essentialist perspectives 
on Muslim societies.  
 
The choice of the theme, Islamic banking, was the result of a long-standing 
interest in Islamic finance: my MSc dissertation explained why the sector never 
took off in Egypt and looked into the 2007/2008 American and European 
financial crisis. The disillusion with the ‘Western’ financial system and 
breakdown in trust roused everyone’s interest in this sector and served as an 
affirmation of Islamic banking practices and allowing the sector to expand and 
mature (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). 
 
The Western mainstream media was at the forefront of this reflexive exercise. 
Media outlets, from the Financial Times (FT) to the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) and the International Herald Tribune (IHT), started to 
investigate the propositions of these ethical sectors. Out of all the ethical 
sectors, and possibly due to an Orientalist stance that pitted Islam as the 
supreme ‘other’, Islamic Banking was scrutinized as a potential contender to 
‘Western’ capitalism. ‘Is Islamic Finance the answer?’ (Brant 2009) and ‘How 
would religion regulate financial markets?’, (El-Diwany 2009) asked the BBC. 
Press Agencies reported that: ‘Vatican Says Islamic Finance May Help Western 
banks in Crisis’ (Totaro 2009) and in a similar vein The Guardian (Imaduddin 
2011) queried, ‘What if the world had been following Islamic financial practices?’ 
Middle East experts such as Charles Tripp (2011) were invited onto radio 
programmes to explain the connection between capitalism and Islam. BBC 
Radio 4 (2009) discussed how a religion-regulated market would follow and 
even the Vatican opined that religiously regulated finance, irrespective of 
religious creed, would benefit communities and banks. This view was expressed 
in the Vatican’s official newspaper Osservatore Romano: ‘The ethical principles 
on which Islamic finance is based may bring banks closer to their clients and to 
the true spirit which should mark every financial service’ (Totaro 2009)  
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This surge in interest did not go unnoticed by the advocates of the sector. At all 
the Islamic finance conferences I attended after September 2008, many 
practitioners, especially shariah scholars resolutely insisted that a financial 
system modelled on Islamic principles would bring an end to these debt-induced 
volatile capitalist crises. The advocates of these ethical forms of finance viewed 
the effects of the financial crisis as a clear vindication of their practices and they 
did not hesitate to point this out. According to the General Secretary of the 
Indian Muslim Community, ‘the main cause of this world financial crisis has 
been usury and interest. The Holy Qur’an guides us to avoid riba, an evil that is 
sufficient to put in danger national and international peace and economic 
stability’ (AIN 2011). 
 
Conducting research for my MSc dissertation, I would discover that even this 
would also consolidate the standing of Islamic banking in countries where it was 
established, thereby increasing demand. To an extent, this opportunity 
foreshadowed the type of case I would select. Investigating why Islamic banking 
practices were growing required finding a case where such a growth was 
evident and where the Islamic banking sector was thriving. Following typical 
procedures, I identified the various locations that would be suitable and feasible 
and then investigated potential case studies including Bahrain, Tunisia, United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia (KSA), Kuwait, Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Countries like Morocco, Syria and Egypt were immediately excluded due to the 
negligible presence of Islamic banking. Others like Pakistan were immediately 
considered unsafe and, later on, the Arab Spring also eliminated Tunisia from 
eligibility.  
 
Following the advice of Hammersley and Atkinson (2007: 28–30), I gathered 
any available evidence about each possible site, interviewed people who had 
experience conducting research in these countries and also started following 
leads in order to determine which countries would be easiest to access. 
Limitations related to access, risk, and expense were also considered.  
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Initially, KSA was emerging as an exciting case study, partly due to its status of 
‘virgin territory’ the limited research on its Islamic banking sector. Mainly this is 
due to the difficulties in acquiring a visa, obstacles which thanks to my 
gatekeepers I would have been able to overcome. Ultimately I had to concede 
that even if I was able to overcome barriers of entry into the country, 
overcoming gender related restrictions would have turned out to be very 
expensive and limited my parameters. For instance, I would have required 
expensive accommodation in an expat community, foreigners have to live in 
compounds and I would have required a driver and a car. The law requires that 
a male companion, my father or brother, would have to accompany me and 
interviews with laypeople would have been limited to female locals only.  
 
Gender risk was less acute in Malaysia and a gendered reflection on my 
experience there is discussed in the last section of this chapter. It is an open 
and multicultural society that enjoys a thriving tourism industry, which is always 
a strong sign of its openness towards, foreigners. Having previously spent over 
three months travelling around the country, it was a location that I was familiar 
with and I had started to establish connections with the Islamic finance 
community there.   
 
Having considered the various options, suitability and access as detailed above, 
across the Middle East, North Africa and South East Asia, Malaysia emerged as 
the most appropriate case study. Although Malaysia was ultimately selected as 
a case through painstaking research and data collection, it is expected that as a 
researcher I also heed my ‘hunches’ (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). As 
Flyvbjerg (2006: 16-17) explains, although intuition often plays a part in picking 
a case that ‘shines’, researchers’ choices must be justified to their scholarly 
community.43 In the next section I will justify my choice of case study. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Flyvbjerg (2006:16) explains that during an interview with Hubert Dreyfus about what makes a 
paradigmatic case, the philosopher, replied, ‘Heidegger says, you recognize a paradigm case 
because it shines’. 
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First, Malaysia, along with Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC), is one of the 
locations which hosts a concentration of Islamic banking assets, capital and 
expertise. Its capital, Kuala Lumpur, is currently one of the global hubs of 
Islamic finance (Warde 2000; Wilson 2004). There is general agreement that, 
‘no other country in the world, especially among the Muslim countries, has 
reached the same level of systemic development of its Islamic banking system 
and architecture’ (Parker 2012).  
 
The Islamic finance sector in Malaysia benefits from a large share of the foreign 
capital flows that the liberalisation and financialisation of the Malaysian 
economy made possible. The South East Asian country’s ability to attract 
Islamic funds is evidence that the growth of Islamic finance sector depends on 
more than cultural capital – usually associated with the traditional seats of the 
Islamic world, such as KSA and Egypt. A country’s ability to operate within the 
norms of global finance is crucial for attracting capital, whether conventional or 
Islamic (Warde 2000). 
 
This qualifies Malaysia as a ‘paradigmatic case’ that operates as a reference 
point which later can be used as a benchmark for other cases (Flyvbjerg 
2006: 15–17). There is no standard for such a case: the researcher must build it 
up into a standard. In this respect, all the evidence points to Malaysia satisfying 
the conditions of a case that is unique, shines, and is a useful reference point 
for the development of further research exploring different cases. Malaysia was 
a pioneer in developing the first successful dual banking systems.44 The growth 
rate of Islamic finance is outpacing the conventional and the regulatory structure 
is sound. Similar to other globalised45 countries like Bahrain and UAE, KSA and 
Malaysia remain the only major markets where Islamic banking has a higher 
return on assets (ROA) ratio than its conventional peers (DiVanna and Hancock 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Bahrain and Pakistan are the only other countries to operate an Islamic banking system in 
parallel with the conventional, and in Pakistan’s case it has been unsuccessful in developing 
both the Islamic and conventional sectors. 
45 The term ‘globalised’ is shorthand for countries that encourage and accommodate global 
capital flows and foreign direct investment.  
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2013). Bank Negara, Malaysia’s central bank’s jurisdiction lies over both 
conventional and Islamic financial systems: retail banking, investment banking, 
and takaful. 
 
Malaysia’s Islamic financial sector was established in 1983 with the passing of 
the Islamic Banking Act. Since the establishment of Bank Islam Malaysia 
Berhad, the country’s first Islamic bank, the sector has been liberalised and now 
totals 21 local and foreign-owned Islamic banks.46 The sector was gradually 
liberalised and deregulated to allow a diverse array of retail banks to operate. 
The 1993 pilot scheme, which involved the largest three commercial banks, 
introduced ‘Islamic windows’:  all commercial banks, merchant banks, and 
finance companies were given the opportunity to introduce Islamic Banking 
products and services (Kazarian 2008). ‘Having yielded successful results, the 
pilot scheme expanded to gradually include more than thirty-one financial 
institutions. The sector continued gaining momentum as the second Islamic 
bank, Bank Muamalat, was established in 1999, and Islamic subsidiaries and 
foreign Islamic banks 2003 and 2005 respectively’ (Dusuki et al. 2011: 118).  
 
There are three types of financial intermediaries operating within the Islamic 
financial sector: consumer institutions (deriving their funds from deposits), non-
depository, which tend to collect funds through sources such as insurance 
premiums and investment intermediaries. The financial institutions studied in 
this research are the commercial banks that belong to the depository category. 
Along with savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, and credit 
unions, their main basic function is to channel the surplus funds to deficit areas 
in the economy, whether to firms or individuals. In a sense they can be thought 
of as the arterial system of the economy. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See  the website of Bank Negara for the full list of banks 
www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=li&cat=islamic&type=IB&fund=0&cu=0 and 
www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=li&cat=iib&type=IIB&fund=0&cu=0 
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The sector can be divided into three further categories: fully Islamic banks that 
were either granted new licenses or were converted from conventional banks, 
fully Islamic subsidiaries (of conventional banks), and Islamic windows of 
conventional banks.  Given concerns of the mixing of funds, ‘windows’ have to 
comply with firewall requirements that include separate capitals (Dusuki et al. 
2011: 119). The subsidiary option is usually facilitated by the option to leverage 
on operating infrastructure, whether property (branches), human or financial 
capital. The decision to license the Islamic banks was accompanied by Islamic 
money schemes in banks and the proliferation of money market instruments 
and insurance schemes. Thus, the Islamic banking market in Malaysia is 
attractive for the researcher as it is rich and multifaceted: made up of different 
types of banks offering a variety of products.  
 
Malaysia, unlike most other Muslim-majority countries has a sophisticated and 
functioning regulatory dual framework: secular and shariah. Besides having to 
adhere to conventional regulation as outlined by Basel III, Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB) and Bank Negara, the sector has an added shariah 
regulatory framework. This includes the Fiqh Academy of Mecca, the 
international agency Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI), and the national Shariah Advisory Council within the remit 
of the Bank Negara. The number of regulatory organisations and the organised 
shariah regulatory framework add another fascinating analytical category. The 
interaction between regulation, expertise, and laypeople is a common theme of 
study for economic sociologists.  
 
International Islamic finance regulatory agencies like AAOIFI work on 
harmonising and standardising the sector in an attempt to construct a global 
comprehensive and consistent regulatory regime. Many jurisdictions, including 
Malaysia, have voluntarily adopted these basic standards, and there is general 
agreement amongst practitioners on the fundamental features of the Islamic 
finance sector. Despite the basic commonality amongst the various national 
Islamic finance regulatory regimes, there is leeway for considerable 
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discrepancies between members of the same organisation. AAOIFI’s standards 
and regulations work on the principles of ‘the recognition of the different Islamic 
financial practices in different jurisdictions, the recognition of the diversity of 
shari'ah opinions which result in a dual set of standards recognized globally, 
and the possibilities for double standards to co-exist and be practiced globally’ 
(Choudhury 2007: 35). 
 
In practice, this means that liberal regulatory regimes like Malaysia can 
accommodate ‘conservative’ foreign Islamic banks  that follow more restrictive 
GCC standards, as well as banks that follow the more ‘liberal’ interpretations. 
There is a number of contracts and products that are permissible and available 
in the Malaysian but not the GCC market. The flexibility of Malaysian regulators 
allows GCC banks operating in Malaysia to follow the stricter alternatives 
permitted by their scholars. The implication for my research is that Malaysia 
allows the widest range of Islamic banking products in the world, making for a 
more nuanced and insightful study of banking practices.  
 
It is due to Malaysia’s uniqueness in sustaining a retail Islamic banking sector 
that parallels the conventional, and is accompanied by a thriving Islamic 
investment insurance sector as well as an Islamic money market, which 
stimulates the sector, that it will be studied as a single case.  
 
The single case study has been challenged for its unscientific approach. 
Positivist quantitative researchers that suspect the single case to be 
symptomatic of lazy research design mainly drive the opposition (Gerring 2006). 
This bias can be the result of a misunderstanding of the single case study’s aim 
and approach. ‘It is the very fuzziness of case studies that grants them an 
advantage in research at the exploratory stage, for the single-case study allows 
one to test a multitude of hypotheses in a rough-and-ready way’ (Gerring 2006: 
41). 
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The testing of hypotheses with a great degree of confidence is not the aim of 
the single case. Its uniqueness is better suited for the generation of several 
theoretical statements or hypotheses about regularities of social life and to 
falsify sweeping theories that attempt to make universal claims (Becker 1970; 
Gerring 2006. Put simply, the difference between the two can be described as a 
‘trade-off between hypothesis generating and hypothesis testing’ (Gerring 
2006: 41). This problem does not apply to this particular research, as this study 
does not set out to test hypotheses about the economic behaviour of Muslim 
consumers of Islamic banks or to make universal claims about Muslims. On the 
contrary, it seeks to illustrate a holistic and detailed picture of the sector in 
Malaysia. Neither does it suffer from subjective bias towards verification 
(Flyvbjerg 2006: 17–20) that arises from a single case study when researchers 
set out with preconceived notions. As explained earlier, the raison d'être of 
grounded theory is not compatible with preconceived hypotheses. If there were 
ever any danger of my entering the field with preconceived notions, the hard 
evidence that emerged with an immersion in the social world being investigated, 
would immediately have forced me to reconsider my ideas.  
 
When taking into consideration the aims and carefully crafted methodology of 
my research, there is no reason to believe that multiple cases would provide an 
advantage. Building Malaysia as a paradigmatic case requires intense 
observation that can only be the result of a singular focus on constructing 
knowledge revealed in the interaction between participant and researcher. ‘The 
proximity to reality, which the case study entails, and the learning process which 
it generates for the researcher will often constitutes a prerequisite for advanced 
understanding’ (Flyvbjerg 2006: 21). At worst, given the very limited resources 
and time allocated to doctoral researchers, the use of a larger sample could 
have resulted in a superficial account of several cases omitting the ‘rich 
ambiguities’ (Nietzsche 1974, quoted in Flyvbjerg 2006: 21) and nuances of the 
Islamic finance sector. Despite the singular focus on Malaysia, reference will be 
made to other Muslim countries especially GCC states. The use of a single 
case does not exclude the addition of ‘other cases that are often brought into 
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the analysis in a peripheral way’ (Gerring 2006: 22). The global nature of the 
Islamic finance sector makes it difficult and counterproductive to exclude 
references to other similarly successful examples like the GCC. The common 
sense perspective that underpins a lot of the Islamic financial literature and 
seeks to depict Muslims with a broad brush stroke, increases the importance of 
including references to other Muslim societies that unlike Malaysia, are 
unsuccessful in developing Islamic finance 
 
 
3.2.1 Fieldwork site 
 
The fieldwork site was located in Kuala Lumpur, the home of the iconic Twin 
Towers, named after the state-owned oil and gas company and designed by the 
world famous architect Cesar Pelli. The towers, at one point the tallest globally, 
are architectural symbols of Malaysia’s modernity: the gargantuan landmark 
enshrines Malaysia’s status as an emerging economic and political power in the 
region, whilst the sophisticated steel and glass façade allude to Malaysia’s 
Islamic heritage by suggesting Islamic geometrical motifs. With the exception of 
Penang, a predominantly Chinese location, Kuala Lumpur is Malaysia’s most 
urbanised area. When discussing sampling, Glaser and Strauss (1967) 
suggested that grounded theory rests on the generation and elaboration of 
theory is created from a site that is able to ‘produce as many categories and 
properties of categories as possible, and to facilitate the emergence of relations 
among categories’ (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007: 32).  
 
As the host of the headquarters of the conventional and Islamic banks and the 
regulatory bodies and financial educational sectors, it is the centre of the 
Malaysian financial sector. The largest conglomerates operating in the country 
and state-run companies like Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS) are also 
based there. Geographically, the urban Malay middle class is concentrated in 
Kuala Lumpur and its satellite, Petaling Jaya (PJ) in the Klang Valley (Talib 
2002). The indicators of middle class wealth, contrasting the upper class and 
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expat lavishness and the deprivation of rural areas are plentiful. An overview of 
the middle-class Kuala Lumpur landscape would reveal lower end foreign cars 
and the locally manufactured Proton parked outside terraced houses, 
bungalows, and condos. By wandering around the malls speckled around the 
city would one would observe locals, ‘malling’, shopping, playing arcade games 
or queuing for the cinema. The wet markets and traditional stalls are always 
packed. Malaysians love to eat out: the consumption of food is a social 
occasion.47 More upmarket restaurants, especially those located in hotels are 
reserved for special events, from holidays to weddings or religious festivals like 
Ramadan. Increasingly, families can afford to employ maids from neighbouring 
Indonesia or the Philippines. They can be observed shopping at wet markets or 
caring for the children during leisurely events.  
 
Besides the diversity and dynamism of the city, the socio-economic status of the 
inhabitants was a main factor for choosing Kuala Lumpur as a site. Given that 
the research focuses on the mass financialisation of Islamic finance through the 
everyday practices of people who consume Islamic banking products, people 
‘without significant capital’, such as middle-class homeowners (Martin 
2002: 12), the fieldwork site had to include a large concentration of individuals 
who fit this description. It is individuals in urban areas who predominantly tap 
into the financial system. The slower development of the financial system in 
rural areas is also reflected in the relatively weak reach of Islamic banking.  
 
Research shows that residents in rural areas tend to be less likely to be tapped 
into the financial sector. When compared to urban counterparts, they are not as 
familiar with banking terms and concepts. There is also a greater resistance by 
rural consumers to adopt Islamic banking practices. They are less aware of its 
existence, perceive the products to be too complex are ambivalent concerning 
its Islamic claims (Thambiah et al. 2011: 189–93). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Wet markets are traditional food markets, typical of South East Asia, providing both fresh 
produce and cooked food. 
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3.3 Research design for an interpretative investigation 
 
Studying the daily conduct of everyday Islamic finance practices which 
predominantly consist of ‘the prosaic practices of saving and borrowing’ 
(Langley 2008: 11) rests on an investigation of the participant’s perspective. It is 
by exploring the layperson’s worldview that we can grasp how they understand 
the Islamic value of the sector, as well as their trust of shariah regulation and 
the halal brand.48  
 
Investigations into the ‘pluralisation of life worlds’ (Flick 2009: 2) are particularly 
associated with qualitative methods, and in particular, an interpretative 
methodology, which ‘takes note of the manner in which actors, reasons and 
intentions are centrally involved in the creation and recreation of social life’ 
(Layder 2006: 164). This method means that assumptions about the worlds 
studied are tested and not unwittingly reproduced. On a basic level it means 
documenting what research participants say and discovering what they take for 
granted or omit to mention.  
 
The interpretative approach is characterised by its ‘orientation to questions of 
meaning’, on problems relating to the how and why of things (Yanov and 
Schwartz-Shea 2006: 17). The endeavour to ‘see research participants’ lives 
from the inside’ allows the researcher to ‘enter the settings’ and ‘gives a 
researcher otherwise unobtainable views’ (Charmaz 2006: 14). The 
interpretative method is driven by a particular set of ontological assumptions. 
The world is viewed as messy, complex, and ripe with meaning and 
characterised by interaction effects that are knowable only after the fact, 
(Bennett and Elman 2006: 456–58). Accordingly, this assumption drives the 
method used to contribute to a particular form of knowledge about Islamic 
banking. The distinct ontology and epistemology are what mark this research as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 It is crucial to point out that the aim of interviewing consumers is not to test the validity of their 
knowledge about the sector, or measure their behaviour against authentic Islamic practices. As I 
go on to explain in Chapter 4, the dogmas and practices found in Muslim societies vary. 
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a sociological study of an economic phenomenon, as opposed to an economic 
study. The research is focused on ‘economic norms and institutions that are 
created for economic ends and are significant because of their economic 
aspect’ (Swedberg 2003: 13) as well as patterns of economic behaviour, yet the 
methods used to study the phenomenon are distinct from what is expected from 
an orthodox economics research project. Indeed, ‘research methods can’t be 
regarded independently of the research process and the issue under study. 
They are specifically embedded in the research process’ (Flick 2009 1). The 
methods employed must be shaped by the research problem and driving the 
overarching processual framework. They aid the researcher to locate, collect 
and analyse the data required to address the research question. 
 
Qualitative research is sometimes critiqued as a second best strategy for 
quantitatively challenged researchers or a slapdash means of collecting data for 
‘journalists without a deadline’ (Bennett and Elman 2006: 458). This unfair 
critique stems from an inability to grasp the advantages of qualitative methods, 
which are anyway often complementary to the quantitative approach. Other 
doubts have been raised about qualitative method’s rigour in generating theory 
about ‘systematic social patterns’ or those that can be extended to other 
contexts (Hammersley 1992). This study makes no attempt to make sweeping 
statements that hold over long periods of time or over a variety of countries or 
axiomatic generalisations about Muslims or Islamic bank consumers. The 
research aims for the more modest goal of ‘bringing a semblance of order and 
consistency to the social interaction’ within the consumers’ microcosm, with the 
aim of drawing ‘modest, pragmatic generalizations from these personal 
experiences’ (Payne and Williams 2005: 296).  
 
Most research on Islamic banking consumer behaviour uses quantitative 
methods. These methods were used in surveys carried out by Abdullah and 
Dusuki (2006), Haque (2010), Thambiah et al. (2011) on consumer perception 
of Islamic banking in Malaysia. Researching the same question, Gerrard and 
Cunningham (1997) in the case of Singapore used quantitative methods, as did 
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Pepinsky (2010) in his study of Indonesia. These studies were useful for the 
preliminary deskwork and also for the potential mapping out of grand 
generalisations. A notable exception is Maurer’s (2005) provocative 
ethnography of Islamic banking in Indonesia and his research on Islamic 
mortgages in the United States of America (2006). In addition, there are 
ethnographies that investigate consumption of a wide variety of Islamic 
commodities and industries. These include Starrett’s (1995) article on the 
political economy of religious commodities in Cairo, Fischer’s work on the halal 
industry amongst the Malaysian diaspora in the UK and in Malaysia (2008; 
2011) and Gillette’s  (2000) investigation on Muslim piety and modernity in 
China.  
 
Amongst the reasons why research on Islamic banking uses quantitative 
methods is that they allow researchers to make extensive generalisations about 
a population. This helps map out the general trends, but due to their restrictive 
nature they neither expose nor explore the context or complexities involved. For 
instance, Pepinsky's (2010) attempt to define and quantify piety, discussed 
below. Crucially, the methods used in this research permit ‘an in-depth 
exploration of a particular topic with a person who has had the relevant 
experience’ (Charmaz 2006: 25). Tools like in-depth interviews or participant 
observation enable researchers to access views and narratives that are 
unobtainable through surveys. Qualitative methods give the researcher the right 
data to ‘construct meaning of their reality’. They also allow for spontaneity as 
unplanned follow-up questions to unanticipated answers are encouraged. In my 
case, this has often led to the emergence of unforeseen data. For instance, it 
transpired that respondents spent a huge chunk of their leisure time ‘malling’ – 
wandering around shopping malls without purchasing anything. This denotes a 
predilection for consumption that would not have emerged had I simply focused 
on quantifiable spending habits. It’s also unlikely that I would have been made 
aware of the term ‘malling’.  
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The other problem associated with surveys is that they use categories that are 
narrow and based on assumptions that can seem inadequate to a sociologist. 
The danger is that they could depict participants within a pre-defined theoretical 
construct that might be based on stereotypical popular ideas. For instance, 
surveys that attempt to correlate piety with the use of IB, like Pepinsky (2010) 
could be exposed to critique for their definition and quantification of piety. 
Sociologists’ knowledge of the numerous Islamic practices can encumber the 
effort to standardise one notion of piety. In his study on Islamic mortgages, 
Maurer (2006: 68) noted the problematic nature of using all-encompassing 
descriptive categories such as conservative or liberal Muslim. They reify the 
very constructs that researchers set out to dismantle in the first place. For 
instance, it was only through qualitative research that I was able to grasp the 
nuances of trust and confidence. The interconnections between different 
systems of trust require the researcher to consider ‘how a particular trust 
relationship under investigation is related to the individual respondent’s other 
relationships’ (Mollering 2006: 153). Discovering that one of the respondents 
was gay was pertinent to his scepticism of Islamic banking. His attitude cannot 
be divorced from his experience of the Malaysian state’s treatment of 
homosexuals and Islam’s stance towards homosexuality. It is unlikely that this 
fact would have emerged from a survey. For this reason, time was spent trying 
to understand the respondents, their world-views and their histories and 
relationships. Enjoying leisure activities, participating in their mundane everyday 
activities was integral to gaining their trust. 
 
 
3.3.2 A note on ‘ordinary’ people and everyday practices  
 
Historically, ethnographic research privileges participant’s voices, especially 
from the point of view of communities who are disenfranchised or peripheral. 
Whilst, my respondents are neither, my project also reiterates a commitment 
towards a more inclusive and ‘human’ sociology. To this end, I quote Braudel, 
one of the leading exponents of the Annales School, who was committed to 
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understanding the social life of people from past epochs; although my main 
focus is the contemporary era, like Braudel (1992: 31), I believe that ‘clearly, our 
starting point must be the people of the world. Only afterwards can we talk 
about things’. Indeed, the starting point of this project is not merely people, but 
‘ordinary people’ who individually make up the masses propping up the private 
consumption sustaining the Malaysian economy.  
 
The social studies of finance, a relatively novel research field that took its lead 
from ‘new’ economic sociology, has both localized the broader global processes 
within financial hubs (Langley 2008) and ‘provide[d] rich descriptions of 
everyday life in the financial industry and insights into the conceptual 
frameworks professionals bring to distributing credit around the globe’ (Hart 
2013). Yet, as their critics have pointed out, the very nature of their studies 
sterilises any political questions in their research agenda. Their limited scope 
generally neglects the experience of the ordinary person in favour of a restricted 
study on a small homogenous social group of experts and the economic elite as 
well as ‘things’ or the technical dimensions of financial mechanics (Ross 2011; 
Hart and Oritz 2014). As Langley (2008: 7) points out, bar some notable 
exceptions49, ‘very little is done to explicitly re‐orientate enquiry beyond global 
finance, beyond professional, expert, and elite networks of knowledge and 
technology … and the social studies of finance has, with some irony, tended to 
continue to divorce finance from society at large’. According to Hart (2013), this 
is notable in their disregard of money. In a review about contemporary research 
on money and finance, He writes: ‘as a result, financial practitioners’ 
preoccupation with money is somehow by-passed. It is as if finance were not a 
branch of the economy. And how world society is constituted through monetary 
relations never enters the intellectual agenda’. 
 
Other scholars, determinedly less diplomatic in their assessment of the 
sociology of finance’s deep-rooted interest in the elite and experts of global 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Langley (2008) singles out Alex Preda's (2001, 2005) works on ‘popular investment’ as the 
exception to the rule.  
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finance, accuse the mainstream exponents of the social science of finance of 
being complicit with elite epistemic communities. For instance, Miller writes that 
Callon (1988), a leading figure of Actor Network Theory (ANT) produces a 
‘defence of the economists’ view of the world and a rejection of the evidence of 
how actual economies operate as available to anthropologists and sociologists’ 
(Miller 2002: 219).  
 
The aim of my focus on the everyday practices of ordinary people who posses 
neither the power nor the expertise to constitute Islamic banking ‘from above’ is 
not to dismiss the study of experts, but to demonstrate a commitment to depict 
a nuanced portrayal of the diversity of social practices and to raise questions 
about a social group that tends to be marginalised in the study of finance. This 
text’s focus on ordinary people and their everyday and endotic practices stems 
for an ontological commitment to the everyday and a corollary epistemological 
perspective that, on one hand seeks to assess banking practices on the terms 
of the people who engage in them, and on the other, seeks to discover the 
hidden political undercurrents that shape these practices.  
 
Sociological research focused on experts and elites that does not critically 
assess the hidden politics behind the authority of expert epistemological 
communities does raise ethical issues regarding complicity. This categorisation 
can also reinforce a dualism between the knowledge of experts and ‘ignorance’ 
of non-experts – a distinction that I view with a degree of scepticism. For our 
purposes, the term ‘ordinary’ or ‘lay’ people is used to draw conceptual 
boundaries around a category of people which is often ignored in studies of 
finance and to juxtapose its social status with that of experts who rank higher in 
the social hierarchy due to their leveraging of institutional power. Accordingly, I 
define an expert as an actor who possesses technical expertise and education, 
and authority that is backed by institutions including, but not limited to, the state. 
These experts have the power to manage the ‘supply’ of Islamic banking 
products, whether it is through regulation, creation, institutionalisation, or 
governance. My respondents are not experts precisely because they do not 
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have this power within the realms of finance/banking and Islam. This definition 
stems from my previously stated commitment to understanding how questions 
of power and institutions shape the unfolding of Islamic banking practices. As 
we shall read in Chapter 6, the institutional backing reinforces the authority of 
these experts to mediate Islamic banking practices, thus enabling a hierarchy of 
knowledge that sets ordinary people up for trust in and reliance on experts.  
 
The lacunae of social studies of finance is also linked to another factor, namely 
the unglamorous and endotic quality of everyday practices that ordinary people 
engage. Perec (2008:204) uses the word ‘endotic’ to describe an everyday that 
is neither ordinary nor extraordinary, neither banal nor exotic. Retail banking is 
so familiar and intertwined with every aspect of our daily life, even that of 
sociologists, that unlike spectacular forms of finance or consumption, it fails to 
register significant interest in academia (Botterill 2010). Conducting research in 
the trading floors of Wall Street or the City of London exudes more exotic 
glamour and power than strolling around supermarkets or hanging out in 
suburban banks to discuss the cost of living with middle-class people.  
 
 
3.4 Grounded theory 
 
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, not having a directly given research 
question lent itself well to the nature of grounded theory. Instead of testing a 
given set of hypotheses or just engaging in description, research questions and 
theory had to be developed throughout the fieldwork as part of the on-going 
research process. The aim of this approach, which is to ‘dig deep into the 
empirical and build analytical structures that reach up to the hypothetical’, 
(Charmaz 2006: 151) firmly locates the project within grounded theory. The 
main characteristic of grounded theory is precisely its ‘grounding’ of theory, in 
empirically rich data. 
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My review of literature on Islamic banking and economic sociology enabled 
‘theoretical sensitivity’ but stopped short of being a literature review (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967: 226). During the preliminary stages of grounded theory, various 
literatures are explored, but the literature review is usually delayed to a later 
stage. As often is the case in ethnographic research, ‘the absence of detailed 
knowledge of a phenomenon or process itself represents a useful starting point’ 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 2007: 22). Familiarising visits to Malaysia, and on-
going meetings with Malaysian Islamic banking practitioners and the studying of 
IB products ensured a reasonable familiarity with the setting without ‘seeing the 
context ‘through the lens of extant ideas’ (Charmaz 2006: 6). Even proponents 
of grounded theory suggest considerable progress can sometimes be made in 
clarifying and developing research problems before fieldwork begins 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 2007: 21).  
 
There is more than one approach towards grounded theory. The Strauss and 
Corbin approach is known for being rigorous and systematic and has been 
criticised for restricting the approach based on a set of protocols (Charmaz 
2006. The use of grounded theory, or, as Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) 
term it, ‘grounded theorising’, as grounded theory is technically the final 
outcome, is in this project conceived as ‘a general stance toward the 
development of fruitful ideas, concepts and theories that were generated 
through a close exploration of data’ (2007: 166) 
 
Given Bryant and Charmaz (2007) and Glaser’s use of grounded theorising as a 
flexible and useful heuristic, their approach was the one that I heeded. Instead 
of a formulaic approach, their method is associated with a broadminded 
commitment to all forms of data and its emphasis on the development of 
abstract concepts that can be applied to other contexts. Diverse kinds of data 
were employed to ‘theorise how meanings, action, and social structure are 
constructed’ (Charmaz 2006: 151). The main sources used included collections 
of personal accounts and compilations of detailed narratives from transcribed 
tapes of interviews conducted with Islamic banking consumers , bankers, 
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regulators, journalists, and other practitioners. Field notes of observation and 
casual conversation were collected through episodes of participant observation 
at halal trade fairs (MIHAS), Islamic banks, Islamic banking conferences, 
Islamic finance educational institutes and with Islamic banking consumers at 
restaurants, coffee shops, and shopping malls.  
 
The initial points of departure – bank preference, saving and spending patterns, 
Islamic doctrine and practices, and morality of finance – enabled me to form the 
initial interview questions. Grounded theory shares some of its basic 
characteristics with ethnographic fieldwork since most types of analysis include 
an interactive process (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007: 158). Given that its aim 
is to generate concepts that fit within the empirical reality, rather than 
formulating a detailed portrayal, the description is not as what Geertz (1973: 5-
6, 9-10) would deem as ‘thick’. Yet, the two approaches share a holistic 
interpretative approach involving the mining of unstructured data, the on-going 
development of the analytical categories and the small sample (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967; Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). 
 
The in-depth, empirically rich techniques of grounded theory suit the 
requirements of the sample size of this research project, a single case study. 
The success of the individual case is reliant on in-depth knowledge and 
evidence associated with grounded theory. Its definite strength lies in the 
necessity of its ‘interpretations to have a stronger evidential base’ (Payne and 
Williams 2005: 299). 
 
A main feature of grounded theory is that hypotheses are not formulated a priori 
to data collection. Rather it is developed in a cyclical manner simultaneously 
with the data collection process (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Charmaz 2006. 
Abductive reasoning aims to generate theory that would be most likely to 
explain the facts – rather than trying to prove the salience of one theory over 
another. Therefore, the aim is to choose the hypothesis that best explains the 
evidence on the ground. This evidence, coded data, shapes theory which in turn 
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shapes the collection of data, like a feedback loop, allowing the researcher to 
switch from data to theory, via theoretical memos which capture ‘meaning and 
ideas for one’s growing theory at the moment they occur’ (Glaser 1998: 178). 
Thus, the exigencies of this method dictate that theory and data mutually shape 
and inform each other. Theory is used instrumentally in order to conceptualise 
and explain the substantive area of focus, in this case: everyday Islamic 
banking practices in Malaysia.   
 
With this in mind, throughout the fieldwork I was collecting and interpreting data 
from which to construct theory. After a number of interviews and significant 
amount of participant observation, certain patterns started emerging. For 
instance, the issue of trust in the shariah system became increasingly evident. 
These issues were reflected upon and used immediately or later as categories 
or patterns to explore. The very nature of grounded theory sets the research 
trajectory into a dialectic and deviating loop. The process is not linear. Ideas are 
explored and return to later, at various stages (Glaser and Strauss 1967; 
Charmaz 2006). And in these ways, to one degree or another, the analysis of 
data feeds into research design and data collection. ‘It ought to involve an 
iterative process in which ideas are used to make sense of data, and data are 
used to change our ideas’ write (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995: 205). In other 
words, there should be movement back and forth between ideas and data. 
Accordingly, the method involved more than just analysing the data and 
recording the findings. The researcher is expected to continuously mine the 
data until theoretical patterns emerge. ‘We must be prepared to go beyond the 
data to develop ideas that will illuminate them, and this will allow us to link our 
ideas with those of others; and we must then bring those ideas back to test their 
fit with further data, and so on’ (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007: 158). 
 
This research meets other criteria that Charmaz (2006) outlines as fundamental 
to grounded theory studies. These are based around credibility, originality, 
resonance, and usefulness. They include intimate familiarity with the setting and 
topic; a sufficient range of data covering a wide range of empirical observations; 
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systematic comparisons between observations and categories; fresh categories 
that offer new insights; theory that challenges and refines current ideas; 
revealing unstable taken-for-granted meanings; drawing links between 
institutions and individual lives; contributing with knowledge that can spark 
further research in other substantive areas (Charmaz 2006: 182–83). The 
discussion below will illustrate how this research complies to these criteria with 
practical examples. 
 
Throughout the fieldwork, systematic comparisons, often in email discussions 
with my supervisor were also being made. Only a few weeks into the fieldwork, 
it became apparent that a considerable section of Islamic banks were 
subsidiaries of conventional banks. The research was adjusted accordingly, and 
effort was made to meet representatives of these banks. With regards to 
consumers, categories brought up by respondents, like Muslim and Islam, were 
unravelled and not taken for granted. Respondents were probed to elaborate 
and part of the analysis tried to review this category and understand how it was 
linked to other categories inherent to Malaysian identity. Links were made 
between consumers and institutions through the abstract idea of trust. It was not 
immediately obvious as to how consumers’ preference formation developed. It 
was a result of the grounded theorising, which allowed the concepts of trust and 
confidence to emerge and generate a nuanced picture of the choice formation.  
 
The data reaped from these initial interviews allowed me to take draw on 
patterns and link them with construct abstractions, which I then continued to 
investigate at more advanced phases of the fieldwork. This non-linear method 
of investigation, looping back and forth from empirical ‘reality’ to abstracted 
conceptualisation was the perfect fit for the development of novel frameworks of 
theory. The acknowledgement of variations amongst Islamic banking practices, 
as opposed to one homogenous framework, particularly suits research focusing 
on social phenomena that fall under the Islamic umbrella, such as Islamic 
banking. Given the propensity of journalistic perspectives on Islamic banking to 
‘black box’ Muslims or Islam, this method is particularly suited for presenting 
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substantive findings that are unequivocally particular to subsection of Kuala 
Lumpur, occur at a unique juncture, and do not claim to be representative of all 
Muslim communities. Despite making no attempts to construct a grand theory of 
all Muslims, or even Malaysians, this research project generates a number of 
insights that can raise comparative questions with other communities of Islamic 
banking consumers, within and outside of Malaysia. In particular, my findings on 
how Islamic banking consumers actively construct their Islamic banking 
practices, trust, shariah regulation and expertise, and rely on social capital 
found in personalised trust relations, sets a successful standard against which 
absence (of Islamic banking practices) can be examined. 
 
 
3.5 Ideal types 
 
The grounded theory that emerged from the grounded theorising includes ideal 
types. Weber first introduced these typologies to sociology in his own 
interpretative studies of economic action. As heuristic tools they are perfect for 
delineating the stark differences between types of action, which can only be 
captured through interpretative methods. Weber used them as tools to show 
that, although on the surface people’s economic action appeared identical, the 
meaning underpinning this action was different. Similarly, the use of this tool 
allows me to capture the differences in meaning between three rational types of 
Islamic banking actors: the idealist Virtuoso, the routine-bound Pragmatist and 
the mistrustful Sceptic.  
 
These concepts are ‘observer-identified’ (Lofland et al. 2006) in that they were 
not identified by the respondents, but by myself – the researcher. As is 
expected of typologies, the three types are not precise renditions of empirical 
reality. ‘The ideality of such a type lies in its simplification and aloofness from 
detail: it will be free from the detailed complexity of the actuality to be analysed 
with its aid’ (Watkins 1952: 23–24). Consumer choice is often messy and not 
monolithic or singular – even within the same individual (Warde 1994). Also, 
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real people do not conform to these types. Ideal types serve as useful heuristic 
tools that stress and interpret commonalities in people that display similar 
behavioural patterns.  
 
Their main value is in providing a ‘bird’s eye view’ (Watkins 1952: 24) of the 
respondents and crystallising their most salient characteristics. Capturing the 
varying emphasis of different arrangements enables a systematic analysis (Hart 
1988: 191). The ideal types will evolve throughout the empirical chapters, but 
the next section will introduce us to the main characteristics of each archetype. 
A striking feature of these types is that they each show evidence of a hierarchy 
of interests, with the order of ideal and material interests shifting across each 
type. They also showed different combinations of reflexivity and routine, with 
reflexivity becoming heightened amongst all three types during times of 
personal or macro economic crises 
 
 
3.6 Historical analysis 
 
Fieldwork was only a part of the overall project. Historical and documentation 
analysis as well as preliminary desk work, are an integral aspect of this project. 
The perspectives of Islamic banking consumers in Chapters 7 and 8 are 
accompanied by a historical and data analysis of the global and Malaysian 
Islamic banking sector and of the relationship between Islam and capitalism in 
Malaysia and in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), aspects of which are 
mainly located in Chapters 1, 4, and 5. Thus, the analysis of the micro issues 
are framed within a broader macro perspective that incorporates the 
contemporary and the historical.  
 
Although he was addressing historians, E. H. Carr’s maxim about history that ‘to 
master and understand it as the key to the understanding of the present’ is a 
useful reminder for sociologists seeking to understand current phenomena 
(1987: 26). Unfortunately, most research on finance excludes an analysis of 
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phenomena that are outside the limits of the observation of ethnographic 
fieldwork. Whilst this approach generates nuanced observations of everyday 
life, it limits the analysis of the researcher to what is immediately discernable. 
This is problematic because ‘not only do social interactions proliferate beyond 
our gaze, but so too do the concepts and narratives that people use to make 
sense of them … [therefore] The first step in linking everyday practices to the 
global contexts that make them understandable is historical comparison’ (Hart 
and Oritz 2014: 475–76). The historical long view serves a second purpose. 
The documentation of social change can impede the researcher from 
reproducing people’s vision of the sector. In the case of Islamic banking, this 
caveat is especially important. Islamic banking is a top-down phenomenon with 
propagates its unique set of ‘origin myths’ that are aligned with the powerful 
interests of the state, banks, and co-opted shariah scholars.  
 
Thus, historical analysis aided me to locate the origins of these myths and 
perceive the social and power relations that exist beyond our immediate gaze 
and prevented me from reproducing ‘the industry’s own vision of itself’ (Hart and 
Oritz 2014: 476). This is especially the case with the Islamic revivalism that 
constructs historical facts and traditions that suit its interests, and which collide 
with the interests of the Islamic banking industry. As I explain in Chapter 5, the 
most obvious example is the mythology that accompanies Islamic finance and 
which Maurer’s otherwise excellent work failed to spot. In Chapter 2, I argue 
that the repercussion of excluding a historical analysis is that the idea of Muslim 
exceptionalism found on both sides of the ideological divide and on a scholarly 
levelis reinforced50.  
 
Second, studies of Islamic banking that forgo a historical analysis exclude the 
centrality of colonial relations in the production and reproduction of this 
knowledge. The origins of modern Islamic moralising as a reaction to Western 
imperialism was highlighted in the first chapter. In the Chapter 4, I explain how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 It is interesting that parallels exist with the ‘more extreme products of Soviet and anti-Soviet 
schools of historiography’ noted by historian Edward Hallett Carr (1987).  
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the colonial domination of Malays also shaped the role of Islam in politics and 
society and help explain its intense contestation in contemporary Malaysia, and 
therefore its salience with regards to the identity formation of Muslim-Malays 
and its Islamic banking practices. It was thanks to primary sources – 
recollections from people involved in the Islamic banking movement from the 
1970s to recent times, and others around them – that I was able to corroborate 
firsthand how the Islamic Banking Act of 1983 emerged as a result of United 
Malays National Organisation’s (UMNO – the leading party within the Barisan 
National coalition) strategy to out-Islamise the Islamic opposition.  
 
 
3.7 Document analysis  
 
Modern day research is increasingly incorporating documents. Researchers 
realised that documents ‘can provide information about the settings being 
studied, or about their wider contexts, and particularly about key figures or 
organizations. Sometimes this information will be of a kind that is not available 
from other sources. On other occasions they may provide important 
corroboration, or may challenge, information received from informants or from 
observation’ (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007: 122). 
 
Although oral testimonies, through interviews, are given priority in this project, 
material resources such as documentation and imagery were also collected and 
analysed. ‘In many instances, therefore, ethnographers need to take account of 
documents as part of the social setting under investigation’ (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 2007: 122). 
 
The written word is important for this project for a number of reasons. First, my 
respondents were all literate and documents are an essential feature of their 
everyday life. Second, banking practices are especially dependent on 
documentation as they are contract and promotional documentation heavy.  
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Documentation and imagery are an integral aspect of Islamic banking practices 
as respondents read promotional material, analyse the figures provided by 
banks and read and sign contracts. Third, the written word is crucial for Islamic 
banking because Islam relies heavily on the written words of the holy texts, the 
most important of which is thought to record the word of God (discussed in 
further detail in Chapter 5).  
 
Certainly, documentation should not be taken as given and ‘official documents 
and enumerations should be treated as social products: they must be 
examined, not relied on uncritically as a research resource’ (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 2007: 130). This caveat was heeded when, for instance, analysing the 
images and symbols and logos used by the Islamic banking sector and the 
wider halal industry. As we shall read in Chapter 5, the selection of images and 
calligraphy used in the branding of the banks and their promotional literature is 
socially significant. As Hammersley and Atkinson point out, if we want to make 
sense of many social worlds, we ought to take account of how they are 
physically constituted (2007: 134). ‘Documents of all types can help the 
researcher uncover meaning, develop understanding, and discover insights 
relevant to the research problem’ (Merriam 1988: 118). Documentation analysis 
is mainly located in Chapter 5. The main focus of this type of analysis was the 
production of knowledge and narratives that inform the sector’s construction by 
state and banks and complement the interviews and participant observation 
conducted with experts. 
 
The advantages of document analysis is that it’s ‘efficient, available cost-
effective, unobtrusive stable exact’ important when dealing with experts who are 
short of time (Bowen 2009: 31). The process included ‘skimming, reading 
interpretation’ (Bowen 2009: 32). Identification process is important. Over the 
three years I collected an immense archive of magazines, leaflets, adverts, 
articles. One of the tasks was to sift through the information and decide what 
was relevant, before proceeding to the analysis section (Strauss and Corbin 
1998; Corbin and Strauss 2008). 
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The document analysis was predominantly based on thematic analysis. The 
method is complementary to the principles of grounded theorising as the 
researchers analysis the data in an effort to recognise emerging themes that 
can become theoretical categories (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006). ‘The 
process involves a careful, more focused re-reading and review of the data. The 
reviewer takes a closer look at the selected data and performs coding and 
category construction, based on the data’s characteristics, to uncover themes 
pertinent to a phenomenon’ (Bowen 2009: 32). In this case, predefined codes 
that had emerged from the interviews and participant observation were used. It 
helped to integrate the data collected from the other methods and also 
emphasise certain arguments that would not have been as easy to extract. For 
instance, being able to compare and contrast theory versus practice in bank 
practices with consumers allowed me to analyse the veiled social relations 
behind with credit risk – which in theory banks were not supposed to engage in. 
Also since I could not be present during the actual meeting during which Islamic 
banking consumers acquire a product or a service, I could get a better sense of 
the discourse that banks use when selling products.  
 
 
3.8 Preliminary desk work 
 
The historical and document analysis did not only take place during or after 
fieldwork. Due to my longstanding research interests, I had already engaged in 
serious research into the subject matter. As an undergraduate, I developed a 
strong interest in the MENA region, which resulted in a dissertation that 
analysed the discourse of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Libya following 
Qaddafi’s rapprochement with the ‘West’. Having decided that I wanted to 
continue focusing on the region, I was intrigued by a series of articles about 
Islamic finance in The Financial Times (FT) published right after the 2007–08 
credit crunch. As I researched the sector, it became increasingly obvious that 
there was very little research about the topic and that, very often, the narrative 
being spun by the interested actors camouflaged a web of contradictions.  
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My research on Islamic banking started with my 2009 MSc dissertation (‘Why 
the Camel is Tied. Towards a Political Sociology of Islamic Finance in the 
MENA Region: The Egyptian Case’). It was through this dissertation, which 
discussed the conflicting political and societal pressures underpinning the 
Islamic finance sector in Egypt, that I started to develop an understanding of the 
sector. This included exploring the scholarly debates, analysing the internal 
tensions though the practitioners’ literature and by attending Islamic finance 
conferences and seminars, as well as by analysing Islamic finance through the 
theoretical framework provided by political and economic sociology.  
 
Following my MSc dissertation, I continued to attend Islamic finance events and 
develop my network, whilst shifting my attention away from the MENA region 
towards the global hub of Islamic finance, Malaysia. Before returning to the 
London School of Economics (LSE) in 2010, I spent four months exploring 
Malaysia and another three learning Arabic in Tunisia. Both served as 
preparation for this PhD.  
 
In the months before I embarked on fieldwork, desk work was undertaken to 
familiarise myself with the socio-economic landscape of Kuala Lumpur in order 
to determine how to select respondents for interview, how to approach 
interviews about financial matters, and also to prepare a list of questions and 
themes. The main method for data collection on population characteristics was 
through a comprehensive review of a broad range of secondary data sources. 
This included the review of household income surveys and surveys on Muslim 
communities, such as the ‘Communities and Local Government Summary 
Report on Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities in England’ (2009). 
 
Another source of secondary literature provided the context and sensitised the 
approach towards the themes and controversies linked to Islamic finance. This 
included a review of research on the behaviour of Islamic finance consumers 
(Dusuki and Abdullah 2007; Haque 2010; Thambiah et al. 2011) and other 
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South East Asian countries (Gerrard and Cunningham 1997 and Pepinsky 
2010). I also reviewed anthropological and sociological accounts of Islamic 
finance and other halal industries amongst Muslim communities in South East 
Asia and the Middle East (Gillette 2000; Kuran 2004; Maurer 2005; 2006; Tripp 
2006; Fischer 2008; 2011). 
 
 
3.9 Pilot Interviews  
 
Pilot interviews were held with a number of Malaysian citizens and other 
Muslims of different nationalities in London during January and February 2012. 
The aim was less to analyse respondents’ answers and more to refine 
approaches and reframe any questions that might have been too leading, 
misleading or inappropriate.   
 
The pilot interviews gave me a practical insight into the type of obstacles I’d 
have to negotiate during further interviews in Malaysia. Interviews with 
Malaysians living in London gave me an insight into Malaysian attitudes towards 
subjects such as Islam, finance, money, consumption and wealth. This 
information informed the set-up of the interviews and the composition of the 
questions and also helped minimise social gaffes. In Malaysia, ‘saving face’ is 
integral to the continuation of relations. When asking questions about sensitive 
subjects like consumption or even status, it is crucial to prevent the respondent 
from ‘losing face’. It was also helpful to know what type of gifts would be 
acceptable and how to navigate questions regarding my personal marital status 
and religious adherence. Admitting to being agnostic or atheist is rarely 
acceptable in Muslim communities. The presence of a single unmarried female 
eager to establish friendships could also elicit unwanted responses. Developing 
strategies to mitigate these potential pitfalls was part of the preparatory process. 
Following the pilot interviews, a detailed discussion was held with my 
supervisor, and a strategy was devised to counteract the shortcomings. Some 
questions were rewritten in order to indicate knowledge of the subject to the 
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respondent. For example, when asking about zakat, the exact percentage 
required under shariah was included.  
 
 
3.10 ‘Getting in’  
 
‘Getting in’ – gaining access to people you want to study is a problem that 
afflicts researchers doing empirical work (Becker 1970: 15). A researcher 
studying the consumption patterns of the Hui, a minority Muslim community in 
Xi’an China, wrote, ‘almost three months into my fieldwork, I wondered if any 
Hui were ever going to talk to me for more than five minutes’ (Gillette 2000: 20). 
Keeping in mind the guardedness of certain communities towards foreigners, I 
used key informants to scope interviews with actors from the supply and 
demand side.  
 
The credibility of informants depends on the researcher’s ability to assess 
critically the informant’s role, actions, and statements in the context being 
researched. They are instrumental to the collection of data and yet can also be 
a source of data in themselves (Becker 1970: 29–30). A researcher must reflect 
on the informant’s possible bias and interest in the project. My informants’ 
interest in aiding my research was evaluated. It was obvious that they believed 
that an LSE researcher added credibility and value to the sector. Throughout 
the research process, the LSE name was often used as leverage to gain access 
with experts and into elite circles. Being aware of their motivation alerted me 
towards their tendency to gloss over controversial aspects of Islamic finance or 
their tendency to ignore individuals or organisations, such as the Malaysian 
Islamic Consumer Association, which is very critical of Islamic finance.  
 
The time constraints imposed on PhD students at British universities means that 
fieldwork can no longer take place over a leisurely two- or three-year period. 
Whereas Fischer and Gillette spent a considerable amount of time developing 
their knowledge of the field and relationships with informants, I had to improvise 
	  	   118	  
and use methods that could provide a short-cut to the establishment of 
connections and instant access to informants. Most importantly, I had to locate 
a base through which to start establishing connections instantly.  
 
 
3.11 Sampling: the snowball technique 
 
Scoping interviews with laypeople proved to be more difficult than finding 
experts who were wiling to share information. I resorted to a strategy used by 
researchers when finding informants who are willing to talk becomes 
challenging: ‘snowballing’. This type of sampling has been defined as a sample 
gathering technique ‘created through a series of referrals that are made within a 
circle of people who know each other’ (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981: 151). It is a 
technique that depends on identifying primary respondents who can then make 
introductions to other people who fit the criteria required by the researcher 
within his or her social networks.  
 
It is a special technique that is generally used by researchers to access hard to 
reach or hidden populations that are often marginalised and/or involved in 
deviant behaviour (Faugier and Sargeant 1997). This technique lubricates 
contacts because of its ‘security features’ (Lee 1993: 67) that reassure 
informants. Since the introductions are made by intermediaries that are part of 
their networks of trust, they trust my intentions and drop their guard. This 
technique was valuable for acquiring lay and expert informants and establish 
myself as a person of trust and an insider within their network. With the former it 
helped create a bond of trust required when asking people to hang out with their 
friends and family and to discuss intimate matters like money. People often view 
discussions about their experiences and beliefs of the crisis, Islam, and money 
to be sensitive and not topics of chats with strangers.  
It is most commonly used to study sexualities as they are ‘often considered 
“private” and outside the “public” realm of research’ (Browne 2005: 48). Lay 
discussions about money may be subject to taboos, especially when practices 
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reveal hierarchies of power (Aldridge 1998). In the case of practitioners, they 
tend to be protective over the data (Guseva 2008). Some mid-level practitioners 
were concerned about corporate espionage and wanted to view my questions 
before the interview and also requested an official letter of introduction and 
reassurance from my supervisor about my ethics.  
 
During fieldwork Guseva (2008) found it difficult to establish contacts with banks 
and card networks. Attempts to contact managerial staff were always blocked or 
detoured to the media relations department.  While I was able to overcome this 
problem though my network of contacts, I was aware that establishing 
relationships with consumers would be more difficult. As it turns out, with 
consumers,  the snowball technique  was even more invaluable. Whilst the high 
social and economic standing of my informants from the industry allowed me to 
access elite practitioners and request interviews with people who would 
otherwise be too busy for doctoral researchers, they were of little use with the 
ordinary consumer. So, although similarly to Guseva (2008), I decided that the 
snowball-sampling technique would be the best strategy. However, besides 
asking for introductions from all my contacts at home and abroad, I also used 
social media websites. 
 
Consequently, I resorted to my diverse groups of contacts, including people in 
finance, academia, civil activism, and engineering, were used so as to create a 
number of different social webs from which to tap respondents. Personal 
friends, family friends, former colleagues, and the online fora of the 
Commonwealth Scholarship recipients and LSE alumni, were mobilised for my 
purposes. I emailed and called friends to put me in touch with anyone who had 
any contact with Malaysia and Islamic banking. I sent email requests on chat 
rooms and fora on social networking sites such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and 
Couchsurf. Being a member of groups like LSE Malaysia and Commonwealth 
Scholars also allowed me to establish contact with a diverse number of 
Malaysians and to locate an ‘adequate sample’ that would allow for the 
discovery of potential themes and types or categories (Glaser and Strauss 
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1967: 230), by directing me to friends and acquaintances that fitted my 
respondent profile. Contacts were asked to participate when they fitted the fluid 
criteria. Many went out of their way, organising dinners, driving, and 
accompanying me to meetings, and even organising parties at home.  
 
By spreading my net as widely as possible, I was also able to overcome one of 
the main problems of this technique. Due to the shared trait between people, 
resulting from homophily, this technique can result in homogeneous samples 
(Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954) as the snowball technique often relies on 
participants sharing the same traits or characteristic under study Faugier and 
Sargeant (1997). In my case it was people who worked in or used Islamic 
banking or were Muslim-Malay. In an attempt to mediate this effect, I resorted to 
basic methods; gyms and regular coffee shops proved to be the unlikely 
solution to my dilemma. Loitering, as other researchers have noted, can 
produce mixed results. For some they do not lead to feasible research 
conditions, but for others, persistence and a ‘lucky break’ can prove productive 
(Atkinson and Hammersley 2007: 44–46). ‘Loitering’ around two different gyms 
and circulating around the same food stalls and coffee shops helped me hone a 
friendship with people with whom I’m still friends to this day.51 Attending the 
same classes on a regular basis, and spending time with them in the sauna, 
allowed me to gain their trust. Soon I was joining them on shopping trips, 
outings to restaurants and the cinema, and meeting their families. As I will 
explain in a later section, this was one of the instances in which my gender 
actually eased access.  
 
Throughout the whole process I was ‘actively sampling’ data: continually 
analysing the data to see where the next theoretical question would take me, or 
to reroute the research to locate respondents or events that were of theoretical 
relevance (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 228). The use of social media has its 
limits. I was fully aware that these contacts belonged to a cosmopolitan and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Two of the informants have invited me to their weddings. As the only foreigner, I felt that this 
was an honour and symbolic of their trust in our friendship.  
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sociable community that mainly consisted of males and non-Muslims and 
regularly mingled with expats and foreigners. It was necessary to make contact 
with a more traditional and somewhat conservative type of Malaysian. I planned 
some of my social activities to establish contact with interviewees including 
single and married females who are more likely to belong to impenetrable tight-
knit groups. By attending classes at the local gym, I diversified my network and 
met young Muslim female professionals. They were employed across a various 
range of industries, from the oil and petrochemical sector, third sector, financial 
and legal sector, as well as medicine.  
 
Affiliation with an education institute is a common and useful way of establishing 
credentials with the local community. Two similar examples are Fischer (2008) 
in Malaysia and Gillette (2000) in the People’s Republic of China. Therefore, my 
starting point was accreditation with a local institution. 
One of my key informants passed on the details of the International Centre for 
Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF) CEO. I requested access to the building 
and the students and I was welcomed as a visiting researcher and allowed to 
spend time at the university and to use the facilities. During my time there I 
interviewed students and was also able to attend industry events to which 
otherwise I would not have been able to gain entry. Getting to know the staff 
and students helped me broaden my network of contacts. Staff and students 
were helpful in introducing me to their contacts outside the Islamice Finance 
sphere. 
 
 
3.12 Semi-structured interviews with consumers 
 
An in-depth interview is sometimes described as a directed conversation 
(Lofland et al. 2006) that requires the social skills necessary for meaningful 
social interaction. In-depth interviews are loosely structured, take heed of crucial 
nonverbal data, and use probing questions to extract elaborate personal 
narratives, not narrow answers (Jones 2004: 259–60).  
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Having decided to opt for the inventiveness of grounded theory and wanting to 
allow unexpected themes or issues to emerge, interviews were semi-structured. 
Semi-structured interviews are best for research that requires a depth of scope, 
specificity and personal context that allows for the deeper dwelling on a specific 
problem and/or situation (Merton et al. 1956: 110–17). Adopting this 
interviewing technique gives the freedom to the interviewees to speak freely 
(Flick 2009: 203–13), allows for reflexivity (Hammersley and Atkinson 
2007: 117), and gives the researcher enough manoeuvring space to use follow-
up questions to clarify ambiguous responses. Introductory meetings, during 
which both the respondent and myself could negotiate the boundaries of the 
interview and also establish rapport, were held whenever possible. It emerged 
that disclosure about my personal and professional background, such as my 
basic knowledge of Arabic and extensive travel in Asia and the Middle East and 
North Africa - the traditional seats of Islam – as well as my motivation in 
researching Islamic banking in Malaysia, helped. Once a rapport was 
established, several of the respondents viewed my work as a positive 
engagement by a westerner in Muslim community. My status changed from that 
of a disengaged outsider into an involved intermediary. 
 
Following the advice of Charmaz (2006), the interview was initiated with a few 
broad, open-ended questions to encourage unanticipated statements and 
stories to emerge. The questions were framed in a way that they would allow 
disclosure. Respondents were directed towards a theme – their trust of 
regulatory boards, for example – but allowed to direct the course of the 
conversation. Simultaneously, the goal was to create the atmosphere of a 
conversation to leave room for the interviewees to open themselves up and 
leave space for the ‘unanticipated’ (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). Although 
the interviews were loosely structured, it was in my interest and that of the 
respondent to reduce unnecessary anxiety. The respondents were informed 
that the conversation would revolve around a specific theme, Islamic banking 
and that this was one of the ways in which I was collecting data for my doctoral 
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research. They were also informed of my ethical obligations and of their right to 
ask me to stop at any moment. The presence of the recorder was sometimes a 
cause of anxiety, but they were always reassured by my guarantee that all the 
information would be kept confidential.  
 
All consumers were residents of Kuala Lumpur and its satellites and all were 
eligible to use financial services. I ensured that the complete range of products 
was represented, from house to car financing, simple deposits, credit cards and 
miscellaneous loans. The participants were part of the wider middle class. They 
were students or white-collar professionals who owned property. This meant 
that they had enough disposable income to participate in the consumer-based 
economy and to be eligible for retail financial products.  
 
The research involved in-depth interviews with 20 laypeople. The number of 
participants fits Mason’s (1996) typology of sampling. The number of the 
sample is acknowledged to be part of wider universes but not chosen primarily 
to represent them directly (Mason 1996: 92–93). The research design did not 
include a predetermined number of respondents. The interviewing process 
ended when ‘theoretical saturation’ was researched. Unlike statistical sampling, 
this sampling technique is not concerned with an accurate evidence of 
distributions of people. The correct sample is reached when additional data fails 
to add substantially new information that could add to the theory building or 
category construction (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 229–30). 
 
Interviews with consumers were held between March and June 2012 in Kuala 
Lumpur. Sporadically, they were also held in other locations. A few respondents 
visited London on holiday in March 2013 and the time spent together served as 
participant observation, and also allowed for interviews. The interviews were 
held at a variety of locations, reflecting the interests of the respondents and the 
social context. It was acceptable to conduct interviews at their homes when I 
was introduced and accompanied by a close acquaintance, or when their home 
was located at a university dorm.  
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When interviewing men, in keeping up with local standards of propriety and for 
my own security, meetings were held in public places such as their workplace or 
malls. Sometimes the respondents expressed a wish to meet at cafés, 
restaurants, and my apartment in central Kuala Lumpur. The respondents were 
never paid. Small customary gifts like chocolates or cakes were presented to 
the host when interviews took place in their home. In the other instances, I 
treated them to coffee or snacks. Some respondents were ambivalent about 
edible gifts that I had brought from abroad and were not from a known brand. I 
soon realised that I had made the wrong assumption that they, like me, would 
have seen mass-branded gifts as impersonal and brash. I was wrong and, 
when I changed strategy, they responded very positively to small edible gifts 
from famous local or international brands – especially Harrods. 
 
Initially, a number of topics were selected with the aim to use these themes to 
lead interviews into an in-depth discussion spanning a number of sensitising 
concepts within a sociological perspective. People’s motives underlying the 
choice of bank and financial products; attitudes towards saving/spending; 
financial ‘education’, socialisation within Islamic teachings and practices – 
school, university, religious teaching, family and friends; lifestyles; ethics of 
conventional and Islamic banking; and the link between Islamic banking and 
cultural identity, were some of the leading themes used. The data thus 
generated enabled successive levels of analysis linked to my main research 
questions. 
 
A list of questions was available for reference. Questions were not mechanically 
read out. They served as a guideline for the themes that I wanted to explore, 
and were seamlessly integrated within the conversation. During the first few 
interviews, knowing that I had a list of questions to fall back on was reassuring, 
even if I rarely resorted to them. This method is not always considered 
appropriate for semi-structured interviews. According to Jones (2004), if in-
depth interviews follow the format of questionnaires, constantly restricting the 
flow of the conversation through a rigid questioning method, then they cannot 
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be considered intensive interviews. I was aware of this limitation and 
endeavoured not to use the written questions, merely to have them with me as 
an emergency crutch. In practice, the flexibility of the interview meant that it was 
not a linear process, permitting me to follow leads that emerged, and 
sometimes to follow up points that had been raised earlier.    
 
 
3.13 Expert interviews  
 
In contrast to consumers interviews, the respondent is of less interest as a 
person than is his or her capacity of being an expert in Islamic banking. The 
interviews were more rigidly structured and focused on their area of expertise 
(Meuser and Nagel 2009: 17–42). All were asked about the general 
development of Islamise banking in Malaysia and the challenges being faced by 
the sector. Furthermore, they were asked to elaborate on their views on the 
tension found in Islamic banking and the critique coming from within the sector 
– particularly with regards to shariah scholars and the move from equity to debt. 
Later, the interviews evolved around thematic units tied to the expertise of the 
person being interviewed. For instance, practitioners focused on retail product 
were asked to explain the development process in relation to the shariah 
scholars and consultancy boards. Focusing is crucial to avoid wasting time 
discussing unrelated topics, and also to prevent appearing amateur. For an 
expert interview to proceed successfully, it is important for the researcher to 
show the respondent familiarity with the topic. From experience, establishing 
one’s authority, perhaps through a short introductory email, prevents experts 
from giving ‘rhetoric’ interviews – lectures on their knowledge (Flick 2009: 89–
90). For instance, CEOs were asked about their consumers; shariah scholars 
about their regulatory role; head of divisions about product development and 
trends; branch managers and cashiers about consumers behaviour; Islamic 
banking movement leaders about their role in the drafting of legislation. 
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Three key gatekeepers, an editor of one of the most prestigious Islamic banking 
publications and regular contributor to the FT and other publications on Islamic 
finance the head of the Islamic division of a major private equity fund, and a 
banker from one of the larger Islamic banks who also had ties to the political 
elite and diplomatic ranks, also helped me to broaden my network. They were 
instrumental in making key introductions to CEOs of Islamic banks and various 
regulators, and in this respect they were also gatekeepers upon whom I relied 
for access. As is often the case, they were the ‘initial point of contact with such 
research settings’ (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007: 49) and allowed me access 
to formal settings that usually require professional membership in order to gain 
access.  
 
They also regularly invited me to conferences and would point out the key 
people at the meetings and also brief me on the latest developments. The IB 
sector is based on a relatively small network. Very often the same people would 
appear at key events, both in London and in Malaysia. Once I started attending 
events regularly, my presence became accepted and often expected. The 
majority of interviews took place in Kuala Lumpur and occasionally in London, 
Malta, and via Skype between 2009 and 2013. Even when focusing on one 
case, it is possible for the data collection to take outside the specified 
boundaries of the location (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). The 16 expert 
interviews were held with key Islamic banking practitioners across a wide 
spectrum of roles, from cashiers who worked in local branches spread around 
Kuala Lumpur and its suburbs, to the managers of these branches, the heads of 
the Islamic products divisions and CEOs. The nature of their jobs and the small 
Islamice finance community meant that I often participated in events with these 
practitioners. Informal chats took place during conferences and seminars. 
Interviews always took place at their office and usually lasted 45–90 minutes. 
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The people interviewed included the following: 
• CEOs of three prominent banks: one Islamic and two Islamic divisions 
of conventional banks; 
• Heads of retail banking division from four banks: one Islamic and 
three Islamic divisions; 
• Head of Islamic finance division – Central Bank (Bank Negara); 
• Leading exponents of the Islamic banking movement, who drafted the 
1983 legislation; 
• Regulatory experts including shariah scholars and lawyers; 
• CEO of INCEIF; 
• Islamic investment bankers; 
• Journalists who specialise in Islamic Finance; 
• Branch managers; 
 
 
3.14 Reflexivity and ethical considerations 
 
Interpretative social scientists depart from an epistemological stance that 
characterises the production of knowledge, as it always involves a certain 
degree of interpretation and judgement, influenced by a wider historical and 
perhaps personal context. Every qualitative researcher is aware that ‘neutral 
questions do not mean a neutral interview’ (Charmaz 2006: 27). Our data 
collection process is a construct of experiences and assumptions brought into 
the interview by the interviewer and interviewee. Naturally, our adherence to the 
stance that knowledge is to a certain extent socially constructed, requires self-
examination of the knowledge we’re producing. Without a doubt, reflexivity is an 
essential requirement of any research exploring a subject, Islam, which has 
borne the brunt of crude prejudices over the centuries (Said 1995; Al-Azmeh 
2010; Lockman 2004; Halliday 1995; 2006; Rodinson 2007; Zubaida 2011). 
 
This section considers my presence in the research in terms of how it might 
have conditioned the situation, and the respondents in particular, as an integral 
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aspect of qualitative research. As Charmaz suggests, ‘research participants 
appraise the interviewer assess the situation, and act on their present 
assessments and prior knowledge, often in taken-for granted ways’ (Charmaz 
2006: 27). The in-depth nature of an intensive interview fosters an act of 
reciprocity similar to a conversation. Just like a conversation, it is ‘contextual 
and negotiated,’ and is not always a straightforward process (Charmaz 
2006: 27). So is the language used as a tool to express the researcher’s 
thoughts: ‘language, in such a perspective, is never simply descriptive, but 
persuasive also’ (Hart 2009). Most would agree that, ‘qualitative research of all 
sorts relies on those who conduct it. We are not passive receptacles into which 
data are poured’ (Charmaz 2006: 15). 
 
Questions also have to be raised about my involvement in the production of 
knowledge. Any sound researcher, wanting to avoid the pitfalls that result from 
a lack of reflexivity, should ask ‘who are the monographs for?’ (Hart 2009), and 
‘how is my status reflective of broader inequalities?’. Equally relevant is my 
outsider status. It created a power imbalance with some of the respondents as 
they raised both silent and overt questions about my knowledge of Islam and 
proceeded to teach me about Islam’s basic doctrines instead of engaging with 
my questions. The resolution to this problem was to communicate snippets of 
my knowledge of the subject during the preliminary orientation chats. In some 
other instances, my status as a doctoral student shifted me into the dominant 
position, albeit to my detriment as respondents were telling me what they 
thought that I wanted to hear instead of their authentic viewpoint. Respondents 
were scared of ‘losing face’ by not being able to answer my technical queries 
about the products or about specific elements of Islamic doctrine. In this type of 
interaction, I could sense they felt that they were acting as ambassadors of their 
faith and country. They felt that it was their responsibility to show their 
knowledge of Islam and the ‘best side’ to the foreigner making queries about 
their culture. It was eventually possible to overcome this obstacle by organising 
several casual meetings and building a rapport.  
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It was not enough to ensure that my questions were not misleading or 
inappropriate. As it turned out, cultural and ethnic differences did pose a minor 
dilemma at times. As other researchers have pointed out, not being a follower of 
the same religion, or even belonging to the same nationality, ‘ was somewhat 
puzzling’ for respondents (Gillette 2000: 20). Upon meeting, the respondents 
could easily identify me as non-Malaysian and non-Muslim, and they almost 
always asked me why I was interested in Islamic banking and Malaysia. As 
explained earlier, my interest in ‘Muslim’ societies evolved from my 
undergraduate interest in understanding developments in the MENA region on 
socio-scientific terms. In order to demystify a vague-sounding reply, I usually 
explained that, coming from a Mediterranean country that had won its 
sovereignty fewer than four decades ago and, due to our cultural, linguistic, and 
historical proximity to North Africa, I felt that I was not white or Western in the 
strictest sense. To facilitate the research process I could have covered my hair 
and, thanks to my knowledge of Islam, plausibly passed myself off as a 
European Muslim, but I wanted to act in good faith and decided that it would not 
only have been unethical, but possibly caused other unanticipated problems.  
 
 
3.15 ‘Face’ in a Malaysian context  
 
The understanding and adaptation of researchers is crucial for repeated access 
to participants and their milieu. This is more so crucial in locations where 
adherence to rigid etiquette is obligatory. Foreigners are usually excused up to 
a point. In order to cushion direct questions that could make me come across as 
brash and enable my respondent to save face, it was sometimes necessary to 
devise roundabout ways for people to answer questions that could cause 
embarrassment. Direct and frank speech is usually seen as confrontational and 
ill-mannered. I was able to observe the consequences of the clash of culture at 
an Islamic finance trade show. An American banker who, as a guest speaker, 
was invited to assess the obstacles and opportunities of Islamic Finance, 
declared that he was going to give a frank assessment of the sector: the panel 
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started to look queasy. He then launched into a speech that condemned the 
‘hypocrisy of Gulf bankers’. As the audience grew increasingly agitated and 
drew horrified gasps, I heard one of the organisers order the technicians to 
switch off his microphone. During the networking coffee, everyone agreed that 
he had made himself persona non grata at all Malaysian Islamic finance events.  
 
Another unavoidable question regarded my religious beliefs. From my travel 
experience in Muslim societies, the question of religion always crops up. 
Atheism or agnosticism is rarely acceptable in Muslim countries. It is generally 
accepted that Muslims are born into a religion and must take their parents’ or 
father’s (when the mother is a non-Muslim) religion.52 Those Muslims who 
profess to be either agnostic or atheist can face criminal retribution for apostasy 
in all Muslim countries, with the exceptions of Turkey and Lebanon. Although as 
a child of non-Muslims I would not be strictly considered an apostate, declaring 
that I was agnostic or atheist would have caused considerable unease and 
friction. When questioned, I simply replied that, just like them, I was one of the 
‘People of the Book’. This is how the Qur’an refers to non-Muslim adherents to 
the Abrahamic religions. 
 
In addition, it is hard to develop genuine empathy and understanding in such a 
relatively short fieldwork period if the respondents, customs and environment 
being studied are new. Historically, researchers doing fieldwork outside their 
customary habitat spent years learning the language and acclimatising in situ.53 
The current PhD format, in which researchers are expected to produce a thesis 
within four years, does not allow for intense immersion. If they are to bypass the 
traditional initiation, contemporary researchers must possess traits of 
cosmopolitanism. When time is of the essence, the ability to relate to ‘others’ 
outside your regular social, cultural, political and economic environment is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Female Muslims are discouraged from marrying non-Muslims; one explanation is that the 
transmittance of Islam is patrilineal. For instance, the non-Muslim husbands of Muslim 
Malaysian females are not granted citizenship. 
53 In what is perhaps an extreme example, Fred Halliday completed his doctorate on Yemen 
over the span of two decades. 
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necessary and can only be borne out of a priori experience. The months spent 
in Malaysia and other South East Asian countries, totalling over 18 months, 
before the commencement of fieldwork, were instructive in the cultural subtleties 
of everyday interaction.  
 
Navigating the labyrinth of social customs in non-northern European contexts 
requires patience and often an appreciation for the art of negotiating difficult 
requests. Observing the dynamics of ‘building face’ enabled me to learn how to 
prevent ‘losing face’. Causing others shame or feelings of embarrassment can 
generate feelings of anger that could result in a researcher being purged from a 
social circle. The rules surrounding ‘face’ are abstract and elusive yet it is one of 
the main filters through which social interaction is regulated. Showing gratitude 
helps establish relationships and gifts are an easy symbolic way to say thanks. 
However, this could also be a minefield. Buying a gift that the recipient cannot 
afford could cause feelings of shame if the relationship is not one of patronage, 
in which a social and economic hierarchy has already been established and de 
facto accepted by all parties. As a foreigner, buying very expensive gifts or 
refusing gifts from my obviously poor respondents could cement the perceived 
racial and economic inequalities between my respondents and me, and lead to 
awkwardness. One of the students at the Islamic University was the daughter of 
a street vendor who struggled to make ends meet. It was very awkward to 
acquiesce in her insistence on paying for lunch and, later on, water and snacks. 
Simultaneously, I understood that she wanted to establish an equal relationship 
and, had I continued resisting, she would have been insulted. Offering 
inappropriate gifts that are haram would also cause them to lose face because 
they would have to shame me by rejecting it. I would discover that, when 
making difficult demands, it was important to give an honourable way out for the 
other party, and this included ensuring that they did not come across as 
ineffectual. Deciphering when a ‘yes’ meant a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ also came in handy.  
 
My Maltese heritage and having lived in Tunisia, as well as having worked with 
Italians and Arabs, exposed me to the understanding of wasta and guanxi. They 
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can be roughly approximated to the ideas of ‘clout’ and ‘who you know’. Like 
social capital, it is relational and collective resources that require more than just 
economic capital. Having been exposed to, and sometimes used, clout myself, 
it enabled me to understand the dynamics of certain relationships and was also 
operationally useful for furthering my research. Name-dropping, establishing 
desired connections and tapping into the resources of my personal social 
network helped me to get ahead. 
 
Having described the methodology used to extract data, the next chapter will 
develop the thesis by outlining the research aims and embedding them within a 
sociological framework. In addition, it will explain my research’s original 
contribution to knowledge and why, despite sociology’s apparent unsuitability 
for the analysis of a financial sector, sociology’s conceptual toolbox offers the 
right concepts with which to unpack Islamic banking practices.  
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‘Without use of history and without a historical sense of psychological matters, the social 
scientist cannot adequately state the kind of problems that ought now to be the orienting points 
of his studies!’ 
C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination  (2000: 143–64). 
 
Chapter Four: The preconditions of Islamic banking in 
Malaysia 
 
4.1 Setting the Scene 
 
Although the main focus of this research project is on everyday Islamic banking 
practices of Muslim-Malays, it is important for the reader to understand that the 
respondents’ social-economic experiences are not self-referential. They need to 
be contextualised within a historical context. As C. Wright Mills explained, the 
analysis of everyday social experiences cannot be detached from discussions 
of the wider historical conjuncture and social structure within which they occur 
(2000: 143–64). 
 
The long view of history, which widens our observation to appreciate decisive 
far-reaching events, is particularly relevant for the study of money. The growth 
of Islamic banking is intertwined in the collective historical memories of the 
Malay national community. As Hart suggests, we will start looking for the 
meaning of Islamic credit by looking ‘in the myriad of acts of remembering that 
link individuals to their communities’ (Hart 2001: 318–19). 
 
With this in mind, this chapter provides a historical analysis of the events that 
created the right conditions for the development and growth of Islamic banking 
in Malaysia. Thus, the focus of the chapter is on the political, cultural and 
economic dynamics: challenges and responses that led to the creation of the 
Islamic banking sector on the one hand, and for Islamic banking practices to 
gain salience amongst the Muslim-Malay community on the other.  
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4.1.1 Expediencies and exigencies 
 
One of the arguments made in this dissertation is that the growth and 
development of Islamic banking is a result of a concerted effort by the state and 
banks to create a mass Islamic financial market. As I explained in the 
introduction, this niche market was the ideal solution to assuage the Malaysian 
state’s political and economic pressures at a unique conjuncture. From an 
economic perspective, Islamic banking provided a niche sector and 
consequently a competitive advantage, accommodated global finance by 
opening access to its increasingly affluent middle class – spurred by the mass 
financialisation of the economy post the 1997-1998 financial crisis. Politically, it 
renewed the political elite’s commitment to its Muslim-Malay constituency by 
acknowledging Islam as an authentic source of Malaysia’s vision. In short, it 
worked as a fix to the breakdown of trust and wage suppression following the 
South East Asian crisis.  
 
It will become evident in this chapter that although the two realities are 
intertwined and mould each other, it is the actors that are part of the dominant 
power structures in the Malaysian political economy that drive Islamic banking. 
Islamic banking is the result of a top-down strategy driven by the economic and 
political interests of Malaysia’s ruling group (the state and the political elite on 
the one hand, and finance capital and specifically the banking elite on the 
other). As will be explained, the Malaysian political economy is characterised by 
a nexus of political and business interests typical of crony capitalism. Islamic 
banking furthers the ethno-nationalist capitalist trajectory advocated by the 
ruling elite by invoking political legitimacy through the cultural and economic 
spheres. Islamic banking accommodates the ‘cultural rights’ programme and 
affirmative action that confirms the trust and the loyalty of the Malay community 
towards the state. Malays will consent to the state’s developmental plan as long 
as it assumes and fulfils its responsibility for their interests, which for many 
translates into political and economic dominance over other ethnic groups. 
 
	  	   135	  
Crucially, it also fuels the economic growth that validates ethnonationalism54 
and maintains the economic and political privileges of the political and banking 
elite (Tajuddin 2012). It sustains patronage and generates private consumption 
driven economic growth, by dispensing consumer credit. The contemporary 
Islamic banking sector is thus a logical conclusion for a state that wants to 
maintain hegemony by satisfying people’s economic demands. 
 
Certainly, there are caveats to this argument. First, the interests of the ruling 
class are not homogenous. Their interests were often expressed in a variety of 
conflicting views, particularly between the UMNO-led state and Parti Islam Sa-
Malaysia, (the All-Malaysia Islamic Party - PAS) the Islamist opposition. Yet, it 
was precisely these contestations, counter-adjustments, compromises and 
strategic responses to the existential threats posed by PAS and crises in the 
political economy that created the conditions for the state’s development of the 
Islamic banking sector. The paradox of the United Malays Nationalist 
Organisation’s (UMNO) political economic trajectory is that they are not totally in 
control of their developmental trajectory. Retaining power requires playing a 
balancing act between the domestic and international pressures (Khoo and 
Hadiz 2010). The paradox is that their long-term survival requires the state to 
prioritise the advancement of Malays at the expense of the immediate interests 
of the Chinese and global capitalism. At the same time, affirmative action 
depends on economic growth, which in turn requires an economy that runs a 
high output. Excluding the economically powerful majority can at times prevent 
the full utilisation of capital, whether human capital or other resources (Tajuddin 
2012: 11). 
 
Second, although laypeople experiencing these practices from an everyday 
perspective were not the primary catalysts of Islamic banking, their stimulus of 
Islamic banking was indirectly exercised through political and social events, that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 A nationalist ideology based on the advancement and protection of ethnic interests.  
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subsequently created the demand for Islamic banking ‘from below’. Hence it is 
the micro social that compounds the salience of Islamic banking.  
These events include, but are not limited to, the dakwah Islamic revivalist 
movement, the post 1997-1998 crisis, and antagonism towards conventional 
finance and the government, culminating in the Reformasi mass social 
movement. All of these happenings, which actors ensconced in the dominant 
power structure could not ignore, generated a greater ethno-political 
consciousness amongst the Muslim-Malay community and thus engendered 
people’s elective affinity for Islamic banking products.  
 
This chapter is not a linear history of Malaysia from the colonial to the 
contemporary era. It’s a historical narrative that provides context for the 
analytical categories discussed in this project: trust and confidence in the state 
and shariah expertise, the symbolic boundaries of shariah regulation, and the 
salience of Islam in the everyday life of the Malay community. Before analysing 
the historical events that set the preconditions for the emergence of the Islamic 
banking sector in Malaysia, this section will start by introducing the Kingdom of 
Malaysia, the country. 
 
 
4.2 The Kingdom of Malaysia 
 
The Federation of Malaya,55 won its independence from the United Kingdom in 
1957.56 A federal constitutional Monarchy, it is made up of 13 states, and has a 
population of approximately 29 million people.57 Malaysia’s strategic location in 
South East Asia sealed its fate as a global hub for trade and commerce since 
the times of the ‘oceanic silk road’ (Tajuddin 2012: 25)58. It shares land and/or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 This was the name of Malaysia at the time of independence. The federation included all 
Malay states in the Malay peninsula, Borneo (Sabah and Sarawak), and Singapore until it was 
expelled in 1965 (Tajuddin 2012: 20). 
56 The Federation of Malaya got independence on 31 Aug 1957; the Federation of Malaysia got 
independence in 16 Sep 1963. Singapore was expelled in 1965. 
57 See: https://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=MALAYSIA 
58 See, also: Braudel (1992: 484.). 
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maritime borders with Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, Brunei, and the 
Philippines.59 Malaysian society is officially multiethnic and multicultural. The 
main ethnic groups include: bumiputras or bumis60 in everyday parlance, Malay 
and other indigenous people, as well as Chinese and Indians.61 In Malaysia, 
ethnic cleavages tend to run along religious lines. Indians and Chinese are 
usually Hindu and Buddhist respectively, with a small minority from each 
community following Christianity.62  
 
The Constitution defines Malay individuals, as Muslim and thus all Malays are 
forcibly Muslim. According to Article 160 of the Malaysian constitutions Malays  
According to Article 160 of the Malaysian Constitution, a Malay is ‘a person who 
professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay 
language, conforms to Malay custom’.63 Malaysia has been described as a 
‘hard multicultural’ state (Eriksen and Stjernfelt 2012). This term is not a 
description of a society that includes a diversity of ethnic groups coexisting side-
by-side. ‘Hard multiculturalism’ is a normative condition which underlines 
collective rights over individual rights. Eriksen and Stjernfelt’s description fits the 
Malaysian case perfectly. It is ‘a community [that] may legally and socially 
enforce its own mores and traditions, whatever it holds sacred. In the most 
extreme force of this version of multiculturalism, the community may even 
mobilise its own police force and legal system in order to demand, to some 
extent or another, the conformity of individuals’ (Eriksen and Stjernfelt 2012: 2). 
Since the political ideology of shariah regulation is presented under the guise of 
culture which is sacred and therefore untouchable, the state can justify and 
create any new traditions like Islamic banking a propos the official culture of the 
state.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Borneo (Sabah) borders the Philippines, but both Sabah and Sarawak border Brunei. 
60 The term means ‘princes of the earth’. It can translate more prosaically as “sons of the soil” 
61 The Bumiptera population stands at 3,572 Chinese 6,584.7 Indian 1,972.6 (‘000). Source: 
Population quick info, Department of Statistic Malaysia retrieved: 20th December 2014. 
62 There are communities of Indian and Chinese Muslims (apart from converts, that is) – the 
Indians come largely from Kerala, and many of the Chinese came as refugees after 1949. 
63 See: www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/malaysia-constitution.pdf 
	  	   138	  
This political ideology encourages the racialisation of people through 
segregation of communities based on shariah regulated symbolic boundaries. 
This allows the state to regulate the behaviour of the individual through a 
collectively constituted process. In everyday life, Muslim-Malays can choose the 
extent (if at all) to which they practice Islam, although due to Islam’s sacred 
status, should run foul of the religious police, they run the risk of being shamed 
and formally penalised – including jail time or fines.64 The ethnic identity of the 
other two main communities is not restricted by legally enforceable religious 
affiliations.  
 
 
4.3 The essentialisation of Malayness 
 
Islamic banking consumers’ affinity to Islamic banking, needs to be 
contextualised within the role that Islam plays as an ethnic signifier of 
Malayness within a political climate that advocates the Islamic particularism of 
Malays and enshrines it in the Constitution. This political ideology that 
masquerades as an eternal and fixed cultural particularity of Malays, has origins 
in the repressive governance of the colonial state. This section is fundamental 
to the development of the arguments of this project as it outlines the historical 
origins of the process through which the state crystallised Malay identity as 
synonymous to Islam. Therefore we can understand how the state came to be 
trusted by Malays as the guardian of the social and symbolic boundaries of its 
community. Last, this section sheds light on the origins of Malay anxieties about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Malays cannot marry non-Muslims (they have to convert). The National Islamic Council has 
its religious police who have the power to carry out supervision in public and private if they 
suspect unIslamic behaviour like premarital sex or if they believe that non-Muslims are 
proselytising. Malays are also not allowed to leave Islam. Malays who have attempted to 
convert or renounce Islam are sent to a re-education camp and a few were made stateless. The 
recent legal case of ‘Jane’ that has gained international notoriety illustrates the extent to which 
freedom of religion for Malays is non-existent: religious affiliation is legally enforceable in 
Malaysia. Jane, a Muslim-Malay who converted to Christianity, has unsuccessfully petitioned 
the law courts for permission to change her name and religious affiliation. The state and the law 
courts insist that as a Malay she can only be a Muslim. In certain instances, Malays had to 
undergo corrective action at a re-education camp.  
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the Chinese and the state’s reward for simultaneously intensifying Malay 
distrust of the Chinese community, and taking the responsibility for pacifying 
them. 
 
The colonial’s state creation of an objective Malay ethnic category partly relied 
on Islam as a symbol of Malay ethnicity. Malayness, as categorised by the 
state, was central to British policies that controlled, pacified, and managed the 
Malay population. Later, the postcolonial state would continue to utilise colonial 
categories of Malay identity, and particularly the alleged consonance of Islam 
and Malayness, as a foundation for invented traditions and practices, such as 
Islamic banking, that served its political and economic ends. Grappling with the 
interplay of politics and identity formation is crucial for the comprehension of the 
arguments made in this thesis.  
 
The indivisibility of Malayness from Islam, although criticised as sociologically 
problematic (Embong 2001; Shamsul 2001; Eriksen and Stjernfelt 2012) are 
widely accepted by the local population, Malay and non-Malay alike, and prevail 
in everyday life. It is accurate to state that, despite being problematic and 
sometimes contested, the conflation of Malay and Muslim identity are 
‘performative’ (Mackenzie 2006) in the everyday life of Malaysians. Last, the 
colonial origins of the crystallisation of Malay identity and its origins in a multi-
ethnic society helps to explain the fraught anxieties and complexities 
surrounding ethnicity in modern-day Malaysia and the need for a banking 
system that symbolically bound and kept pure from the ‘dirt’ (Hacking 2003) of 
others. The relationship between the different ethnic groups or races, the term 
that most Malaysians insist on using, both in everyday parlance and official 
state terminology, is messy and has historically oscillated between administered 
tolerance to violent hostility. It is only by pedalling back to the British colonial 
creation and administration of multi-ethnic society that we can understand why 
these anxieties about the ‘other’ are still echoed nowadays as is evident from 
some of the respondents’ ruminations about non-Malays and the use of Islamic 
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banking as avoiding the risks associated to transgressing the boundaries set by 
shariah regulation. 
 
 
4.3.1 Colonial legacies and Islam 
  
The ‘objective’ categories and practices, related to identity and mostly 
unquestioned by Malaysians, originate in colonial technologies of knowledge – 
predicated upon the growing requirements of an expanding capitalist empire 
(Shamsul 2001). Deconstructing these racialised categories and their 
associations to occupations and socio-economic status is fundamental to the 
comprehension of the theses of this dissertation. Reference to a Malay identity 
is constant throughout the respondents’ responses. This category is the 
foundational knowledge upon which the reification of Islamic and Malay 
traditions, like Islamic banking, is based. Malay identity, and state practices that 
purport to promote it, are constructed with ideological materials, knowledge of 
‘facts’ and canonical categories based on such knowledge, as well as the 
‘conquest of the native “epistemological space”’ (Shamsul 2001: 357) that 
contrary to popular myth, are of pre-colonial origin.  
 
Modern multicultural society in Malaysia, as in other former colonies, was the 
primarily the result of colonial policy (Hirschman 1986).65 These multi-ethnic but 
rigidly stratified societies of the British Empire, 66  famously documented by 
George Orwell in Burmese Days, were a visible feature of colonial rule and the 
expanding global capitalist economy. Various territories within the Empire, 
including Rangoon and Penang, would become modern hubs of the globalised 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 The Chinese diaspora had established a presence in Malaysia prior to British colonisation. 
Historical records show that the Chinese were already settling in the Malay Peninsula during the 
epoch of the Malacca Sultanate of the 15th century. Even nowadays, this community is still 
distinguished from the more recent waves of Chinese migrants, and its members are referred to 
as the Straits Chinese. The critical flow of Chinese migrants that poured into Malaysia did so at 
the turn of the 20th century, when capitalist development picked a rapid tempo (Tajuddin 
2012: 56–-57).  
66 Orwell describe the cosmopolitan feel of the ‘Eastern territories’ of the British Empire.  
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economy. The British administrators encouraged the migration of the Chinese, 
and Southern Indians to their South East Asian territories. However, the 
immigrants’ occupation was decided according to colonial imperatives. Global 
demand for tin attracted the large wave of Chinese workers to mining, whilst 
British colonial ethnic labour policy stipulated that Indians worked in the rubber 
plantations (and were banned from the mines) (Tajuddin 2012: 59). A limited 
number of Malays, sons of the elite, would eventually be educated for posts 
within the colonial administration. The majority of Malays were peasants 
confined to the rural areas, occupied with subsistence farming or fishing 
(Mokhzani 1973). A multiethnic society provided cheap labour in mines and 
rubber plantations whilst preventing the formation of a unified underclass. A 
racialised division of labour enabled the colonial rulers to employ a strategy of 
divide et impera and thus pre-empt any indigenous collective action against 
British rule. This stratification system would be justified through racist 
perceptions and discourse that would resonate with people’s ethnic grievances 
and thus trickle to the streets. As I write in Chapters 6 and 7, the ‘natural traits’ 
of ethnic groups as identified by the British, are still present in contemporary 
Malaysia: Chinese are greedy yet hard working, the Malays lazy and deceitful, 
and the Indians argumentative drunks (Hirschman 1986; Tajuddin 2012: 76).  
 
Constrained by the poverty of the countryside, the marginalised Malays were 
excluded from the economic opportunities that economic growth made available 
to the other ethnic groups, especially the Chinese, as colonial policy aimed to 
divide and rule. Chinese immigrants were released from their contracts and they 
exploited the opportunities of a burgeoning economy. Chinese businesses were 
emerging and dominating various sector including banking, light industry, and 
retail (Tajuddin 2012: 57). Malays also endured financial exclusion. Commercial 
banks did not extend credit to smallholders. Their largest flows of credit went to 
predominantly foreign owned rubber and timber estates (Mokhzani 1973) and 
they were also excluded from ethnic moneylending networks. The Chinese, 
backed by clans, established ethnic networks that allowed other Chinese to 
access a Chinese owned network of banks and loan companies at reasonable 
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rates (Tajuddin 2012: 56–59). This credit market would simultaneously feed the 
growth of small enterprises and (private consumption) of retail goods in 
Chinese-owned stores. 
 
Whilst members of the Chinese community became upwardly mobile and 
amassed capital, the Malays largely remained impoverished peasants in the 
peripheral rural areas. Due to the restrictive and exclusionary nature of ethnic 
networks, the rural Malays did not have access to the capital that was allowing 
the Chinese to flourish commercially and improve their standard of living. They 
depended on informal means of obtaining small amounts of credit, most often 
from Chinese shopkeepers. This made them vulnerable to loan sharks and the 
punitive terms of usury, as well as ethnicising acutely asymmetrical debt-
relations (Mokhzani 1973: 25–27). 
 
 
4.3.2 The origins of cultural rights for Malays 
  
The Malays resented their social, political, and economic marginalisation and 
exclusion from the commercial and banking networks of the predominantly 
urban Chinese – people they considered as temporary guests. In an attempt to 
allay the resentment of the indigenous groups at what they perceived to be the 
increasing wealth of the immigrants at their own expense, the British would 
eventually award Malaysians special cultural and subsistence rice farming 
rights, in the shape of The Malay Reservation Act of 1913, (Shamsul 2001: 
360–1) and Rice Lands Enactment 1917 (Tajuddin 2012: 61). The special rights 
turned out to be a ruse that only helped cement the Sultans’ rule over the 
Malays and further British encroachment over of Malay socio-economic life. The 
Sultans had served as a useful proxy for British policing and pacification (Lee 
1990: 487). Now, through their control of Malay special rights, they would also 
prove instrumental in accessing lands and resources that would later be 
allocated to European capital (Tajuddin 2012: 60–2). The lands were controlled 
and managed by their own overlords for the British. The special rights would 
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also confine Malays to their small plots, which could only be used for rice 
farming67 and were never awarded any type of investment by the British, were 
away from the centres of commerce. Effectively, these policies only served to 
further institutionalise their marginalisation and prevent any meaningful 
participation in the economy.  
 
These colonial policies would lay the foundations for the incremental economic 
disparity between ethnic groups, create Malay anxiety about the Chinese 
‘other’, and also ferment Malay suspicion of foreign capital that enriched itself at 
the expense of the Malays. As we shall read later on, this suspicion would be 
echoed several decades later during moments of crises and would also serve 
as legitimation for affirmative policies and ethno-nationalism.  
 
Crucially, it would also create an imperative for the institutionalisation of Malay 
ethnicity. If privilege, allocated to mitigate grievances and pacify Malays (Lee 
1990), depended on ethnicity, then ethnicity had to be formally defined and 
governed (Shamsul 2001; Rudnyckyji 2013). Managing colonial subjects, 
primarily to mitigate inter-ethnic grievances, created an imperative for the use of 
technologies to create subject populations.68 An inevitable consequence of 
these technologies was the creation of epistemological frameworks of ethnicity 
(Shamsul 2001). As Lochman (2004: 90) points out, ‘there is a close 
relationship between “knowledge” about the Orient and colonial power over the 
Orient’. Allocating ‘privilege’ according to race required a clear definition of who 
was a true Malay. The classification was primarily based on the three pillars of 
language, king, and religion (Shamsul 2001). As mentioned earlier, colonialism 
was only possible due to the agency of Malay rulers. This classification served 
colonial rule by further sanctifying the ruler (Tajuddin 2012: 32). Language was 
essential, but not a strong enough discriminator. Many immigrants were fluent in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Rice farming was regulated via punitive measures. Any Malay caught growing other crops 
would be heavily fined or have his crops confiscated. 
68 Initially, the British use of technologies of knowledge such as the census, created subject 
populations according to ethnicity, for the expediency of governance (Hirschman 1987; 
Rudnyckyji 2013). 
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Malay, but most would not convert to Islam. Thus, Islam was the strongest 
discriminating factor and the common denominator: all Malays had to be 
Muslim. The other elements defining the classification were less equivocal and 
the margins were arbitrary as they diverged from one region to another, 
according to locally specific political aims. For instance, ‘a person of Arab 
descent was Malay in Kedah but not in Johor. A Siamese or Kampuchean could 
be Malay in Kelantan but not in Negeri Sembilan’ (Shamsul 2001: 361). In other 
regions, it was only those who could prove ‘blood’ descent from a Malaysian 
(not Indonesian)69 qualified as Malay.  
 
Colonialism’s ethnicised labour structure would have other repercussions. It 
prevented the emergence of a unified civil society or civic nationalism (Tajuddin 
2012: 7). Instead, ethnicity would become the centrifugal force for cooperation 
and the primary signifier of social and symbolic boundaries. Malaysian society 
would remain divided along ethnic lines and sentiments and would organise 
itself accordingly. These latent inter-ethnic divisions and intra-ethnic 
allegiances, would surface after the end of Japanese occupation, and violently 
erupt after Merdeka (independence).  
 
The shared experience of World War II hardship by all Malaysians would not 
prove to be enough for the different ethnic groups to overcome their differences. 
The role of the Chinese in leading the communist party resistance against the 
Japanese, following the hasty British retreat, led to the expectation amongst the 
non-Malays that following independence, the Constitution would afford all of the 
diverse communities equal rights (Eriksen and Stjernfelt 2012: 79). The Labour-
led UK government would indeed advocate a liberal approach to citizenship. 
Based on the Canadian and Indian experience, they aimed to engender a broad 
civic notion of ‘Malayanhood’ based on equal political participation, not ethnic 
hierarchies (Tajuddin 2012: 102).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Many Malays in Malacca, Johore, NS, Selangor, Kedah, and Penang are of Minangkabau and 
Acehnese origin – some relatively recently. 
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This plan did not please the Malay political echelons. The conservative wing of 
the Malay elite perceived this plan as an outright denial of their birthright and 
reacted with hostility to the plan. Most Malays always viewed the Chinese and 
Indians as temporary guests and were hostile at the idea of sharing citizenship 
with them (Lee 1990; Tajuddin 2012). Using a nationalist rhetoric, they would 
agitate the Malay community against the Constitution that gave equal rights to 
the Chinese and Indian community (Lee 1990).70  
 
The run-up to the 1969 elections would continue to be marked by tense 
bargaining over the balance of power on issues of economy, education, and 
language between ethnic groups. The Malays perceived the political economy 
as being rigged against their interests. The rest felt that Malay demands were 
discriminatory and unmeritocratic (Tajuddin 2012: 150–51). The outcome of the 
elections, followed by a celebration of the predominantly Chinese Democratic 
Action Party (DAP) and Labour Party, in Malay neighbourhoods in Kuala 
Lumpur, would prove incendiary. Racist taunting on both sides would worsen 
into unprecedented rioting and ethnic violence. Hundreds, mainly Chinese, 
would be left dead and badly injured.  
 
 
4.3.3 The state of emergency and deepening of inter-ethnic cleavages 
 
The state of emergency that followed, between 1969–71, would mark the 
beginning of a new era of the Malay-led UMNO legitimacy. These riots would 
remain engrained in the collective memory of all Malaysians as the ‘symbol of 
the “sanctity” of Malay nationalism’ (Lee 1990:491). The Malays would rally 
behind the United Malay Nationalist Organisation (UMNO), which insisted on 
the pre-Merdeka recognition by the British of the special position of the Malays. 
Aware of the fate that indigenous people in former colonies endured, they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Legacy of the Emergency 1948-1960, and the “Kerajaan Cina Empat-Belas Hari” (14 Days’ of 
Chinese Rule) in Muar-Batu Pahat in 1945 was still very alive among Malays and Indians in 
1969 
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demanded policies that would not jeopardise Malay special rights to land, Islam, 
and the civil service (Shamsul 2001; Tajuddin 2012).71 
 
The new elites, wanting to reassert Malay and UMNO dominance, assured 
Malays that economic equality and political control would be a precondition of 
their rule. In this new social contract, the Malays were guaranteed a 
continuation of their special position, whilst others were granted citizenship 
rights and cultural and linguistic protection (Shad 2003: 33). Second, it made 
the ruling elite aware of the destabilising effects of racial tensions thus 
terminating all attempts at meaningful dialogue about interethnic relations.  
 
This would signal the beginning of the postcolonial state’s control of Malay 
identity and ‘special rights’ for its own political and economic expediencies and 
exigencies. Colonial knowledge and categories would again prove to be 
instrumental in tempering Malay discontent and governing populations. Cultural 
symbols, including Islam and the Malay language, would be used as 
discriminators to define the Malay identity (of the majority) against that of the 
Chinese and Indian (minorities). Again, religion as an ethnic identifier would 
become a gateway to special privileges. Except that this time they would lead to 
concrete significant economic and political benefits for the Malay masses. 
Fourth, the political class realised that the risks (instability and turmoil) 
associated to racial tension could be harnessed for population management 
and escalated accordingly. Debates about identity, religion, or the balance of 
power would be securitised.72 Questions of Islam, Malay identity or state power 
would be constructed as threats to the security of Malays and the nation as a 
whole. The defence of the Malay position in society depended on maintaining 
the status quo, thus enabling a discourse of Malay ‘us’ against ‘them’ non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 The division of labour from colonial times bequeathed an uneven balance of economic wealth 
between the predominantly rural Malays and the Chinese who were concentrated in urban 
areas 
72  The Copenhagen school defines security as a practice: a specific way of framing and 
dramatizing as issue as having absolute priority due to its presentation as a threat. 
(Wæver 1996: 108).  
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Malays. The underlying message of the ruling elites was that any disruption of 
the status quo, particularly Malay dominance – equating to UMNO – would 
recreate the ethnic tensions and violence of the 1969 riots (Tajuddin 2012: 154) 
and in response, the state could and would invoke its right to use violence (Lee 
1990: 493). 
 
In one shot they could foster consent within the Malay community as well as 
neutralise political demands or debate of non-Malays. This pattern would 
remain the leitmotif of Malaysian politics. As Tajuddin points out, ‘ethnic 
suspicions and hostilities have in fact become the basis for the kind of politics 
that have thus far kept the ruling elites in power in Malaysia’ (2012: xiii). The 
reverberations of these events are still manifested today, whether in the docile 
citizens and uncritical media or the impunity with which the ruling elite uses 
authoritarian laws to imprison anyone who questions Islam or Malay privilege 
under the guise of ‘public order’ (Eriksen and Stjernfelt 2012: 30).73 
Furthermore, they are also echoed in the symbolic boundaries underpinning 
halal consumption, included Islamic banking. 
  
 
4.3.4 Post-Merdeka (Independence) Malaysia  
 
As I argue in Chapter 6, respondents trust Islamic banking because it is 
underwritten by the state. This section will explain how the affirmative policies 
that successful emancipated millions of Malays from rural poverty would cement 
their collective loyalty and trust in the state. Just like the Malay kings in colonial 
times, the political elite would use the technique of cultural privilege for Malays 
as identified by Islamic membership in order to instil loyalty. Malay privilege in 
independent Malaysia would also be discerned through adherence to Islam. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 For instance, the lawyer representing leader of the opposition, Anwar Ibrahim, on sodomy 
charges was charged with sedition for suggesting that his client’s conviction was the result of a 
political conspiracy. See: www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-19/an-anwar-lawyer-charged-with-
sedition/5682126 
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Second, this affirmative action would engender a social pact between the 
UMNO government and the Malay community. The state would protect their 
cultural, political, and economic interests and they would reciprocate with trust 
in the government. Last, the embourgeoisement that followed would lay the 
groundwork for the mass financialisation that would occur three decades later 
and allow Islamic banking practices to grow. The assets accumulated, mainly 
property, would allow ordinary people to tap into the Islamic credit market.  
 
The state of emergency declared after the riots strengthened Malay politicians 
and bolstered UMNO. The Barisan Nasional (BN – historically the National 
Front) coalition74, led by the Malay-based UMNO, embarked on policies aimed 
at correcting the economic imbalance between the ethnic groups and finally 
‘eliminate identification of ethnicity with economic function’ (Gomez and Jomo 
1997: 238). Bumiputras would benefit from several forms of political and 
economic affirmative action. ‘The social and political inequalities moulded by 
colonial racial ideologies were replicated and elaborated after independence 
because the structural blueprint of colonial Malaya was not radically 
transformed upon the departure of the British’ (Lee 1990: 485). In 1968, 65.8 
per cent of Malays would still be working in low-wage agricultural and plantation 
work, compared to 64 per cent of Chinese, who were employed in the more 
lucrative commercial, manufacturing, mining and services sectors (Tajuddin 
2012: 148). Independence, did not automatically correct the pernicious legacy 
of colonial policy. The Malay community would remain disenfranchised, highly 
impoverished, and bereft of educational and employment opportunities 
(Tajuddin 2012: 63).   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 It is a confederation of political parties, which has been Malaysia's federal ruling political 
force, under the name Perikatan, since independence in 1957. Currently, it is made up of 13 
parties: Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA); Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC); Malaysian; 
People's Movement Party (GERAKAN); People's Progressive Party (PPP); Parti Pesaka 
Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB); Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP); Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS); 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP); Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sabah (PBRS); United Pasokmomogun 
Kadazandusun Murut Organisation (UPKO); Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party (SPDP); 
Sarawak People's Party (PRS). 
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Ironically, the foundation of these affirmative policies would be based on 
colonial knowledge and categories. The same ethnic categories discussed in 
the previous section are used to distinguish Malay ethnicity and in fact can even 
be found on identity cards. (Shamsul 2001: 364). Thus, the value and prestige 
of being Malay increased. History repeating itself, categorisation of identity 
would be central to state policy. Islam would also remain central to Malay 
identity. The same categories used by the colonial state to manage and 
dominate a population, would later be used to emancipate them. 
 
  
4.4 Affirmative action: The New Economic Policy  
 
Two of the most important policies implemented included The New Economic 
Policy (NEP) launched in 1970 and its offshoot the New Education Policy 
(NEDP) (Jomo 1997). The NEP’s directive was state-led re-distribution of job 
opportunities and economic resources (Tajuddin 2012: 153). Since then, Malays 
have been given, among other privileges, housing discounts, employment 
preferences, ‘priority for government contracts, increased access to capital and 
opportunities to buy assets that are privatized’ (Johnson and Mitton 2002: 6; 
Tajuddin 2012). The NEDP allowed sizeable numbers of Malay youths and 
students being given the opportunity to study locally and internationally, up to 
the tertiary level. This included special quotas in local college admissions and 
scholarships (Lee 1990: 488). The evidence shows that it remains one of the 
most successful examples of state-led socio-economic engineering (Tajuddin 
2012). The NDP would not have been possible had the economy not been 
sustained through economic growth. The oil boom during the early 1970s 
provided sufficient foreign exchange to cash-starved countries such Malaysia to 
fuel their huge national development budgets and import-substitution 
industrialisation strategies. The programmes aimed at assisting the Malays, as 
an ethnic community, would mark the beginning of ethnic welfarist/distributionist 
policies as one of the cornerstones of Malaysian modern economic 
development, gave Malays a stake in the political order. 
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of poverty. Rural and urban poverty was reduced by more than 30 per cent and 
‘the ratio of mean income differentials between Chinese and Malays narrowed 
from 2.23 in 1970 to about 1.9 in 1989’ (Tajuddin 2012: 153). 
 
Certainly, these policies served an ideological purpose (Fischer 2008; Tajuddin 
2012). The redressing of the poverty endured by Malays was inextricably linked 
with the benevolence of a state that for the first time, protected their interests. 
That the NEP would serve to cement Malay loyalty towards the ruling party was 
clear throughout the interviews. All Malays, no matter how critical of the current 
administration, equated the modernisation of the country and the advancement 
of the Malay community with a Malay controlled state. There was no doubt that 
their general wellbeing was contingent to Malay hegemony. The interests of the 
expanding middle class would continue to be served by the United Malays 
National Organisation (UMNO) and in return they would continue to receive 
political and financial support from the middle class (Embong 1998).  
 
Yet, through its instrumental role in connecting the grass-roots with the UMNO 
leadership via a complex network of patron–client relationship, also fostered 
garnering Malay loyalty towards the party, leading middle-class Malays to see 
themselves as indebted and dependent on an UMNO-led state (Lee 1990; 
Tajuddin 2012). ‘The NEP transformed Malay dominance into Malay hegemony 
within the notion of a plural society so that Malay culture became synonymous 
with national culture and in the eyes of the Malays, the state became 
synonymous with Malay interests’ (Fischer 2008: 34). This remains the case in 
contemporary Malaysia. For Fischer (2008:19) this loyalty is based on UMNO’s 
insistence ‘on the inescapable bonds between nation, state, Islam, and 
Malayness on the one hand and an ideology built on Malay privileges and 
domination on the other.’  
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4.5 Islamisation from above: The bureaucratisation of Islam   
 
This section will explore how the state resorted to the shariah as a means to 
mediate political contestations from the Islamic opposition and reaffirm its 
authority as the sole guardian of Malay interests. Inadvertently, this strategy 
would institutionalise Islam and shariah scholars within the state bureaucracy. 
This would lay the foundations for the legitimacy of Islamic expertise in spheres 
traditionally considered secular, such as banking. It would also mark the 
establishment of the first Islamic bank and the Islamic banking act as well as 
other public Islamic institutions: mosques, universities, and radio stations. This 
turn towards Islam, the Malay ethnic signifier par excellence, was a means for 
the state to continue furthering Malay interests. Thus, Islam was instrumental in 
fostering an Islamic ethic that is tied to trust in the state and ‘evoked as cultural 
kinship’ (Fischer 2008: 25). 
 
If, as mentioned earlier, historically BN’s strategy had been to neutralise the 
opposition by reducing the salience of class, by the late 1970s and early 1980s 
it had developed a new strategy to crowd out a second ideological alternative: 
political Islam. The Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), supported by the Islamic 
social grassroots movements and student organisations, including the Muslim 
Youth Movement (ABIM) and the Sufi Darul Arqam were perceived as a political 
threat by the ruling political elites (Lee 1990). Riding the wave of Islamic 
revivalism, discussed in the next section, PAS, was rapidly gaining inroads with 
rural Malays and capturing the imagination of the middle class. Some question 
the extent to which PAS was a real threat to UMNO hegemony (Abbott and 
Gregorios-Pippas 2010). Unlike in Arab countries, where independence failed to 
deliver the promised socio-economic development (Hourani 1990), the NEP and 
affirmative policy led to the embourgiosement of millions (Khoo and Hadiz 
2010). Indeed, it is more possible that the state wanted to bolster its legitimacy 
and all epistemological spaces by driving its own Islamisation programme. It is 
also likely that the colonial precedent of institutionalising Islam (Khoo and Hadiz 
2010:18) had its effect on the institutional memory of the state.  
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Irrespective of the genuineness of the ‘Islamic threat’ the new strategy allowed 
the government to outbid any real or perceived Islamist competition to its 
hegemony on the Malays (Khoo and Hadiz 2010) and use Islam as a site for 
political intervention (Mutalib 1994: 152).  
 
UMNO used its considerable power of incumbency to embark on an Islamic 
programme meant to ‘out-Islamise’ their opponents (Hoffstaedter 2009; Khoo 
and Hadiz 2010; Saat 2011).75 To silence dissent, leaders of the student 
Islamist movements like Anwar Ibrahim76 (then President of ABIM) were 
coopted into the government.  
 
Even the first Islamic Banking Act was the result of political competition. 
According to one of the founders of the Islamic Banking movement, Islamic 
banking was also originally the result of a tactical measure by the government 
to outmanoeuvre the Islamist opposition. During an interview, this Islamic 
banking activist revealed that his fellow group of activists used the political 
threat posed by the Islamist movement as leverage to fulfil their aims. In his 
own words:  
 
‘We went to convince PAS first, and they were immediately on board and this 
put us at an advantage when negotiating with the government. We knew that 
the government wouldn’t want to put itself at a disadvantage by coming across 
as unIslamic or as being against freedom of choice for Muslims. We were right, 
the government agreed to launch the Islamic Banking Act’.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Sufis are followers of a mystical Islam. Sufi orders are found in both the Sunni and Shia 
traditions, and followers are often but not always ascetic. These orders were often successful in 
extending Islam outside its original territories. Well-known Sufi mystics include the poets Rumi 
and Omar Khayyam and the whirling dervish movement of Turkey, who have become a famous 
tourist attraction. 
76 He is currently the main opposition leader who was humiliated and jailed on charges of 
sodomy. 
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The co-optation would eventually give them agency within the state to pursue 
an Islamic agenda and institutionalise Islam within the state (Abbott and 
Gregorios-Pippas 2010). The inadvertent result of the political competition over 
Islam was the intensification of the reification of the Malay community as 
singularly Muslim (Mutalib 1994: 152) and the Islamisation of the state 
machinery. As Khoo and Hadiz (2012: 20) surmise: ‘the state having infiltrated 
religion… religion rebounded by percolating through the state’. 
 
 
4.5.1 Islamising the State 
 
The state extended and strengthened its control over Islam by formally 
Islamising the government machinery. This was followed by the introduction of 
Islamic related programmes and policy directives: aspects of the legal system 
were revised to make it in line with Islamic law; religious knowledge became an 
examination subject; Islamic economic institutions were established. In 1988 
Mahathir announced that Islam was the national and official religion and every 
citizen should learn its values. Since Sunni Islam was reiterated the official 
branch of Malaysian Islam, nonconforming ‘sects’ were shut down with the 
leaders imprisoned under the International Security Act77 (ISA) with no time 
limits. This change was observed in all spheres of political and public life. 
Newsreaders greeted listeners with salaam aleikum and the azan (prayer call) 
was aired on the national television station (RTM). The government announced 
that the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) and not the Nonaligned or 
Commonwealth countries would be the most important (Mutalib 1994: 152). 
Massive mosques were planned and the setting up of Islamic Universities was 
accompanied by the Islamic Economic Foundation (Saat 2011: 140).78  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 The ISA allows for detention without trial or criminal charges under limited, legally defined 
circumstances. This was replaced by the Akta Kesalahan Keselamatan (Langkah-Langkah 
Khas) 2012 (Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012, ‘"to provide for special measures 
relating to security offences for the purpose of maintaining public order and security and for 
connected matters’ (Act 747 Security Offences). 
78 It was Mahathir who first embarked on the Islamisation of state institutions and political 
discourse when he became Prime Minister in 1981. 
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4.5.2 Islamocrats: The bureaucratisation of Islamic expertise   
 
The institutionalisation of Islam was sealed by the inclusion of ulama (religious 
scholars) within the bureaucratic ranks. Despite the political divergences of the 
religious scholars, they have always supported the view that Islam remains the 
supreme marker of Malay identity (Saat 2011). In this respect, they are a 
lynchpin in the regulation of Malay generalised identity and customs. Malaysian 
society is hierarchical and respect for formal authority such as bureaucrats or 
shariah scholars has always been a part of Malaysian social custom (Nagata 
1980: 434) and is still important now. As we shall see in Chapters 6 and 7, this 
is reflected in the majority of the respondents’ emphasis on the role of religious 
experts in regulating their socio-economic life and other domains of their social 
life. 
 
The state would rely on the community of scholars who operated as a 
seemingly independent authority, and thus the government could capitalise from 
appearing to be regulated by experts who are ‘the legitimate authority to speak 
on behalf of the community on matters pertaining to Islam’ (Saat 2011: 13) and 
thus part of the social fabric of Malay life and perceived as answerable to a 
divine and not political order. The government responded to the joint threat of 
PAS and Islamic revivalism (discussed in the next section) by co-opting 
religious scholars and capitalising on their authority and legitimacy.  
Fischer (2008: 43) writes: ‘The growing centrality of Islam in Malaysian society 
is also reflected in the materialisation of an Islamic bureaucracy or the 
bureaucratization of Malay ethnicity. The Islamic clergy and bureaucrats hold a 
central position within this political and bureaucratic establishment’. The co-
optation of religious experts within the bureaucratic structure of the state had 
the corollary effect of de facto establishing Islam as a legitimate source of 
political knowledge whilst eroding its secular foundation.  
 
The state’s co-optation of the scholars was aimed at maximising the social 
capital and legitimacy of the scholars. In turn, the scholars claimed greater 
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prestige and power in setting the agenda of the state, permeating aspects of 
economic and financial policy that were previously considered off bounds for 
religious experts. The rise of this select community of experts was linked to a 
wider change in the political fortunes of Islamocrats ‘whose interests and power 
lay in de-secularising public institutions and regulating social life’ (Khoo and 
Hadiz 2010: 19). They saw this moment as a window of opportunity to expand 
their political influence and authority outside the religious realm (Nagata 1980; 
Saat 2011: 136). A consequence of the bureaucratisation of the ulama was their 
legitimisation of their expansion of power in the public sphere. They expanded 
their remit of expertise to include ‘... “economics, politics, language, culture, and 
medicine” – all the ills of which could be cured through their Islamic prescription’ 
(Saat 2011: 140). Arguably, the impact of Islamisation was strongest in 
pedagogical institutions. Whereas modernisation had led Islamic education to 
decline, the Islamocrats’ priority was to gestate Malays within a pure form of 
Islam (Abbott and Gregorios-Pippas 2010) when people were at their most 
receptive.  
 
This policy culminated in the establishment of an Islamic Consultative Body, the 
Institute for Islamic Understanding, the IIUM, Islamic economic institutions 
including the Islamic Development Foundation and the beginning of Islamic 
financial institutions including Insurance and finally a bank (Abbott and 
Gregorios-Pippas 2010; Khoo and Hadiz 2010). As their authority was bolstered 
through a renewed religious consciousness amongst the public the 
Government, wanting to mute and co-opt any challengers, carved out a more 
critical role for many ulama in the public administration of the state. It was 
against this backdrop that Malaysia’s Islamic finance sector was established in 
1983 with the passing of the Islamic Banking Act. The government developed 
the sector from the Pilgrims’ Management and Fund Board or Tabung Haji, an 
Islamic fund initiated to aid Malay pilgrims fund their hajj, into a fully-fledged 
financial sector. By the end of this period, Islam had become a visible symbol 
and feature of social, political, and economic life (Abbott and Gregorios-Pippas 
2010:135).   
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4.6 The increasing salience of Islam in everyday life 
 
In the previous section, I discussed how political competition took place through 
the contestation of Islam between the government and the opposition. In this 
section I will explain how these dynamics were primarily motivated by a bottom-
up Islamic revivalism. The intensification of Islam in social life during this period 
marks the consolidation of Islam as the primary identifier of the Malay 
community. It was during this period that the dichotomy of Malays versus non-
Malays was transposed with a Muslim versus non-Muslim discourse which 
however served to denote who was Malay and who was an outsider (Nagata 
1980; Fischer 2008). Islam became an increasingly salient aspect of everyday 
social life and a means of communicating ones identity and belonging to the 
Malay community. The salience of Muslim identity, values, and practices are still 
evident today and thus the social capital attached to following the right Islamic 
practices is valuable. It also creates the context for the evaluation of the value 
of Islamic banking products and the importance of familial and peer social ties in 
generating confidence in Islamic banking and thus mobilising the individual 
‘horizontally’ into responding to the call of Islamic banking.  
 
As mentioned earlier, UMNO’s NEP aided the repression of all ideological 
alternatives. Dissatisfaction could not be expressed through secular political 
means. Islam was the only vehicle that could convey people’s disillusionment 
and dissatisfaction (Nagata 1980). Islam as a metaphor: a political ideology 
using an Islamic discourse through which political actors can enchant and 
mobilise people, would emerge by the mid-1970s and make Malaysia a nucleus 
for Islamic civil society and social movements (Nagata 1980; Abbott and 
Gregorios-Pippas 2010; Saat 2011). Despite the diversity in ideology and form 
of the surge in Islamic consciousness, as Zubaida explains, what they all have 
in common is the use of ‘Islam as an idiom in terms of which many social 
groups and political interests express their aspirations and frustrations’ (Zubaida 
2011: 106). The Islamic revivialist movement know as Dakwah (which means 
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invitation or call), would along with the Islamisation of the state, intensify Islam 
as an ethnic identifier.79  
 
Although people’s turn towards a more authentic Islamic self was the result of 
local happenings, they were also inspired by international events (Mutalib 
1994: 152). The backlash against Western economic and political domination 
and distaste towards internationally non-aligned nationalist socialisms such as 
Qaddafi’s Libya and Bouteflika’s Algeria placed Islam as an authentic and 
liberating third way. In this respect, Muslim-Malays were synchronised to other 
Muslim communities who were captivated by the spectacle of self-determination 
and triumphalism that was the Iranian Revolution (Saat 2011). The Islamic 
revival had an international and a local dimension that carried ‘specific 
implications for individual Muslim countries with different meanings in local 
situations’ (Nagata 1980: 405).  
 
The modernisation of post-Independence Malaysia, carried out through the 
social engineering of the NEP, was characterised by rapid economic 
development and tremendous upheaval. The demographic, economic and 
social change was unprecedented with urbanisation was one of the most visible 
outcomes of modernisation. By 1979, 30 per cent of Malays – who have always 
been rural people – moved to the cities (Mutalib 1993: 29). Millions of Malay 
peasants moved away from the kampong to the cities in search of better jobs 
and university education. Unequipped and overawed, many experienced a 
sense of anomie and alienation. A sense of disillusionment and revulsion with 
Western values and lifestyle began to set in with many middle class Malays 
(Lee 1990: 494; Nagata 1980). For many, the improved standard of living is 
accompanied by a sense of dislocation of identity. In the complex urban setting 
that is Kuala Lumpur or during their exposure to Western cultures in British 
universities, they could no longer rely on the localised relations that are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Dakwah was not a homogenous movement with clear goals, it had various heads. The 
Muslim Students Associations (MSA) and Islamic Representative Councils (IRC), Darul Arqam 
(Sufi millenarianism were guided by members of the new middle class, including Anwar Ibrahim. 
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organised in terms of place as in the kampong (village). The educated ‘new’ 
middle class, feeling alienated and apprehensive, decried the secularising and 
‘unIslamic’ trends they saw developing within Malay society (Khoo and Hadiz 
2010: 15). This anomie ‘made them susceptible to an alternative lifestyle’ 
offered by other students from similar Muslim origins (Nagata 1980: 438). Active 
Muslim students, whom they met studying locally or abroad, from the Indian 
subcontinent, Iran, and the Arab Middle East, provided them with an idealistic 
political grammar to articulate their frustrations and disapproval (Khoo and 
Hadiz 2010; Tajuddin 2012). Universities, the domain of the new Malay middle 
class would become hubs for the Dakwah movement. The movement derived 
most of its membership from the academic and civil service ranks (Nagata 
1980; Fischer 2008). 
 
The turn to a ‘purer’ Islam, the application of Islam to everyday life, became 
conspicuous in everyday social life, particularly with the emergence of the veil 
(Nagata 1980; Abbott and Gregorios-Pippas 2010). In combatting this isolation, 
rather than concealing it as an individual private matter, it has become more of 
a public representation – a collective self, grounded in Islamic symbols and 
practices. Broadly accepted norms of conduct are transmitted through sociality. 
The social influence of Islamic identity on Malays is captured by Mead’s idea of 
the ‘generalised other’. He wrote ‘it is in the form of the generalised other that 
the social process influences the behaviour of the individuals involved in it and 
carrying it on, that is, that the community exercised control over the conduct of 
its individual members; for it is in this form that the social process or community 
enters as a determining factor into the individual’s thinking’ (1934: 155). Thus, 
the Islamic turn of the Malay self was created and moulded by social responses 
that enhanced the solidarity of the community. These responses were not just 
responses to direct interaction with other individuals. Rather, the self is 
interpreting and responding to a collective understanding of broadly accepted 
norms of how to be Malay, which in this instance was symbolised by an 
intensification of Islamic belief and ritual.  
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Malays were faced with social pressure to demonstrate a commitment to Islam 
and thus there was added caché for those who could perform Islam correctly. 
This transformed Malay customs that had always contained an element of folk 
and syncretism due to Hindu influence. It became untoward to hold the typical 
Malay wedding as it was inspired by Hindu custom (Nagata 1980). As I explain 
in Chapter 6, respondents described how their aunts and cousins started to 
wear veils and looser clothes. Much to their dismay, there was a backlash 
against Chinese food, even if it was pork-free, and shadow-puppets as they 
became unIslamic. Knowing how to conform to Islamic practice in order to 
maintain a pure social sphere required knowledge on how to perform them 
correctly or one would not fit in (Nagata 1980). This had the effect of 
institutionalising halal as a practice amongst many Muslim households and the 
opening up of halal businesses. Unfortunately, it also made more prominent the 
boundaries between those who confirmed to the halal practices and were pure 
and the others who did not and were ‘symbolic pollution’ (Douglas 1996). 
 
 
4.7 Ethno-nationalist development  
This section focuses on the post NEP period, during which political and financial 
interests, across the ethnic divide, became aligned. It was during this juncture 
that the state was fully set for the emergence of Islamic banking. First, the new 
developmental trajectory would gear the country towards export-driven growth 
that would make the country vulnerable to the shocks of the crisis. Second, 
Bumiputera capitalism would spur the financialisation of the business sphere. 
This would foreshadow the mass financialisation that followed the 1997-1998 
financial crisis. Last, the state would attempt to shape economic practices – 
consumption on the one hand and saving on the other – to people’s sense of 
moral duty: nationalist and Islamic. 
It was around the 1980s that the Malaysian political economy coalesced the 
state-led development and Malay aspiration to exploit their stake in the 
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economic order (Tajuddin 2012: 179). The state had to navigate between its 
Malay constituency and the non-Malay business elite, on whose economic 
growth the government’s continued stability depended. Even if BN, the ruling 
coalition in Malaysia, has been dominated by UMNO since its inception and had 
as its main focus Malay affirmative policy, it has always been backed by leaders 
of the Chinese elite networks80 who had pragmatically integrated within the 
networks of the Malay political elite.81  This developmental trajectory was driven 
by ethno-nationalist politics that sought to be ethnically inclusive for the ‘greater 
good’ of Malaysian economic growth, yet would inevitable produce and promote 
halal consumption, including Islamic banking.  
 
 
4.7.1 Bumiputera Capitalism 
 
The NEP in the 1970s had set the stage for the intensifying of the relationships 
between politically connected firms and business people with politicians 
(Gomez and Jomo 1997; Yeung 2009). Increasingly, business people in the 
private sector, whether Malay or Chinese, had to develop close connections 
with UMNO politicians in order to stay in business (Yeung 2009). Yeung sums 
up the situation succinctly: 
 
‘This new business class would be heavily dependent on political elites for 
access to government resources, such as infrastructure projects, licenses and 
privatized rents, a practice common in a number of countries in Southeast Asia, 
including in Malaysia and Indonesia. Political elites, on the flip side, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Yeoh 2012 explains: ‘The MCA bore the bulk of the election expenses for the MCA-UMNO 
coalition up to the federal elections of 1955. Consequently, MCA funds also helped to secure 
the Alliance’s electoral victory in the first elections for a fully elected assembly in August 1959’. 
81 This was primarily the result of a mutually beneficial relationship that commenced during the 
early beginnings of UMNO (Lee 1990; Yeung 2009; Tajuddin 2012). The financing of UMNO by 
the Chinese tycoons of the day ensured a few key governmental (economic policy) posts for 
Chinese politicians and commercial favours such as banking licences (Gomez and Jomo 1997; 
Yeung 2009; Tajuddin 2012). 
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required campaign funding from the business class during party and general 
elections to enable them to get re-elected as representatives in government, a 
situation seen in most East Asian economies. These two groups tended to 
defend and mutually support each other, especially against competitive 
intrusions’.  
 
Writing about this period, scholars explain that despite the far-reaching reforms, 
the core political and economic power structures prevailed (Gomez and Jomo 
1999; Rethel 2011). It would be more accurate to explain that the prevalence of 
power structures did not prevail despite the reforms but as a result of. It was the 
aim of UMNO to radically re-engineer Malaysian society whilst remaining at the 
core of its power structure. As often is the case, the state’s strategy to relinquish 
direct control of the markets and allow them to operate ‘autonomously’ 
according to market forces was a necessary condition for the effective 
reinstatement within the global economic order (Scott 2012). 
 
It is important to mention the broader regional context of these developments. 
‘The nexus between state and business in East Asia emerged as a major 
phenomenon when the developmental state model, involving active state 
intervention to rapidly industrialise economies, was adopted by governments in 
the region’ (Vithiatharan and Gomez 2014: 602). Similarly the Malaysian state 
wanted to ‘incubate’ the domestic capitalist class. Therefore, the ‘economic 
policy has been variously shaped by statist-nationalist impulses and pro-global 
market interests’ (Khoo and Hadiz 2010: 6). The developmental state helped 
accelerate the industrialisation and economic growth of low value-added 
countries like South Korea and Taiwan (Tajuddin 2012: 155–6) which had 
recently become cheap industrial labour centres and markets for foreign, 
especially Japanese industrial products and services. The import-substitution 
strategy enabled acquisition of technology from American companies and 
successful transfer of and knowhow from Japan, allowing them to join the 
consumer-driven commodity chain for retail goods (Tajmuddin 2012: 156–8). 
Malaysia wanted to follow the trajectory of its neighbours in order to appease 
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the middle and capitalist class through industry protection, economic growth, job 
creation and higher income.  
 
Reflecting on this period during an interview, an established banker who is 
close to the Malaysian political elite, explains that Islamic banking was one of 
many industries that were meant to be by Malays and for Malays. Thus 
accelerating economic growth by instigating patriotic consumption: 
 
Understand that Islamic banking was part of the change in 
infrastructure of the country: political economy, industrial, legal and 
legislative. The visionary leaders of Malaysia had already been 
working on an economic plan that would allow the country to pull 
itself by the bootstraps. National industry like Proton [car 
manufacturers] allowed people to attach an identity to certain goods. 
People can be proud of these goods and focus on them and this 
reaps economic benefits. 
 
Included in the broader incubating of the capitalist class was an effort to create 
an indigenous Malay/Bumiputera capitalist class through the privatisation of 
state assets to close political associates (Gomez and Jomo 1997; Yeung 2009; 
Tajuddin 2012). Having empowered indigenous labour with the NEP, UMNO 
also wanted to increase the presence of Malays at the top layer of the economic 
strata by indigenising the means of production. Mahathir would exert pressure 
on banks to provide credit to Malays for business projects. He would then 
proceed to sell state assets and companies to the same Malays. State-
controlled banks became a major vehicle by which individuals who were closely 
connected to the government obtained loans to purchase privatised state assets 
(Doraisami 2005: 255).  
 
According to researchers on corruption in Malaysia, ‘government policy forcing 
state and private banks to meet Malay lending quotas enabled politically 
connected Malay entrepreneurs to buy privatized companies’ (Doraisami 
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2005: 255). Former state managers and senior bureaucrats with ties to UMNO 
politicians were encouraged to move to the private sector in order to form a 
Bumiputera business class. The state embarked on a structural transformation 
of its economy marked by liberalisation, privatisation, and the financialisation of 
the politic-business sphere (Gomez and Jomo 2003; Rethel 2011) by inspiring 
Malay entrepreneurialism through Islamic values and using Islam to instil a 
disciplined work ethic with workers (Khoo and Hadiz 2010). At the same time 
Malaysia’s political gaze shifted east. The government announced that its Look 
East foreign policy and modeled Malaysia Incorporated on the Japanese model. 
Unsurprisingly, these shifts would also take an Islamic slant (Khoo and Hadiz 
2010: 19). The Islamisation of the state and political sphere was taken to its 
logical conclusion with the state’s harnessing of Islam to its developmental 
narrative.  
 
 
4.7.2 Homo Islamicus 
 
Once again Islam became a site for political intervention, albeit for economic 
ends (Embong 2001; Fischer 2008; Khoo and Hadiz 2010). The state turned to 
Islam to appeal to people’s duty to consume lavishly and yet work and save 
sensibly. This project rested on the amalgamation of two distinct domains: 
religion and the economy, with the aim of enabling prescriptive Islamic values 
that enhanced the reach of capitalist dispositions in the everyday life of ordinary 
borrowers and savers. Mahathir articulated the need for Malays to find in 
themselves homo Islamicus: an Islamically inspired ethical orientation towards 
one’s self, economic practices, and ummah. In an attempt to ground their 
developmental vision in authentic terms that resonated with the temper of the 
people, political elites also started to articulate a Muslim version of the 
Protestant Ethic (Khoo 2006) as the basis to Melayu Baru (the New Malay)82: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Essentially, the Melayu Baru is a project directed to the transformation and modernisation of 
the Malay society, with its emphasis currently on the creation and expansion of the Malay 
capitalist and the new middle classes, and the development of a work culture and ethics in 	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an ideal man who is entrepreneurial and modern and looks to Muslim values for 
inspiration (Embong 2001).83 It would be compatible with his ‘Look East policy’ 
Malaysia’s straying from its alleged Islamic roots was identified as the cause of 
‘Malay Backwardness’. Given that ‘the ‘lack of Islam’ has often been used to 
explain ‘Malay backwardness,’ a return to Malaysia’s authentic and Islamic 
golden past was the obvious antidote (Hoffstaedter 2009).  
 
Entrepreneurialism, self-restraint, and accountability are some of the 
characteristics highlighted as Islamic virtues that should form the foundation of 
one’s economic practices. Malays were encouraged to spend, save and work 
Islamically, ‘in keeping with the demands of the work regime of a rapidly 
industrializing society’ (Embong 2001: 169). The state was moulding its citizens 
into subjects that practised a version of Islamic piety that was in tune with the 
political and economic requirements of its modernisation project.  This state’s 
turn towards Islam, including the co-optation of religious scholars, was part of 
an effort to ignite an Islamic equivalent of the Protestant work ethic, and 
conveniently also rebutted the accusations of secularism from PAS, the 
increasingly popular Islamist party (Nagata 1980).   
 
These events stimulated a resurgence of interest and reassessment of the 
identity of Muslims, as individuals and a collective. This same audience became 
more attentive to the state’s appeal for Malaysians to discover ‘their Islamic 
roots and drag the country out of its backward state’ (Mahathir). As students of 
Weber and sociology of Islam would know, Mahathir belongs to a school of 
Muslim reformers who ironically use Weberian arguments, not structural 
disadvantages, to account for the developmental failures of their society, 
especially ‘theories of individual ascetic motivation’ (Turner and 2010: 157). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
keeping with the demands of the work regime of a rapidly industrializing society’ (Embong 2001: 
169). For further reading see Embong 2001; Hoffstaedter 2009; Saat 2011. 
83 As many have pointed out, whether it ever had a basis in reality, remains another matter.  
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Paradoxically, whilst Protestantism was invoked to encourage Malays to work 
and save, it was a Catholic ethic that the state was promoting in the sphere of 
consumption. Accompanying the incubation of local industries with protectionist 
policies and a political discourse based on Islamic ethic, was an ethno-
nationalist drive that was underpinned by a rhetoric that shifted the burden of its 
success on its citizens. Malaysians were told that as consumers they were 
equally responsible for the success of the economic trajectory. The ethno-
nationalist political discourse framed consumption as a patriotic act of a dutiful 
citizen (Pietrykowski 2009). This marked the state of the state’s call to its 
citizens to consume and save for the state. Citizens reciprocate the privileges 
that accompany ‘economic egalitarianism’, brought about by the proliferations of 
means of credit, through the ‘duty’ of consumption (Cohen 2003; Fischer 2008).  
 
Malays were encouraged to spend, save and work Islamically, ‘in keeping with 
the demands of the work regime of a rapidly industrialising society’ (Embong 
2001: 169). Halal industries, particularly banks, would cater for the financial 
needs of this ideal type of Malay who schizophrenically would save and work 
like a protestant and consume like a catholic even if these products had to be 
Islamically compliant. Economic egalitarianism for Malays was not only repaid 
through the duty of consumption, but especially through Islamic consumption, 
the only authentic method of consumption.  
 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
 
To paraphrase C. Wright Mills, the aim of this chapter was to emphasise the 
historical junctions that will orientate the reader towards the vital themes that 
will be discussed in the remaining chapters. This chapter emphasised how the 
emergence, development, and growth of Islamic banking practices are 
embedded within broader, historically determined, closely intertwined, social, 
economic, cultural, and political circumstances. More specifically, this chapter 
contextualises how the ‘culturally constructed complexities’ (Valsiner 2008: xii), 
	  	   166	  
of trust and confidence in the state, can enable the acceptance of the 
halal/haram boundaries as common knowledge within the Muslim-Malay 
community. I chart the emergence of Islamic banking through five historical 
vignettes. They display the contingences that enabled the conditions for ‘supply’ 
as well as ‘demand’. These are understood not as irreducible ‘givens’ but as the 
results of political, economic and discursive strategies:  
 
• Crystallisation of Muslim-Malay identity 
The premise of Islamic banking is based on political notions that reify Malay 
identity as Muslim. Without denying that the Malay community has historically 
been affiliated to Islamic practice, the emphasis in this section is on the colonial 
origins of the ethnicisation of religion and the institutionalisation of Islamo-Malay 
identity. Ironically, these practices were originally formulated by the colonial 
state to manage ethnicised labour hierarchies for its political and economic 
ends. Post independence, they would be redeployed by the postcolonial state 
and continue to perpetuate a performative role in everyday Malay life.  
 
• The Malaysian postcolonial state: capitalist dirigisme 
The emphasis of this section is on how the state’s affirmative action alleviated 
millions out of poverty and also created a cycle of Malay dependency and 
loyalty towards an UMNO-led state. The policy to alleviate the Malay community 
out of poverty forged a social contract between UMNO and the Malay 
community. The government furthered their interests and they would reciprocate 
with their trust and support. Therefore, for the majority within the Malay 
community, social mobility, and prosperity is inevitably associated with a Malay 
controlled state.  
 
• Islamisation from above: The bureaucratisation of Islam 
The irony of UMNO’s bid to out-Islamicise their Islamist rivals, is the resultant 
intensification of the Islamic metaphor in the political sphere. By co-opting the 
leaders of the Islamist party and the Islamist revival movement, they gave them 
agency within the state apparatus to implement their Islamic agenda. This shift 
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would validate Islam, and its representatives: shariah scholars, as a legitimate 
source of authority for political power. They would also establish various Islamic 
institutions including an Islamic bank and insurance. Thus, as I go on to explain 
in Chapter 5, shariah regulation is based on a legacy of bureaucratisation of 
Islam, compounded by the institutionalisation of Malay identity.  
 
• Islamic Revivalism from below  
The revivalism, shaped by political and social forces, would be the ‘fertile’ soil 
that would allow the seed sowed by the state to germinate. The values and 
ethics engendered in people would create an elective affinity for the values that 
would attract Muslim-Malay consumers to Islamic banking. These values are 
not homogenous and practices are justified according to various interests. As 
we shall discover in the rest of the dissertation, a variety of hierarchies of values 
are embodied by the ideal types: pragmatist, virtuoso and sceptic. 
 
• Ethno-nationalist development and Islamic consumption 
This section focuses on the post-NEP economic development. First, I consider 
the convergence of interests of the political and economic elite. The creation of 
Islamic banking is the ideal example of the accommodation between domestic 
and international pressures, as well as political and business interests. This 
meeting of interests became heightened during Mahathir’s attempt to create 
‘Bumicapitalism’ based on a Bumiputera class. Second I explain how 
paradoxically, the state would invoke Islamic discourse to entice Malaysians to 
save and work like Protestants but consume like Catholics albeit halal products.  
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‘Trust in Allah, but tie your camel first’ (an Arab saying also found in Hadith At-Tirmidhi: 2517). 
 
Chapter 5: The Crystallisation of the Islamic banking   
sector   
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The first four chapters of this dissertation have served to introduce the main 
themes of this project, set the theoretical framework and research methodology 
and contextualise the project within the historical long view. The next three 
chapters, starting from this one, will deliver a substantive analysis of Islamic 
banking based on observations from the field. Whilst the next two chapters will 
concentrate on data collected from participant observation and interviews with 
ordinary people, this chapter will concentrate on the structural parameters of the 
Islamic banking sector, or ‘supply’. For this reason, the data used in this chapter 
emerged from two sources: participant observation and interviews conducted 
with experts and a content analysis of a variety of Islamic banking texts from the 
Qur’an to Islamic banking textbooks and promotional literature for consumers.  
 
In the previous chapters I explained how Islam in Malaysia is a site for political 
contestations between the government and opposition and between the political 
elite and civil society. Consequently, Islam is a powerful tool-kit of symbols 
whose resonance can be used for the mobilisation of people. It is this political 
and social salience that informs the state’s use of the shariah and the 
halal/haram boundaries in its developmental trajectory.  
 
As I explained in the previous chapter, the creation of the Islamic banking sector 
rests on two factors: the state’s use of it to mediate political contestations and 
reaffirm its authority as the sole representative and guardian of Malays, and to 
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legitimate its developmental trajectory. Creating Islamic credit would provide a 
political and economic fix. Islamic banking products would underpin the 
consumption required to temper the political discontent that followed the crisis 
and create a competitive niche for Malaysia in the global economy – within a 
regulatory context that Muslim-Malays, the main constituency of UMNO, trusted. 
This chapter examines how the cultural components of the ‘ideology of the 
shariah’ (Zubaida 2003; 2011) is deployed ‘from above’ to capitalise on the 
salience of shared Islamic values ‘from below’ in order to create a niche 
financial sector in Malaysia.  
 
Following in the footsteps of other reformist and modernist Islamists, Prime 
Minister Mahathir proclaimed that the state would re-embed the political 
economy, including part of its financial system within Islamic values. Mahathir 
calculated that this ideological turn would legitimise and bolster the state’s 
capitalist trajectory as well as engender a tangible shift in economic action 
amongst Malays. The state’s rhetoric encouraged Malays to unleash their 
entrepreneurial zeal and work ethic according to state’s interpretation of  Islamic 
values. Following the breakdown of trust caused by the 1997-1998 financial 
crisis, the state would again scale up its efforts to promote Malaysia’s Islamic 
development by boosting the Islamic banking sector. It would build on ideas of 
Islamic development from the 1980s by embracing the technological 
innovations (Warde 2000: 125) and ‘epistemic legitimation’ (Rethel 2011) from 
global finance. Islamic banking was advocated as ‘individually profitable and 
nationally beneficial’ (Tripp 2006: 117).  
 
For the first time since the inception of Islamic finance, the state managed to 
create a profitable market within which Islamic financial institutions would not 
operate simply as ethical or charitable enterprises but as market-oriented 
institutions that would generate profits within a distinctly Islamic value 
framework. The state’s promise was that unlike previous Islamic banking 
products, these would be as efficient as the conventional. But unlike their 
conventional counterparts, their outcome would have financial and spiritual 
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benefits. Islamic banking consumers would be guarded against speculative risk 
found in conventional finance and they would also avoid Islam’s greatest sin: 
riba. Unlike the experiments of previous decades, the unprecedented growth 
suggest that this new paradigm appealed to consumers. Ironically, the sector’s 
convergence with global finance would legitimise the sector in their eyes. 
Islamic banking would resonate with Muslim-Malays who no longer trusted the 
conventional financial system but still needed credit: they appreciate its Islamic 
blessing and yet feel assured with the nod given by global finance.  
 
Culture, in the shape of the shariah was deployed by the state as a tool to spur 
Muslim-Malays into action. The construction of Islamic banking based on 
‘cultural components’ that were intertwined with the social and cultural life of 
ordinary people offered new possibilities to recreate new strategies of action 
(Swidler 1986). Islam’s vast repertoire of symbols, language and ideas would 
become the basis of an alternative ‘cultural tool-kit’ that could provide a ‘world-
view’ which simultaneously problematised conventional banking and also 
offered a solution (Swidler 1986). Through Islamic banking, the state and banks 
offered a new ‘justification’ (Weber 2005) based on an ideology, ‘a system of 
cultural meaning’ that felt authentic to ordinary people’s moral universe (Swidler 
1986:279). In times of crisis, ‘ideologies – explicit, articulated, highly organised 
meaning systems’ (Swidler 1986:278; Weber 2005) forge new practices. In this 
case, shariah regulation based on the boundary creations of halal/haram helped 
provide moral clarity in times of uncertainty and also provide a path of salvation: 
financial, spiritual, social, and political (Douglas 1996).  
 
The perspective of culture as ‘a repertoire of strategies’ has been used to 
explain how action is mobilised when shared values are unfavourable to a 
market (see Chan 2009). My findings demonstrate that this perspective is also 
salient for the growth of markets where the shared values are favourable. As I 
argue, the growth of Islamic banking practices is not only due to a coalescence 
of generalised values from below. These values found an opportunity, means of 
expression and ideological direction in the Islamic banking sector. Therefore, 
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my argument put equal emphasis on the ability of actors to create action from 
meaning and also on structural parameters of culture, in this case the Islamic 
banking sector. This approach also puts into perspective, the tensions present 
in the Islamic banking sector as a result of the extensiveness of Islam’s tool-kit 
and its malleability to any ideological project.  
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to establish how the states and banks have crafted 
Islamic banking as a ‘tradition’ (Hobsbawm 1983) that diverges from the original 
implications of the prohibition of riba and instead support neo-liberal practices 
that are part of the state’s developmental strategy. For this reason, the first 
section of the chapter will include a discussion of the core principles, drawn 
from sacred Islamic texts and fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), upon which Islamic 
banking is premised. Islamic finance is ‘underpinned by a host of definitional, 
language and doctrinal debates’ (Pollard and Samers 2007: 315) and 
translations’ (Maurer 2005; 2012: 419). The aim is to critically assess how 
components of the Islamic repertoire of ‘tools’ have been crystallised into a 
contemporary banking sector that through claims of Islamic distinctiveness can 
shape people’s banking practices. Although it has been argued that Islamic 
banking is not about the implementation of Qur’anic prohibitions, but the 
debates surrounding riba (Maurer 2005; 2006), I contend that on the contrary, 
the Islamic banking sector in Malaysia is driven by the state’s attempt to frame 
one type of correct Islamic banking practices that is politically and economically 
expedient.  
 
For this reason, tracing the historical contours of the numerous controversial 
debates about riba and the concrete endeavours that led to the creation of 
Islamic financial institutions adds a layer of nuance to the practitioners’ debates 
about contemporary applications of the shariah to banking and the tensions that 
ensue as a result. It allows the researcher to compare and contrast the Islamic 
moral vocabulary with the realities of the Islamic banking sector and highlights 
the contestations surrounding the drive for efficiency, debt-based products and 
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standardisation versus the pressures to retain authenticity, social justice and 
equity. The second half will focus on how the values and practices discussed in 
the first half of the chapter are institutionalised and codified within the regulatory 
boundaries of Islamic banking. Although it is the Malaysian state that 
underwrites the Islamic banking sector, in order to prevent tensions arising from 
the state’s dual management of conventional and Islamic finance and secular 
and Islamic law, shariah scholars are co-opted to regulate Islamic banking. 
Shariah scholars are integral to the ‘shariahisation’ of Islamic banking products. 
The regulatory process, which draws boundaries around what is permissible 
and what is not, resembles that of halal food – the first mass commodity to be 
produced under shariah regulations. Scholars filter undesirable elements and 
enact specific rituals and practices that create boundaries between halal and 
haram food – labelling one as permissible and clean and the other as forbidden 
and polluted (Douglas 1996).  
  
The aim of this chapter is not to straitjacket Islamic banking as either authentic, 
or inauthentic.84 It is to establish how the states and banks have crafted Islamic 
banking as a ‘tradition’ (Hobsbawm 1983), that diverges from the original 
implications of the prohibition of riba, and instead support neo-liberal practices 
that are part of the state’s developmental strategy. It traces the theological roots 
of Islamic value and walks the reader through the state’s adoption of this value 
into Islamic credit that can be mass-consumed by Muslim-Malays. Since 
advocates of the sector, state and banks, often ‘folklorise’ (Al-Azmeh 2010), 
‘whilst shunning confrontation with historical evidence’ (Kuran 2004:159) the 
‘longview’ of the historical approach is necessary (Hobsbawm 1983:1–20). An 
analysis of Islamic banking theory and practice, as endorsed by the interested 
actors, enables the researcher to distinguish points of continuity and of 
transformation as well as tension, ambiguity, and ambivalence. Invariably, an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 There are various ways of approaching Islam in sociological and anthropological research. 
This thesis follows Asad in conceptualising Islam as a discursive tradition that includes and 
relates to itself to the fundamental texts of the Qur’an and the Hadith (Asad 1986). For an 
insightful overview to the debate, refer to Talal Asad’s The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam 
(1986). 
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analysis of the adaptation of these ancient texts into modern, standardised and 
codified practices throws considerable light on the direction being taken by 
Islamic banking, and more generally, on the creation of the ‘working myths’ that 
legitimise the dominant form and value of Islamic credit.  
 
 
5.2 The main pillars of Islamic banking  
 
Islamic banking differentiates itself as Allah-sanctioned finance through 
additional regulation based on an interpretation of the shariah. For proponents 
of this system, the regulation of financial products, services, and behaviour 
according to an Islamic code of conduct, results in a financial system that 
maximises maslaha, (which means public interest as in public good) and 
minimizes madarah or harm (Zubaida 2003: 15; Warde 2000: 42). 
 
In the words of Islamic banking practitioner Tarek El-Diwany, ‘Religion gives us 
a set of objectives and a set of rules to help us achieve these objectives. The 
purpose of corporate activity is to maximise shareholder value. The objective of 
all religions is very different. The purpose of life is to worship god. If you believe 
that you’ll stand in front of your creator, on the day of judgment, and have to 
justify what you did in this life then that’s a very powerful regulator of all activity, 
including financial activity. And I would argue that it’s more powerful than a set 
of regulations handed down to you by a financial regulator. We really have to 
look at a system of human governance where financial organisations are 
governed by the people, and their own values, internal moral drivers rather than 
external set of rules which they get around with’ (El-Diwany 2009)85 86 (my 
italics/emphasis).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 El-Diwany was discussing the role of religion in finance on BBC Radio 4. 
86 Echoing early Polanyi, Islamic Political Economy creates a ‘false dichotomy’ (Hart 2001; Dodd 
2014) between special purpose and general purpose money. They argue that unlike Islamic 
banking, the market-economy is disembedded (from society) and any value system and has 
thus become self-referential and a threat to society. 
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As a rule of thumb, a valid Islamic financial transaction must include all the vital 
aspects of a (secular) legal contract, and is certified by a board of shariah 
scholars as being free of any haram (forbidden) elements according to their 
interpretation of the school of fiqh (roughly an Islamic version of jurisprudence) 
they practice. ‘An important precept of Islam is al aslu fil ashya’ al ibadah, or 
that the norm with regards to things is permissibility’ (Dusuki 2011: 3). Put 
simply, all transactions are halal (permissible) as long as they exclude anything 
that is strictly prohibited. This includes riba (usury), gharar (excessive 
uncertainty), maysur (gambling), and the production or trade of impure, i.e. 
haram (forbidden) commodities. Islamic banking derives its legitimacy from 
Islamic sources like the Qur’an, Hadith and Sunnah, and from fatwas (legal 
opinions) issued by shariah scholars who are experts in fiqh (Islamic 
jurisprudence). Islamic texts are mined for sayings and guidelines concerning 
economic and financial activity.  
 
Conforming to the reformist tradition then, the Islamic banking sector, does not 
perceive the ‘shari’ah as set of fixed rules, but a Weltanschauung, a worldview, 
from which men have to deduce rules in relation to their conditions and 
understanding’ (Zubaida 2003: 145). They adopt a ‘historical relativism’ 
(Zubaida 2003) that accepts the Quran and the traditions of the prophet whilst 
adapting them to the exigencies and spirit of the time. The shariah is derived 
from ‘the sacred sources of Islam: “the Qur’an as the word of God”, “the habitual 
behaviour or sunna” of the Prophet as it was recorded in “traditions of hadiths”’ 
(Hourani 1990: 66).87 A division between mu‘amalat (transactions) and men’s 
worship of God exist but these are artificial as ‘acts of worship have a social 
aspect’, and any dictates of the Qur’an including those regarding economic 
practices are ‘also directed towards God’ (Hourani 1990: 65).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 The ‘hierarchy’ of the shariah is: Quran, Sunnah, Ijma’, Qiyas, Ijtihad, and (in some Schools 
such as the Shafiite) al ‘adah wa-l ‘urf (local ‘custom and usage’). 
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The shariah is sometimes mistakenly assumed to be a fixed and discernable 
body of laws similar to a modern constitution (Zubaida 2003), which reveals 
precise rules about conduct. A more accurate representation of the shariah is 
that of a broad body of religious precepts. For the most part the Qur’an 
expresses God’s will in terms of general principles with few exceptions 
regarding specific commands related to private matters such as marriage and 
inheritance (Hourani 1990: 65; Zubaida 2003: 12). ‘Except by implication, the 
Qur’an does not contain within itself a system of doctrines, but it does tell men 
what God wishes them to do’ (Hourani 1990: 65). Therefore, the shariah is 
predominantly man-made’ i.e. ‘transmitted and developed through human 
agency’ (Zubaida 2003: 10), reflecting the historical legacies and specific 
institutional anchoring of each jurisdiction (Warde 2000). 
 
Indeed, the tradition of the shariah is based on a ‘hybrid formation’ resulting 
from its absorption of customary practices, and local cultural and legal traditions 
from (Arab to Roman law). The mosaic of Islamic practices across different 
regions makes it impossible to establish one standard set of economic mores or 
practices that are constant for all adherents to Islam. The everyday banking 
practices of the ummah (community of believers) are not uniform. Even 
amongst the pious – a minority inclined to dogmatically follow Islamic precepts 
there is no consensus on what constitutes authentically Islamic economic 
behaviour. Islam allows for discrepancy in interpretation and implementation, 
which varies according to the different schools of fiqh (jurisprudence, body of 
laws and moral precepts) (Hourani 1990: 69).88 
 
Indeed its amenability to the various exigencies of the diverse ‘Muslim’ world is 
what makes it such a powerful and ‘flexible vocabulary of a moral economy’ 
(Zubaida 2003: 11) that provide the building blocs for a cultural strategy that 
shapes people’s action. This variation of practices can also be observed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88  The complexity of interpretation in Islam does not stop at the fault lines between Sunni and 
Shia. Each branch developed several fiqh schools, each with its own interpretation of mores and 
codes of conduct.  
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amongst the countries where Islamic Banking is established. Iran, a theocracy, 
opts for rigid, dogmatic, and all encompassing practices. De jure, if not de facto, 
all state-regulated activity is Islamic. The Wahhabi Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has 
a concentration of Hanbali fiqh and a literal interpretation of the shariah. 
Regimes and states that are not religion driven (irrespective of their formal 
adherence to Islam) but that are broadly orientated towards secularisation and 
modernisation opt for more flexible interpretations. These encourage (in the 
case of Sunnism, as the Shia have their own schools) a plurality of fiqh 
corresponding to madhhab - ‘schools’ of juridical thought.  
 
The madhhab differ ‘from each other on certain substantive points of law, and 
also on the principles of legal reasoning (usul al-fiqh), and in particular on the 
place of Hadith and the legitimacy, limits, and methods of ijtihad (Hourani 
1990: 69). Egypt follows a mix of Hanafi and Maliki, which allows for a wider 
interpretation of religious texts, although, just like Malaysia all four - Hanafi, 
Maliki, Hanbali, Shafii - are allowed for the purposes of Islamic banking (Warde 
2000: 32–4). Some argue that the variety of interpretations is motivated by 
political expediency. Kuran says that ‘regimes in desperate need of political 
legitimacy have funded, and are continuing to fund, movements rich in religious 
symbolism in order to cultivate an image of piety’ (2001: 24–25).  Others, like 
Warde (2000) point to Islam’s dynamic adaptation to local environments that 
has driven the development of distinct traditions in different countries, all of 
which have evolved over the 14 centuries of Islam’s existence as a religious 
and political reality. 
 
 
5.2.1 Riba  
 
Islamic banking is primarily defined and understood as riba-free banking. 
Whereas nowadays it is used to denote the charge incurred upon incurring a 
financial debt, riba refers to any growth, financial or otherwise, that is singularly 
induced. Riba, the root meaning of which is ‘increase’, (Tripp 2006: 126) or 
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‘growth’ (Subhani 2006) is the imperative ethical cornerstone of Islamic banking 
(Kuran 2004). Riba is usually translated into English as usury, an illegal and 
immoral rate of interest, but for the purposes of Islamic banking, all interest is 
usury. Consequently, the Islamic banking system is built around ‘the elimination 
of the payment and receipts of interest in all forms’ (Lewis 2009).  
 
Whether riba was meant to encompass all forms of interest, or solely usurious 
(socially unaccepted) interest is not clear. As we shall read in the next section, 
debates surrounding the authentic meaning of riba have always been 
controversial and as mentioned in Chapter 1. To this day, its meaning remains 
enigmatic, heterogeneous, and subject to controversy (Warde 2000: 55; Kuran 
2004: 39–41; Subhani 2006; Tripp 2006: 103–33). Several verses of the Qur’an 
and the hadith clearly prohibit riba but do not define it precisely: the term is 
imbued with ambiguity.  
 
Some of the most renowned verses in the Qur’an prohibiting riba that stand out 
include: 
 
‘Those who devour riba will not stand except as stands one whom the Evil One 
by his touch has driven to madness. That is because they say, “bay’ is like riba". 
But God had permitted bay’ and forbidden riba.’ (Al-Baqarah, Q 2: 275–81) 
 
‘You who believe! Devour not Usury, doubled and multiplied; but fear Allah; that 
you may (really) prosper.’ (Al ‘Imran, Q 3: 130) 
 
‘That they took Usury, thought they were forbidden; and that they devoured 
men’s substance wrongfully – We have prepared for those among them who 
reject Faith a grievous punishment.’ (Al-Nisa’, Q 4: 161) 
 
‘The riba that is practiced to increase some people's wealth, does not gain 
anything with God. But if people give to charity, seeking God's pleasure, these 
are the ones who receive their reward many fold.’ (Ar-Rum 30: 39) 
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The verses in the Qur’an are unequivocal in their condemnation of riba, stating 
that those who are true believers would fear Allah and give up their demand for 
riba or it would result in the destruction of a Muslim’s honour.89  
Riba is singled out as the gravest sin. It is worse than any crime, including theft, 
adultery, or murder, which any believer could ever commit. 
 
For some, the ban on interest is another mark of Islam’s exotic appeal. 
Certainly, due to historical contingency, it is only in Islam that the question of 
riba remains salient to scholars and believers, however Islam is not the only 
religion that espouses doctrinal hostility to riba. Historically, all three Abrahamic 
religions – Christianity, Judaism and Islam – 90 raised philosophical and ethical 
objections to the unnatural growth from self-generation for money and other 
acts (including incest). Although this commonality has been disputed by Maurer, 
who asserted that Islamic banking’s prohibition of riba cannot be equated with 
‘early Christian injunctions against usury’, the etymological roots of riba in 
Arabic are identical to other Semitic languages including Hebrew ribbit (marbit 
or tarbit) and the same connotations of 'increase', as in Leviticus 25: 36–37’ 
(Benthall 2001). There is a consensus across a variety of disciplines that all 
three religions posed doctrinal objections to interest91 (Subhani 2006; Warde 
2000; Tripp 2006; Graeber 2011; Kaleem and Lewis 2014).   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Hadith ibn Majah and Al-Hakim on the authority of Ibn Mas‘ud. 
90 That historically Catholicism espoused a harsh attitude towards usury and even commerce is 
a fact that is well known amongst theologians and lay Catholics alike. In ‘Debt: a historical study 
of worldview on debt’, Graeber makes this point emphatically. He states the following: ‘Usury 
was seen above all as an assault on Christian charity, on Jesus’s injunction to treat the poor as 
they would treat the Christ himself, giving without expectation of return and allowing the 
borrower to decide on recompense (Luke 6, p.34-35)’ (Graeber 2011: 283). Judaism’s 
opposition to interest might not be as renowned as that of the other two faiths, in fact the Jewish 
community in Europe became associated to moneylending and usury. Nevertheless 
ambivalence with regards to interest is present in some of its sacred texts. Consider Ezekiel 18, 
p.13: 'He who lends at interest, and takes profit; shall he then live? He shall not live. He has 
done all these abominations; he shall surely die; his blood shall be upon himself.’ 
91 Although Judaism permitted profit from interest in dealings with ‘strangers’ i.e. non-Jews 
(Kaleem and Lewis 2014).  
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The ethical and philosophical objections to interest stem from a variety of 
understandings of the problematic of riba. An aversion towards riba, based on 
the principle of natural law, is also evident ancient Greek philosophical inquiries 
about interest and the meaning of money. Aristotle described interest (tokos) as 
the ‘most hated’ and ‘unnatural’ art of making a gain from money itself, whether 
from speculation or the creation of debt. For Aristotle, ‘money was intended to 
be used in exchange, but not to increase at interest. And this term interest, 
which means the birth of money from money, is applied to the breeding of 
money because the offspring resembles the parent.’92 Its from this notion of riba 
as growth that we launch into an investigation of the original meaning of riba.  
 
 
5.2.2 Riba as divine debt 
 
One of the (heterodox) perspectives that lends itself particularly well to 
sociological theories of money, conceptualises riba as a transgression of the 
divine. Similar to Aristotelian abhorrence of riba, the Qur’an’s prohibition is 
based on natural law: money begetting money is unnatural and against the will 
of nature and God. 
 
The most intriguing perspectives of this argument is Subhani’s (2006) 
hermeneutical analysis of riba. For Subhani, the original prohibition of riba does 
not stem from its unjust outcome as modern reformers proclaim.  
Subhani is interested in the original meaning of riba and suggests that it is only 
by looking at the broader meaning of riba in reference to the other individual 
parts and in reference to the whole of the Qur’an which details the various types 
of riba, the majority of which are non economic transgressions, can its genesis 
be understood.93 The emphasis on the unnatural act of singular growth is 
accentuated by the Qur’an’s adjunct rule regarding exchange. The Qur’an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 (Aristotle, Politics, Part X – http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html). 
93 Out of the 72 chapters detailing the sin of riba, only one is interest (Q 2: 275).  
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states that whilst singular growth is forbidden, growth through process of duality 
is not. Take the widely quoted Quranic verse 275 from Surah 2 – Al-Baqarah. It 
presents riba as part of a duality forbidding riba but allowing bay’, which is trade 
or exchange instead: 
 
‘Those who devour riba will not stand except as stands one whom the Evil One 
by his touch has driven to madness. That is because they say, “bay is like riba.” 
But God had permitted bay’ and forbidden riba.’ (The Meaning of the Holy 
Qur’an 2006: 59).  
 
He then refers us to the Qur’an’s sanctions for riba and compares it to other 
economic crimes. The act of riba is punished by the worst sanctions mentioned 
in the Qur’an: madness of the devil and hellfire (Subhani 2006: 62). Similar 
economic crimes like theft, which unlike riba are not consensual and often 
involves coercion, are not subjected to the harsh punishment of riba. Subhani 
reasons that if, as the reformist school argued, riba was banned on account of 
the exploitation of the poor by the wealthy, wouldn’t similar exploitation through 
theft or fraud be worse? At the very least, interest was consensual and did not 
involve deception. The conclusion is that riba is not prohibited due to its 
economic nature, there are more profound implications. Subhani asks: ‘why is 
riba singled out and what are the characteristics of riba that make this the worst 
crime imaginable?’  
 
He concludes that the act of riba and its applications in the holy texts indicate 
that riba means means growth from a process of self-generation (Subhani 
2008: 10), which even without the intervention of another actor, can theoretically 
endure for eternity. He singles out this characteristic as the distinguishing 
feature of riba when places it in the most precarious category of transgressions.  
 
What this perspective underlies is that any value that is created singularly from 
a debt to another human, with no exchange taking place, is transgressing the 
divine order of God. Therefore, according to Islamic thought, money cannot be 
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created from itself through interest generated from debt. Value and money, can 
only be the result of sale, barter, trade, or any other kind of exchange that is 
consistent with Divine intentions. Echoing Adam Smith’s metaphor, Maurer 
notes that in Islamic banking, ‘it is the hand of God that is supposed to stabilize 
a real value’ (Maurer 2012: 420).94 It is not a stretch therefore, to conclude that 
any value is connected to the divine realm. Any loans can only be ‘good loans’ 
as in loans that are inherently made good because the borrower never incurs 
any debt (except for the principle). The rules of Qard Hasan, a type of permitted 
loan, stipulates that no interest can be charged and until the borrower has 
means to so s/he is under no duress to repay it. Human beings can only owe 
the original debt to Allah. 
 
The Qur’an’s connection between the binaries in the Qur’an – divine/human, 
sacred/earthly and singular/plural – means that for Allah, singularity is the 
prerogative of the divine.95 The notion of original debt that humans owe their 
existence to God is also echoed in a number of Qur’anic injunctions, including 
one which emphatically ‘declares riba to be “harrama” (2: 275). The Arabic verb 
“harrama” in its emphatic form means, to prohibit something because it is out of 
bounds for you, or because it is sacred’ (Subhani 2008: 11). 
 
Whilst this perspective still does not confirm with any certainty what the original 
prohibition means and why it enacted in the first place, the notion of riba as the 
transgression of the divine resonates with the primordial debt theories. 
According to Ingham (2004: 90), ‘The primordial debt is that owed by the living 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Some Islamic political economists claim that Adam Smith was influenced by Islamic thought, 
and others believe that he echoes it. Both groups view the invisible hand as the restatement of 
divine regulation. Abbas Mirakhor writes the following, ‘Smith makes clear in his Theory of Moral 
Sentiments that compliance with the rules prescribed by the Creator and with the rules of the 
market was essential to his vision … Smith succinctly and clearly shares some of the 
fundamental institutional scaffolding of Islam: belief in the necessity of compliance with the rules 
prescribed by the Creator’ (ISFIRE: Islamic Finance Review, Vol. 1, Issue 1, November 2011).  
95 Crucially for Subhani, any growth or increase linked to human activity must take place through 
an activity underpinned by a plurality such as exchange – whether this is a sexual act between 
an unrelated male and female or an act of trade. Any increase or growth that occurs outside of 
these parameters, is a transgression of the divinely ordained duality of nature. Procreation 
between a man and a woman, as well as trade and commerce are an act of bay’ whilst incest 
and interest are not. 
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to the continuity and durability of the society that secures their individual 
existence’. In essence, this theory suggests that the living are in fundamental 
debt to a higher divine being. The use of the word ‘abeed or ‘ibadi, translated as 
‘slave’ to refer to members of the ummah (the imagined Muslim community of 
believers), also suggest that perhaps it is not a stretch to suggest that a 
unilateral debt, was one that could only be owed to the divine and not other 
mere mortals.96 If believers are slaves of Allah, then it is to him that they can be 
eternally indebted to – not another human being. This theory is often associated 
to the emergence of authority whose legitimacy resides in its ability to represent 
the divine (Theret 1999: 61). This debt would ‘evolve as a debt to rulers and 
states which are essentially surrogates for the idea of society’ (Dodd 2014: 23). 
Aptly, one of my sceptical respondents quipped about Islamic banking, ‘they 
want to touch God … they want to play God’. He criticises the sector for this 
transgression, arguing that politicians and bankers aim to assume the 
indebtedness that Malays feel to Allah, whilst inverting its central premise. 
Unlike the other perspective of riba that we’ll be discussing next, which as I will 
argue is amenable to the logic of global finance, this perspective raises 
awkward questions for the Islamic banking sector. By suggesting that the 
origins of debt and therefore money lie in religious hierarchy, it challenges the 
Menger’s proposition, discussed in Chapter 2, that the roots of money 
originated in commercial life.  
 
 
5.2.3 The prohibition of riba for a just society  
 
This section explores the idea of prohibition of riba for the protection of the 
public interest and justice. Maslaha is translated as utility or interest as in public 
interest or welfare. The main premise of this perspective is that, ‘riba is unfair, it 
is exploitative, and it is unproductive’ (Warde 2000: 63). The premise is that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Many popular Muslim names such as Abdullah or Abd are variations of the word slave as in 
‘Abdullah is the slave of Allah’.  
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maslaha ‘is known to prohibit what is harmful and to institute what is beneficial 
for Muslims, in this life and the next’ (Zubaida 2003: 15). 
 
The notion of justice stems back to the early Islamic Political Economy whose 
claim was based on the argument that ‘an Islamic system … would be free, on 
one hand, of the exploitation and severe inequalities that characterize 
capitalism and, on the other, of the class struggles and intolerable restrictions 
that are hallmarks of socialism’ (Kuran 2004: 103). In its early years, Islamic 
economics was the political project of idealists and Islamic ideologues, mainly 
from the Indian Sub-continent, who aimed to develop a society that was free of 
Western influence. Appealing to the Muslim identity of his community, in the 
hope of gaining enough momentum to obtain cultural autonomy, seemed like 
the best form of political recourse for the emancipation of Muslims and the 
development of the economy. Activists like Mawdudi97 resented the colonisation 
of Muslims’ minds by Western (British) influence and argued that the economic 
and political development of Muslim societies depended on their ability to return 
to an Islamic way of life (Kuran 2004). For these Islamic revivalists Islam was a 
solution to the social, political, and economic injustices suffered by Muslims. 
They invoked maslaha to ‘justify the recasting of the law in accordance with the 
exigencies of modern life’ (Zubaida 2003: 16). The application of Islam to the 
political economy and the prohibition of riba was viewed as a primary tool of 
equalisation.  
 
Certainly, the notion of justice in Islam did not materialise in recent times. 
Medieval Islamic scholarship, for instance, the work of Al Ghazali, who 
introduced Aristotelian objections to riba in Islamic philosophy (Ghazanfar 2000; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 According to Kuran (2004), the intellectual forefather of the Islamic economics or Islamic 
Political Economy (IPE), was Sayyid Abul-Ala Mawdudi, who was born in British-ruled India. 
Mawdudi was the founder of a political party (the Jamaat-e-Islami) that fought for the 
emancipation of Indian Muslims. Mawdudi initially resisted the idea of political autonomy, which 
would later culminate in the creation of Pakistan. However, with the impending prospect of 
India’s Independence, Mawdudi became concerned by the Hindus’ increasing political power, at 
the detriment to the minority and often-poor Muslims.  
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Kuran 2004), was focused on notions of justice.98 Al Ghazali made an emphasis 
on the social welfare aspects of economic practices that increase utility 
(musalih) instead of disutilities (mafasid). For example, Al Ghazali (d.1127 CE) 
rejected lending because ‘whoever uses money in riba practices becomes 
ungrateful and unjust’, since money is ‘not created to be sought for itself but for 
other objects’. And since ‘hoarding money is injustice, it is meaningless to sell 
money for money except to take money as an end in itself which is injustice’ 
(Lewis 2009: 10). The principle of this tradition is a pragmatic one. Based on 
inductive reasoning, it starts with certainties of certain legal premises and 
proceeds to derive legal reasoning made in reference to them (Zubaida 
2003: 15–16). Its pragmatic flexibility also allows for reasoned not arbitrary 
exception to the rules that are overtly harsh and result in disutility.  
 
Zubaida cites the Araya contract, a classic example of this pragmatism. The 
Qur’an prohibits speculative contracts so unripe dates cannot be bartered 
against edible ones, as the dates might ultimately not be fit to eat. ‘Yet jurists 
have allowed this exception in order to avoid hardship for growers’ (Zubaida 
2003: 16). 
 
Although it is widely accepted that all three religions objected to interest, as far 
as Islam is concerned honest profit gained from productive work is a different 
matter – neither profit nor private ownership is considered unjust. 
Within the constraints of the divine laws and limits that don’t lead to greed or the 
pursuit of personal whims, the medieval Islamic philosopher, ‘Al-Ghazali sees 
nothing condemnable or sinful about people being “maximisers” and acquisitive. 
“Man loves to accumulate wealth and possessions of all kinds of property. If he 
has two valleys of gold, he wants a third” [Ihya 2, p.280]’ (Ghazanfar 
2000: 879). The Qur’an has no qualms with profit generated from trade and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Some historians believe that it was Al Ghazali who introduced or reintroduced Aristotelian 
philosophy to medieval European philosophers, the Scholastics (Ghazanfar 2000). 
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commerce, private property, or with inheritance (Kuran 2004; Rodinson 2007).99 
A famous verse from the Hadith captures the priority of private property in 
Islam: ‘a man’s property is as sacred as his blood’. Even if in the original sense, 
man owes all debt, time and the earth’s resources to God, there is 
acknowledgement that ‘man is the owner of the fruits of his own labour’ 
(Ghazanfar 2000: 879). As Rodinson points out, not only does Islam not 
discourage economic activity and profit, many of its verses glorify commerce. 
He writes that, ‘it does not merely say that one must not forget one’s portion of 
this world.., it also says that it is proper to combine the practice of religion and 
material life, carrying on trade even during pilgrimages, and goes so far as to 
mention commercial profit under the name of “God’s Bounty” (Rodinson 
2007: 42).100  
 
In some respects, this conceptualisation of Islam’s role in the economy is similar 
to Keynesian interventions to temper the excesses of the market (Warde 
2000: 46). This stance serves as a firm intellectual foundation for a sector that is 
compatible with neo-liberal ideology. Unlike the perspective which suggests that 
riba is a transgression of the divine, which is categorical in all dealings related 
to interest (whether they are defined as such or referred to through other 
terminologies), this view justifies and opens the realm of possibilities for debt-
based products using stratagems that on paper avoid interest.  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 There is an Islamic law of inheritance that stipulates that it must be shared according to the 
principles of fairness. One example is that equal shares for full siblings of the same sex rules 
out primogeniture (Kuran 2004: 105–6). 
100 It also often mentioned and widely known amongst the ummah, that the Prophet Muhammad 
belonged to a tribe (Quraysh) that included caravan traders (Warde 2000: 38; Hourani 
2002: 15). Whenever practitioners at conferences are introducing Islamic finance to a 
nonMuslim audience and want to emphasise Islam’s compatibility with profit, it is common for 
them to mention the Prophet’s reputation as an honest and skilful merchant who managed the 
commercial affairs of his wealthy first wife – the widow Khadija. In terms of symbolism this is 
significant. Besides following the readings of the Qur’an and Hadith, Muslims are also 
encouraged to emulate the Prophet’s way of life. 
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5.2.4 Contemporary consensus  
 
The perspective discussed in the previous section, prohibition of riba in the 
name of justice, informs the contemporary consensus in the Islamic banking 
world. ‘In 1986, the Fiqh (jurisprudence) Academy of the Islamic Conference 
supported the restrictive interpretation of early jurists, condemning all interest-
bearing transactions as void’ (Warde 2000: 57; Tripp 2006). 
 
Based on this decision, all riba is interest and Islamic banking practitioners are 
expected to believe in this ‘truth’ unconditionally (Kuran 2004: 39–40; 58). The 
majority of shariah scholars and boards, including the SAC in Malaysia, agree 
that riba as interest. It is the profit that is accrued from riba that is viewed as 
distinct to that collected from an economic transaction (Tripp 2006: 126). This is 
clearly stated in Islam’s unwavering prohibition of profit generated through riba 
as mentioned in the Qur’an and the Hadith. It is a result of the inference of 
these verses that they decide which profit is permissible and which is not. Any 
Islamic banking service charge cannot resemble compounding interest. 
Consequently they object to the fixed pre-determined element in interest based 
lending and it is problematic because the lender eschews all the risk that is 
usually associated with making profit from trade and the possibility of growth of 
interest has no ceiling.  
 
Although the prohibition of riba is specifically mentioned in the Qur’an, Islamic 
banking uses the Hadith as the principal source for the delineation of current 
practices. The main quote is the following: ‘Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat 
for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates, and salt for salt, like for like, equal 
for equal and hand to hand, if the commodities differ, then you may sell as you 
wish provided that the exchange is hand to hand’ (Sahih al-Muslim) (Dusuki 
2011: 178). According to the common interpretation of these verses, 
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conventional financial transactions commit riba on three counts commonly from 
two types of transactions a: loan-type transaction, or an exchange contract.101  
 
It is this narrative that the Malaysian state and banks disseminate and 
emphasise amongst Muslim Malay consumers. Their reading material for 
consumers, for instance, their leaflets leave no space for ambiguities. A leaflet 
from one of the banks states the following: ‘The prohibition of usury in Islam is 
very clear-cut, so much so that there is no conflict of opinion amongst the 
scholars’.  
 
They continue to equate usury with the interest charged by conventional banks, 
using the example of conventional car loans to illustrate their point.102 They also 
highlight the dichotomy between the usurious practices of conventional banks, 
and the principled – and their Islamically stringent –  products. This point of view 
was one that I came across frequently during Islamic finance conferences. As 
the head of retail products division of a prominent Saudi bank, with branches in 
Malaysia remarked, ‘as far as I’m concerned, if we’re halal, then conventional 
banks should just be called haram banks’. 
 
It is the dichotomy of halal/haram that underpins the industry’s message. A 
juxtaposition of the permissible Islamic banking products versus the forbidden 
conventional is meant to contrast the superior value of the former against the 
latter. Malays are taught that one type of banking practices will be rewarded and 
the other punished. The industry, remind consumers that it is their responsibility 
to police their practices and prevent transgression. In order to maintain this 
discipline, Malays are encouraged to take an active role as informed Muslim 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Riba can take place on three different counts:  
• Charging excess due to delay in payment (riba al-nasiah) in lending and borrowing 
contracts (riba al-duyun). 
• The delay of delivery of one of the commodities. 
• The exchange for the same commodity in unequal amount (riba al-fadl) in exchange 
contracts (riba al-buyu’) (Dusuki 2011: 177–80). 
 
102 Notes provided by the CEO of Bank Muamalat. The notes provided were his own as yet 
unpublished drafts of the leaflet:  Riba, Usury and its prohibition.  
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citizens. As one CEO complained, ‘most Muslims don’t understand the severity 
of riba. They don’t see it as an obligation to use Islamic Banking. Islamic 
banking is compulsory and they don’t know it. There is one small miserable 
chapter in the Islamic Studies class, which is compulsory for all school children 
from the age of 6. The way it is explained also doesn’t relate to real life. My 
daughter had to stand up in class and say, this is banking that they’re talking 
about lah!’ (it is a common emphatic in Malay and Malaysian English).  
 
The conversation with this practitioner and with others highlights the industry’s 
policy of encouraging socialisation - or what they call ‘indoctrination’ into self-
management - into conforming with the expanded boundaries of the halal 
dichotomy. As many practitioners complained, people’s acceptance of these 
new halal boundaries, previously concerned with very specific and limited rituals 
related to food and hygiene, was a complex and tortured process.  
 
Writing about the ‘cultural reconstruction’ that takes place in the 
commodification of finance, Aldridge writes that it, ‘requires people to take 
active responsibility … The key implication is that people must be made aware 
that this is a field in which they will need to participate as informed citizens’ 
(1998: 7). She continued to explain that as far as the industry was concerned it 
was ‘all about indoctrination – or lack of it’.  For this reason, there was an 
industry wide strategy to signal correct type of banking for Malays, the sacred 
texts that highlighted this prohibition and comparison to similar rituals of 
avoidance like alcohol and pork that they were already following. Crucially, they 
wanted to emphasise that they were signalling important aspects of a Muslim 
way of life that consumers had missed out on. They are responsible for their 
own spiritual and financial welfare. As Jackson explains, ‘government policies 
and practices send important signals to consumers about institutional goals and 
national priorities. They indicate in sometimes subtle but very powerful ways the 
kinds of behaviours that are rewarded in society, the kinds of attitudes that are 
valued, the goals and aspirations that are regarded as appropriate, what 
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success means and the worldview under which consumers are expected to act’ 
(Jackson 2006: 120). 
 
It was for this reason that the banks whose main consumer base consists solely 
of Muslim-Malays, organised or sponsored community events. These banks 
sponsored religious festivals and information sessions with their own shariah 
scholars in predominantly Malay enclaves. Their representative participated in 
neighborhood groups, prayer meetings, or mosques to educate people about 
the prohibition of riba and the Islamic banking sector.  
 
Fully aware of the necessity of socialising people into these practices, my 
insider informants disclosed that every couple of months, off the books informal 
industry-wide meetings are held. The most influential actors in the sector meet 
to discuss the developments in the sector and to formulate what they term an 
educational strategy. This strategy is most visible in the advertising material 
aimed at consumers. The rewards and penalties of using Islamic banking are 
clearly underlined in leaflets. For instance, one booklet emphasises the severity 
of riba by comparing it to other sins. It states that whoever engages in usurious 
practices is committing a sin that is 36 times worse than adultery. 
 
According to one informant who used to attend these meetings, the main 
objective was to ‘educate’ Malays about Islamic banking and instil in them the 
habit of Islamic banking. They believe that the self-regulation that Malays 
demonstrate in their other consumption habits can be extended to banking 
practices. For some of the CEOs, schools are the obvious institution from which 
to start creating consciousness of Islamic banking and laying the groundwork 
for later habits. The use of schools to structure dispositions and preferences in 
lieu of future actions is also evident in European countries with regards to 
conventional banking. Policy recommendations include courses on financial 
literary and management for school children (Aldridge 1998). For this reason 
explanations found in pamphlets or other forms of advertising contextualise 
Islamic banking within the parameters of halal and haram – a binary that 
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consumers are already accustomed to. As we’ll discover in Chapters 6 and 7, 
the familiarity of halal commodities helps newcomers ease into Islamic banking. 
 
This ‘educational’ strategy was also confirmed during interviews with other 
practitioners. Shariah scholars explained how they were trying to recalibrate 
Muslim-Malay attitudes towards Islamic banking by encouraging them to 
incorporate this practice as a part of their range of rituals, thus emphasising 
spirituality. He said, ‘Malaysians are very concerned with ritual. They’re 
obsessed with what they eat and with escaping dogs. They will generally avoid 
alcohol. But they don’t understand the severity and gravity of riba. The problem 
is indoctrination. We don’t indoctrinate people about riba. We must put the fear 
of God in people. Riba is worse than adultery or eating pork or drinking. It is an 
act of war against God’. 
 
A female CEO described the signalling of goals related to financial rewards. 
According to her, following the financial crisis the industry also strategised to 
market the financial welfare message: ‘After the crisis, there was a huge surge 
in interest in Islamic Banking, including by non-Muslim consumers. We met with 
our clients and explained to them that they had a choice to make a smart move. 
In volatile times, the fixed rate of Islamic banking is a smart move. Rates moved 
by a 1,000 – business became unsustainable’.  
 
The problematisation of debt that emerged from the crisis also allows the sector 
to tie in financial self-discipline to the use of Islamic banking. Ironically, although 
as mentioned in Chapter 1, Malaysians rejected the troika’s argument that the 
crisis was due to excessive debt (and corruption), this moral self-flagellation 
resonates with many respondents. A number of them cautioned about the use 
of credit cards and the dangers of excessive debt which was the result of too 
much greed and no regard for real ‘musts’ or ‘needs’. A number mentioned 
suicides caused by excessive debt as a cautionary tale for all Malaysians. The 
pamphlet selects choice quotes that emphasise how debt must be settled swiftly 
and people are not to borrow capriciously. 
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‘If he is forced to take a loan, he must vow to repay it and strive to settle the 
debt’. It is the responsibility of consumers to ensure that their debt will be 
incurred for a necessity and that they can repay it. 
 
The responsibilisation of debt was one of the new concepts that the sector was 
trying to ingrain as part of the banking practices. Financial loans under Islam 
are generally associated with debt forgiveness for debtors who are under 
duress. Indeed, the forgiven loans earn the creditor more blessings than charity. 
But, the practitioners explain, this is a business and we are trying to teach them 
about debt repayment. No one would undertake the risks associated with 
lending if debt repayment was not compulsory. Islamic banking is not charity 
and everyone needs to understand that the shariah states that debtors must 
pay back their dues.   
 
The CEO said that despite their efforts, they are often ‘criticised for not being 
really Islamic’. She said that the critics say, ‘it’s expensive and priced against 
BLR. The reality is that we do our best, but reality is that we do live in a secular 
society. Our system is engrained in conventional finance. For example, a 
benchmark must be provided in order to be competitive. But you can’t 
guarantee the return – only the principle’. 
 
Not all Malays are in agreement with these practices. Some civil society groups 
condemn Islamic banking as western banking with an Islamic veneer. These 
organisations, which I was unable to interview due to their reluctance, lead the 
attack on the sector. For instance, their website explains that Islamic banking is 
shariah-compliant on paper but not in spirit because it does not cater for the 
holistic wellbeing required of all Islamic activities.103  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 It is not unusual for Islamic movements to either ignore economic issues or to object to the 
Islamic banking sector. In most cases, expedience ‘prevails over “Islamic correctness”’ (Warde 
2000:12). As the Ayatollah Khomeini famously stated: ‘the revolution is not about the price of 
melons’ (www.iar-gwu.org/node/291). Similarly, recent developments from the movement du 	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She concludes by explaining that she often has incursions with the groups who 
actively campaign against Islamic banking. The most prominent is the Islamic 
consumer association. The attacks often become personal. She recalls one 
incident in which they barged into her office with the Qur’an and started to recite 
parts of it. In her own words: ‘My scholars and I were reciting back at them. As I 
always say, one can recite any parts of the Qur’an to back an argument, 
especially when it is taken out of context. These same zealots also hate me 
personally, especially because of tawaruk, and call me infidel and the “Devil in 
Prada” – literally’.  
 
 
5.2.5 Contestations  
 
Outside the coordinated consensus, there are voices of dissent about riba and 
the Islamic banking system. An unlikely alliance of religious scholars of Islam, 
and (secular) social scientists dispute the definition of riba as interest, citing 
historical conditionality. One of the most famous examples comes from the 
former Sheikh at one of the most prestigious seats of Islamic learning, Al-Azhar 
University in Egypt, state-appointed Mohammed Sayed Tantawi stated that 
there was no difference between Islamic and conventional finance, inasmuch as 
the predetermined profits earned by depositing money in conventional banks 
was not interest, but acceptable profit and therefore religiously lawful. In 1997, 
Tantawi doubled the blow by adding that ‘conventional banks were closer to 
Islam than Islamic banks’ (Soliman 2004: 272; Tripp 2006). 
 
The most vocal secular exponent of this argument is Kuran (2004) who argues 
that the prohibition of riba must be understood in the context of possible 
physical enslavement of the debtors (and the family) who fail to honour their 
debts. Accordingly, what was explicitly prohibited was a pre-Islamic practice 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
jour, ISIL, also serve to confirm that whilst, quite unusually, monetary policy is on the agenda, 
Islamic finance is definitely not. 
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amongst the Prophet Mohammad’s tribe, the Quraysh, which often resulted in 
the borrower's enslavement due to his inability to pay back the debt, which 
would double if he failed to pay on time (Subhani 2006; Kuran 2004; Warde 
2000). The Prophet Mohammad’s aim of banning riba was to prevent 
enslavement for debt. Thus, Kuran argues that the rules governing riba are 
irrelevant to contemporary financial practices because people do not risk actual 
enslavement. 
 
Economic historians and sociologists of the Middle East find issue with two 
aspects of the historical narrative presented by Islamic banking in its prohibition 
of interest. They argue that contemporary prohibition is based on an assumption 
the shariah as a fixed and dominant body of canonical law in historical Muslim 
societies (Halliday 2008; Zubaida 2011). They also contest the historicisation of 
the shariah as a kind of constitution that bound its rulers to ‘the modern notion 
of “the rule of law”’. They argue that this conceptualisation is the product of 
Islamic reformists who resorted to adaptation instead of annihilation in the face 
of growing secularism (Zubaida 2011: 13–15). The use of riba is depicted as 
one such colonial intrusion that changed the course of an interest-free society. 
However, some economic historians suggest that purely riba-free transactions 
were the exception, not the norm. Writing about pious Muslims who lent money 
without interest, Rodinson (2007) tartly states, ‘their relative rarity is clearly 
apparent from the inability of modern apologists of Islam, who are very anxious 
to offer historical examples of the phenomenon, to find more than a few cases 
to exhibit’.   
 
The most damming evidence, for those who mythologise the Golden Age 
(Kuran 2004) comes from the religious waqf – held up by many in the Islamic 
banking sector as another gold standard. According to Pamuk, from as early as 
the 15th century up until the 18th century, these cash endowments were lending 
funds at 10 per cent or more interest per annum (Pamuk 2000: 81). Interest 
rates or lack thereof were adjusted by the ruler according to political 
contingency (Lewis 2007). Various sources indicate that in many Muslim 
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contexts, riba referred to ‘only exorbitant and exploitative rates and 
arrangements’ such as usurious practices that exceeded a moral or legal limit 
and ‘dealing in interest was taken for granted’ by the majority of Muslims 
(Zubaida 2011: 16–17). Even during the rare occasions that interest-based 
money lending was questioned; they were outmanoeuvred by leading jurists 
and authorities. In one famous case, the highest body of Ottoman scholars 
ruled in favour of interest (Rodinson). Furthermore, religious people who wanted 
to live by the book would ask scholars to give their blessing to hiyal – 
strategems similar to the most popular banking products explained in Chapter 
One (Kuran 2004; Rodinson 2007: 80; Zubaida 2011) which were later 
introduced in Europe. 
 
 
5.2.6 Maysir and Gharar: Gambling, Hazard, or Chance  
 
Also central to Islamic moral economy is the condemnation of maysir (gambling) 
and gharar (uncertainty). Unlike riba, the meaning of which remains obscure, 
the Qur’an is unambiguous about the prohibition of maysir and gharar. This 
injunction includes all forms of gambling, stating ‘O Believers, wine and 
gambling, idols and divination by arrows are but abominations devised by 
Satan, avoid them so that you may prosper’ and extends to commercial 
dealings that involve unrequired risk and uncertainty [Al Maidah 5] Dusuki 
2011: 90; 183). One of the most famous Hadith (Ahmad) states, ‘do not buy fish 
that is still in the water because there are elements of gharar.’ Other pertinent 
examples found in the Hadith include the sale of grain and grapes until ripe, the 
advance sale of objects collected during a diver’s dive, runaway slaves, and 
unborn livestock.  
 
In all cases, these sayings point to aleatory contracts, whose outcome depends 
on luck or chance. In contemporary terms this would include a ‘sale by auction, 
since the seller does not know what price he will get for the object being sold, or 
any sale in which the merchandise is not precisely, numerically defined (e.g. the 
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fruits growing on a palm-tree) although the price is expressed in definite terms 
etc.’ (Rodinson 2007: 45).104 It is through the condemnation of maysir and riba 
that the concept of gharar, often translated as risk, uncertainty, and hazard was 
deduced (Dusuki 2011: 181). There is no direct mention of the word in the 
Qur’an (Warde 2000: 59; Dusuki 2011: 181). Since there is no prohibition in the 
Qur’an, the Hadith are used as the next best source to deduce the norm with 
regards gharar. The roots of the word gharar are linked to deception and deceit 
and is thought to allude to the necessity of a sense of fairness in all contracts, 
whether through the insistence on transparency, mutual consent, access to 
material information, and the banning of all practices that include exposure to 
unnecessary risk. Certain legal concepts found in English Law, such as 
malfeasance and good faith can be useful to explain other aspects of this 
concept such as Al-Tanajush (silent collusion to create high demand); Tadlis Al-
‘Aib (deliberate hiding of flaws); Al Khilabah (devious actions used to clinch the 
contract); and Al-Khiyanah (dishonest claims about the actual capital ratio used 
for the purchase of goods and services). 
 
This concept is seen as being particularly relevant to weaker parties with limited 
bargaining power, who are more likely to shoulder an unfair burden of risk. 
Indeed the verses stress the protection of the weakest and least privileged in 
society, whether through the banning of speculation over basic commodities or 
the prevention of ‘avoidable ignorance’ what would be termed avoidable 
information asymmetry, such as deliberately misconstruing the quality of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104Mohammed Hashim Kamali writes that, ‘in futures trading, both of the counter values, that is, 
the payment of price, and delivery of the subject matter are postponed to a future date, whereas 
this is not the case in either salam or bay’ al-mu’ajjal. The former involves deferment only of the 
delivery of the subject matter of sale but the price is paid at the time of contract, whereas the 
latter involves deferment only of the price, with the delivery being completed as of the time of 
contract. Moreover, futures trading are much more complex and several other aspects of the 
operational features of futures, such as the fact that most of the sales and purchases are off-set 
through reverse transactions prior to delivery and payment – present problems which cannot be 
addressed within the rubric of salam and bay’ al-mu’ajjal but need separate analysis and ijtihad 
beyond all these’ (Kamali 1999: 66).  
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product or terms of the agreement, that would lead to unearned profit for one 
and undeserved loss for the other party (Kuran 2004: 175). 105 
 
There can be three instances of gharar. These are: settlement risk, non-
disclosure of material information on the subject matter, and the undue 
complexity that arises from the combining of two sales in one interdependent 
contract (Dusuki 2011: 182). Although gharar is sometimes wrongly translated 
as risk, it’s closer in meaning to unnecessary risk linked to the ‘game of chance’ 
in speculative activities like gambling. As Warde (2000: 59) points out, ‘gharar 
should not be used interchangeably with the broad concept of risk. Islam does 
not advocate the avoidance of risk. Indeed incurring commercial risk is 
approved, even encouraged, provided it is equitably shared’.106 The banning of 
contracts bearing excessive risk and uncertainty, especially those with an 
aleatory element makes it difficult to justify financial instruments such as 
derivatives that rely on unknown future outcomes, involve overtly complex risk 
management and, unlike trade or commerce, is not viewed as a productive 
effort or provide any value-adding economic activities to society. Islam 
encourages the type of risk-taking activity that is part-and-parcel of any 
commercial endeavour. This type of ‘entrepreneurial risk’, associated to the risk 
of loss tied to the right to return, is accepted by practitioners as unavoidable and 
‘part of the normal course of business in every economy activity.’ In other 
words, the calculable and foreseen risk of any productive effort that though its 
profit and loss nexus, adds value to society is viewed as part of the natural 
order of life; nothing ventured; nothing gained. As Al-Ghazali explains in Ihya 
(4: 118), ‘they [traders and businesses] bear a lot of trouble in seeking profits 
and take risks and endanger lives on voyages’ (Ghazanfar 2000: 878).107 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Stricter interpretations also exclude speculation of non-basic commodities and luxuries.  
106 Risk in this case is linked to pre modern notions of luck and fortune. In western scholarship it 
has many contested definitions, it is sometimes conflated with and sometimes distinguished 
from uncertainty. In sociology, the concept is generally discussed in relation to the outlook of a 
modern future-oriented society, in which hazards are assessed in relation to future possibilities. 
107 Another type of risk identified is the type related to natural disasters. The sector accepts that 
‘people seek to protect themselves from the effect of these calamities by taking insurance.’ 	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unforeseen events or ‘unknown unknowns’ have to be left to the mercy of God 
(tawakkul). The famous Hadith quote captures this attitude perfectly: ‘Tie your 
camel first, and put your trust in Allah’ (‘aqil wa tawakkal). In other words, as 
long as all sensible precaution is undertaken, there is no need to fear what the 
future might bring. 
 
The injunctions against the activities of speculators, or certain middlemen such 
as stockbrokers are based on an objection to gain that is unearned because 
there was a fixed return and no risk involved. For instance, renting to farmers is 
morally unjustifiable because the quality and quantity of the harvest are not 
forgone conclusions. Whilst the landowner can lead a comfortable life of leisure 
with no risk to his income, the labourer will struggle for his subsistence (Kuran 
2004: 175–76). It is from these concepts that the idea of mutuality of risk is 
derived. According to theoretical principles, Islamic banking practices must 
ensure that the burden of risk is fairly shared amongst all parties. If part of the 
rationale of the public welfare justifications behind the banning of interest lies in 
the belief that the creation of money with no risk-burden is unfair, then fairness 
in risk and return should be an integral component of any compliant contract.  
Having discussed the main principles of Islamic banking and respondents’ 
perceptions, we will now shift our attention to how Islamic banking operates in 
principle. The hallmark of an alternative banking sector is not just in its 
principles but also in the legitimacy of its outcome.  
 
5.3 Questions of outcome: The Islamisation of finance or the 
financialisation of Islam? 
 
Having discussed the controversies surrounding meaning and the theoretical 
boundaries of Islamic banking, we now turn to practice. Is output consistent with 
its theoretical standards and how does it compare to conventional banking? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Takaful has been developed as a shariah-compliant insurance, thus avoiding all ‘forbidden 
elements’ (Dusuki 2011: 183–84).  
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Here we’ll look at Islamic banking’s claims of alterity on its own terms, as the 
‘output’ of Islamic banking partly determines its legitimacy (Rethel 2011). The 
point is not to dismiss Islamic banking for living up to idealised heights that 
especially not even conventional banking manages to live up to. ‘Often 
alternatives are “the same” as the dominant, just different in scale, meaning, or 
institutional location or authority of the actors involved’. (Maurer 2012: 415). 
Rather, it is to find out how Islamic banking ‘oscillates in and out of phase with 
the central tendency’ (Maurer 2012: 415). As one of the shariah scholars noted, 
‘technical compliance is neither here, nor there. We should take a more holistic 
approach and work to fulfil our moral obligations to clients’. 
 
First, we need to understand the primary operations of Islamic financial 
institutions. ‘Islamic banks collect deposit funds from investors, both by means 
of mudaraba investment accounts and other deposit accounts, on one side of 
the balance sheet, and then invest these funds in a variety of Islamically 
acceptable forms, on the other side’. (Lewis 2014: 11). Traditionally, banks 
engage in activities that can broadly be divided into two: risk sharing, and 
monitoring and enforcement. This distinction is of great importance for grasping 
the differences between Islamic and conventional banking (Lewis 2014). In 
particular, this is related to the type of financial intermediation specific to Islamic 
banking. Unlike their conventional counterparts, Islamic banks engage in, ‘profit-
and-loss modes of finance and investment in trade and commodities via sales-
based and leasing contracts feature extensively in their activities’ (Lewis 
2014: 11). 
 
The arrangements means that in the lender must share in the borrower’s risk 
(Warde 2000; Lewis 2014). This raises the thorny issue of borrowers’ 
behaviour, or what economists call moral hazard (Warde 2000: 154–55; Lewis 
2014: 23). A financial system whose raison d’être was originally to challenge 
homo economicus by replacing him with homo Islamicus – a virtuous being who 
strives for the Glory of God – cannot a priori model its operations on the notion 
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the notion that Islamic norms will ‘transform selfish and acquisitive homo 
economicus into a paragon of virtue, homo Islamicus. Homo Islamicus acquires 
property freely, but never through speculation, gambling, hoarding, or 
destructive competition’ (Kuran 2004: 42). According to one of the CFOs 
interviewed, Islamic banks had to ‘learn the hard way’ that homo Islamicus was 
as privy to temptation as his atomised and individualistic brother. He continues, 
‘when we first started operating we didn’t carry out thorough credit checks. 
People used to buy car financing and then drive the car across the border to 
Thailand, sell it, and claim that it was stolen and stop payments. We soon had 
to change our operations’.  
 
Another problem concerned risk sharing. With pure profit-and-loss instruments, 
people are engaging in riskier activities. Many want the benefits of the system 
without the risk (Warde 2000: 154). As a number of practitioners complained, 
especially upon the introduction of Islamic banks, people expect them to 
operate like charities and have to be taught that banks are businesses and 
regular payments are mandatory. It is for this reason that many Islamic banks 
have switched to debt and follow risk management models leveraged on 
conventional knowledge.  
 
 
5.3.1 Debt versus equity 
 
The industry’s capitulation to debt, instead of adhering to equity, is located at 
the heart of Islamic banking’s tensions between the norms of Islam and finance. 
The premise of masalih is based on the ‘real-life’ financing not profit from 
finance activities. Primarily because as Islamic political economists insist, 
‘unlike the financial capitalism or financialisation, Islamic financing is purely a 
real-life, real goods financing. No financing can find its way to the Islamic 
system without passing through the production and/or exchange of real goods 
and services’ (El Ghalfy and Khiyar 2012).   
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A common yardstick used to measure Islamic finance’s shift towards 
financialisation and away from its original principles, is the proliferation of debt-
enhancing financial products. The data is unequivocal in this regard. Figures 
show that it is debt-based financial contracts, mostly murabaha, or extensions 
of murabaha, and not equity-based PLS instruments like mudarabah and 
musharakah, the gold standard of Islamic banking that dominate global and 
Malaysian Islamic Banking. ‘The percentage share of musharakah declined 
from 1.4% in 2000 to 0.5% in 2003. Evidently, it seems that major modes of 
Islamic financing are in the form of bay bi thaman al-ajil and ijarah thumma al-
bay with 47.4% and 27.9% respectively in 2003’ (Mehmet 2007: 5). By the end 
of 2012, financing by murabaha or its extensions eclipsed other financing 
methods such as ijarah (leasing finance) and its extensions, making them 
almost negligible. One of the leading dissenting voices is the Islamic political 
economist Mehmet Asutay, from the Durham [University] Centre for Islamic 
Economics and Finance. He is vociferous about the gulf between the priorities 
of the ideals outlined in the Islamic moral economy and the current state of the 
sector. He argues that there is a stark shift in priorities from the original aim of 
‘financing in the real economy’ to bringing  ‘debt-enhancing financial products to 
the market’. The original aim of ‘financing in the real economy’ through equity 
has been sacrificed to achieve efficiency in the shape of ‘debt-enhancing 
financial products to the market’ (2007: 5). 
 
Others object to this characterisation of Islamic banking. They argue that debt-
based instruments are permissible, subject to certain restrictions. Kaleem and 
Lewis (2014), cite rulings by jurists which allow premium profit on debt, through 
methods such as deferred payment sale, bill of exchange. These include the so-
called hiyal mentioned earlier, which brings us full circle to the earlier discussion 
about Islamic banking. Are critics right to view these methods are ruses to trick 
unsuspecting people into buying Islamic banking products, or is there a 
substantive difference? Therefore, we will turn to the social relations 
underpinning Islamic credit from the perspective of the ordinary borrower. More 
specifically, we will try to understand whether the social relations between the 
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two parties are conducted as equals or whether they are subject to an 
asymmetry of power. 
 
5.3.2 Credit risk   
 
This point is crucial on two counts. First is contains debt within the limits of the 
real economy. Second, it preserves the social welfare of the consumer by 
preventing people from being burdened with debt that they cannot sustain. Also, 
since equity financing requires a focus on the viability and profitability of the 
venture, the creditworthiness of the individual is not questioned 
For Islamic banking, one of the implications of using equity instead of debt 
regards risk. The problem with debt-based instruments is twofold. Since it is 
debt and not equity based it doesn’t bear mutuality of risk and relies on credit-
risk profiling of the individual. In this section we will discuss credit risk, before 
moving onto the mutuality of risk. 
 
The use of equity in Islamic banking is expected to follow the same criteria as 
any other type of equity financing. The only measures that the bank should take 
into account is the moral permissibility of the project and economic viability. The 
banks are expected to measure entrepreneurial risk which, as I mentioned 
earlier, is allowed and even encouraged by Islam. Instead, since Islamic banks 
want to avoid the moral hazards of profit-and-loss, it is the norm for Islamic 
banks to take into account credit risk. My discussions with practitioners from 
Islamic banks revealed that all banks use the conventional credit risk 
assessment model. As one banker explained in an apologetic tone: ‘Credit 
underwriting is the DNA of each bank.  The system is a universal one. We are 
obliged by the regulators to have a strict underwriting policy – Islamic and 
conventional. There is no difference’. 
 
Critics of the turn towards pragmatism see the failure to address this core issue 
as a major socio-economic failure of Islamic finance. The calculation of the 
credit risk of households and individuals as opposed to the equity risk posed by 
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their proposed venture is central in facilitating the shift from the financing 
objectives (of the real economy) towards financialisation and the proliferation of 
debt-enhancing financial products within the market.108 Those that believe that 
Islamic finance has deviated from the Islamic moral economy express an 
unease about the emphasis on credit risk profiling that inevitably accompanies 
the shift towards debt-based instruments. In theory, Islamic banks should not 
evaluate the credit risk of an individual or enterprise because it would place all 
the risk one party. It is the equity risk associated with profit/loss prospects of the 
entrepreneurial proposition that should be appraised.  
 
 
5.3.3 Mutuality of risk 
 
A classic example of a problematic vehicle that is banned in the Gulf is the bai’ 
bi thaman ajil (BBA) sales contract. The BBA sales contract with immediate 
repurchase agreement has been criticised for being ‘insufficiently different’ from 
conventional products (Shaharuddin 2012), and the scholars in the Gulf are 
adamant that these products are based on a legal contrivance that defeats the 
spirit of the prohibition of riba. In the GCC, the product would be structured on a 
murabaha instead and this stricter interpretation is also carried into the 
Malaysian market by GCC banks. They offer the BBA based on the mark-up 
sale. Islamic bank’s shift from its gold standards have been particularly 
problematic in a commonly used long-term extension of murabaha called – bai’ 
bi thaman ajil (BBA).   
 
With BBA, payment is carried out for a longer period because it is generally 
used for home financing.  In theory the bank is responsible for hundred per cent 
of the risk as it technically owns the asset for which credit is forwarded till all the 
payments are settled (Wilson 2004).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 See: 
www.newhorizonislamicbanking.com/index.cfm?section=lectures&id=11252&action=view 
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In practice, risks associated to ownership are only assumed by the bank for a 
couple of minutes. This has social implications when the sale involves a 
property that has not as yet been developed. In the case that the developer 
abandons the project, as has happened in the past, borrowers are forced to pay 
the full price for a house that was never finished by the developers. In Malaysia 
there were several cases where the consumer buying house-financing was 
ordered by the court to pay back the full price of the house costing RM492,000 
to a bank although the bank only paid RM39,000 to the developer.109 
 
Since there is no agreement between the developer of the property and the 
bank, but an agreement between the bank and the consumer, when developers 
abandon housing projects, consumers face bankruptcy through loss of 
investment, property and outstanding debt with banks, as well as a ruined credit 
history which would leave them unable to access credit for the unforeseeable 
future. As these cases show, despite the ideals of mutuality of risk, there is no 
space for collective control or spread of risk between all parties involved. 
 
To the credit of the smaller and solely Islamic banks, according to an informant, 
consumers who were cheated by their developers, were forgiven the remained 
of their debt. When the developer absconded his responsibilities and stopped 
building the housing that the consumers had already partly paid for through 
house financing, the bank decided that as it was a genuine case of hardship 
and the only one who had acted in bad faith was the developer, they would 
absorb the losses – despite not being legally obliged to do so.  
 
How do practitioners who are actively creating the sector perceive the critique 
levelled against Islamic banking? This was the question posed during my 
interviews with them. Were they of the opinion that the criticism that Islamic 
Finance is mimicking the conventional at the expense of its core Islamic values 
is justified?   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 See: http://www.propertyguru.com.my/property-news/2012/10/6326/help-buyers-of-
abandoned-housing-projects-ppim 
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They all agreed that ultimately Islamic Finance is a niche sector intermeshed 
within the larger conventional financial system and that it also faces fierce 
challenges typical of any financial market in a capitalist system. In the words of 
one CEO, ‘The reality is that we live in a secular society. Our system is 
engrained in conventional finance. For example, a benchmark must be provided 
in order to be competitive. But you can’t guarantee the return – only the 
principle’.  
 
However their experiences are particular, reflecting their political and social 
realities and also the diversity of Islamic banking. The majority were dismissive 
of the critique. One cites the example of Enron to explain that there is a 
substantial difference that matters when things go wrong. He tells me, ‘imagine 
that you have a situation like Enron again. The Islamic investor would be able to 
collect a substantial return even if the company goes bust because investments 
are based on real tangible assets that can be bought and sold again.110 In the 
Islamic system there is a sale of real assets or usufruct that results in 
ownership. For example, the power plants and machinery can be sold and the 
investor will collect at least some of those funds’.  
 
A minority believes that although there is a distinction between the two sectors, 
the next stage of Islamic Finance should be about enforcing the ethical side of 
the sector. They are convinced that this is a strategic move that would put 
pressure on the shariah windows and also allow the banks to fulfil their masalah 
obligation. The head of a retail banking division explains: ‘I am aware that I tend 
to lean towards the financialisation of the sector, because I am in a position 
where to bring profit for the bank, now we are almost a lending bank, instead of 
leaning towards equity. But, I agree with the need to stick to the true Islamic 
principles. We, as Islamic banks have to start thinking about things that help the 
society and this should be a move towards equity. We should go into big 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Usufruct is a legal term that refers to the right of one individual to use and enjoy the property 
of another, provided its substance is neither impaired nor altered. 
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projects where people will benefit but it all depends on the market. It will be very 
difficult to move into the next phase because there are all sorts of competitive 
pressures that we need to face’. As a shariah scholar admitted the sector was 
not fulfilling its duties towards SMEs and especially halal business. Accordingly 
he says, ‘one of the problems, post crisis, is that all banks have become more 
risk averse. But we should do more to support halal business. These type of 
projects speak to our aspirations’. 
 
As they all confirm, the conventional moved in when they realised that ethical 
products are a lucrative innovation within the financial sector and in Malaysia it 
made sense to offer Islamic rather than generic ethical products. They view 
Islamic banking as another step in the innovation and developments of 
products. They remark that the competition really increased due to the 
conventional banks opening Islamic windows, rightly reasoning that for them 
there was a small risk and potential for a massive profit.  
 
Although passionate about a career that comes across as more of a cause than 
just a job, there is a lingering feeling that for the practitioners, the legitimation of 
Islamic banking by the conventional sector was a pyrrhic victory. The use of 
debt-based products, similar to that of the conventional enhanced Islamic 
finance’s ability to attract conventional banks and increase its supply of capital, 
expertise and operations. This expansion and development brought about with 
it critique that the sector is mimicking the financial engineering of the 
conventional sector, what some call ‘banking in Islamic garb’ instead of finding 
ethical solutions for socio-economic problems.  
 
They concur with each other’s assessment that very few banks are willing to 
use the purest forms – musharakah or mudarabah – because of the huge risk 
involved: ‘to use the purest products, one must be willing to take 100 per cent 
risk and responsibility and very few banks are willing to do that’, one banker 
concedes. In this first two-thirds of the chapter we have established that Islamic 
finance is marked by heterogeneous views. Despite the standardisation of the 
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sector, there is a dissonance amongst practitioners. They are aware that the 
value of Islamic Finance depends on its religious legitimacy. Yet, its survival 
requires maintaining market validity.  
 
 
5.4 The standardisation of Islamic banking  
 
This section focuses on the process of codification of the Islamic banking sector 
through the standardisation of the regulatory process and its production of 
social use-value of Islamic banking. Both processes aim to build consumers’ 
trust in Islamic banking through standardisation and branding of halal. The 
standardisation process, standard creation and adherence rests on the 
legitimacy of shariah scholars. All financial systems are guided by regulations 
and standards. The Islamic banking sector has gained global legitimacy by 
acquiescing in their standards. However, its added value stems from its 
additional shariah regulation. These standards, despite being religious in origin 
also have to be perceived as legitimate. As Rethel points out, the legitimacy of 
any financial system rests on outcomes or meeting expectations, but also on its 
input or adherence to standards.  
 
Since tensions between theory and practice were already discussed in the 
previous section, the rest of the chapter examines how ‘procedural legitimacy’ 
(Rethel 2011:77) is created. We will first focus on the role of shariah scholars 
and the regulation of Islamic banking standards. Then we will turn our attention 
to the process involved in moulding Islamic banking into a distinct sector. As the 
reader shall discover, the branding process enhances the juxtaposition of 
Islamic banking with the conventional. The sector’s appropriation of signs linked 
to the Middle East also increases its desirability and sense of authentic 
familiarity with Muslim-Malays. However, first we’ll examine the broader political 
opportunities and risks of shariah regulation from the perspective of the state. 
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5.4.1 State monopoly and centralisation 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Islamic banking has an economic function 
as well as a social use value, both of which serve as a political and economic fix 
to the crisis which has hit Malaysia. Consequently, although Islamic banking 
created an opportunity out of a crisis, it also poses its own risks.  
  
As Wilson (2009) notes, in societies where the regime is associated with the 
state and both suffer from a deficiency in legitimacy, or can create the 
opportunity for the emergence of political contradictions, it is logical to detach 
regulatory systems from the state completely.111  Fortunately for the Malaysian 
elite, its heterogeneous ethnicity and official multicultural status, makes it able to 
negotiate these tensions better than other countries that are almost 
homogeneously Muslim (albeit of different sects). The Chinese are begrudgingly 
seen as a powerful force of the economic and social fabric and most 
acknowledge that they can be catered for. This need to mediate between the 
various ethnic groups buys the state some leeway. Nevertheless, the state as a 
secular institution deriving its legitimacy from non-religious sources is better off 
outsourcing the regulation to shariah scholars. Although as explained in the 
previous chapter, they are co-opted and operate within the parameters of the 
state, they derive their authority from divine sources and are viewed by society 
to be legitimate. As Fischer (2008: 221) argues, the state regards Islamic 
banking by imposing categories of thought leveraged through its symbolic and 
physical power. I illustrate this argument by examining how these categories are 
applied though regulation. 
 
In Malaysia, the shariah boards are controlled by the state through the Bank 
Negara (central bank). Since 1997, legal opinions related to Islamic Banking 
have been centralised and stringently regulated through the SAC. According to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 KSA exemplifies this dilemma. If the state derives its legitimacy from a religious (Islamic) 
source, then by default, all its institutions and policies are derived from Islam i.e. Islamic. 
Singling out one sector as Islamic implies that the other spheres of society are not. 
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the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009, the members are appointed by the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong (King), on the recommendation of the finance minister 
(Dusuki 2011: 715). The SAC of Bank Negara ‘is responsible to advise on 
matters in relation to Islamic banking and takaful businesses or any other 
Islamic finance area that is supervised and regulated by BNM’.112 
 
As a result, products in Malaysia develop as an industry, through a top-down 
approach, not through individual banks. As a practitioner confirmed: ‘each 
individual bank has to operate through the central bank. Products are 
commoditised, there isn’t one particular product that one bank offers that the 
other one doesn’t. Everyone is selling the same thing’. The few rare instances in 
which innovative products are introduced, such as the diminishing musharakah, 
it is usually the result of innovation from a Gulf bank. The practitioners believe 
that the sector benefits from developing products collectively and then pushing 
them through the central bank. As one informant confided during a conference 
coffee break, ‘the centralisation of shariah regulation is pragmatic. It ensures 
that everyone follows the same rules and everyone agrees that it benefits the 
industry as a whole as it decreases conflicts between financial institutions in the 
public arena.’   
 
 
5.4.2 Co-optation of non-state actors 
 
The distinguishing feature of Islamic finance is its shariah value, derived from its 
adherence to a set of shariah inspired rules. The shariah advisory boards 
consult state and/or private institutions on the shariah regulation of Islamic 
products and services. The most vital members of these boards are the 
religious shariah scholars who manage the shariah or halal standards.113 As the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 http//www.mifc.com/index.php?ch=menu_law&pg=menu_law_sac 
113 The translation of shariah scholars or shariah advisors is an imprecise translation of 
specialists of fiqh al muamalat, known as ulama. For the purpose of this thesis, shariah scholars 
will specifically refer to those ulama who use their knowledge of fiqh to approve or develop 
Islamic financial products.  
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supreme experts of Islamic orthodoxy, they are bestowed with the religious 
authority to issue fatwas (legal opinions) related to Islamic orthopraxy, 
according to their interpretation of the shariah. It is through their blessing that a 
product or service can be branded halal.  
 
In Malaysia, the regulatory framework is on the centralised side of the 
continuum; in contrast to the fragmented shariah regulatory system found in the 
GCC is at the opposite end. Therefore it operates according to a two tier 
system. The central bank is the main entity that controls the shariah board 
which is the sole authority that can issue supreme edicts about Islamic banking 
products. ‘In order to avoid bickering among rival schools of Islamic thought, 
Mahathir established in 1997 a National Syariyah (Shariah) board (SAC) 
designed to harmonize financial practices and review the compatibility of new 
financial products with religion’ (Warde 2000: 125). 
 
The second tier shariah scholars simply ensure the institution’s compliance to 
directives issued by the SAC. Just like legal departments in conventional banks, 
they have to make sure that their institution complies with the SAC’s edicts. 
Unlike the private shariah boards in the GCC, they are not involved in 
innovating and creating products for the bank. The shariah boards can include 
experts from diverse fields including accountancy, law, and conventional 
finance, to ensure the board’s ability to understand all aspects of finance. 
However, these members must be kept to a minimum and it’s the shariah 
scholars that are indispensable. 
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5.4.3 Halal industries: certification   
 
Shariah regulation is based on a dichotomous principle: halal/haram. A strict 
interpretation of halal is all that which is lawful and permitted. This contrasts 
with haram, all that which is unlawful and prohibited by Allah. This binary 
definition of permissible/forbidden was historically used for the management of 
the dietary practices of Muslims (see Douglas 1996; Fischer 2008; Nasir and 
Pereira 2008). Just like Islamic banking, everything clean and pure is permitted, 
except what is not (see Nasir and Pereira 2008 for a comprehensive list). It is 
important to stress that this dichotomy stresses not just what is permitted, but 
what must be avoided. Muslims look to scholars, who delineate the boundaries 
of permissible/forbidden according to orthodoxy, to learn about the right form of 
orthopraxy, following the right practice.114 The role of the shariah scholars is to 
interpret the complex Islamic orthodoxy of their legal school. Given that practice 
is derived from doctrine, establishing orthodoxy is integral to orthopraxy. In 
contrast, religions like Christianity, which stress orthodoxy, do not necessarily 
incorporate a high degree of practice.115 
 
The certification and regulation of Islamic finance is an offshoot of the 
standardisation of halal commodities, mainly food. Halal was a common 
domestic practice in Malaysian households. However, ‘within the last 50 years, 
there has been a formalization of the halal food and drink process. More 
specifically, unlike the past, where food processing and production has been a 
traditional and local practice, there are now many international, national and 
regional organizations that issue halal certificates’ (Nasik and Pereira 2008: 63). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 The centrality of practice in Islam is apparent in the five pillars of Islam, especially Sunni 
Islam. A dutiful Muslim is one who follows the shahada (Islamic creed), salah (daily prayers) 
zakat (almsgiving), sawm (fasting) and hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca once in a lifetime). Given that 
orthopraxy is fundamental to Islam, the emphasis on the right practices within all spheres of life 
is not illogical.  
115 Compared to ‘active’ Muslims, the practice of ‘active’ Catholics can come across as anaemic. 
Compulsion is only limited to frequent confession and mass on Sundays and special occasions 
like religious holidays. Fasting during lent is rarely the norm and not stringently followed.  
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In the case of state involvement in the regulation of halal, such as Malaysia, 
halal becomes ‘associated with the state and contributes to the fusing of myths 
of the historical Islamic nation with more modern imagining’ (Fischer 2008: 83). 
In Malaysia, whilst producers are involved in the differentiation process between 
the various halal goods, just as in the conventional, it is the state that 
underwrites the halal brand. People expect the state to monitor and maintain 
standards. Whilst differentiation between Islamic and conventional is promoted 
and highlighted, intra-sector differentiation is kept to the minimum, echoing the 
trends of retail banking products in the Anglo-Saxon world (Aldridge 1998:12). 
The centralised shariah regulation underpins all of the banking products, 
reducing the shariah distinction between each bank and enabling consumer 
accessibility. This reduces the amount of cultural capital required to shop 
around between the Islamic distinctions between the banks and products. 
Centralised shariah regulation allows for the opening and closing the 
conversation about alterity and difference at a tempo that suits the state whilst it 
creates competition between conventional and Islamic. Moreover, it keeps to a 
minimum any discrepancies between products in order to limit shariah 
competition between banks, as this could lead to inflammatory debates about 
correct or improper Islamic banking practices.  
 
Although Islamic banking banks also compete with each other, the starkest 
differentiation process takes place at a market level because it is coordinated 
and centralised by the state. Therefore, the state positioned this market as a 
niche and in doing so created an identity for the sector (Aspers 2011). 
 
The shift of halal, from a localised practice where communities would prepare 
their own food in accordance to halal rules, into a state regulated industry, is 
associated with the commoditisation of goods. As Fischer (2008) suggests, it is 
crucial to distinguish between the ‘strictly religious practices based on 
halal/haram dichotomies and halal’s certification’, conceptualising the latter as 
part of a strategy that includes the marketing, pluralisation and promotion of 
halalisation as a brand or logo of state capitalism: Halal tm’ (Fischer 2008: 39).  
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For the Malaysian state, halal banking was the logical extension of the halal 
industries. As consumers increasingly demanded halal commodities, many felt 
that it would be preferable to match their halal consumption with halal credit that 
is generated through means that adhere to shariah standards. To a large 
extent, Islamic finance’s growth provides the backdrop to the expansion and 
increasing expert-led standardisation of these industries. In order to understand 
the shariah regulation of finance, it would be helpful to understand how food 
became halalised, a certification process that is as complex and ambiguous as 
finance. Food was the first commodity to be halalised and the good that is most 
commonly associated with this standard. In fact, at halal fairs, Islamic retail 
banks showcase their products alongside other mass-oriented commodities. 
Attending the Malaysian International Halal showcase (MIHAS) – the premier 
halal trade fair,116 which is held annually in Kuala Lumpur, I observed a platform 
for hundreds of halal products and services that are stamped with the halal 
brand. Thousands of consumers and trade-buyers (over 69 per cent of the 
visiting population) browse the stands offering all sorts of consumer goods. 
Gourmet and junk food (from produits du terroir to chicken nuggets), make-up, 
clothing, perfume, pharmaceuticals, natural remedies, fine bone china, and 
travel agencies, and of course financial products and services are some of the 
commodities on display.  
 
From a secular European perspective, where explicitly religious regulation is 
increasingly rare, halal regulation might seem like an intrusive and additional 
layer of regulation. As halal regulators are keen to point out, both 
institutionalised regulation of food products for religious (Jewish kosher and Jain 
veganism are merely two examples) and/or health and safety or ethical reasons 
is commonplace across a variety of regions. The European Union (EU) has 
issued legislation that ensures a basic standard of health and safety, and for the 
additional certification of organic and genetically modified organisms (GMOs). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 http://www.mihas.com.my/about-us/about-mihas.php 
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The United States of America’s (USA) Food Standards Authority (FSA) also 
follows a similar if somewhat less stringent regulatory process. Unlike the EU, 
the USA refuses to regulate kosher products, deeming standards that are 
‘intrinsically religious in nature’ to fall under the first amendment, and thus 
outside the remit of the state. ‘In Israel, by contrast, the state is closely involved, 
promoting the Chief Rabbinate’s kosher label as the only acceptable one’ (The 
Economist, 9 February 2013: 53).  
 
Islamic banking is also part of a larger niche of ethical financial sector. The 
origins of ethical finance can also be located in servicing the needs of religious 
consumers and preceded the modern industry for ethical commodities. Ethical 
investment is defined as ‘the use of ethical and social criteria in the selection 
and management of investment portfolios, generally consisting of company 
shares’ Wilson (1997: 1326). In 1928, a fund was opened to cater for the needs 
of American Christian investors. The ethical industry was buoyed by the 
emergence of new social movements and a realignment of political priorities 
amongst citizens of post-industrial countries to accommodate so-called 
postmaterialist values (Inglehart 1990, 1997). Besides basic economic and 
security needs, ecology and later nuclear disarmament and divestment from 
Rhodesia and South Africa, gained prominence as a result of the direct action 
taken by vocal new social movements (Wilson 1997).  
 
An awareness amongst Islamic finance practitioners that by drawing parallels 
between ethical and Islamic finance, it reduces the exoticness of Islamic finance 
and makes it more appealing to non-Muslim consumers, is inspiring an 
emphasis of the halal brand as being part of the ethical movement. As Wilson 
(1997: 1325) notes, even if the ethical criteria differ, ‘there is arguably much that 
both parties can learn from one another, especially with respect to investment 
techniques’. By 1950, sin stock screening, which excluded unethical 
investments like tobacco and alcohol, had been developed (Langley 2008: 129).  
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5.4.4 Malaysia’s pragmatic Shariah regulation  
 
The Malaysian Shariah regulatory regime is located on the more permissive 
side of the continuum than its GCC counterparts. The Malaysian SAC 
recognises contracts that are rejected in the Arabian Peninsula, thus allowing 
GCC banks to operate in Malaysia. Historically, ulama in Malaysia have 
followed the Shafi’i madhhab. For the purposes of Islamic Finance, ‘In their 
deliberations, the members of the SAC accept all sources and manhaj 
(methodologies) of Islamic jurists from all of the four schools of Islamic thought 
(Shafi’i, Hanafi, Maliki and Hanbali)’ (Hassan and Mahlknecht 2011: 223), are 
accepted in relation to fiqh mu‘amalat (Islamic commercial transactions). This is 
testimony to the pragmatic attitude of the Malaysian State. The wide variety of 
fiqh allows for an incredibly wide variety of interpretations to be used for the 
creation of new products. 
Not all fiqh is derived from the Qur’an or the Sunnah. Reformist Islamists use 
jurisprudential methods to derive Islamic reasoning to derive ‘legal codes from 
the revealed sources of Islamic law that take the nature of modern society into 
consideration (Sonn 2006:182). These include: qiyas, analogical reasoning, 
itjihad, independent reasoning, and ijima’, unanimous consensus amongst 
scholars as an accepted method of fiqh creation (Sonn 2006; Zubaida 2011). 
Ijima’ is allowed on the debatable belief that ‘in many important contexts a 
consensus will form and that this consensus will coincide with the public 
interest’ (Kuran 2004: 177). a standard hermeneutical method 
Since fiqh mu‘amalat deals with transactions and products that did not exist in 
the time of the Prophet Muhammad, these sources are an imperative for the 
creation of Islamic fiinance. These sources are even more crucial for banking 
and financial services than they are to other commodities like food. Islamic 
practices related to food and clothing had a pre-modern precedent because 
people always needed to eat but financial intermediation is a relatively recent 
phenomenon.  
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In order to decide what is halal and haram, the regulatory boards act like filters 
by screening the activities and products of financial institutions and frequently 
updating their list of non-compliant items. The screening process follows 
different standards the exact procedures as that of ethical funds are followed. 
Similar to ethical finance, they screen for positive and negative elements, yet 
most of the effort is exerted on screening out negative elements that would not 
be favoured by investors or consumers. The process followed is usually one of 
purification and screening. One glaring omission in Islamic Finance that is 
usually expected of ethical finance is the avoidance of defence-related 
investments. In both ethical and Islamic finance, there is scope for positive 
screening of investments in companies that promote a wider social 
responsibility, corporate social responsibility (CSR) for the ethical investments, 
and masalih for Islamic. Although CSR is a major component for ethical 
investments, Islamic finance is squarely focused on negative screening 
(Langley 2008: 127–36), thus eliminating the impure rather than actively 
nurturing what is just. The Bank Negara lists the following service, goods and 
income as haram, or non-compliant: 
• Financial services. 
• Gambling. 
• Manufacturing of non-halal products, conventional insurance. 
• Entertainment. 
• Manufacture or sale of tobacco-based products or related products. 
• Stockbroking or share trading in shariah non-approved securities 
• Other activities deemed non-permissible. 
• Interest income from conventional fixed deposits/interest-bearing 
instruments. 
• Dividends received from investment in shariah non-compliant securities 
(Dusuki et al. 2011). 
 
Similarly to the screening process of organic food, halal products do not require 
a hundred per cent purity. Allowances are made for a limited amount of haram 
products and funds, including the most sacrilegious of items like pork and 
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alcohol. A textbook issued by a research institute funded by the Bank Negara, 
declares that, ‘up to twenty-five per cent is allowed for activities which are 
tainted by non-compliant elements e.g. hotel, resort, share trading; twenty per 
cent for the lease from Shariah non-compliant tenant; ten per cent for activities 
that are widespread and difficult to avoid; five per cent for clearly prohibited 
activities like riba, gambling, liquor and pork’.117 
 
Islamic finance’s compliance to ethical standards that are of a religious nature 
has set precedents of schisms and dissonance between the religious and 
secular legal codes. The application of shariah law within a wider secular legal 
framework carries its own baggage of inconsistencies.118 Malaysian Islamic 
Finance was exposed to several instances of tension between the ‘secular’ 
legal and religious legal systems. Until 2009, contractual disputes related to 
Islamic financial services were resolved in secular courtrooms, which gave 
primacy to secular commercial law. In several instances, the verdicts 
sidestepped shariah rulings, invalidating Islamic finance contracts. In order to 
eliminate dissonance between the two legal codes and reduce the reputational 
risk of Islamic Finance, Bank Negara decided that in all disputes involving 
Islamic Finance, shariah law as interpreted by the SAC, would take precedence 
over secular commercial law. ‘The SAC was accorded the status of the sole 
authoritative body on shariah matters pertaining to Islamic banking, takaful and 
Islamic finance119‘ and in the case of disputes or contradictory rulings, courts 
and arbitrator are required to refer to the ‘binding’ rulings of the SAC.       
 
 
5.5 Symbols: logos and language 
 
It is not only the blessing of shariah scholars that gives Islamic banking value. 
The industry engages in a complex process of brand building that compounds 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Obtained from the ICM Bulletin 2Q 2012; Securities Commission’s website   
118For the purpose of this thesis, secular legal framework refers to a legal code that does not 
derive its legitimacy from religious capital whether experts or texts. 
119 http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=7&pg=715&ac=802 
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the trust-building process of shariah regulation. ‘The accessibility of mass-
market financial products is signalled by strong branding’ (Aldridge 1998:12). 
The use of signs also indicate how the commodification of meaning 
underpinning Islamic banking products in preparation for the mass market. 
 
The halal logo is one of the most sought-after symbols by Muslim consumers. It 
is a mainstay of the signalisation process of the halal industry (Fischer 
2008:188). Signs, including logos are instrumental in the differentiation 
competition that takes place between producers of goods. ‘Differences makes 
the sign machine’ (Goldman and Papson 1996: 27) by propping up the halal 
logo. The standardisation of products, especially in close substitutes, makes it 
necessary that the additional value of the product is explicitly signalled Goldman 
and Papson 1996: 3). The aestheticisation of products can signal differentiation: 
added value and uniqueness. As Fischer (2008) explains, it is incorporated as a 
central aspect of the performance of consumption for Muslim-Malays.  
 
The appropriation of signs, language and symbols that denote an Islamic 
authenticity lies at the core of the sector’s strategy to beckon consumers. The 
Middle East, as an imagined space, invokes feelings of authenticity and desire 
amongst Muslim-Malays. The signs are curated based on ‘raw materials’ such 
as Arabic words, geometric patterns and calligraphy that are ‘worked into 
commodities’ through meaning found in the ‘cultural fabric’ of ordinary Muslim-
Malays. The advertising used by the industry ‘combines and recombines 
signifiers and signifieds to define a sign currency that can be joined to 
commodities (products and services)’ (Goldman and Papson 1996: 24). The 
process transfers meaning from one system – Middle East – to another: Shariah 
regulated banks.  
 
In Malaysia, since the Islamic revival Arab habits are increasingly venerated by 
ordinary people. The commodification process often requires that signifiers 
have a basis in daily life for the product to resonate with the consumer 
(Goldman and Papson 1996:11). In Chapter 4, I described how the Islamic 
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revival increased the currency of all activities and things with the added Islamic 
adjective. Islamic art was displayed at home and there was intense pressure to 
perform all rituals ‘authentically’ – closer to the Arabic rather than the low form 
favoured in villages (Nagata 1980; Fischer 2008).  
 
As the cradle of Islam, the Middle East in held in the highest regard by all 
Muslims. It is regarded as the home of high culture and knowledge (Hourani 
1990; Abaza 1994) and the Holy City of Mecca. By extension, so have symbolic 
associations to region, particularly Arabic. Hourani writes that since the times of 
the first Muslim conquests, ‘the Arabic language spread together with Islam’ 
(1990: 48) and it started to emerge as the preeminent language in the 
conquered territories.  
 
The word of Allah was revealed to the Prophet in Arabic, therefore there are 
strong associations between Islam and the Arabic language. ‘The Qur’an was 
the first book to be written in Arabic, and Muslims believed it was the language 
in which it had been revealed … It was essential for those who accepted the 
Qur’an as the Word of God to understand its language.’ (Hourani (1990: 49). 
Throughout the Arabic world, there is caché to be gained from speaking Modern 
Standard Arabic, besides the local ‘dialect’. The social capital associated to 
Arabic is even more pronounced amongst non-Arab populations like Malay 
since Bahasa Melayu (the Malay language) belongs to the Austronesian family 
of languages, which has no link to the language of God. With the spread of 
Islam, Arabic became the highest medium of expression not only for those from 
the Arabian peninsula but also for any other societies that accepted the religion 
of Islam (Hourani 1990). Certainly, Malaysians’ relationship with the Middle East 
is not an uncomplicated one. The ‘love-hate’ relationship with the Middle East, 
especially ‘its somewhat violent, contradictory way of life’ (Abaza 1994: 139–51) 
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and their ostentatious wealth became clear during my discussions with 
respondents.120  
 
Nevertheless, the impact of the Middle East is undeniable and this is reflected in 
the successful association of its meaning systems, such as language and art, 
with Islamic banking products. Upon arriving in Malaysia, I was surprised to 
overhear people within a certain milieu greet each other with ‘as salaamu 
alaikum’ instead of selamat dating (welcome) or the more common Hai in 
Manglish (Malaysian English). Respondents who could speak Arabic, 
predominantly virtuosi, also proudly announced that this was one of their 
accomplishments as devout Muslims, along with ritual adherence to Islamic 
praxis including pilgrimages.121 Therefore, given the desirability of imagery from 
the Middle East, the industry’s choice is consistent with the desires it is trying to 
evoke amongst its targeted consumer base. It is not surprising then that the 
symbolic value of Arabic is also pronounced in Islamic banking products. The 
most obvious symbolic process through which the authenticity of Islamic 
banking products is accentuated is through the use of Arabic names for the 
products, although some of the names of the banks are also derived from 
terminology used in the Qur’an for instance mu‘amalat which refers to fiqh of 
transactions. Some of the most common contract names like musharakah don’t 
need any explanation; others like al ijarah thumma al bai (hire purchase) are 
complex so they have to be translated (photo attached). 
 
New services and concepts almost always use Arabic words and if possible 
they will carry an association to Islam and preferably to Mohammed. Recently, 
one of the banks launched a service that is very popular in the Gulf, as gender 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 One of my respondents even made a joke that reflected this ambivalent relationship with the 
region. He said: ‘Malaysians joke that Allah placed the Prophet in the Gulf, far away from here, 
because they always needed his presence more over there’. 
121 The power of the Middle East as social capital was also reflected in my interactions with 
respondents. My reputation amongst respondents was enhanced by my basic use of the Arabic 
language. They were impressed to discover that my native language was Semitic and derived 
from Arabic. Many rationalised that I was a Christian Arab, rather than a European, and that 
improved my standing. 
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segregation is commonplace. Women’s banking caters for all the financial 
needs of women that are serviced by women-only banks. As the bank website 
announces, this service, called ‘Az Zahra is adapted from the name of Prophet 
Muhammad’s daughter, Saidatina Fatima Az Zahra RA; it carries the meaning 
‘the shining one’. Az Zahra captures the qualities of femininity, intelligence, 
beauty, purity, love, serenity, and passion. Served by women only’ 
(www.rhb.com.my). Often, the banks also use geometric patterns for their logos 
and letterheads. Calligraphy, ‘the art of fine writing’, also carries a special 
significance for Muslims. They believe that ‘as God has communicated Himself 
to many by His word, in the Arabic language … Calligraphy became one of the 
most important of Islamic arts, and Arabic writing adorned not only buildings, 
but also coins … The writing was used to proclaim the glory and eternity of 
God.’ (Hourani 1990: 56–57). 
 
This symbolism is deemed so crucial that one of the major Islamic banks 
leveraged from a conventional platform had to undergo a major image overhaul 
after failing to convince its customers of its authenticity. During an interview, the 
CEO confided that research revealed that for consumers, symbolic capital 
mattered. The bank changed its name by adding the tag Islamic and adapted its 
logo and letterhead around Arabic lettering and geometric design. We can see 
how in its quest to promote Islamic banking as an authentic choice for Malays, 
the Islamic banking industry harvests signs with meaning. In an ironic twist 
typical of the contemporary modernity, it appropriates and disconnects and 
recontextualises and circulates signs across a number of geo-political spaces. 
In this respect, it is becoming an international standard that ‘involves turning 
local practices into transferable ones’ (Demortain 2007: 2). 
 
 
5.6 Conclusion  
 
The aim of this chapter was to understand how the Malaysian state and banks 
have created an objective Islamic banking sector. We started the discussion 
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with an explanation of the shariah, a set of religious norms that provide 
guidelines for believers. We established that the shariah is not a strict body of 
laws but rather a source of cultural components that are amenable to a variety 
of ideologies. The dexterity of this cultural tool-kit is partly the result of its 
adaptation to a variety of institutional, cultural and geo-political contexts 
throughout history. Indeed, despite the attempts of the state and banks to pin 
down the meaning of the main precept of Islam banking, riba, its origins remain 
ambiguous and are subject to a variety of interpretations.  
 
Although some suggest that the prohibition riba was originally conceived as the 
transgression of the divine, the most widely-accepted interpretation is that riba 
was prohibited due to its unjust effect. This interpretation, which informs the 
consensus around the prohibition, of riba lends itself well to the creation of a 
profitable modern financial system that is based on Islamic values. The merger 
of these two logics have led some to contest the values of the sector.  
 
We examined the legitimacy of the sector’s claims by comparing and 
contrasting its theoretical standards and its practices. The main tension arises 
from the sector’s use of debt-based products instead of equity. Consumers are 
still subject to a credit risk assessment and the risk of the transaction is not 
shared equally, instead it is borne by the consumer. Nevertheless, as the 
practitioners point out, although the young sector has to work on its ethical 
dimension, they have still broke new ground by creating a sector that depends 
on its unique source of authority, legitimacy, value and meaning.  
 
In the second section, we looked at how the unique value of the sector is 
transmitted to its consumers. The sector is involved in a concerted effort to 
adapt people’s banking practice around this prohibition of riba. The sector is 
monitored through a set of shariah-inspired rules, which filter out undesirable 
elements and promote desirable practices. In this respect, the standardisation 
system is comparable to other ethical financial systems and to other halal 
products. In order to communicate the added-Islamic value, the sector adapts 
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the widely accepted language and symbols of other halal commodities to 
banking products. Thus, the added Islamic-value that results from the shariah 
scholar’s regulation of the products according to the boundaries of halal, are 
communicated via Arabic calligraphy, the use of Arabic terminology and middle-
eastern motifs. The standardisation of Islamic banking products based on the 
ancient holy texts of Islam, as interpreted by shariah scholars, and 
communicated by symbols and motifs serve to inspire people’s trust in the 
system. It is this trust in shariah regulation, which we’ll go on to analyse in the 
next chapter. 
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Virtuoso: ‘Muslims must follow the Quran and what the scholars advise. We can only trust’. 
 
CIA agent Pyle: ‘A man becomes trustworthy when you trust him’. 
(Graham Greene, The Quiet American) 
 
Chapter 6: Trust, shariah regulation and expertise 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Revisiting my field notes I recalled the importance of people’s trust in the 
shariah regulatory system. From the very first few days of my fieldwork in Kuala 
Lumpur, trust shone as the crucial element on which demand for Islamic 
banking depended, and this trust was subject to the authority of shariah 
scholars giving their blessing to halal products. It was a factor that pre-fieldwork 
I had underestimated. In an excerpt dated 6 April 2012, I wrote:  
 
I have to admit that people’s trust in the scholars was a blind spot on 
my part and (this revelation) has left me dumbfounded. The scholars’ 
role in the supply side was always obvious. Less so their role in 
acting as a figurative lynchpin between supply and demand. 
Notwithstanding Islamic banking’s religious claims, my scientific 
education formed my cynical perspective on religious figures of 
authority, especially in economic and political domains. This fact 
made me blind to the genuine trust that people can place in the 
expertise of such authority figures. It’s early days but a clear pattern is 
emerging from the first batch of interviews: these scholars are 
‘conductors’ of trust. Most people seem to believe in their fatwas 
because of their trust in their unique expertise in all matters related to 
Islam.  
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This excerpt sheds light on how the main theme of this chapter was developed 
thanks to an explorative method. Researchers using grounded theory are 
expected to construct fresh theoretical categories that emerge from the data. 
Similarly to other researchers, such as Sitkin and Stickel (1996) and Uzzi (1996; 
1997), I also did not set out to study trust from the outset. Had I not entered the 
field with the limited predispositions expected of grounded theorists, I probably 
would have taken trust for granted.122   
 
Studying trust is tricky, as trust is both a precondition and extant condition to the 
development and growth of Islamic banking. In Chapter 4, I explained how 
people trust the state to represent their interests: political, economic, and socio-
cultural – in this case Islam as a function of the Malay ethnie. It is on this 
precondition that the state’s development of shariah regulation for Islamic 
banking was perceived as legitimate. The crystallisation of the Islamic banking 
sector, as discussed in Chapter 5, is based on cherry-picked cultural 
components that simultaneously problematise conventional banking and offer 
Islamic banking as a solution. I explained how this repertoire of strategies was 
communicated via symbols and signifiers that felt authentic to Muslim-Malays 
and thus inspired trust. The combination of standardised norms of the shariah 
as regulated through halal enables an internal identification process that creates 
the unity of collective (Warde 1994: 64; Douglas 1996) from which individual 
banking practices can be regulated. The foundation of trust does not imply that 
people’s trust in Islamic banking is a given or that it is unilateral, from 
consumers to the state. The state, the main institution to underwrite Islamic 
banking is involved in a complex process of negotiation with people. In a 
nutshell: it has to earn their trust in Islamic banking. In this chapter, we now turn 
to ordinary consumers and seek to interpret the process of trust from their 
everyday perspective. More specifically, we examine how they perceive the 
state-led trust-building process through shariah regulation. Crucially, we also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 The grounded theory approach has precedents in the study of trust. Sitkin and Stickel (1996) 
also found that adopting this amorphous method allowed them the flexibility to react to 
unexpected and novel insights. 
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focus on the intermediation of shariah scholars in order to discover why they are 
seen as legitimate regulatory authorities of halal boundaries.  
 
Although other studies of Islamic consumption in Malaysia suggest that halal 
consumption is bound to consumers’ trust in the state (Fischer 2008), trust is 
not isolated as a separate analytical concept and the intermediation of religious 
experts as the embodiment of the shariah regulation, in the otherwise ‘faceless 
trust’ of abstract systems (Giddens 1990) is neglected. Trust is one of the most 
difficult concepts to handle empirically (Misztal 1996: 96; Barbalet 2009: 368). 
One of the main methodological and theoretical dilemmas is that considerations 
of the past, present and future are encapsulated in the experience. For 
example, the respondents were already users of Islamic banking products when 
fieldwork started and, as a researcher, I was not there to capture most of ‘the 
“pure” experiences of trust’. (Mollering 2006: 145). However, the role of, trust 
does not stop at the definitive moment that they chose Islamic banking; their 
trust was continuously developing. As a researcher, I was not able to capture 
the key moment when they decided to use Islamic banking (although there was 
one exception). I was, however, able to discuss their present trust based on 
past decisions and in light of present and future outcomes. Second, capturing, 
the ‘interaction effects between the [different] levels of trust’ (Mollering 
2006: 11) and interconnectivity of trust with other social and political 
phenomena is also difficult. The heuristic distinction, between micro, meso, and 
macro levels of analysis that is common in social sciences, is analytically useful 
but can be problematic in practical situations. The false dichotomy can 
misrepresent empirical reality (Nooteboom 2007) where ‘more than one level 
matters and there are also possible interactional effects between the levels’ 
(Mollering 2006: 131). 
 
In this chapter, I seek to build on previous chapters, which served to 
contextualise trust and confidence. Both social mechanisms ‘do not exist in 
isolation and always have to be seen in its wider context’ (Mollering 2006: 153). 
Consequently, so far I have suggested that Islamic banking practices are 
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embedded in the authority of the Malaysian state and its management of 
symbolic halal boundaries through shariah regulation. The dynamics of the 
management of these boundaries, representing the political, cultural, and 
economic stake of Muslim-Malays in society, are crucial in understanding 
people’s trust in Islamic banking.  
 
With this in mind, I will go on to suggest that trust has a significant purpose; it is 
the ‘glue’ underpinning Muslim-Malays’ everyday Islamic banking practices in 
Kuala Lumpur. Trust, the organising concept of this chapter, links to the 
overarching aim of this project. Trust is the common thread underpinning the 
everyday Islamic banking practices within broader historically determined, 
social, economic, cultural and political circumstances (discussed in previous 
chapters). Using three ideal types that emerged from the data, I will go on to 
show that the trust in shariah regulation, depends on two main factors: trust in 
the workings and underlying values of the shariah regulatory regime and trust in 
the ‘competence and cognitive intensions’ (Nooteboom 2007: 35) of the shariah 
scholars as flesh-and-blood expert intermediaries of shariah regulation. 
Furthermore, trust in the state’s ability to deliver on its shariah promise is linked 
to people’s confidence in the state’s competence in representing their interests 
including the halal boundaries that are viewed as a means of standardisation 
and representation of Muslim-Malay culture.  
 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. In the first section, I place trust in 
sociological focus by explaining why trust is inherently social. Its creation, 
maintenance, and function emanate from its collective social sources. In the 
second section, I shift to the theoretical frameworks that aim to explain trust – 
its functions and characteristics. Using Giddens’ (1990) conceptualisation of 
trust as a starting point, I carve out a space for trust within Islamic banking 
practices. I discuss the characteristics of trust and explore its various bases. 
The data shows that the nature of this trust is not homogenous. Therefore, I 
probe further into the mechanisms of trust by asking: is trust homogeneous or 
are there noticeable discrepancies in the mechanisms of trust between the ideal 
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types? Is trust reflexive, passive or routinised? In order to organise the various 
processes, ideal types are used as heuristic tools to characterise different types 
of trust. The virtuoso, the pragmatist and the sceptic – ideal types that have 
emerged from the data – each typify the various strands of trust observed 
during fieldwork. Is there space for mistrust and shades of ambivalence? We 
will then go on to examine the corollary effects of trust in shariah regulation. 
More specifically, we ask, is it possible that, whilst trust might be functional 
within the scope of Islamic banking, it could prove dysfunctional within broader 
Malaysian society? In the second half of the chapter, we will turn to the 
dynamics between expertise, regulation and trust: what qualifies shariah 
scholars as legitimate experts in the eyes of ordinary people? How do they 
bridge the gap between abstract systems and ordinary people? How does their 
role enable them to act as trust agencies?  
 
 
6.2 Trust in sociological focus 
 
Trust was once a main theme in the texts of leading sociological figures.123 But, 
from the mid-century onwards, interest waned and it’s only recently that it has 
enjoyed a resurgence (Mistzal 1996; Swedberg 2010: 18). Perhaps it is a sign 
of the times, marked by a noticeable  growth of voter apathy and a simmering 
distrust in political institutions, that trust is again a focus of sociological analysis. 
Characteristically of trust, it is only when it is lacking that people start to 
question it. 
 
In addition, as outlined in Chapter 2, the other reason for the ambivalent status 
of trust within sociology, is its elasticity as a concept and its ability to find a 
home in a number of disciplines. Indeed, there is an aspect of trust, its cognitive 
base, that remains elusive to theoretical tools available to sociology. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 See for instance Émile Durkheim’s Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (1957) or Leçon de 
sociologie (1972), Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 2005, Parson’s The 
Social System (1951) and Simmel’s The Sociology of Money (1950).	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Nevertheless, as we shall discover in the next two chapters, starting from this 
one, the creation, maintenance and function of trust emanate from collective 
social life – not the lone individual. Trust’s relational quality, that it must involve 
at least one other individual or an institution (Giddens 1990; Lewis and Weigert 
1985; Simmel 2005), and that ‘the practical significance of trust lies in the social 
action it underwrites’ (Lewis and Weigert 1985: 971), is one of the few aspects 
of trust over which there is consensus.  
 
Thus, in the case of Islamic banking practices, trust can be said to exist in 
relation to shariah regulation and expertise and its function guarantees the 
social order that enables the proliferation of Islamic banking practices. Trust’s 
function as well as its source exists in relation to something or someone 
exogenous to the individual, whether experts, abstract systems or their social 
ties. Trust is often described in terms of its function. Some of the commonly 
cited functions of trust view it as a prerequisite to: order (Mistzal 1996; Beckert 
2007b), reduced social complexity (Luhmann 1979), co-operation (Gambetta 
1988), social capital (Putnam 1995), individual risk calculation (Coleman 1990). 
Trust is found in interpersonal face-to-face relationships, such as the ones 
discussed in the next chapter. It can also denote the trust discussed in this 
chapter, a ‘generalised trust’ (Giddens 1990) that is instrumental for the 
functioning of ‘systemic trust’ (Luhmann 1979: 22) of ‘abstract systems’ 
(Giddens 1990). 
 
Since trust is usually noted after the ‘deed’ (the act of trust) happens and also 
due to an effort to understand the base of order in society, i.e. the consequence 
of trust (or lack of) in society (see de Tocqueville;  Putnam 1995;), trust is often 
discussed in terms of its functional consequences. Indeed, for Luhmann, trust is 
distinguished from other social mechanisms through its function. Therefore, all 
varieties of trust, have one shared commonality, its function, ‘reduces social 
complexity by going beyond available information and generalising expectations 
of behaviour in that it replaces missing information with an internally guaranteed 
security’ (1979: 93).  
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For our purposes, trust has three important functions: it is the foundation to 
order (Mistzal 1996) that underpins the growth of Islamic banking practices and 
it reduces the complexity faced by consumers in the face of an increasingly 
complex world (Luhmann 1979) that offers consists of a variety of choices. 
From the reduction of complexity emerges its third function, it serves as a 
‘coping mechanism’ (Warde 1994) to counter the uncertainty and risk 
associated with the complexity of choice characterised by increased ‘reflexivity’ 
and ‘weak inductive knowledge’ (Giddens 1990) which cannot secure complete 
certainty.   
 
 
6.3 The characteristics of trust 
 
The problem with solely focusing on the functions of trust is that this tells us 
very little about how trust as a social mechanism operates (Mistzal 1996) and 
from what base the ‘state of favourable expectation is produced’ (Mollering 
2001: 404). In fact, whilst trust in Islamic banking was easily verified in the 
beginning of interviews through a yes or no answer to the question: ‘do you trust 
Islamic banks, banking products or shariah regulation?’ Understanding the 
source of the functional consequence turned out to be more complex. As I 
mentioned in the second chapter, the definition formulated by Giddens (1990) is 
the one adopted in this project as an entry point into understanding the process 
underpinning the consumer’s trust in Islamic banking. According to Giddens: 
 
Trust may be defined as confidence in the reliability of a person or 
system, regarding a given set of outcomes or events, where that 
confidence express a faith in the probity or love of another, or in 
the correctness of abstract principles (technical knowledge) 
(1990:34). 
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This definition highlights the following facts relevant to the discussion (see 
Chapter 2 for a more detailed analysis of this definition). It emphasises the 
sociality of trust; it denotes a possibility of unmet expectations; assumes good 
expectations on behalf of the trustee and faith in the reliability of the knowledge 
underpinning the system or represented the expertise; expresses an affinity 
between trust and confidence. These characteristics as they are relevant to this 
project will be discussed below in further detail. 
 
 
6.3.1 Trust and confidence   
 
Trust is often merged or conflated with confidence (Mistzal 1996; Swedberg 
2013), as both are fundamental aspects to the fiduciary system upon which any 
system relies. Since we will be discussing confidence in the next chapter, we 
will tease out the major discrepancies between trust and confidence, according 
to their use in this project (see Luhmann 1979; Giddens 1990; Dodd 1994) for 
different perspectives on the difference between trust and confidence). 
 
Trust is defined by the individual’s determination and potential to choose 
(Mistzal 1996: 16). As Luhmann points out, trust denotes the possibility of 
alternatives and therefore, the possibility of unmet expectations, whilst 
confidence does not. Although Luhmann insists on a categorising the two 
separately, Giddens’ conception of trust and confidence is more suitable for our 
purposes. He conceives of confidence and trust as belonging to the same type 
of process, albeit differing by the degree of certainty. As a result, confidence, 
which is based on more certainty, has been earned and therefore given, whilst 
trust, which is based on weaker knowledge, is received (Simmel 2005; 
Swedberg 2013). When choosing between Islamic and conventional banking, 
respondents are choosing between alternatives and setting themselves up to 
the risk of failed expectations. On the other hand in this instance choice is 
underpinned by consumer confidence in the state’s and banks’ underwriting of 
credit-money. For this reason, since we are discussing trust in shariah 
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regulation, trust kicks in at the moment of choice between conventional and 
Islamic banking.   
 
 
6.3.2 Expectations and faith  
 
People’s attitude towards shariah regulation as one of trust is underpinned by 
expectations that both the system and the experts representing it have their 
‘interest at heart’. From this we can already derive that trust is belief that the 
expectations of the ‘trustor’ are met (Mollering 2001: 404; Mistzal 1996).  
 
Expectations are not based on complete knowledge, or trust would not be 
required. Simmel, whose work on trust served as a foundation for Luhmann’s 
and Giddens’ later work, suggested that trust included an enigmatic element 
that was akin to a ‘quasireligious faith’ (Simmel 2005: 178). The notion of ‘trust 
as faith’ (Giddens 1990: 27) implies that a leap into the unknown bridges the 
gap between limited knowledge and expectations (Mollering 2001). 
 
Users of Islamic banking products expect the shariah experts to produce 
banking practices that authentically represent Islamic value. They also expect 
the effect of their choice to be of benefit in the current life and/or the afterlife, yet 
they have no way of finding out whether the value holds up, before they 
experience a financial crisis or in the afterlife. When asked how they knew for 
certain that Islamic banking was Islamic, one of the respondents replied, ‘we 
don’t, we can simply trust’. 
 
 
6.3.3 Time  
 
The leap-of-faith discussed above is required because trust is orientated 
towards the future, but the act takes place in the present, often built on 
expectations based on past experience or knowledge. Thus, there is a time 
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lapse between the act of trusting and the meeting of expectations. Presently, 
the ‘trustor’ believes in the added-Islamic value of Islamic banking. However, 
whether the trust will be justified or broken can only be known after the event 
itself (Giddens 1990: 33; Barbalet 2009: 369). The outcome of the trust in 
Islamic value can only be known in the future whether in the afterlife or when 
they avoid another economic crisis. The future orientation of the respondents is 
summed up in the following phrase: ‘Islamic means that what we pay now will 
pay off in the long run’. 
 
 
6.3.4 Reflexivity  
 
Modernity is distinct in its heightened reflexivity and ‘active trust’ that involve 
greater deliberation and reflexivity than that found in basic generalised trust. 
Reflexivity is characterised by a ‘conscious awareness’ (Luhmann 1979) of the 
self in identity creation. The act is carried out by a back-and-forth action during 
which the individual examines cause and outcome and ‘the problematisation of 
the relationship between representation and reality’ (Pollner 2006: 562). Acts of 
reflexivity are mostly evidenced in the practices of the virtuoso and the sceptic. 
Although the outcome is the same – they both use Islamic banking products – 
the process is marked by different kinds of trust. Both types compare the theory 
of Islamic banking in holy texts with the outcome of the products and the advice 
of the shariah experts. Whilst the virtuoso can spot discrepancies and 
ambiguities between the two, the ambivalence that emerges from the 
contradictions observed is contained by a leap of faith. Conversely, the result of 
the contradictory process linked to the increased awareness of the complex 
choices, coupled with limited knowledge (Mistzal 1996: 132), leaves the sceptic 
unconvinced and highly critical of shariah regulation, and expertise (but not of 
its financial outcome). 
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6.3.5 Distrust   
 
Although the discussion is broadly focused on trust and its function, as 
explained above, reflexivity can also result in distrust. Distrust, such as the one 
typified by the sceptic, is not the antithesis of trust.124 Rather it is part of the 
wider spectrum of trust which ranges from a high degree of faith to a weaker 
one in which the intentions or outcome of the system or the experts are 
questioned. Most of the literature on trust views trust as a positive social 
mechanism with positive outcomes. The positive outlook on trust is due to the 
functionalist emphasis on normative order and cooperation (Putnam 1995). 
Since trust is conceived as morally essential, these perspectives exclude the 
possibility of a functional distrust. As Luhmann (1979: 71–75) pointed out, there 
is a need for distrust, as characterised by the sceptic type. ‘Healthy distrust’ is 
an integral part of democratic practices (Valsiner 2008), as distrust can indicate 
a rational response to conflicting interests or be built on past experiences of 
unmet expectations (Mistzal 1996: 72). Indeed, as I argue that the trust of the 
virtuoso and the pragmatists in Islamic banking is tied up with loyalty to the 
state in return for it assuming the responsibility of their economic and ideal 
interests, the sceptic demonstrates a disdain towards this inviolable norm within 
the Muslim-Malay community. By rejecting this social contract, he is also 
rejecting the inviolable norms of shariah regulation and the halal/haram 
boundaries.  
 
 
6.3.6 Risk and anxiety  
 
The notion of risk, here defined in the everyday sense – the possibility of loss 
that arises when one is vulnerable to the actions of others (Luhmann 1988; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Giddens suggests that the opposite of trust is existential angst and dread (1990: 100). 
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Nooteboom 2007),125  – is inextricable from trust. Trust and risk are the flipside 
of the same coin as trust in modernity is inversely related to the certainty 
afforded by traditional social forms (Luhmann 1979; Giddens 1990). Incomplete 
knowledge, total awareness of contingency of a future outcome, inability to 
control other’s actions (Misztal 1996: 18) create a perception of uncertainty and 
risk. The management of risk discourse by a political and economic elite, for 
instance by transmitting incomplete information about risks, can also contribute 
to distrust and anxiety. In this case, distrust is ‘unhealthy’ as it characterises the 
political mood. Although Luhmann argues that there should be a space for 
distrust in the system, when distrust becomes overwhelming, it becomes 
dysfunctional (1979: 75). As we shall go on to discover in the section about 
distrust and social pollution, in this chapter and the next, symbolic boundaries of 
the shariah are materialising in dysfunctional social boundaries that foster fear 
of others, mainly Chinese Malaysians, and the fragmentation of society.  
 
 
6.3.7 Routine  
 
Although reflexivity is the leitmotif of modern society, routine also emerges as a 
distinct base for trust. Trust’s need to be constantly renewed through dynamic 
and consistent fulfilment of expectations (Simmel 2005: 177-178; 214), is 
exhausting and unfeasible. Modelling his theory on Simmel’s work, Giddens 
suggests that the instances of active trust are infrequent and generally spurred 
by exceptional circumstances. He concedes that generalised trust is less of a 
‘leap to commitment’ than surrender to the mundane and continuous routine of 
everyday life, which automatically excludes other options (Giddens 1990: 90). 
As a result, people rely on compensatory mechanisms that relieve the constant 
reflexivity, which is tiring and unsustainable (Warde 1994: 891–2). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 This definition contrasts to the economic use of risk, which denotes a range of possible 
outcomes and uncertainty, defined as not knowing what the complete range of possible 
outcomes (Knight 1921).  
	  	   235	  
In all cases, people can choose to delegate choice to intermediaries like experts 
and family and friends or resort to routine and social conventions. Active 
trusting is only ‘actively’ intermittently during exceptional moments such as the 
window of opportunity opened by the financial crisis (Giddens 1990; Mollering 
2006; Nooteboom 2007). In this chapter as well as the next, we will come 
across various instances of compensatory mechanisms. However, this mode of 
trust is represented by the pragmatist. Compared to the high levels of reflexivity 
of the virtuoso, the pragmatist is highly routinised in the halal way of life. This 
type is also the most likely to delegate the choice, with the aim of getting to the 
most socially acceptable outcome. Nevertheless, across all types, reliance on 
experts is also indemnification against a ‘wrong choice’. As they liked to assure 
me, should any misgivings turn out to be true, they will be exonerated due to 
their ‘pure’ intent and the act of trusting designated experts: ‘I have done my 
part and used Islamic banking. If it is not really Islamic, the scholars will have to 
answer to Allah not me because my intention was a good one’. 
 
 
6.4 Introducing the ideal types in Islamic banking  
 
In Chapter 2 I explained how the collection of data took place in a variety of 
sites: my apartment, the respondents’ homes, their work place, coffee shops, 
retail bank outlets, as well as shopping malls, casual dinners at the wet-market, 
and hanging out between workouts at the gym in Kuala Lumpur. The data, 
reflecting the consumers’ reality, is then distilled through three ideal types. This 
chapter is the first to profoundly engage and interpret the respondents’ attitude 
towards Islamic banking through the ideal types: the Pragmatist, the Virtuoso 
and the Sceptic, which we will be exploring in further detail here.  
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6.4.1 The Pragmatist  
 
Being a Muslim myself, it is better for me to follow the rules of Islamic [banking] 
… I use Islamic banking because it’s Islamic and I am a Muslim. 
 
This type showcases a pattern of consumption that is overall routinised with 
intermittent reflexivity. Routine should not be understood as the result of 
following rules. Rather, it can be attributed to a predisposition which generates 
analogous preferences (Aldridge 1998: 5). Routine is one of the compensatory 
mechanisms that delegates choices in order to mediate the anxiety that arise 
through the obligation to choose (Warde 1994: 891–92; 896). Behavioural 
patterns of this type suggests that predisposition defined by the consumption of 
Islamic products and reliance on the state backed shariah regulation is more 
likely to generate analogous preferences across all economic practices. As one 
of the respondents reasoned, making the leap from Islamic commodities to 
Islamic banking seemed logical. This type expresses explicit discursive 
interaction about the financial aspect of the product and less about the ideals of 
the halal system. Islamic ideals and values are not ignored but they’re satisfied 
with the lowest common denominator.  
 
6.4.2 The Virtuoso  
 
The only solution for a Muslim is to try and comply with what Islam asks from us 
as much as possible. 
 
This type is characterised by a high degree of monitoring and reflexivity. 
She or he engages in explicit discursive interaction about the Islamic aspect of 
the product and less about the finance than the pragmatists. The hierarchy of 
interests is stacked in favour of ideal interests against pecuniary gains as they 
strive for excellence in religious practice. The financial aspects are not 
completely ignored but are certainly secondary. Paradoxically, this type relies 
heavily on state and expert regulation but expresses ambivalence about the 
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interests of the parties supplying the products. Despite their reliance on state 
regulation, their choices cannot be classified as being completely routinised. 
They are highly reflexive about their choices, contextualising their use of Islamic 
banking practices within wider existential speculations about man and God, and 
man and being. Nevertheless, they do not handle ambiguities well, viewing life 
through a Manichean prism of Islamic (good and clean) and non-Islamic (bad 
and dirty).  
 
 
6.4.3 The Sceptic  
 
I doubt that the Prophet was discussing financial derivatives with his followers. 
Islamic banking is typical of putting too much emphasis on the form and not the 
spirit. 
 
This type views Islamic banking as another type of commodity that is available 
on the market. He (as this type was only made up of male respondents) is less 
interested in the moral aspect, shuns shariah scholars and is predominantly 
concerned with the economic outcome. He is generally well versed in the 
mechanics of finance and financial products in general and can identify the 
technical aspects of Islamic banking products that appeal to him. He does not 
identify with the moral or Islamic symbolism of the products and, unlike the 
Pragmatist and the Virtuoso, is likely to examine all pros and cons of all 
products, Islamic and non-Islamic alike, and judge each on the merits of their 
economic outcome.  Most expressed an initial scepticism because of the Islam 
element. Some are wary that it could have links to political Islam. For the 
hardliner sceptic, Islamic banking was not authentically Islamic and linked to the 
rise of fundamentalism and dogmatism and is a source of symbolic violence 
because these practices are viewed as a political struggle for Malay dominance 
– which he wants no part of. He is less likely to be interested in the solely 
Islamic banks and more likely to be a saver/borrower with one of the larger dual 
platform banks. He rejects the halal routinisation but is concerned about the 
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lack of certainty and risk of conventional products. However as most pointed 
one, these characteristics are not necessarily Muslim: interest ceilings can be 
found in conventional products and Islamic banking is ‘trying to reinvent the 
wheel’.  
 
 
6.5 Trust and everyday Islamic banking practices  
 
During fieldwork I noted that the difficulty in pinning down trust is not confined to 
sociological analysis. It also emerged during interviews. There is a variety of 
definitions in everyday language and opacity regarding the meaning of trust. 
This ambiguity did not go unnoticed when discussing this theme with the 
respondents. Without any prompting, the respondents themselves declared 
their trust in Islamic banking products – yet many could not explain what they 
meant. 
 
It was common for respondents to resort to tautological reasoning that 
reinforced a circular logic by repeating the same phrase in different guises. 
Characteristically, it was the Pragmatists who explained their trust in 
tautological phrases. ‘I trust Islamic banking because it’s Islamic’ was the 
response of many respondents. An unexpected reaction was the inability of 
some to explain how or why they believed that it was Islamic. The Islamic 
quality of the product was something that was taken for granted and was 
obvious for them – requiring no explanation. They conveyed what Mollering 
(2006: 51) refers to as a ‘taken-for-grantedness’. 
  
As a result, squeezing out more elaborate explanations required the same 
questions to be creatively re-articulated. However, the obvious nature of trust for 
respondents was meaningful in itself. This obvious nature of behaviour is typical 
of routine: ‘regularly and habitually performed programmes of action or 
procedures … And they represent institutions in as much as they are typified, 
objectivated and legitimated, not senseless repetitions, although their sense is 
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mostly tacit and taken-for-granted whilst they are performed’ (Mollering 
2006: 69). When I pointed out that they were not really explaining why they 
trusted Islamic banking and I tried to prod them for a deeper insight into their 
reasoning, they replied that they had picked to live their life as Muslims and it 
was their intention to live their life as closely as possible to Islamic rulings 
indicating their reliance on halal as a convenient convention. In the words of 
Abdi:  
 
I use Islamic banking because it’s Islamic and I am a Muslim. As a 
practising Muslim it is important that if there are banking products 
made according to Islamic reasoning, even if they’re basically the 
same thing financially. If I can do or use something which is in 
compliance with the shariah ruling, then I choose that, even for my 
financing. In the end, if I pay more or less, as long as I pay within 
what is permissible according to the shariah ruling, it makes no 
difference. 
 
The response of other Pragmatists followed in a similar vein. Their statement I 
know that Islamic banking is good because it’s Islamic is pointing to a 
mechanism upon which their trust depends. Generalised trust becomes 
routinised in their daily life. When they say that they trust Islamic banking, they 
mean that they trust that it is based on sound Islamic values and therefore this 
is not meaningless repetitions. They have consciously decided to be guided by 
its bearings. The leap of commitment takes place at the moment they decide to 
rely on shariah regulation for all their choices.  
 
Pragmatists exercise reflexivity at the point in which they decide to rely on 
shariah regulation that is a given and stable institution (Mollering 2006: 51). It is 
only subsequently that they abdicate the need for reflexivity, until a 
circumstance dictates that they reconsider their original commitment. In 
empirical terms, the choice related to Islamic value is taken at a sectorial not 
individual bank level. They view their options as the Islamic banking industry 
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versus the conventional, rather than viewing individual banks as part of a wider 
choice. This recurrent routine is neither irrational nor unreasonable (Warde 
1994; Mollering 2006). Their automatic reliance on halal narrows down their 
options considerably, reduces anxiety and increases efficiency.  
 
A useful analogy is to think of Islam as their moral compass in life and they just 
follow the course without reflecting too long on the route. Simmel (1950: 319) 
observed that ‘motivation and regulation of this behaviour have become so 
objectified that confidence no longer needs any properly personal knowledge’. 
Singa illustrates this point with her comment when asked about the advantages 
of Islamic versus conventional banking:  
 
I am not too concerned with analysing the advantages of either. But 
as it is now, with being a Muslim myself, it is better for me to follow 
the rules of Islamic [banking]. However they decide to work the 
mechanisms out, like how interest should be worked out, it is better 
for me because Islam shows the better path in life. 
 
What emerged from interviews with the respondents was that the 
epistemological foundations of shariah regulation have permeated their 
perception of life and they expect to find goods that are tagged as Islamic and 
have confidence that they reflect the halal values of shariah regulation. For 
instance take the following quote: 
 
MM: Do you think that it is a compulsion of choice for Muslims to 
use Islamic banking? 
Ahmed: I will not judge what others do ... That is for God to decide. 
But I think that you cannot be Muslim if you have Islamic products 
and you don’t use them. Before we did not have a choice and now 
we do, so why not use them? They might not be perfect but it is 
something. 
MM: How do you know that an Islamic banking product is really 
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Islamic? 
Ahmed: So whether the product is halal or shariah compliant, that 
is taken as a given. When the bank issues an Islamic product, 
shariah scholars have to approve it first. So we can take it as that 
all Islamic products are halal. 
 
Throughout the discussion about Islamic banking, halal regulation of other 
commodities often cropped up. The pragmatists all reasoned that Islamic 
banking was homologous to any other halal commodities and services and 
many settled into the consolation of comfort of routine by halal. For them, once 
people agreed with the principles of halal it would be illogical to reject halal 
banking. Lufti said that it was illogical for devout Muslims not to use Islamic 
banking: ‘You can’t eat halal food and not use Islamic banking’.  
 
Other researchers like Fischer (2008) wrote that similarly, for some of his 
informants, Islamic banking is a logical necessity in ‘halalisation’. In principle, it 
would be altogether impossible for them to perform proper Islamic consumption 
with haram money from conventional banking (2008: 186). Many pragmatists 
compare their use of Islamic banking products to their use of other shariah-
sanctioned products and services, specifically food, beverages, fashion, 
entertainment, make-up and porcelain. The best description of how Islamic 
banking contributes to a sense of continuity in their everyday practices – from 
eating to clothing and banking – is illustrated by Yasmin:  
 
It is very important that certain aspects of our way of life is according 
to Islamic teachings. In Malaysia everything is Islamic: banking, 
eating, business, mu‘amalat. Everything is about Islam and 
everything is related. That is one of the good things about business in 
Malaysia. Ever since we were kids we were brought up with this idea 
that we must be into religion and this applies to business too. 
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Even the ‘Virtuosi’ believe that all aspects of their social life must be analogous 
to every other part. The sum of their everyday practices has to be coherent 
according to Islamic values. However, they do not simply incorporate a new 
idea into their routine. Throughout our discussions they showed that they 
contemplate every single action on its own terms. They examined it according 
to the Islamic norms promoted by the Islamic banking system versus their own 
reading of Islamic ethics, whether through actual studying of the holy texts, 
religious classes or media messages – therefore the back and forth 
problematisation of Islamic banking was frequently revisited.  
Zaharia explained her ‘conversion’ to her complete Islamic life, which includes 
Islamic banking:  
 
In my case, we learnt Islamic education for the sake of learning; we 
don’t really understand it as a whole. But as I progressed in my 
education, and I went to college, one of the sisters from the Central 
Bank of Malaysia, she came and she talked to us about Islam and 
certain things about Islam to increase our understanding. I think that 
when I’m in my international school, the Islamic programme helped 
me understand my religion more, and I personally believe that when 
you study your own religion, you have to know and understand what 
you are doing, instead of just learning in class.  
 
Zaharia explained that she feels lucky to have discovered Islam again late in life 
and that she’s going through a real spiritual renaissance. She was awakened 
from the non-Islamic routine and since this rebirth, she’s been trying to live as 
Islamically as possible, as the Qur’an instructs Muslims ‘to get as involved as 
possible’.   
 
She continues to explain: 
 
As soon as I found out that we could bank Islamically, that Islamic 
banks existed, I closed my other accounts and switched. Knowing 
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that there were banks based on the principles of Islam, it would have 
been wrong not to close the conventional and change to Islamic. We 
chose to live Islamically as a family because we were lucky to 
rediscover and renew our knowledge of Islam. Once we discovered 
the knowledge of the Qur’an, we became different. 
 
Reflexivity was prominent amongst those Virtuosi who had rediscovered a 
sense of self as a Muslim. Islamic banking was part of this broader process of 
discovery. Instead of following Islamic rules as routine, their spiritual awakening 
required an examination of the Islamic ideals and the execution of these ideals 
in all spheres of life. Zaharia underwent this spiritual awakening late in her life. 
She explained that her parents followed Islamic rules just as a way of ticking off 
the boxes. They were rules to be followed without much consideration of context 
or meaning. 
 
Mazran: The problem is that as children we were taught to embrace 
religion without really discovering what it really is about. We just 
followed and went to the teacher and just never questioned and never 
knew where the rule originated from and which phrase it came from. 
We never rediscovered and renewed our knowledge. Once we open 
to the Qur’an, the change becomes different. 
 
For the Virtuosi, Islamic banking practices are embedded in everyday 
conundrums and examination of choices beyond the parameters allowed by and 
created by the state. The narrative is less of one of convention and more of 
reflexive norm negotiation. Unlike the Pragmatists, they are less concerned 
about what they as Muslims ought to do and more focused on their personal 
voyage as a Muslim overcoming the tribulations of everyday choices.  
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6.6 Ordinary consumers, Islamic banking and the state 
 
Although respondents were not directly asked about the state’s role in Islamic 
banking, it nevertheless emerged during the discussions. For the Pragmatists, 
Islamic banking products are a way of confirming Malayness as defined by the 
state. For them, the state is simultaneously above Malay society and yet 
constitutive of it and its Islamic values. Following the introduction of shariah 
regulation, halal products have taken on an ethnic significance as they will only 
buy food that is produced by Muslims (Fischer 2008: 38) who are always 
identified as Malay. As more than one respondent reminded me: 
‘Muslim is Malay and Malay is always Muslim’. 
 
A student at the Islamic University said the following: ‘Our government is 
fighting against the current to create a better world for Muslims. We should 
support them’. Her friend agreed: ‘We are lucky that government does this for 
us. In Egypt they had the pharaoh [referring to the deposed Mubarak] who did 
not allow Islamic banking. Malaysians owe it to the government to use Islamic 
banking – there is no doubt’. These statements highlight the sense of reciprocity 
and obligation between the state and consumers. 
 
Islamic banking for the Virtuoso remains a necessary evil. As purists who 
sought to obtain moral clarity in all their actions, they remained ambivalent 
about the mechanisms of the system. Riba was certainly forbidden they said. 
Unfortunately, it was not obvious to them that Islamic banking was not engaging 
in hiyal. However, they acquiesced because the fatwas of the scholars had the 
ultimate authority. This uncertainty was revealed during one dinnertime 
conversation. A respondent, her younger brother, and her mother, laughed and 
nodded in acknowledgement when I asked what they thought about those 
Muslims who thought that Islamic banking mimicked the conventional: ‘Islamic 
is not pure enough. It has too many non-halal elements in it … And it’s not 
always clear as to how much the separation of [Islamic and conventional] 
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money is enforced. But there is one main difference – there is no riba in Islamic 
banking’. 
 
As many Virtuosi revealed, the golden standard of Islamic banking practices 
remained family lending and borrowing. These banking practices were never 
tainted with any kind of riba and there was no obligatory payment under duress. 
As was dictated by the Qur’an, there was an understanding that they paid their 
family back when they had the means.  
 
Still, there was an expectation on behalf of the respondents, that the state 
should set standards and intervene and regulate according to these standards. 
Speaking about other Islamic countries that did not have Islamic banking 
services, Omar said:  
 
Our government exposed us to this system, it made sure that 
everyone had the knowledge and it should be up to their government 
to do the same. Especially as they are an Islamic country, why aren’t 
they using Islamic banking? The government of an Islamic country 
should educate its people about Islam, and that includes Islamic 
banking, so that way everyone can live a better life. 
 
Islam is viewed as part of their cultural interest because Malays are taught from 
their childhood to revere Islam, and those who represent it, as a symbol of their 
innate identity. Respondents explained that the authority of scholars was 
engrained in their socialisation at school and at home. For instance, Nour said 
that they learnt to regard shariah scholars as guides who occupy a central 
position in their relationship between ethnicity and religion: ‘Malay means 
Muslim … always. And since we were kids, we were brought up with the idea 
that Malays should follow our religion in all spheres and especially what our 
shariah scholars of Shafi Islam said’. Traditionally, the masjid (mosque) or the 
surau (prayer room) are the main physical spaces where the laity interacts with 
the experts. These are the locations at which scholars preach their sermon, 
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lead prayers, or manage their smaller and more intimate prayer groups for 
those who wanted to study the Qur’an closely.  
 
It became increasingly clear that, to varying degrees and for different reasons, 
the state’s regulation of Islamic banking was perceived as part of the state’s 
duty to protect and improve the welfare of Muslim-Malays. In assuming 
responsibility for halal practices, it was ensuring cultural protection for the 
Pragmatist and spiritual well-being for the Virtuoso. Not everyone agreed with 
this stance. Whilst the Virtuosi and Pragmatists trusted the government for 
ensuring the clear separation of what is allowed for Muslims and what is not, 
others viewed this excessive trust in shariah regulation as the result of a 
political environment where the differences between Muslims and others are 
highlighted and discussed using inflammatory language.  
 
Marwan was vociferous about this point. An eloquent student who undertook 
most of his education in schools abroad, he is quick to point out that Islam does 
not say anything about modern banking or financial instruments per se.  
He quips: ‘I doubt that the Prophet was discussing derivatives with his 
followers’. Marwan does not trust policies that he believes are designed to 
‘create divisions based on religion’. He emphatically adds a caveat to his 
argument. He has no problem with using Islamic banking products but, as far 
he’s concerned, he is paying the same costs and getting the same products as 
the conventional. For Marwan, there is no difference between conventional and 
Islamic, and has no confidence in its ethical or Islamic value proposition.  
 
Marwan elaborates:  
 
One day I was thinking about this and was asking myself, what is 
behind all this? They do believe that there is a God who is recording us 
so that one day he’ll say: you did this and that and this. What is this a 
game? I don’t think that this is how religion works, with God checking 
up on us and punishing this and that. But this fear and this lack of 
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thinking is what they use to encourage people to use Islamic banking. 
Use Islamic banking or this will be one way that you’ll get punished. Or 
use Islamic banking so that it will make up for your other mistakes. 
What is this a game? This is ridiculous. Typically putting too much 
emphasis on the form and not the spirit. They become materialistic, 
they want to touch God. This is part of the problem with Islamic 
banking too, because shapes your thinking in a way. 
 
Global finance’s backing of Islamic banking did reduce the legitimacy of the 
sector’s claims of alterity for some. On the other hand, as noted in earlier 
comments, for the Pragmatists and Virtuosi, this was symbolic of Islam and 
Muslims protecting their self-interest and well-being in as authentic a means as 
possible. Yet, not all Virtuosi were convinced that the state’s combination of the 
logic of Islam with that of global finance was really ideal. Take the following 
example of a Virtuoso who is comparing and contrasting the interest system of 
the conventional with the charges of Islamic banks: 
 
Osman: Sometimes conventional is more Islamic. If a woman borrows 
2 hundred thousand cash, then she is someone who is doing 
business. If she gives you half of that, wouldn’t you have denied her 
from half of her business? Would she not use that money for other 
investment and make profit? Profit is allowed in Islam. It’s only fair 
that you pay extra for the profit that she missed.  
 
In his exchange, Osman not only pointed out the opportunity cost of lending 
money, he also went on to show awareness and engagement with the 
discursive trends with Islamic banking circles as he compared and contrasted 
his views with that of shariah scholars. 
 
MM: Aren’t you convinced that this is really Islamic? 
Osman: There is still a dialogue. Because scholars say, someone 
lends you 1k and they expect an extra 100 on top of that, that is riba. 
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So I say OK. We are not in the position to question them, they have 
the knowledge, so we have to take their word for it. 
 
Osman’s attitude is typical of the Virtuoso. Although he uses Islamic banking, 
his views on the regulation and the experts were characterised by ambiguity, 
even if they finally acquiesced through their faith in it. Fischer also reflected 
that, ‘purists in general critiqued the material excesses of the state, but with 
respect to Islamic Banking they fully and uncritically relied on the authenticity of 
state certification’ (2008: 186). They were more vocally sceptic about the 
motives of the interests behind the sector, and yet they heavily relied on this 
regulation for all their consumer and financial needs.  
 
The Sceptics also echoed the reservations made by the economic historians 
(see Chapter 5). Marwan was also convinced that riba was an injunction that 
was only applicable in circumstances where slavery was a distinct possibility. 
He also shrugged off the claims of difference. When asked to elaborate he 
replied: ‘Price ceilings? That’s nothing new. In the conventional market you can 
get that through hedging. You can enter into a swap or whatever. Even a fixed 
amount is nothing new’.   
 
For Marwan, Islamic banking lacked legitimacy due to the similar result of 
conventional banking. He continued:  
 
For Islamic finance, one of the motivators is that we should help the 
Muslim public. How do we help them? There is a product called 
mudaraba. Someone provides the capital and someone provides 
management and we share profit. No interest charged. So the banks 
are supposed to provide capital and public should provide 
entrepreneurship and they should share the profit. But this doesn’t 
happen. Most of the banks wouldn’t offer this product to you 
because they wouldn’t trust you. They would tell you it’s not worth it 
for them because it’s too risky, or you might not pay your money 
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back. At the end of the day it’s not fair. It’s basically around the 
same thing – they’re just giving it different names and making 
themselves feel good but changing the process through which they 
do it. 
 
Seif also views Islamic banking as the next logical extension of the state’s 
efforts to use Islam for political expediency. He explains that being a gay man 
he finds himself at odds with some aspects of Islam and especially the 
encroachment of religious regulation on his private life. Still, from a cultural 
perspective, he considers himself to be Muslim and appreciates the finer ethical 
points that the religion emphasises. What he objects to is what he perceives to 
be the increasing use of Islam by the political class in an attempt to divide and 
rule the different ethnic communities.  
 
He explains: ‘I don’t like the Islamisation of Malaysia and I find that this Islam 
tag is all politics, it’s not about religion. There is the trend to say, this is the 
Islamic way or that is the Islamic way but it’s the politicians driving it in order to 
get votes. I’m sure that this also includes IB, and I do know that Muslims are 
being taught that conventional banking is not halal’. 
 
Meanwhile, Marwan states: 
 
I am a Muslim and I never lost touch with religious teachings. I know 
the Qur’an inside out and I still pray occasionally. But that is probably 
why I see through these political attempts to use religion to control 
people’s lives. I’m not like the majority who are always fussing about 
the origin of the chicken they’re eating but never think about the spirit 
of what they’re doing. I don’t eat pork but I don’t live the halal lifestyle 
that people follow blindly here. I think that if Islamic banking urges us 
to discuss the morality behind economic transactions and how to deal 
with others: to be kind, generous, and nice, then it’s great. But then 
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again everybody agrees with this: Muslim, Catholic or Jew. These are 
all abstract comments that make sense.  
 
In both these comments we can observe how, for the Sceptics, the boundaries 
of halal are seen as a code for expressing and defending interests which are in 
conflict with theirs and they reject them.  
 
 
6.7 The materialisation of halal boundaries in social life 
 
In this section, we further the analysis of the boundaries on which Islamic 
banking is based by contextualising them within the broader salience of halal in 
the everyday life of Malays. We also look at their social significance in terms of 
notions of purity and in connection to everyday social interaction with ‘other’ 
Malaysians.  
 
Seif explains how these boundaries are being actively promoted by the banks. 
He says:  
 
They are teaching them interest is haram and so then the Muslims 
think ‘oh, so I can no longer use conventional banking and I must use 
IB because there is no interest in it so it’s halal’. This is emphasised 
by the banks themselves. When peoples’ ID card states that they are 
Muslim, the bank employees will automatically suggest Islamic 
products. 
 
As I will also discuss in greater detail in the next chapter, we will discover that 
anyone inside the halal boundary is clean whilst others are ‘dirty’ (Hacking 
2003). Hence these boundaries take on social significance as they also coincide 
with the boundaries delineating ethnicity. Certainly, this experience is not 
restricted to Malaysia. The Muslim Hui minority in China also identified clean 
and permissible with their own ethnic group and forbidden with the Han majority 
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(Gillette 2007). However, since in Malaysia Malays are a political force, the 
social implications are more complex and linked to Malay privilege.  
 
The testimony of the Sceptics offered valuable insights into how these symbolic 
boundaries have emerged in everyday social life as rituals of exclusion. ‘Such 
rituals permit a constant negotiation over issues that might pollute and hence 
cause communal friction’ (Turner 2008: 6). Their testimony provides a historical 
context to the evolution and materialisation of symbolic boundaries into social 
cleavages over the past three decades. Kheku’s charming anecdotes shed light 
on social life in Malaysia before the rise to prominence of halal boundaries in 
their everyday life created perceptions of risk that have concrete consequences 
on the social interaction between ethnic groups as Muslim-Malays fiercely guard 
their pure social spheres from dirt whose behaviour is not limited by the same 
rules. As I listened to Khee’s recollections of his childhood, growing in the 
jungle, he told me how his father, a Malay farmer, often hunted wild boar (a 
member of the haram pig family) with his Chinese friend, whose thick accent 
marked him out as a recent migrant from mainland China. Kheku chuckles that 
not only did the family savour roasted boar, but his father used to hunt with their 
beloved dogs, largely shunned by Muslims now for being ‘unclean or dirty’. He 
says: 
 
There was a great sense of community before, and less divisions 
based on these religious notions that intrude in our lives now. This is 
not the case any more; people don’t mix together anymore now and 
this is why they insist on using Islamic banking, Islamic this and 
Islamic that. These changes became very noticeable in the 1980s. In 
the 70s I was very young, but I noticed them as a teenager in the 80s. 
When I was a kid no one covered their hair and I remember when I 
lived in the kampong that my father used to take us to Chinese 
restaurants and we ate everything except for pork. But now you don’t 
really see this happening any more. Muslims refuse to eat at 
restaurants owned by non-Muslims and make a fuss about this and 
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that being halal. They want to eat at Muslim restaurants because they 
don’t want to eat pork or because they don’t even want the utensils to 
have touched pork even if it’s been cleaned. They’ve been told that 
anything not prepared by Muslims is not clean and not halal as it 
could be contaminated by pork. 
 
Others corroborate Kheku’s observations about the evolution of boundaries and 
their gendering of attitudes of trust and on the flip-side risk. Before the 
introduction of shariah regulation, food was prepared by kin, or at a local stall 
prepared by people who were ‘completely’ identified with the localised setting – 
even if they belonged to a different ethnicity. The social regulation of credit also 
followed a similar evolution.  
 
Anthropological accounts from the early 1970s illustrate how, following 
Independence, demand for sundry items, including food that could not be 
farmed, was often bought on credit from Chinese shopkeepers. The same 
shopkeepers also acted as informal moneylenders. Yet, Muslims were neither 
bothered by the fact that the Chinese ate pork and drank alcohol, nor concerned 
by the knowledge that the money they borrowed was probably, at least partly, 
the profit of haram activities (Mokhzani 1973). The scholarly evidence, and 
Khee’s observations, suggest that contemporary attitudes to the risk of 
contamination from others emerged over time, in tandem with the increasing 
salience of halal boundaries. From no awareness with little care about the 
mixing of food and money with those of other ethnic groups, we observe a 
mindset orientated to the risk of the social pollution of others who fall outside 
the accepted confines of purity. As Hacking (2003) would suggest, the creation 
of boundaries, designated to conserve purity and keep pollution out, has 
created the fear of risk of defilement from others. 
 
The fear of defilement mentioned above was evident in my discussions with the 
Pragmatists and Virtuosi. A number of respondents expressed alarm at the 
thought that non-Muslims were polluting the pool with money obtained through 
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haram activities. Many believe that the correct preparation or handling of halal 
goods and services, including Islamic banking, can only be carried out by 
Muslims. This ingrained mistrust of non-Muslims surfaced when I brought gifts 
from the UK to my respondents. Although it was evident that they were pained 
not to make me lose face, before even touching the gift with their hands, some 
asked whether it was halal certified and others just wanted assurance that it 
contained no alcohol or pork. 
 
The ideal types were not critical of the state’s boundary creation. Most 
understood the regulation of these differences as a de facto social fact derived 
from religious difference. As a result they had strong opinions on purity 
maintained by halal and the risks associated to its violation. The majority of 
respondents expressed sensitivity to the methods of production of everyday 
goods and services. They feared that contamination could undermine their 
identity, and this was a cause of anxiety. Consequently, for the Pragmatist and 
Virtuoso, their loyalty to the state hinges on their trust in its capacity to regulate 
Islamic banking and other halal goods as part of their cultural interests.  
 
Unlike the Sceptic, these types believe that life as a Muslim is regulated by 
rules that clearly demarcate what is permissible and what is not. They also 
explain that the regulations might sound odd to an ‘outsider’ who would be 
perplexed at the idea of avoiding certain types of soap or bone china. However 
they insist that in Malaysia, this expectation of difference emanates from within 
the Muslim-Malay community as much as from outside, reflecting the ‘dialectic 
interplay of processes of internal and external definitions’ (Lamont and Molnar 
2002: 170), vis-à-vis the halal boundaries. 
 
Sarah, a Virtuoso, contrasts and compares some of the primary distinctions of 
purity and pollutions of Muslims with the habits of those who are not: ‘As 
Muslims we have lots of regulations, of dos and don’ts, so to avoid all that riba 
and all the forbidden things that will carry us to our day after. Certainly, this is 
important for items like food and soap and even china’. 
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When asked why she singled out these two items, she replied:  
 
Because sometimes they mix it with pig fat or pig bone. It’s unclean 
for Muslims to touch anything made from pig. The Qur’an says that 
the pig is dirty and we are forbidden. The only exception is in an 
emergency where there is nothing else to eat. This is a big different 
with the Chinese. They eat pig, a lot of pig. They also like to drink and 
gamble. All these things are forbidden by the Qur’an. 
 
Talking about the use of Islamic banks by non-Muslims, especially Chinese, 
who are viewed by many as ‘dirty’ in other respects, resulted in mixed reactions. 
The pragmatists welcomed it as a sign of legitimacy. One respondent, 
comparing them to members of the Jewish community, explained that they were 
known as ‘shrewd, hardworking, and [having] financial acumen’. She concluded 
that this was a clear sign that Islamic Banking offered financial value. The 
Virtuosi were not concerned with the legitimation of the financial outcome. For 
some it was proof Islamic banking was not truly Islamic and that it was polluted 
by the dirty money of the Chinese. These Virtuosi were concerned that they 
could be borrowing money that was derived from haram sources. For the other 
optimistic Virtuosi, the regulatory process purified the money that might have 
been derived from haram sources, reasoning that in any case, it was their intent 
that they had control over and that is what mattered. In addition, they viewed 
the use of Islamic banking of non-Muslims as proof of its blessing, concluding 
that this was a welcome opportunity to proselytise, one of their duties as devout 
Muslims. 
 
 
6.8 Shariah scholars as experts  
 
Having discussed the broader implications of trust in shariah regulation, this 
section explores how the expertise of shariah scholars enables them to function 
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as general trust agencies for Islamic banking. As mentioned in the introduction, 
as the human access points to the abstract shariah system scholars act as 
intermediaries between supply and demand, and their influence features heavily 
in everyday practices of laypeople.  
 
Malaysians have no means to verify whether the goods and services are truly 
compliant to halal regulation and, in most cases, are not even privy to the 
specialised knowledge required to make such judgements. Many admitted to a 
lack of knowledge about the production of these products, and others who were 
connected to people working in the sector said: ‘If I were just a member of the 
public, I would not know any of the scholars directly involved, but I know 
 
Shariah scholars’ first qualification as experts relates to their broader role as 
authorities on the technical knowledge (Giddens 1990: 84) related to the shariah 
and its interpretations. Shariah scholars are trusted because people trust their 
intentions. In this case, it’s not the calculations that count as intent but ‘the 
possession of expertise to carry out such action. In other words, intended 
actions consist of a person’s intentions and his or her emotional, technical or 
material ability to perform the intended actions’ (Misztal 1996: 24). 
  
Their reputation as experts of Islam is also recognised by the state and the 
Muslim community to give them the authority to issue fatwas and interpret 
Islamic teachings (Turner and Arslan 2011). This makes shariah scholars 
dynamic agents in the production of Islamic banking value. As explained in 
Chapter 5, the religious expertise of shariah scholars automatically qualifies 
them to give advice on every aspect related to social life including economic 
practices. This includes the drawing of boundaries – what is in and pure and 
what is out and dirty. 
 
Within this broader group exists a subsection of scholars who have developed 
further technical expertise that is directly related to Islamic banking. These 
scholars are a minority within a stratum whose privileges are derived from the 
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intersectionality of political, financial, and religious power and are underpinned 
by the state. The Malaysian state maintains a monopoly by legitimating only a 
small pool of experts who simultaneously control the supply and demand sides 
of Islamic banking products according to its political exigencies.  
 
The authority of this breed of scholar increases at the expense of the more 
traditional scholar who is not fluent in the modern day language of finance or 
technology (Turner and Arslan 2011). The younger scholar is seeking formal 
qualifications related to finance, accountancy, or economics, besides being 
fluent in Malay, Arabic, and English as well as the technology used for social 
media. More often than not, religious experts whose professional environment is 
informed by classical religious teachings as much as ‘western’ economic 
‘sciences’ like finance and accountancy have made Islamic banking more 
central to Muslim-Malay everyday life. Indeed, parallels can be drawn between 
the regulatory function of these scholars and that of financial advisors in the 
conventional financial sector. Both groups draw on similar resources: 
information, expertise, financial, and economic resources; authority and 
legitimacy; strategic positions and organisational skills (Black 2003: 11). The 
trust that Malaysians have in shariah scholars is intertwined with the fabric of 
everyday social life. Besides their institutionalisation as policy experts and 
regulators in the state bureaucracy, as discussed in Chapter 3, their influence 
extends to the more mundane and routine aspects of everyday lives of the 
average Malay.  
 
Malaysians show a strong bond of attachment to religious experts for various 
‘problems’ as the experts can legitimately straddle different fields that overlap 
through a similar logic of practice. Shariah scholars are consulted for general 
counselling, work advice, spousal abuse, and depression (Ng 1998: 43) Even in 
urban area such as Kuala Lumpur, shariah scholars occupy a position of 
prestige as guardians, creators, and interpreters of Islamic knowledge. Their 
religious power lies in their authority to profoundly modify, in a deep and lasting 
fashion, the practices of ordinary people. In effect, they channel their narrow 
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technical knowledge to a wider public audience that does not have the capacity 
to develop this knowledge. All respondents underlined the special status that 
shariah scholars held in the everyday life of the great majority of Muslim-
Malays.  
  
The experiences of respondents who believe in the underlying value system of 
the shariah prove what Mistzal (1996) and Giddens (1990) have argued from a 
theoretical standpoint. That whilst encounters are not always presupposed, in a 
large majority of instances, positive encounters with the individuals and groups 
responsible will take place and they are access points which generate trust and 
confidence in the shariah regulatory system. Respondents reacted warmly to 
some of the personal qualities of these same religious experts, what Weber 
(1968: 440–67) identifies as ‘charisma’ that gives a person an ‘extraordinary 
quality’. Consider for instance, the response of an NGO worker, Mohammed, a 
Pragmatist. He was adamant that the shariah compliant labelling by scholars is 
central to the public’s willingness to use Islamic banking. I asked him whether 
the scholars’ blessing played a role in his choice to use Islamic Banking. He 
replied ‘yes!’ and continued to explain:  
 
Mohammed: At first I was not sure about Islamic banking. I had never 
heard of it before going to university. Slowly, during my time at the 
Islamic university, I started to learn about riba [from the shariah 
scholars on campus] and I started to understand why Islamic banking 
is a compulsion for anyone who wants to follow Islam.  
MM: How do you know that they’re saying the truth? 
Mohammed: Just like eating halal food, there is a huge element of 
trust on the consumer’s part. Like it or not I have to trust them. I 
cannot buy a house without their trust. I know that these scholars 
have a much higher level of knowledge that I have on Islam, and I 
trust them.  
 
These in-the-flesh encounters with the scholars were very important for the 
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Virtuoso. Knowledge helped communicate trust in Islamic banking. The Virtuosi 
overwhelmingly confirmed their regular attendance at these religious events. 
Many developed a passion for deeper learning about Islamic banking during 
their preparation for their pilgrimage to Mecca, which is one of the five pillars of 
Islam. People are initiated into rituals that they might not have been aware of or 
asked to further their knowledge of them. The pilgrims are reminded that their 
Islamic consumption must be practiced with the corresponding Islamic finance 
and are introduced to the various financial options available such as Tabung 
Haji, the fund set up specifically for Malay pilgrims. Second, they are made 
aware that before embarking on the hajj or any other pilgrimage all altercations 
and financial debt have to be settled. The following quotes show how scholars 
use Islamic rituals to encourage laypeople to internalise the boundaries of 
banking practices and adopt behaviours accordingly. For Aminah, another 
Virtuoso, the preparation for the pilgrimage served as an induction course about 
Islamic banking.  
 
Aminah: Whenever we want to go Mecca we have to get some 
knowledge on how it’s done. It takes months of preparation to purify 
ourselves and learn how to embark on this journey in the right mind-
set. So the scholars here teach us more about Islam and how to be 
better Muslims. They prepare us before we go there in many ways. 
We were often reminded about the money that they use, that the 
money is halal, that is when you really start learning about it. I used to 
follow Tabung Haji courses on TV which explained the problems with 
riba in greater detail.  
 
Other Virtuosi like Zaharia found the scholars in Mecca even more helpful in her 
wider pursuit of living Islamically:  
 
I learnt a lot about it here from these scholars but then in Mecca you 
get to be exposed to more knowledge about Islam from Qur’an. That 
is how most of us here get started into learning much more about 
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religion. When I was there I learnt even more about Islamic banking 
and for the first time in my life I was given the alternative to riba. That 
is when I chose the Islamic. 
 
Anisah, another Virtuoso, illustrated how the charisma of an expert also 
stimulated trust: 
  
We used to rotate scholars but at one point we went for a consistent 
one because he was a good speaker. We could understand what he 
said and we were all very very comfortable with him. I think that it’s 
because he was not pushy. He was nice and he also made jokes. He 
always told us what we should do based on what the Qur’an said and 
explained the reason. So it was simple: we get the instruction of what 
we do and why. It was then that I decided that I want to become an 
Islamic banker to fight for my religion. He was one of the first who 
spoke about riba. He said that the law in Islam said that if you accept 
riba, God will be mad at us and he will send us to hellfire. He really 
disliked riba and he told us that now we have a choice with Islamic 
banks. 
 
 
6.9 Communicating trust in Islamic banking 
 
Even respondents who were lax about their mosque attendance followed the 
scholars online or on television, across all the age groups. The Pragmatists, 
who were generally lax with their mosque attendance explained that they were 
no different from the westerners who visited their places of worship during the 
festive season. An effort was made for Ramadan and other holidays, but the 
rest of the time they kept themselves informed through television and social 
media. The younger cohorts in particular, followed the younger group of shariah 
scholars who kept themselves abreast with technological changes central to the 
everyday life of their communities. Besides the more traditional modes of 
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interaction they are also monopolising newer forms of media and this was 
reflected in the enthusiastic engagement of the Pragmatists. Several of the 
people interviewed participated in regular virtual interaction through the 
submission of questions and scholars responded with online fatwas.  
 
Daynah is one of the Pragmatists enthused by the younger internet scholars:  
 
Nowadays I follow a scholar on TV and the internet. He is very popular. 
He is an internet scholar called Idrus. He is very funny and he is very 
up-to-date. For example people ask him about the PTPTN. Do we need 
to pay it? And he says, yes if you borrow the money, you have to pay it 
back. But the interest it depends on yourself. It is not providence to pay 
the interest, but nowadays, since it is custom to pay the interest and 
the law says so, we must pay it, yet there is no compulsion to pay the 
interest. So the 54,000 we must pay it back, the rest – the interest – 
depends on us. He is up-to-date! 
 
Television has been an important tool in promoting the new face of modern 
scholars. Islamic Channel remains a regular mainstay and scholars are now 
starring in Islamic entertainment such as the Imam Idol that glued Malays to 
their television sets every Friday night for several weeks. 70-year-old Singha 
smiles and enthusiastically describes her passion for watching scholars on the 
state-owned TV station, AlHijrah, and ‘Imam Idol’ an Islamic version of 
American Idol based on the search for a new Imam:  
 
There are these programmes regarding banking and how to invest in 
your money, and there are a lot. I enjoy watching these shows and I 
love to listen. Most of them are also bankers and scholars so they 
know what they are saying and can explain it to the common man. I 
also learnt a lot from watching Solehah. Women from all over the 
country had to compete to be the best da’wa – promoter of Islam. 
They had different challenges such as preventing adultery or helping 
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teenage girls with pregnancies. On one of the series there was also 
an Islamic banker who competed. I learnt that insurance was haram. 
 
Both types, Pragmatist and Virtuoso, seek out scholars for pleasure and 
establish an emotional rapport with them. Many enjoy listening to them recite 
the Qur’an, dish out advice on interpersonal relations and in the meantime get a 
glimpse of the ‘problems being faced by the younger generation’ and teach 
them about new halal food, finance, travel destinations, music, and film. Sonia 
chuckles as she says:  
 
Oh yes yes! yes! I enjoy listening to them [the scholars]. Their 
thoughts on how to live everyday life as a Muslim are important to me. 
It’s not only Islamic banking, but other aspects of life such as 
relationships and how to treat other people and charity. 
 
As these excerpts show, the trust generated as a consequence of the regulatory 
capacity and reach of the shariah scholar in the private and public social life of 
Muslim-Malays is unparalleled by other experts within any other sector or 
industry. They are not limited to targeting consumers during purchases or at 
home through traditional media. The Islamic banking industry has at its disposal 
experts who are more deeply engrained in the social and moral life of the 
layperson and have at their disposition a wider array of techniques available. 
Having established the wider social context of their authority amongst the 
community, we will go on to discuss how their influence is reflected in everyday 
Islamic banking practices. 
 
The discussions with the respondents revealed that their relationship with 
shariah scholars coincided with theoretical discussions on the functions of 
expertise for the Pragmatist and the Virtuoso. First, for the Pragmatists and the 
Virtuosi, the scholars fulfilled the vital function of ensuring that Islamic banking 
was purely Islamic. When asked why this was important, many echoed Nour, 
who stated: ‘I am not an expert on Islamic banking. We have scholars who are 
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and they lead us to the right way’. For many respondents, the lofty ideals of the 
shariah would be overwhelming without the guidance of the scholars who taught 
them to aim for these ideals whilst recognising that ‘We can trust them to tell us 
what is wrong and what is right and how to guide us as human beings who have 
temptations and not angels’.  
 
Thus, the respondents highlighted the connective function of experts. The 
authority that comes with the possession of unique knowledge positions them 
as access points of connection between lay individuals or collectivities and the 
representatives of abstract systems (Giddens 1990: 88). In a similar vein, but 
within more of an empirical context, Demortain (2007: 5) highlights the 
regulatory capacity afforded through what he calls the ‘multipositionality and 
authoritative knowledge of experts’ which gives them the capacity to act as 
translators between users and rule makers. This function became obvious 
during the interviews as respondents described their reliance on the scholars to 
give Islamic banking their blessing, explain the rules in practice and also, how 
they relate to the broader religious framework of Islam. Osman expresses his 
beliefs on the importance of shariah scholars in his everyday practices:  
 
It is crucial for scholars to approve of Islamic banking. Without them, 
Islamic banking could not exist. They are our spiritual guides and they 
know what rules must or must not be followed. They have great 
knowledge of Islam and they can guide us. 
 
The asymmetry of power, knowledge, and authority between the expert and the 
ordinary person did not remain unnoticed by the respondents. Their awareness 
of their ignorance in the face of the expertise of scholars is what partly 
motivated their trust. The trust in the expertise of the shariah scholars is not 
based on the layperson’s full knowledge of Islamic teachings. On the contrary, 
trust is required specifically in the absence of complete knowledge, confirming, 
‘faith is sustained in the workings of the knowledge of which the lay person is 
largely ignorant’ (Giddens 1990: 88). This admission of weak knowledge was a 
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caveat that many interviewees made a point to mention in the beginning of their 
interview. They often apologised that they would not be able to help me with my 
research. When I inquired why they thought that this was the case – did they 
not use Islamic banking products? Certainly, they did was their reply. But they 
were not experts and could not provide me with a detailed explanation. Many 
would reply, ‘but you probably know more than I do, I don’t know as much as 
you do’.  
 
The lack of interest or knowledge about money and banking is not unusual. 
Their admission of weak knowledge points to the impossible feat of becoming 
an expert, and coupled with a lack of enthusiasm, increases the necessity to 
rely on experts to separate the pure from the impure, or the Islamic from non-
Islamic.  
 
Laypeople are aware of their weak knowledge and that the experts are in the 
best position to interpret and digest these abstract and complex rules on their 
behalf. They expect scholars to explain things that they would not understand 
on their own and they trust them enough to accept partial and incomplete 
knowledge. Most respondents feel that the spheres of finance and Islam, 
especially when combined together, are not domains that can be easily 
comprehended. Many shun in-depth knowledge of either, instead relying on the 
opinions of others who have access to this knowledge. They expect this 
knowledge to be comprehensible to a non-expert, be free from unnecessary 
jargon, and as much as possible be available across different types of media – 
especially the interactive kind. Consider the following exchanges: 
 
Biey confirms that she accesses shariah scholars on different media: 
  
At the university library, I had come across some of the papers of my 
favourite scholar, but I have the basic knowledge on Islamic finance 
and these were too in-depth and technical for me to understand. He 
used difficult words that I could not understand. Truth be told, I prefer 
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to follow him on TV or on his blog – where I post questions. I was 
surprised the first time I heard him because I could understand it and 
it made me think. I guess that when he’s on TV, he must deliver 
something up to the public standard. He cannot go into too much 
detail. So for me the TV show is better for the public. 
 
MM: How are you sure that it is really Islamic? What gives you the certainty?  
 
Osman: I know that some are saying that it’s even worse than 
conventional because it debases the name of Islam. What is 
important for me is that scholars are saying that this is Islamic and the 
truth is that they are our spiritual guides who spend many years and 
actually their lifetime studying Islam and I’m not in a position to learn 
whether it’s true. 
 
MM: Are you ever concerned that Islamic banks might not be following the strict 
Islamic guidelines or that, as some Muslims believe, they are just a ruse? 
 
Zaharia: We try to use our knowledge and understanding as much as 
we can but you cannot know everything about the Islamic banks’ 
activities. You can try and find out but it is difficult to understand the 
finance parts and even more how Islam applies to the finance. The 
only solution for Muslims is to try to comply with what Islam asks from 
us as much as possible – according to the Qur’an and what the 
scholars advise. We can only trust. 
 
The relationship to expertise was not even across all respondents. The third 
ideal type, the Sceptic, was not at all convinced by the shariah value of Islamic 
banking and even less of the intention of the scholars. The Sceptics expressed 
the strongest degree of distrust, ‘having an actively negative attitude toward the 
claims to expertise that the system incorporates. In the case of persons it 
means doubting or disbelieving the claims to integrity their actions embody or 
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display’ (Giddens 1990: 99). Sceptics expressed concern that Islamic Banking 
and the scholars were an instrument for the state to legitimate its omnipresence 
within Malaysian society. They mistrusted the claims made by the regulatory 
system and the scholars and bankers who communicated these claims as 
agents of this system. The common denominator between the respondents who 
mistrust Islamic banking’s value proposition is their view of shariah regulation as 
a divisive political ideology that neglects authentic Islamic principles. They trust 
that Islamic banking products are financially viable and can offer good financial 
value for money but ‘there is nothing fundamentally Islamic about it’.  
 
Seif: I think that the financial industry is trying to capitalise on these 
identities and the government is encouraging it for economic and 
political reasons. I think that there is a huge complicity between the 
two. These halal and kosher industries boil down to economic 
incentives. A friend was telling me about this New York rabbi whose 
job it is to inspect the materials or products that originate from SE 
Asia but are to be used in the West. I know that he is paid a fortune, 
so these religious people clearly have a vested interest. He stays in 
luxury hotels and gets paid a lot just to stamp items as kosher. I’ve 
also heard of shariah scholars who do the same. They’re in the 
pockets of banks and also enjoy a very luxurious standard of living. I 
read that some Gulf ulama who were at a conference in Asia but 
stopped in Bangkok and somehow got lost there for four days. Can 
you imagine, getting lost in Bangkok, wink wink? 
 
Similarly, respondents who did not view Islamic banking as truly Islamic and did 
not trust the Islamic banking universe also showed a disinclination towards 
other types of halal regulation. For these Malays, Islamic banking is a ruse by 
the government, scholars, and commercial interests to use shariah for their 
advantage.  
 
	  	   266	  
Seif was always sceptical of Islamic banking on both its financial and ethical 
grounds. When Seif first heard of it he thought that it was a ‘crazy experiment of 
fundamentalists’ and, like many of their ‘hare-brained ideas’, it was doomed to 
fail. He was also uncomfortable with the idea of aiding any attempt as 
encouraging ‘Wahhabi-Saudi influence over Malaysia’. Ironically, it was his 
French non-Muslim life-partner, equally ‘repulsed by displays of 
fundamentalism’, who convinced him to carry out a cost-benefit financial 
analysis. Seif came round to its ‘financial advantages’ but is still cynical about 
Islamic banking’s ethical value. 
 
6.10 Conclusion  
 
This chapter deepened the analysis of the development and growth of Islamic 
banking practices by examining how the process is shaped by the dynamics of 
trust in shariah regulation and expertise. Islamic banking is unique in its reliance 
on formal regulation informed by religious norms and rules, andthe aim of this 
chapter was to study ordinary people’s trust in shariah regulation. Trust is a 
fiduciary predisposition defined by choice (Mistzal 1996), possibility of 
alternatives (Luhmann 1979), and ‘quasifaith’ that bridges the gap to weak 
knowledge (Simmel 2005: 178), and uncertainty (Giddens 1990). Shariah 
regulation was singled out for analysis as through its halal boundaries it is 
perceived as being instrumental in excluding forbidden haram elements from 
Islamic credit and maintaining purity within. I argue that, quite simply, for those 
who perceive social use-value in Islamic banking, trust in the shariah regulation 
is the first condition underpinning their choice of Islamic banking. Trust has a 
significant role: it is the ‘glue’ underpinning Malays’ everyday Islamic banking 
practices.  
 
My findings, organised on the basis of three ideal types that emerged during 
fieldwork in Kuala Lumpur, reveal that for Islamic banking consumers trust in 
shariah regulation and its experts is a primary embedding mechanism of 
everyday Islamic banking practices. Trust is a foundation  that underpins the 
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growth of Islamic banking. It reduces complexity faced by consumers in a 
complex world marked by a number of choices, and it functions as a coping 
mechanism in the face of risks that expectations from Islamic banking products 
are not met. For most respondents, the state’s underwriting of the Islamic 
banking sector was viewed as part of the state’s responsibility to care for and 
safeguard the cultural interests of the Malay community. Consequently, trust is 
functional in enabling people to choose Islamic banking over the conventional. 
Consumer trust in shariah regulation depends on two main factors: trust in the 
workings and underlying values of the shariah regulatory regime, and trust in 
the ‘competence and cognitive intentions’ (Nooteboom 2007: 35) of the shariah 
scholars. The role of these experts is to engage in the symbolic production of 
the added social use value of Islamic banking as defined by halal boundaries. 
By simultaneously regulating supply and demand, these experts are ‘flesh-and-
blood’ intermediaries (Giddens 1990) between the sector and the consumers 
and function as conduits of trust. 
 
Although respondents of all three types consumed Islamic banking products, 
their attitudes to the them ranges from primarily moral in the case of Virtuoso, to 
purely instrumental in the case of Skeptic. The virtuoso is characterised by 
reflexive trust and an interest in living out the ideal values of Islam as a form of 
excellence. This pursuit of excellence engenders ambivalence in this type, as 
he compares Islamic utopia to the practice on the ground. The pragmatist is not 
interested in excellence, but the practice hat is socially acceptable through a 
combination of material and ideal interests. Consequently, he consciously rests 
on routinised choices. Attitudes to the role and expertise of the Shariah scholars 
also differed. The virtuoso and the pragamatist both trust the scholars and 
consider them to be a positive influence, but the former are more prepared and 
or inclined to be proactive in their approach to them, compared to the 
pragmatists. The sceptic shows a high degree of reflexivity but unlike the 
virtuoso, rejects the ideals and practice. As a result, his interest in Islamic 
banking is financial. This type views scholars as agents of the state and its 
allies in the financial sector.  Moreover, it was this type that was the vocal about 
	  	   268	  
the dysfunctional effects of sharia boundaries with the broad context of national 
Malaysian society, and sceptic respondents expressed disquiet at the role of the 
experts in enabling such effects. 
 
Although the focus of the discussion is on the functional aspects of trust, the 
data suggested that both trust and distrust have a dysfunctional side.  
According to the testimony of the respondents, the effect of shariah regulation is 
the materialisation of symbolic boundaries into social ones. Shariah regulations 
that enforce boundaries of permissible/forbidden and pure/impure increase 
solidarity and order within these boundaries, but distrust towards others outside 
these boundaries. Therefore shariah regulation has corollary effects: it is both 
functional and dysfunctional. Whilst it generally engenders the trust of Muslim-
Malays in Islamic banking, it contributes to creating an atmosphere of distrust 
between ethnic groups and creates fragmentation with the broader Malaysian 
society. Having looked at trust as one of the embedding mechanisms of Islamic 
banking practices, the next chapter examines how family and peers are 
unwitting allies of the state and Islamic banks by signalling confidence in Islamic 
banking.  
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Pragmatist: ‘Our family has great input in our lives, from the bank account we open to what we 
study’. 
 
Chapter 7: Social ties, and confidence in Islamic 
banking 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
One of the first instances of participant observation in Kuala Lumpur took place 
at the MIHAS halal fair. The products at this fair were geared towards a ‘Muslim 
consumer’: an individual who demands commodities that are produced in 
accordance with shariah regulation. The fair was held in the Kuala Lumpur 
Convention Centre (KLCC) conference centre attached to the Petronas Twin 
Towers. Alighting at the KLCC stop on the air-conditioned metro, I made my 
way directly to the fair where I was welcomed with a ‘goody bag’ full of 
vouchers, leaflets and assorted samples of halal goods. Walking around I 
perused all the products and services on offer, sometimes chatting with other 
customers and at other times inquiring about the goods being offered at the 
stands. All sort of products and services available in European markets were on 
offer, albeit with a halal accent: frozen food, chicken nuggets to pizza and 
kebabs; non-alcoholic wine, beer and cider; breathable nail polish that does not 
contravene the pre-prayer ritual of washing hands and arms; Islamic (pig free) 
bone china; luxury terroir cured meats from France; holidays to family friendly 
resorts that are alcohol free and offer segregated leisure areas as well as family 
entertainment and, of course, Islamic bank accounts, mortgages, loans, 
insurance, and investment funds.  
 
The scene I observed on this humid, rainy morning reminded me of a typical 
buzzing high-street in any European country. As families together compared the 
samples of frozen food, boisterous children trailing their parents stuffed their 
mouths with as many free morsels of food as humanely possible. Gaggles of 
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schoolgirls moved around in packs, gossiping and giggling, from one cosmetics 
counter to another helping each other pick halal eyeliner, lip-gloss, and nail 
polish. Young couples and fresh graduates toured the bank stands, discussing 
the best financing deals on offer together. Very often they would be 
accompanied by the father who would supervise the discussions with Islamic 
bank representatives, interjecting with questions or encouraging comments 
whenever he felt that it was required.   
 
This scene, which I participated in frequently for the duration of my stay, albeit 
on a smaller scale and in a variety of settings, brought home the sociality of 
everyday Islamic banking practices. The interviews confirmed what I observed 
during participant observation at the hubs of economic activity: banks, shopping 
malls, fairs, and markets. People’s everyday Islamic banking practices are not a 
simply a sum of their individual preferences, they also depend on their social 
environment, their habits and their dispositions. Second, people use Islamic 
banking products because so do their peers and family members. Third party 
use of Islamic banking is a ‘proxy sign of confidence’ (Swedberg 2010; 2013). 
People discuss money and consumer choices with their partners, are 
accompanied to the bank by their parents, and consult friends about the best 
financial products for their needs. Their personal ties with people they trust 
shape their everyday Islamic banking practices. 
 
In Chapter 5, I discussed how trust in the shariah regulatory regime and 
expertise is the primary embedding mechanism of everyday Islamic banking 
practices. Abstract systems are a permanent feature of modern societies. As 
people move away from personalised trust, they increasingly rely on 
generalised trust in abstract systems that are characterised by a ‘faceless 
commitment’ (Giddens 1990). This chapter builds on the previous one: I 
examine how the personalised trust between consumers of Islamic banking 
products and other laypeople they encounter on a routine basis is the conduit to 
confidence in Islamic banking which promotes its use and its growth. A lens is 
focused on the respondents’ strong social ties to demonstrate that the growth of 
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Islamic banking practices depends on the confidence generated in the sector 
through proxy signs. These can include recommendations and experience of 
trusted family members and peers. 
  
Despite people’s reliance on abstract systems and expertise, social relations 
still play an important supporting role in shaping economic choice. In effect, by 
promoting confidence in Islamic banking, family and friends are inadvertent 
‘allies’ of the state and Islamic banks. Respondents follow direct advice or 
emulate the example or experience set of they trust. Social ties are 
characterised by personalised trust. For people to follow the advice of other 
laypeople, they must trust them to have good intentions in their regard (Layder 
2006). 
 
Proxy signs of confidence depend on an idea of independence vis-à-vis 
interests of the banks (Swedberg 2010). Since the main theoretical anchor of 
this chapter is on personalised trust and social ties, reputation also plays a role 
in these ties. Respondents trust their family and the views and advice of their 
elders. They trust their family and friends, especially those with experience and 
knowledge of finance, business or Islam and those who have been more 
successful than them. If this circle of persons they trust itself expresses its trust 
in Islamic banking, then they will themselves have confidence in Islamic banking 
and hence be encouraged to use it. Thus, social ties typical of face-to-face 
relationships, play an important role in building confidence in Islamic banking by 
communicating that Islamic banking practices are the proper type of banking 
practices for Malays and by ‘standing in’ for limited information (Swedberg 
2010), reducing the complexity of Islamic banking for laypeople.   
 
As explained in Chapter 2, this project demonstrates that there are other 
implications for choice in the contradiction between the ‘societalising process 
and individual atomisation’ (Warde 1994: 879). Instead of thinking of consumer 
choice as being primarily linked to the individual’s creation of a unique identity, it 
is likely that, as Warde counter-argues, ‘being socially acceptable is the goal 
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and the means of allying anxiety’ (Warde 1994: 65). People want trusted family 
and peers to signal that they are making the right choice. 
 
Confidence matters in different ways for each ideal type. The Virtuoso follows 
the advice of trusted people who posses a higher level of knowledge of Islam 
than they and the Pragmatists seek to emulate others who can balance the 
appropriate Islamic banking practices with economic gain. On the other hand, 
the Sceptics, who reject the state’s conception of halal boundaries, also reject 
its conception of Islam. Therefore, in practice, they reject their family as a 
source of guidance in this respect, both their real and fictive kin and others. The 
Sceptics use Islamic banks because people in their trusted social milieu have 
confidence in the reduced risks and preferable long-term rates which denote 
economic stability. 
 
This chapter is split into two main sections: the first half will focus on theoretical 
insights about the relationship between social ties and Islamic banking. The 
discussion starts by examining the role of social ties vis-à-vis choice in 
modernity. In particular, how do new social forms contribute to the confidence 
that underpins the growth of Islamic banking practices? Trust and social ties are 
often discussed in relation to their positive social functions, but is this always 
the case? Can trust and reliance on our close social ties result in dysfunctional 
consequences? 
 
The second part of the chapter considers and presents the grounded theory that 
emerges from the data collected in the field, using the three ideal types to 
structure the analysis. The discussion then elaborates further on the 
characteristics of the personal social ties observed during fieldwork: family 
members and peers, and how in signalling confidence in the growth of Islamic 
banking practices they are inadvertent allies of the state and Islamic banks. 
Last, we examine how these strong social ties that promote confidence in halal 
consumption broadly and Islamic banking specifically, can also contribute to 
broader social dysfunction within Malaysian society. On one hand, close social 
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ties function to enhance social cohesion and the coordination and consolidation 
of Islamic banking practices amongst Muslim-Malays. The flipside of this 
outcome is that by encouraging coalescence of group identity and solidarity 
around the boundaries of halal/haram as underpinned by shariah regulation 
discussed in the last chapter, it enforces a heightened sense of risk in the 
interaction with ‘others’ whose everyday practices fall outside the halal 
boundary. The broader implications for all of Malaysian society is that Islamic 
banking practices contribute to the intra-community cohesion of Muslim-Malays 
but accentuate the deepening of cleavages between Muslim-Malays and other 
ethnic groups and therefore the fragmentation of Malaysian society. 
 
 
7.2 Confidence and personal ties 
 
As stated in previous chapters, this project is based on grounded theorising. 
The conclusions that emerge are driven by the data and constructed into 
analytical structures making references to established theoretical frameworks 
when necessary. Whilst the argument presented in the previous chapters 
emerged from patterns that were immediately obvious, I struggled to make 
sense of the patterns discussed in this chapter. It was immediately obvious that 
family and friends played a fundamental role in laypeople’s choice of banking, 
but it proved difficult to theorise. As it turns out the difficulty was the result of not 
heeding the caveat emphasised by grounded theory advocates: to listen to the 
data. The conclusion proved to be much simpler than originally envisaged: 
people are social beings who seek cues from others whom they trust. When 
people with whom they have strong personal ties vouch for Islamic banking and 
also have experience of Islamic banking, they create confidence in Islamic 
banking practices, thus encouraging their uptake and growth. 
 
In the last chapter I explained how shariah regulation and expertise aids the 
growth of Islamic banking by acting as a trust agency in Islamic credit. 
Generalised trust in abstract systems and expertise is ubiquitous in modern 
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societies. One feature common to the paradigm of modernity presented by 
Giddens (1990), Beck (1992) and Bauman (2000) is the idea that people 
experience a highly individualised existence that is shaped by reflexive identity-
creation.126 The individualisation of people is linked with dependence on 
modern institutions, the nature of which is deeply bound with the mechanisms of 
trust in abstract systems (Giddens 1990: 83). For Giddens and Beck, this, the 
atomisation of the individual’s choice process is bound with trust in expert 
knowledge of modern institutions – which is both ubiquitous and ineluctable. 
These institutions mediate the risk that was not present in traditional set-ups, 
but emerges with the freedom of choice bestowed upon the modern individual: 
he has no choice but to reflexively choose, with all the anxiety that this entails 
(Bauman 1992). 
 
Critically, choice, particularly as it becomes more commodified, diversified, and 
complex, is based upon the maintenance of self-identity (Giddens 1990; Beck 
1992; Bauman 2000), with more reliance on institutions and experts and less on 
traditional social forms. This means that the modernisation process has 
displaced traditional frameworks such as the family from the centre of the 
individual’s existence, into the periphery.  
 
The evidence from Kuala Lumpur shows that, similar to patterns observed in 
other modern societies, traditional social forms have dissolved and abstract 
systems regulated by experts are pervasive as demonstrated by people’s 
overwhelming trust in shariah regulation. Yet, individuals are still influenced by 
and reliant on social forces. The opportunity for free association opened up the 
respondents to socialisation with other individuals outside the traditional family 
group. Respondents associate with peers from university, the workplace, and 
other social spaces typical of a modern urban landscape. Still, the family 
remains a lasting influence on the economic choices of respondents. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Bauman (1990) acknowledges the role of life-style and neo-tribes as Giddens (1990) 
mentions taste and lifestyle which he attributes to social groups without explaining how the 
boundaries demarcating these differences are formed (Warde 1994: 892–93). 
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observations that Liu (2008: 57) made about the dynamics of modern 
consumption in China, also applies to the Malaysian case: modern consumption 
is ‘intimately associated with interlocked collective responsibilities’ such as filial 
piety. Therefore, the shift towards generalised trust in abstract systems such as 
shariah regulation, does not only coexist with social forms such as the family, it 
is enabled and accommodated by them. 
 
In societies, such a Malaysia, where there is a ‘high value on interdependence’ 
and the pressure to ‘adjust to meet the expectations of others’ and the good of 
others’ (Liu 2008: 62), signs of confidence from trusted proxies play a sizeable 
role in shaping consumption choices. Despite, or perhaps as a result of, 
pressures of identity creation and choice, social interaction provides an 
opportunity to relieve the anxiety. Thus, social interaction is crucial for 
consumption and therefore for the growth of Islamic banking practices. 
Therefore, although as mentioned in the last chapter choice of Islamic baking is 
characterised by reflexivity, another often-neglected element of economic 
choice is habit, more specifically, the habitual expectation denoted by 
confidence. Although generalised trust in regulation and expertise such as 
shariah regulation and scholars are a feature of Islamic banking practices, 
economic life is still reliant and constituted by other social forces that include 
face-to-face encounters and encourage habit by signalling confidence. 
 
 
7.2.1 Confidence, personal ties and Islamic banking 
 
Confidence, as was explained in Chapter 2, is the predominance and 
communication of habitual expectations (Dodd 1994: 138). It is based not on 
best information, but on proxy signals, negative or positive (Swedberg 2010; 
2013). Confidence, here, is taken to include the fiduciary dimension of Islamic 
banking practices that cannot be captured by the trust framework discussed in 
the previous chapter. This shifts the focus to the impact of personalised not 
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generalised trust and therefore on people with whom respondents have strong 
social ties – not depersonalised links to abstract systems and expertise.  
 
As my data demonstrates, the individual engages in social interaction with 
others for purposes of communication. Modernity transforms the social forms of 
people’s engagement and interaction. The free association typical of modern 
cities like Kuala Lumpur takes place within networks of communication, where 
individuals look for signs of confidence related to their impending choices. As 
respondents interact self-consciously with trusted social connections within this 
structural cultural context, the signs of confidence demonstrated by others 
shape their choice of banking. 
 
Rather than only accounting for direct recommendations, Swedberg suggest 
that we should also account for the importance of signs in signalling confidence. 
For him, people’s reliance on something else other than full knowledge, such as 
friends vouching for the reliability of Islamic banks or the outcome of their 
products is a proxy sign of confidence (2013: 543). These signs of confidence 
come from direct communication of experience or from the indirect socialisation 
into Islamic banking practices. Therefore, confidence in Islamic banking 
depends on Muslim-Malay’s symbolic interaction with each other, which is then 
expressed in unique subjective ways according to the ideal types (Virtuoso, 
Pragmatist, and Sceptic) that are discussed later on.  
 
The implications are threefold: 
 
Anxiety and risk:  
Modern society is characterised by a proliferation of choices and goods and the 
mediation of abstract systems between commodities and people. The anxiety 
that results from overwhelming choice and space–time distanciation is mediated 
by confidence. Reliance on signs of confidence from family and peers reduces 
the risks of making the wrong, financially unsound, socially awkward, and sinful 
choice. It has already been argued that the management of one’s own personal 
	  	   277	  
finance generates understandable anxiety, principally because making the right 
choice requires a level of experience that laypeople rarely posses (Aldridge 
1998; Lai 2001). Financialisation, it follows, will tend to generate widespread 
anxiety principally because of the abundance of financial products confronting 
the lay127 consumer and, especially under the pressure of a political narrative 
that relentlessly insists on the individual’s responsibility to reap the profits as 
well as a professional investor. In the case of Islamic banking products, another 
layer of complexity exists. Ordinary people are not only expected to understand 
the mechanics of banking products and their financial functions, they have the 
added burden of having to understand shariah regulation and its Islamic value, 
and consume accordingly. Trust in the signals of confidence coming from kin 
and peer, or even merely in following in their footsteps, eases this burden.  
 
Identity and consumption:  
Consumption is a fundamental forum of symbolic interaction between people 
and objective culture. It is a moral choice, involving social interaction, collective 
meaning and individual action through which people can become socialised as 
well as self-fulfilled. In this case, as trusted others reinforce these choices by 
giving signs of confidence that this is the socially acceptable banking choice, 
respondents internalise a halal lifestyle, including banking practices. This 
meaningful action becomes part of their being and identity whilst they also 
become socially acceptable members of their immediate community.  
 
Embedded economic action:  
Last, it is clear that Islamic banking practices are neither asocial nor solely 
based on utility maximisation of the individual. The embeddedness of 
consumption of credit in social ties in order to mediate incomplete information 
and the uncertainty that accompanies choice contradicts the suggestion that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Laypeople are specifically not experts because they have not acquired the specialist 
knowledge that marks out experts as authorities on that particular subject (Collins and Evans 
2002: 238).   
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economic action is in tension with the social world. On the contrary, social life 
facilitates and constitutes consumption of credit.  
 
 
7.3. Characterising the personal ties of Islamic banking consumers  
 
Social ties inform most of network analysis that was inspired by Granovetter’s 
(1985) opus Economic Action and Social Structure: the Problem of 
Embeddedness. In his article, he explored ‘the role of concrete personal 
relations and structures (or “networks”) of such relations’ (1985: 490) and how 
they shape the inclinations of people’s economic behaviour.  
 
This project does not follow network analysis. The use of social ties is used to 
denote a more basic social reality based on what Granovetter (1973; 1983) calls 
strong/thick social ties that connect people who have frequent face-to-face 
encounters and share intimate information, space or experiences together. The 
strength of network analysis is in understanding ‘how macro-social structures 
emerge out of micro-level processes of interpersonal and inter-group 
interactions’ (Lin 2006: 628) and often demonstrates the advantages of weak 
ties. Here we will simply be observing social interaction between people who 
enjoy immediate and almost daily encounters – not their broader network. 
 
In this chapter, I will be examining personalised trust relationships that are 
typical of high density networks and characteristically based on ‘sameness’ 
(Granovetter 1983) and thus, are usually taken for granted by the very people 
for whom they are instrumental in mobilising resources (Layder 2006 :165).  
 
There are various ways to characterise the familial and friend networks 
observed amongst the respondents. These networks are considered ‘strong 
ties’ (Granovetter 1973) according to the measure dictated by the homophily 
principle: the strength (or weakness) of the ties is determined by the network 
distance. This is defined as: ‘the number of relationships through which a piece 
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of information must travel to connect two individuals’ (McPherson, Smith-Lovin 
and Cook 2001: 416).  
 
The reinforcement of the trust and social capital cycle within ‘strong ties’ is often 
also due to homophily (Lin 2006; McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001; 
Mignione 2006; Nooteboom 2007). According to McPherson, Smith-Lovin, 
Cook’s extensive review of the subject: ‘homophily is the principle that a contact 
between similar persons occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people. 
The pervasive fact of homophily means that cultural, behavioural and genetic or 
material information that flows through networks will tend to be localized’ 
(2001: 416).  
 
People trust those with whom they enjoy close social proximity and in turn these 
people generate more trust by repeatedly confirming their expectations. The 
experience of respondents suggests that confidence is built on habitual meeting 
of expectations, which perpetuates a cycle of confidence and trust. Homophily 
was observed across all the ideal types. The tendency of each type was to look 
for confidence from people with similar values. It is common for people to 
choose friends like themselves, rather than becoming more alike due to 
reciprocal influence. By associating with people like ourselves, our worldview is 
reinforced (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001: 415–16). There was 
systematic evidence of both value and status homophily amongst the 
respondents (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954). The coalescing of ideal types is the 
latter, as it is based on values, attitudes, and beliefs (Lazarsfeld and Merton 
1954). Virtuosi pursue signs from others who claimed to prioritise Islamic ideals 
above all else. The pursuit of a ‘balanced modern life’ that takes into account 
‘realities of life and Muslim values’ was the commonality of pragmatists. 
Sceptics wanted signs of confidence in the financial stability and return. The 
recurring and mundane nature of social ties is what makes them effective 
generators and conduits of trust as well as a valuable resource of social capital. 
Were these ties not a routine aspect of social life, and had to be constantly re-
examined, their efficacy would be greatly reduced.  
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7.3.1 Peer groups 
 
Status homophily in ‘which similarity is based on (informal, formal or ascribed) 
status’128 (Lazarsfeld and Merton) must also be taken into account. This is 
characterised by an inclusion typical of larger social networks where information 
is circulated. The latter types of bonds are often fostered at school or work – the 
two locations where, due to sharing similar activities, the majority of ties that are 
not kin are fostered (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001: 431). This tight 
fostering of ties was especially evident amongst students. As they revealed 
during interviews, university was a time of exciting change but also of insecurity 
that was better navigated with the help of friends. Interacting within the same 
institution such as university or the office creates opportunities for shared 
experiences and bonding, especially when these involve a rite of passage such 
as living away from the family home for the first time. The shared spaces of 
interaction, experience and life goals means that when in doubt, people look at 
others for direction. Take Biey, who admitted: 
 
Yes, we talk about a lot of things. We help each other out because we 
are all students and face the same problems. Most of us didn’t know 
how to apply for PTPTN129 or which bank to choose. And even 
creating a budget was something that we helped each other with. 
Being a student is expensive and if we know of cheap deals we will 
tell each other. I found out that Bank Rakyat sponsored a friend. They 
were talking about it and she helped me apply for a sponsorship too. I 
wouldn’t have known about it if my friend had not told me. 
The students sought advice from others who were like them and ‘in the 
same boat’, confirming that belonging to networks of similar people is 
efficient as people share similar resources required for similar life-goals 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Both social and structural homophily will be discusses here, although it must be pointed out 
that value and quality are derivative of social position themselves (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and 
Cook 2001: 419). 
129 PTPTN stands for Perbadanan Tabung Pendidikan Tinggi Nasional (National Higher 
Education Fund Corporation) 
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and these resources are especially valuable in complex environments (Lin 
2006; McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001). This was also observed 
of respondents who were in their mid-twenties to thirties and who 
associated with other professionals from their work place as well as 
others they met at meeting places such as the gym or prayer groups. As 
they were either earning a salary for the first time or were planning to start 
a family, issues such house financing, personal financing, and takaful as 
well as financial planning became a priority they all shared and therefore 
discussed and in relation to which they would look at others for signs of 
confidence. As to be expected, ethnicity was a uniting force for the 
virtuosi and pragmatists.  
 
These findings corresponded with the discoveries made by other researchers 
(Fischer 2008; Eriksen and Stjernfelt 2012). Even in urban Kuala Lumpur, most 
respondents, with the exceptions of the Sceptics, connected to ethnically 
homogeneous networks. Whilst it is expected in private spaces like the 
household, as inter-ethnic marriages are discouraged, some public spaces like 
neighbourhoods and pedagogical institutions are often informally or formally 
segregated, inhibiting spontaneous social intercourse with others outside their 
ethnic group. The public spaces where people can casually interact, such as 
shopping malls are not conducive to meaningful interaction only ‘civil inattention’ 
(Giddens 1990; Bauman 2001). 
 
When visiting respondents in their homes, I usually arrived an hour early to 
explore the area and I would often notice a concentration of Muslim-Malays. 
With the exceptions of the Sceptics, most of whom had foreign and non-Muslim 
partners, respondents confirmed that they lived in majority-Muslim areas that 
were specifically designated for them, according to the affirmative policy which 
prioritised swathes of land for Muslim-Malays. 
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The student respondents at the International Islamic University of Malaysia 
(IIUM) explained that even if they wanted to make friends with non-Muslim 
Malaysians it would be hard. 
 
Lufti: I only knew one person who was not Muslim studying here. All 
undergraduates here are Muslim. The Chinese go to UKM or non-
Muslim universities and the majority go to Unitah Rahman University, 
which is a private college. At home all my friends are Muslim too. I 
don’t really know why, I think that we should all be one nation 
Malaysia, but it is just the way it is. 
 
His classmate confirmed that this concentration not only prevented interaction 
with ‘outsiders’, but it also reinforced conformity amongst her peers. For some 
students, university was the first time that they heard of Islamic banking. It was 
here that they opened their first Islamic bank account too. 
 
Daynah: I am not a very pious Muslim. I never really did much, but 
when I started studying Islamic studies here, I started doing more 
Muslim obligations. I pray every day when they call us for prayer and 
this is an Islamic university. It makes us more pious. They constantly 
remind us of Islam and that it is our duty as Malays to follow Islam. 
 
7.3.2 The family 
 
The second type of social ties to be studied is the family. The family is an 
especially important source of social ties and association in many modern 
societies. The household is of special political and economic relevance in many 
societies, especially as most family ties are homophilous on most 
characteristics (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001: 431). Malaysia is no 
exception. The family, in this case the Muslim-Malay unit, takes on a unique 
significance with regards to Islamic banking and the respondents’ use of Islamic 
banking products. In our discussion about Islamic banking practices, it’s 
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salience increases due to overwhelming reliance of individuals on the family, 
compared to for instance the UK where young adults often move out at a young 
age. Second, the Malaysian family is also a site of political intervention by the 
Malaysian state (Stivens 2006; Fischer 2008). The Muslim-Malay family today is 
the most effective site wherein the lay consumer is called upon to act as a good 
Muslim and as a good Malay within the spheres of money, consumption and 
Islam. For this reason, family members are important sources of proxy signs of 
confidence. 
 
 
7.3.2.1 The family as a site of political intervention 
 
The family’s importance in shaping people’s practices was recognised by both 
the Malaysian state and its challengers, hence, the use of the family as a site of 
political contestation. For Fischer it is ‘the body through which Malaysians are 
subjected to the moral calls from the government’ (2008: 151). Due to the 
family’s prominence in the partisan political arena, the domestic sphere is highly 
politicised and is the site of disputes between state, its challengers and media 
that take place under the guise of ‘family values’ (Stivens 2006) and identity and 
nationalist consumption (Fischer 2008). 
 
Former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad often spoke about his views on the 
family’s role in Malaysian society in public. He argued that the family played an 
important role in economic growth, and considered the family as the main 
vehicle of deployment in the state’s development goals. For instance, in 2003, 
he said ‘Family is the basic social unit which prepares and supplies human 
capital resources for national development’. The family values agenda calls 
upon the Malay family to auto-discipline itself for its own good and 
consequently, the greater good of the country. It has been suggested that 
paradoxically, the contests between Islamisation projects (Othman 1998: 186) 
discussed in Chapter 4, produced an ‘ideological convergence’ (Stivens 2006) 
over the family as a conservative neo-liberal construct based on ‘Asian Values’, 
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the ‘Asian family’ and the Islamic family (Stivens 1998b). The irony was noted 
by other researchers who observed that that the convergence between two 
seemingly opposing narratives celebrates a call for the family to pursue the 
state’s developmental goals (Fischer 2008; Stivens 2006) of which Islamic 
banking is an integral part. 
 
This ‘neo-traditionalist’ construct was reflected in the opinions of most 
respondents who contrasted the Malaysian family with the problematic louche 
western model that promotes libertinage in the spiritual and economic spheres. 
The following quotes illustrate this point perfectly:  
 
Omar: ‘Our upbringing is different to yours. We are less free to make more 
decisions as our parents have more control over our lives’.  
 
Yasmin, who was interviewed jointly (and would, ironically, later be disowned 
by her family for marrying someone they disapproved of) with Omar, agreed: 
‘They have great input in our lives, from the bank account we open to what we 
study’.  
 
Omar continues: ‘But I think that it’s also mutual. They want to guide us and we 
want them to guide us and we also think that we have more respect for their 
opinions than in the West. Not all Malays are like this but I would say that the 
majority are. Why do I think that this? Some is the influence of religion and 
some are Asian values’. 
 
Interpreting the economic crisis and the London riots that had taken place the 
previous summer as the result of excessive consumption with no ethical brakes, 
Yasmin adds:  
 
The West is very materialist and not interested in religion. The 
economic crisis was the result of too much greed. Everyone wants 
nice houses and credit cards to buy expensive goods that are for 
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desire and not need. The protests in London were also about wanting 
more. They riot and steal expensive things. There is something wrong 
in a system that promotes this materialism. 
 
It is therefore not surprising that families are a foundational formative source of 
banking practices. They provide a shared and intimate space of consumption 
and communication about matters of consumption. Consider the following 
extracts from my field notes. They are replies by members of the three ideal 
types outlined in Chapter 5 to my question regarding the influence of their family 
on their use of plastic money:  
 
Yasmin, a Pragmatist says:  
 
My parents and I always discuss how finances are to be managed. 
They taught me the difference between necessary needs and desires. 
For example, both of my parents told me that they couldn’t afford 
credit cards. We use credit cards as a safety device. We don’t carry 
cash but we use them as debit cards and we also get points for using 
them. We never spend more than what we have in our account.  
 
Omar, another Pragmatist confides:  
 
My parents use it for household goods and whenever we go 
shopping. We each have several credit cards. Credit cards are 
especially useful when you need to buy very expensive things. The 
family has a formative role in shaping particular dispositions towards 
value and trust in specific consumer goods and services. More 
specifically, it is related the family’s link to wider dynamics of 
Malaysian politics.  
 
Abdul, a 28-year-old virtuoso who has a 6-year-old son and 4-year-old 
daughter, explains that the views of the family, particularly the male heads of 
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the family, carry a lot of weight when it comes to important decisions. 
Participation in the economic life of the children, like other aspects of social life 
is viewed as normal and necessary. He speaks from the point of view of a 
parent and the head of the family: 
 
My children are still young but I make sure to expose them to the 
Islamic way of living. We do have discussions at home and I already 
explain our choices to them. Even when they are older, I will insist 
that we must all use Islamic banking. Awareness is key to living the 
Islamic life. 
 
Another Virtuoso, Zaharia is a parent. She confirms that she encouraged her 
children to take Islamic banking. Ideally, she would loan them the money herself 
as she belives that to be the most Islamic way to bank. Unfortunately that is not 
an option. She explains: ‘We do discuss their finances and Islamic banking. For 
me Islamic banking allows them to take loans on a clean conscience – without 
getting involved in riba’. 
 
As the above quotes demonstrate, family members are a first point of reference 
and confidence for the respondents. For many Malaysians the household is still 
the space where uncertainty over sensitive issues like money are dealt with, or 
mediated through interaction with other family members. The belief that 
important concerns should be kept within the family is indicative of its standing 
as an important resource by all Malaysian ethnic groups (Kit S Ng 1998: 42). 
Researchers who have studied the Malaysian family believe that in both its 
nuclear and extended forms, it has ‘continuing force’ through powerful ‘imagined 
and concrete networks’ that operate powerfully across internal geographical 
distances in the country and beyond (Stivens 1996; 2006). In fact, many 
respondents emphasised on several occasions that the wellbeing of the family, 
financial and spiritual, was one of their main priorities and that the wellbeing of 
the family as a collectivity and of the individual also rested on the other family 
members. 
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Family ties provide the social and cultural capital upon which everyday 
economic knowledge, ethos and taste are based. Lai’s (2001) survey of 
Taiwanese consumers shows that social ties function as sources of trust that 
inform economic behaviour. Family and friends and honored acquaintances with 
whom respondents enjoy strong ties are highly valued for their advice (or 
merely their example) in as much as they are one’s social capital, and therefore 
a source of value.  
 
 
7.4. Trust, knowledge and Islamic banking  
 
This section provides a broad overview of the social interaction of the three 
ideal types surrounding Islamic banking for both friends and family. Later 
sections will focus on social interactions in contexts that emerged as unique to 
each social form: the financial crisis and the family and, the rite of passage and 
peers. A rite of passages is defined an event or an experience that marks the 
person’s transition from one social stage to another. According to the 
respondents, these experiences were strongly marked by interaction with peer. 
The ones discussed here are: living away from home for the first time, buying 
the first property and starting a family. 
 
Family and friends were frequently mentioned as an influence over the 
respondents’ choice to use Islamic over conventional and also their choice of 
one Islamic bank over another. Discussions with friends, family, educators at 
school and university featured heavily in interviews with respondents. For the 
Pragmatists and Virtuosi, social ties bestowed respondents with the necessary 
resources to react to the symbolic cues offered by Islamic banking. Conversely, 
whilst the Sceptics recognised the symbolic cues they reacted to the 
instrumental-financial and not symbolic value. Thus they ignored or rejected the 
Islamic-moral call. Respondents pointed out that social interaction exposed 
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them to Islamic banks and equipped them with the necessary ability of using 
Islamic banking but bypassing time consuming reflections.  
 
The interviews revealed how respondents trust friends and family to have their 
interest at heart, showing that personalised trust rested on faith in intentions of 
others. Crucially, it is not just their economic interests that friends and family 
have at heart but also their spiritual well-being, mirroring Bourdieu’s argument 
that for ordinary people, economic choices are inextricable from the moral and 
ethical universe. Not all confidence was directly communicated. Often it was 
subtle and took place through the parents setting ‘the standard’ which the 
children would later continue following. Some of the families transmitted their 
preference for Islamic banking through ‘modelling’ (Neely 2005) the ideal 
practices, which they then reinforced with overt communication, problematising 
both conventional banking and consumption and offering Islamic banking as a 
solution. A number of the respondents mentioned that they were made aware 
by their parents, from a young age, that zakat130 was being paid on their behalf. 
The ‘modelling actions’ were followed up with ‘reinforcement’ (Neely 2005), or 
discussions about the tenets of Islam and how they coincided with Islamic 
banking and the opening of Islamic bank accounts. Often, their parents had 
opened the first bank accounts of the younger Pragmatists and Virtuosi. A 
number of the respondents echoed Ayman’s experience:  
 
‘My first account was a CIMB Islamic account, but I didn’t open it.  
My parents opened it and gave me the money. They wanted to  
guide me from a young age’.  
 
Members of all ideal types expressed how family and friends are sympathetic to 
their lack of knowledge on financial matters and wanted to act as stand-ins and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 The act of zakat is similar to almsgiving. Its literal meaning is purification and it denotes a 
Muslim’s duty to donate a portion of one’s wealth as a means of purification of both wealth and 
soul. In contemporary times, it is viewed by many as a type of social taxation and evidence that 
Islam offers a complete blueprint for an economic system (See Kuran 2004; Tripp 20082006 for 
further detail).  
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guides on their behalf. The friends and family members either worked in finance 
and were thus authorities on the subject or had decades of experience and 
could ‘guide them on the right path’. It is important to point out that although 
some of these associates would be defined as experts (read more about the 
definition in Chapter 2), in this case the bond is underpinned by personalised 
and emotional trust. The authority of these experts makes them attractive, but 
ultimately, they are trusted due to their strong social connections based on 
frequent face-to-face encounters. The respondents believe that the 
interpersonal connection places a duty on friends to share honest advice unlike 
that provided by banks or advertising. As one respondent pointed out: ‘Family is 
only interested in your happiness. Family does not want to make money from 
you … just make sure that you are doing the right thing’. 
 
Besides receiving social cues and knowledge about taste and distinctions that 
are symbolic of Muslim-Malay identity, social ties have another functional value. 
They increase the efficiency of choice by providing the respondent with a direct 
shortcut to broader and faster decisions. Having proxies collecting, organising 
and distilling information on your behalf means that less time, resources and 
effort are required to make a certain choice. 
 
In order to gain deeper insights into the dynamics described above we shall 
now turn to Karima, a Virtuoso. She explains that her choice of banking was 
determined by the authoritative advice and example of her father. She used his 
confidence in Islamic banking as her proxy. Clearly, she regards this social tie 
as a valuable source of advice, the value of which was not less than the value 
of professional expert advice. Karima explains that her father’s knowledge of 
Islamic banking gave her insights into the structuring of the products. Being an 
Islamic banker and an expert in the field he was also able to point her to the 
most renowned and active shariah scholars in Islamic banking. As a Malay who 
declares that Islam is a core aspect of her identity, she was pleased that her 
father was a gateway to gaining an understanding of the taste that a middle 
class Malay female like her should follow. She subtly expressed scorn towards 
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peers who do not explicitly demonstrate their distinct Islamic taste in finance but 
instead choose to continue with conventional banking. In Karima’s own words:  
 
My father’s knowledge helped me make the right and informed 
choices. If I was a normal member of the public I wouldn’t know all 
these details. For example, when I want to buy anything that requires 
financing, I will make sure that I will only subscribe to Islamic 
financing. So I will immediately ask: ‘please refer me to the person 
who can subscribe me to Islamic financing’. Others who have not 
been exposed to this knowledge forget that they’re Muslim when it 
comes to real life. Some of my friends will just follow the financing that 
the dealer points them to because they will want to buy this car or this 
house. It is not in our culture to be demanding, but my knowledge 
gives me the confidence that I am making the right choice. 
 
Karima trusted her father to make the best recommendations for both her 
spiritual and economic choices. Thanks to her father, she bypassed the grueling 
work: collecting information and then analyzing the sometimes-conflicting 
information and weighing the various choices. She arrived straight at the end 
result. From her vantage point, her trust enabled her to opt for the best choice in 
two respects. First, she was introduced to the world of Islamic banking, the 
intricacies of the products and the moral narrative surrounding the sector. 
Second, Karima was also given an advantage by being privy to information 
regarding the hierarchy of scholars:  
 
My father is an Islamic banker and he knows who the best shariah 
scholars for banking are. In the beginning when I didn’t have a clue 
about any of the products and how they were structured and, what is 
permissible and what is not.  
 
Other respondents also spoke about scheduled family discussions to discuss 
the optimal financial practices and how their parents accompanied them to the 
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bank to open their accounts, which is how I met some of the younger 
respondents. These instances show the impact of ‘direct consumer learning’ 
(Neely 2005) on people’s banking choices. The queries of Pragmatists focused 
on the difference in price and moral value between conventional and Islamic 
products. Like the Sceptics, they often used the term interest to describe the 
price of the product. Unlike the Virtuosi, they were also very frank about their 
concern with the financial outcomes of their choice, i.e. price. Whilst already 
having an obvious preference for Islamic banking, this choice was not a 
foregone conclusion and they were swayed towards this option when they learnt 
that the difference would not be overwhelming or in some cases, Islamic was 
even cheaper. According to Nour:  
 
My family approve of Islamic banking because it makes financial 
sense and because they uphold Islamic values. As they say in 
English, it is a win-win situation. My friends confirmed this, most of 
who work with banks. Because of our age we always have a 
discussion about house finance and personal loans. I’m not from the 
banking sector, but I like to listen. They give me advice about how to 
go about things. So for example when I wanted home financing, a 
very, very good friend, who is a manager of one of Bank Salaam 
branches, suggested that I take the Islamic financial loan as it is 
cheaper than the conventional. He wrote a short list of banks that I 
should look at and in the end I chose RHB. The flat rate for every 
bank is 6.2% but if you take it with an Islamic, the interest can be 
deducted up to 2.4%. He told me that it depends on the size of my 
loan. My house cost RM 180,000 because it is a low cost house (of 
less than 200,000), so I got the deduction and the final interest that I 
will pay to the end of tenure will be up to 4.2 or 4.4% only. 
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Similarly, Abdi says:  
 
My father was the one who brought up the topic. He asked me, do 
you take the conventional or the Islamic loan? He was concerned 
about the loan and interest, because he doesn’t want us to pay more 
than we have to pay and he was also concerned that riba was not 
good for us as Muslims. We had to avoid it, within reason. He 
explained that not only is riba against Islam but that we would also 
suffer financially with conventional. For example if we pay 250,000RM 
for the house, with the conventional would be double. That was one of 
his concerns mostly. Maybe 20 years ago we didn’t have Islamic 
banks. My uncles paid for up to 250,000 for their house, much much 
more than the original price, because of very high interest. I say that 
Islamic banking brings a new wave of loans and idea of banking. It is 
very good. 
 
The attention of the Pragmatist was geared towards signs of confidence in a 
balanced or what in their own words they describe as  ‘a modern and moderate’ 
option for Muslim-Malays. Unlike the Virtuoso, the emphasis is not solely the 
moral purity and intransigence of halal boundaries, nor just on the financial 
outcome, like the Sceptic. The aim was to include a balanced amount of both. 
Yet, as I explained in the last chapter, their routinisation of halal practices meant 
that the choice of Islamic was already taken for granted. Thus the confidence 
sought was about the individual banks and the products. 
 
For another Virtuoso, trust in family was impetus for change, contradicting 
theories that trust tends to maintain the status quo (Mistzal 2006). Family 
members who through Islamic revivalism discovered this total way of life felt 
that it was their duty to inform others and share the religious capital that they 
had discovered. From a spiritual perspective they perceived themselves as 
belonging to a higher status and living in a more complete state of purity. As a 
result, they switch to a completely halal way of life.  This signalled confidence to 
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other family members to do the same. The signs of confidence about halal 
eventually expanded to include banking practices too. 
Karima says: 
 
We discuss our finances very often. When it is something related to 
money, we will make sure that it adheres to Islamic principles. For 
example, I didn’t take car financing because my father could pay it in 
cash. Then I paid him on an instalment basis, without any additional 
interest and only because I had a salary and could afford to pay him 
back. This is one-to-one borrowing, the most ideal type according to 
Islam. It doesn’t strictly relate to Islam banking but you can see that in 
our family affairs, we are still shariah compliant. 
 
Sceptics were the exception to the rule. In the same way that the Virtuosi and 
Pragmatists distinctively integrated their life as part of an integral Muslim-Malay 
whole, the Sceptic was also integralist in his rejection. Having rejected the 
state’s shariah regulation, he also broke the trust with his family in all matters 
related to Islamic value. In particular, the Sceptic either did not prescribe to his 
family’s idea of the special value of Islamic banking or followed their negative 
signals. 
 
Seif’s family live in the rural part of Malaysia. As such, they share very little in 
terms of moral or ethical values. According to him, their bonds are based on 
emotionally charged memories of his very pleasant childhood. Being gay, a fact 
all of the family is aware of but no one ever discusses, any communication 
about morality or ethics according to the Islamic way of life are avoided. They 
are aware that Seif rejects and mistrusts any moral calls made on behalf of the 
shariah. Other Sceptics rejected the Islamic value of Islamic banking because 
they accepted the negative signals of confidence in Islamic banking. Marwan’s 
cosmopolitan family is Muslim and proudly so. Yet, they express hostility to the 
idea that the state should intervene in such ‘private matters’. Marwan explained:  
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Although we follow basic Islamic moral codes, my family tries to avoid 
halal. We see it as an invasion of our space and a political attempt to 
politicise religion. Obviously, food is difficult to avoid here. We’re not 
going to go out of our way to obtain non-halal food. But with all things 
being equal, we would usually go for the non-halal. They were a bit 
shocked that I decided to get an Islamic mortgage. They consider it 
fundamentalist. When I explained that it made financial sense, they 
came round to the idea. 
 
 
7.5. Family and the financial crisis 
 
Households are subject to an increasing proximity to financial markets 
(Carruthers and Chul-Kim 2011: 246). An increasing number of families own 
financial assets such as stocks and pensions. In addition, many Malaysians 
supplement their income through consumption of banking products, making 
them vulnerable to credit market conditions. This vulnerability is perhaps linked 
to reports that some 60 Malaysians are declaring bankruptcy every day. As 
mentioned earlier, household debt has outpaced the GDP growth (see Chapter 
1). It stands at RM 4.76 billion ($1.35 billion) and RM 1.31 billion ($37 billion) as 
of second quarter of 2013 for conventional loan and Islamic financing 
respectively (INCEIF 2014). The proximity to financial markets means that the 
family is increasingly vulnerable when there is a crisis. The crisis was unusual in 
that polar opposite confidence signs, both positive and negative, were operating 
simultaneously. As trust in conventional banking collapsed, people starting 
looking elsewhere. As we shall go on to read, for the Virtuosi, as a result of the 
financial crisis, it was the family that first problematised the use of conventional 
banking. 
 
The household is a primary space of interaction for the family. As a result, it is 
not only routine happenings that they experience together, but when on 
occasion they happen, extraordinary circumstances too. For many, the 1997-
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1998 financial crisis was such an extraordinary and unfortunate happening. It 
set the stage for a break in confidence in conventional banking and for 
increased trust and later confidence in Islamic banking. The family 
problematised conventional banking practices and thus signaled negative 
confidence towards conventional banking and later positive towards the Islamic. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, when trust and confidence in conventional banking 
decreased, people turned to Islamic banking. The South East Asian crisis was a 
traumatic event for many families, including those of the respondents. The 
effect was felt by the adults, those old enough to lose their assets or funds or to 
be directly hit by the soaring interest rates. Many respondents mentioned the 
crisis as the causal factor that broke their trust in conventional banking and thus 
problematised the values (or lack thereof) the banking practices that they had 
engaged in so far. Often the proxy signals were not transmitted instantly, but 
later through anecdotes and the collective family memory.  
 
Anisah’s father lost his job and as a result had to downgrade their ‘middle class’ 
lifestyle, including their house, car and leisure options. Anisah reveals that it 
was her mother who recently shared the traumatic experience of the financial 
crisis. Her mother’s memory served as a negative signal towards the 
conventional:  
 
Most of my financial education comes from my parents and we often 
discuss these topics. It helps that my dad’s a banker and mum’s an 
accountant. During the crisis I was in secondary school and of course 
all my siblings were still in school. My mum was not working, so for 
Dad to support all of us during the financial crisis was so tough. The 
interest rate increased so much and he needed to pay higher and 
higher installments for the house. So what could he do? He sold the 
car and then he paid some portion of the housing financing principal. 
 
Anisah said that after the financial crisis, the family was determined to avoid 
riba and the Western financial system. They viewed it as morally bankrupt and 
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skewed in favour of the banks and the West. Anxiety concerning financial 
institutions is not uncommon in post-crisis societies when the trust and social 
capital required for people to get involved in more financial activities than are 
strictly necessary are low. People who have experienced extreme forms of 
economic hardship during an economic crisis show high levels of mistrust in 
financial intermediation (Stix 2011). If as is assumed in this thesis, that money is 
conceived as a ‘promise’ – a social relation between creditors and debtors that 
requires the ‘community’ to step in with guarantees to the banking sector (Pixley 
2010: 38), then people’s reluctance to use conventional banks and their switch 
to Islamic banking is illustrative of their trust and confidence that this promise 
was better guaranteed by using this sector. 
 
Mazran’s family was badly hit during the crisis. They also switched to Islamic 
banking, but he still speaks about the experience with great bitterness:  
 
I was 16 during the financial crisis and it affected my parents badly. 
Inshallah we didn’t lose everything but they had to let go of several 
assets. Fortunately not the main house because they had a lot of 
assets, but they had to let go of a lot of land and houses that my 
parents had worked hard to acquire over the years. We also had to 
change our car and our lifestyle.  
 
What these exchanges show is that, for the respondents, the crisis left a deep-
rooted mark on their worldview and conditioned their banking practices. The 
dread and anxiety transmitted by their parents not only changed their choice of 
banking sector it also influenced approach to borrowing and spending and 
specifically debt. Both concluded that following this formative experience, 
Islamic banking was the inevitable choice for them. Mazran sighs as he 
confides that he believes that the 1997-1998 crisis was not the last one:  
 
Growing up during the 1997-1998 financial crisis, I think that I learnt 
from it. I learnt that most borrowing takes place over a long span, 30 
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years or so and the unpredictability of the future must be taken into 
account. I decided to go Islamic because it is safer in the long term. 
We have this law that says that banks can only penalise certain 
amounts of the default and how they treat the default is different from 
the conventional. The crisis also taught me a valuable lesson in faith. 
I was never taught about riba in an everyday perspective and the 
teaching mainly focused on basic everyday things. Riba is taught in 
an abstract way, disconnected from everyday life and it did not occur 
to me that, if you’re not careful, riba happens constantly in your life. 
Experiencing the worst effect of riba in real life makes you wonder 
what effect it will have in the afterlife.  
 
 
7.6. Peers and rites of passage 
 
Peers are another trusted source of confidence for respondents. For many 
respondents, peers were useful for navigating similar life circumstances that 
were new and relatively more complex than the situations that they were used 
to. As they move out of their family home and begin their adult life, peer 
relations take on a stronger role in their life. During moments of greater 
uncertainty than usual, peers reduced anxiety of choice. Daynah said that: 
   
‘life as a student is not so easy, so you discuss finance often  
with friends to learn from them. We realise that we know  
different things and that we can help each other by sharing our 
knowledge and information’.  
 
Lufti, a Pragmatist admitted that he knew nothing about banking or managing 
his finances before coming to university. Coming from a relatively privileged 
background, he never had to make any choices. His parents did everything for 
him, when he was not at boarding school. At university he had unprecedented 
and unfettered freedom but it was sometimes cumbersome. He had to dedicate 
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time to making choices that he never had to confront before. His friendship with 
university friends was useful in this respect. When for instance he had to 
choose a bank or a type of loan, he observed the choices of the others who 
more worldly than him. 
 
Daynah and Lufti, friends and classmates at the Islamic University, agreed that 
the choices were not obvious and they were often uncertain and confused. 
Daynah, whose mother was a street vendor selling noodles, captures the 
dilemma faced by most of the Pragmatists: 
 
In practical terms we would always pick the one with the best profits, 
so if the conventional bank offers more profit or much lower rates, my 
first reaction would be to pick that. But I also recognise that if I want 
my life to be blessed, I have to choose Islamic. There is no doubt 
about whether you are doing the right thing or not then. No questions 
about whether we are fulfilling the commandments of Allah.  
 
Fatima, another Pragmatist explains:  
 
Many of my friends often ask me for advice. They want to know which 
Islamic bank they should take financing from and so on. We share 
information because it is a common conversation at our age. At this 
moment all of us are making large purchases. At our age we are 
buying cars and homes. 
 
This is particularly salient because these special purchases occur during 
landmarks, or moments that are turning points in their lives. Respondents who 
are uncertain about finance or Islam or both can mobilise by proxy the 
resources of their social ties. It allows them to escape the routine and less 
attractive tasks, such as information gathering, required when making a choice 
in consumption. Besides being anxiety inducing, banking can be ‘dry and boring 
for many people’ (Pixley 2010: 39). Respondents expressed boredom at the 
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idea of analysing the banking options and were happy to bypass this process by 
speaking to friends they trusted would have their best intentions at heart and 
who had acquired more knowledge and experience than themselves.  
 
Balkis, another Pragmatist, was introduced to home financing by a friend who is 
a manager of HalalBank in Kuala Lumpur. He was the one who suggested that 
she take the loan, telling her that if she used Islamic financing instead of a 
regular mortgage, it would be cheaper. She explains: 
 
Because of my friend I got a good deal. I did not have to do any 
research. Hmphhh, it is tiring and boring you know? This very, very 
good friend is a manager of a bank so he knew all the rates and 
policies. He suggested a few banks and people and I took a loan with 
RHB bank. He suggested that I do not take the financing with his 
bank because it was not competitive compared to the others. 
 
In other less frequent instances, the respondents were the ones to influence 
their friends. Sarah, a Virtuoso, was one such case. Having discovered Islamic 
banking, she was dismayed that her friends were ignoring their moral duty as 
Muslims. Clearly emotional about this issue, she explains how she soon set 
them on the right path: 
 
I didn’t think about opening an Islamic bank account because I wasn’t 
exposed to it. It was not until that I came to university that this matter 
was brought to me … we did know that Islamic banking existed, but 
we weren’t properly exposed to the matter. Before my friends were 
using the conventional bank but when I made them aware they 
switched. We all just have Islamic now.  
 
The social ties of the Virtuoso communicate idealistic and moral confidence 
about Islamic banking. The focus is less on the financial outcome, and more 
about being a good Muslim. The respondents feel that these collective 
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resources belong to the Ummah and can also teach them the proper way of 
behaving as a good Malay citizen who adheres to Islamic teaching.  
 
Sarah, continues:  
 
Yes you have to take society into your consideration – in Islam [it] is 
not just about yourself. We can also help each other by sharing our 
knowledge with each other. As we are starting to have children, I 
have three, living a Muslim life is important. We need to help each 
other learning what this means.  
 
Mazran explained how his friend’s cousin is a CEO of an Islamic bank.  
 
We had the opportunity to meet with this CEO and he explained that 
getting out of riba and then going back to it is wrong. He was given 
the opportunity to move to Islamic banking and now he can never 
move back. It’s the same for us.  
 
 
7.6.1 University 
 
University was a formative experience for many Virtuosi. It was the first instance 
in which they immersed themselves in a ‘total’ manner within an Islamic 
environment. Some of them lived together in dorms. Others lived at home but 
spent most of the day with their peers: learning, hanging out and eating 
together. All these activities were either Islamically inclined or included Islamic 
rituals. Praying was a frequent activity throughout the day and even eating was 
based on a presupposition of Islamic regulation.  
 
The focus of the university was an Islamic pedagogy according to Malay values. 
They monitored the students who in turn were expected to self-discipline 
themselves and others. The following quotes will illustrate how these Virtuosi 
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students, often uninformed and unequipped to manage their finances, sought 
the counsel of others in their social network. Many of them join a student society 
that were led by older and ‘better-informed students’ who had the authority to 
lead. Some of these societies take it upon themselves to aid their novice 
students to live Islamically. They lead discussions on a variety of everyday 
subjects, mainly finances, but also relationships and ‘other personal things’ and 
they also invite the representatives of Islamic banks to hold seminars where 
they dispense information and brochures during a free lunch. 
 
Discussing how university uses a formative social space in terms of Islamic 
banking, Daynah responds:  
 
I would say from university, because I learnt Islamic Finance. 
Normally during sermon the focus is more general: how to serve your 
God, how to pray and how to fast. Normally you would get that 
information through formal education … I mean university. For 
example one day we were discussing charity in Islam and discussing 
waqfs (Islamic trusts). 
 
University was where many respondents were socialised into Islamic banking. 
This introduction was quite decisive for lower middle or working class 
respondents. For many of these respondents, coming from poorer and often 
rural areas, lectures, casual chats and meetings organised by student 
associations were spaces through which they could be socialised into the ways 
of Islamic banking. Take, for instance, the next quote from Aminah:  
 
When I entered university they brought up the issue of Islamic 
banking when I opened the bank account. This was first mentioned 
during the class Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human 
Science131 and later from the student leader of the university society 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 See: www.iium.edu.my/irkhs 
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we had just joined. During the society meetings we mainly discuss 
economics and other issues of everyday that come up. They alert us 
to things that students will encounter in everyday life. The main point 
we know is that interest is forbidden. We always discuss the PTPTN. 
It is the most important issue. Most students are taking this loan and 
they want to know their rights. We discuss whether PTPTN according 
to Islamic values and whether it is Islamic to pay it back. 
 
The PTPTN was one of the priority issues for many students. It was their first 
encounter with institutional, complex debt. As a result of the financialisation of 
tertiary education, bar house financing, for many students education ‘financing’ 
was one of the most consequential choices they would ever have to make. They 
were concerned about the financial and moral repercussions of this student 
loan. Many students and student associations discussed the outcome of this 
loan. Many Pragmatists were outraged at the high interest being charged and 
others, mainly Virtuosi were upset that interest was even being charged in the 
first place. For this reason, a number of respondents attended protests against 
the PTPTN. 
 
Arya, another Virtuoso, says that they are not only encouraged to use Islamic 
banking, but strongly discouraged to use any conventional products. Sometimes 
they discuss credit cards with friends and also their financial future: how they 
will be able to earn money to buy things that they want and the virtuous way to 
do so. They spend hours reading about new phones and laptops, the problems 
that users are facing and also their features. They love clothes and gadgets and 
spend most of their money on these things. During one of their many 
discussions, they could not figure out whether using both systems was 
permissible. They reasoned that since the Malaysian government offered both, 
then maybe it was ok. They asked their fiqh mu‘amalat lecturer, who set them 
straight and told them combining the two is unIslamic: ‘Madam Amnah told us 
not to take any credit cards or products from conventional banks. She said that 
we will end up buried in debt and also pay riba on top of that. All the students 
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need to study the fiqh and we study all of them, but we know that as Malays we 
must follow Shafi’. 
 
Sceptics accessed information through family and friends, debated the Islamic 
value but rejected it. They were interested in the financial returns. Jalil says:  
 
I agree that most of us are like him. So far I have one account with 
Junebank. Then I also have another with HalalBank. I don’t care 
about the Islamic bit. I only opened it because I opened ASAP 
because the profits are excellent. They give me very high dividends. I 
discussed with my friend and she also agreed that the dividends 
would be great and allow us to pay our PTPTN rates.   
 
Marwan, who is agnostic towards Islamic banking, yet a believer of Islam who 
‘never lost touch with religious teaching’, is vehemently against the principles of 
Islamic banking. He starts off by saying: ‘I have nothing against it. I use it, but it 
is based purely on a cost-benefit analysis. I wouldn’t pay more unless I could 
see any additional benefits’. 
 
Yet his views would be highly controversial amongst the other ideal types: 
‘Some are very strict about it and get offended and they insist that it is different, 
this is halal and it is shariah compliant and this is what you as a Muslim want’. 
Explaining his attempts at trying to discuss Islamic banking with his peers, 
Marwan sighs and says: 
 
They try and tell you, no it’s different because when you buy a car 
with the conventional bank you’ll have to pay interest and that is 
haram. We can make it halal because we will buy the car and charge 
you a higher price and sell it you. It’s true that it’s the same price, but 
it is a selling transaction not an interest-based transaction which is 
haram and sales is halal. I say, guys, are you trying to cheat me or 
are you trying to cheat God? I still have to pay the same thing. I can 
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buy the car from the same market and it’s cheaper – you are charging 
me more! Why do I have to pay you more? Because this is interest 
but they don’t call it interest. It won’t convince me.   
 
 
7.7 Social dysfunction: confidence, risk and dirt 
 
We have so far discussed how strong social ties are functional in 
communicating confidence and enabling the growth of Islamic banking 
practices. By creating order through the bridging of gaps in knowledge and the 
mitigation of uncertainty, confidence enables the coordination of economic 
action. However there are caveats: as mentioned earlier, thick ties can be 
dysfunctional. Strong ties are Janus-faced.  
 
Whilst they are highly functional in proliferating Islamic banking practices, they 
can also prove dysfunctional within broader societal dynamics. In the last 
chapter we already introduced the dysfunctional effect of symbolic boundaries 
of shariah regulation by explaining how it creates symbolic affinities between 
dirt and nonMuslims (generally nonMalays) who fall outside the boundary of 
halal. Muslims who follow rituals of the shariah by only partaking in what is 
permissible are pure. Conversely, for the pragmatist and virtuso, others who fall 
outside are impure and belong with what is dirty. Here we continue the 
discussion by highlighting how thick ties acerbate this dysfunction caused by 
boundaries. 
 
Thick ties have been denigrated for promoting ‘sameness’ through the 
dissemination of ‘provincial views and ideas of close friends’ (Granovetter 
1983: 202) to the detriment of society. Granovetter warns that strong ties can 
lead to dysfunction: wider social systems can become fragmented. Although he 
makes the case for the reduction of obstacles for those seeking to join the 
labour market, his cautions about the dangers of subgroups separated by 
acrimonious cleavages such as race and ethnicity, resonate in the Malaysian 
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case. Therefore the suspicion and distrust in other people whose social life is 
located outside these boundaries becomes manifest in the restriction of social 
interaction of Muslim-Malays. These symbolic boundaries become material – 
encouraging the fragmentation of Malaysian society through the social 
disassociation of communities from each other. As we shall go on to discover, 
these symbolic practices encourage Muslim-Malays to restrict interaction with to 
others like themselves.  
 
The testimony of respondents in the previous chapter revealed that strong 
bonding within the Muslim-Malay community and trust in shariah regulation 
comes at a price. As Turner (2008) noted, there is a price to pay for purity. 
Some respondents, mostly Virtuosi and a number of Pragmatists express 
distrust towards other communities who do not believe or commit to a halal 
lifestyle regulated by the shariah. Evidence collected for this chapter also 
supports the view that strong ties reaffirm ‘common sense’ found within the 
community and shield people from other perspectives. The Sceptics, who are 
situated on the other side of the spectrum, supported this view. It is not 
surprising that the social ties of Sceptics who showed the highest degree of 
reflexivity are characterised by the highest degree of diversity and often reject 
the state-sanctioned norms regarding Islam and more specifically the halal 
lifestyle.  
 
Examining the positive aspects of trust is conventional and common. Less 
obvious, is the recognition that trust isn’t always functional (Dodd 1994: 139; 
Mistzal 1996). In this section, I suggest that the flipside of shariah socialisation 
is the emergence of risk associated to ‘others’ who are not regulated by its 
rules. The cohesion fostered by trust and confidence in ‘shariahisation’ within 
the Muslim-Malay community acerbates suspicion of other ethnic groups. The 
perception that non-Muslims are unclean and tainted by ‘social pollution: dirt’ 
(Hacking 2003) is the price of shariah regulation that defines Muslim-Malays 
versus non-Muslim others: Chinese and Indians. This social friction is the price 
of religious excellence. Since the paradox of piety is that it cannot be flaunted, it 
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is best measured against those who lack it. Thus, those interested in gauging 
their piety attempt to contrast and minimise contact with those who lack it 
(Turner 2008). This friction is reflected in the response of a Virtuoso, who uses 
an analogy to explain how the dirt of others can taint Muslims and how it is best 
avoided:  
 
I think that the Chinese do things differently to the Malays. They have 
more money and are only interested in profit. They will choose to 
invest their money in the banks with the best profits and not ones 
according to good values. They do not care if the money comes from 
haram activities. We do not solely pick a bank on profit motive. Our 
money must be free from the sins of riba and we need to purify 
ourselves by not taking it. 
 
The trust that acts as ‘glue’ between the individuals in the community and the 
state is, so far as shariah regulation is concerned, synonymous with a pure and 
clean lifestyle inherent in the Muslim-Malay way-of-being, and gives rise to the 
corollary reaction of treating others outside the community as dirty. The 
dynamics of this dysfunction are lodged around the fraught contours of 
boundaries. It is through boundaries that risks are mitigated and identified 
(Hacking 2003: 35). Moreover, the corollary to this perception is that the risk of 
overstepping the boundaries raises the risk of contamination, which smears the 
very core of Muslim-Malay being. In practical terms this is translated into 
Pragmatists and Virtuosi avoiding goods and services produced by non-
Muslims. Mazran, a Virtuoso, told me: 
 
‘You’ll be surprised that some people, if they find out that the  
chicken came from a Chinese store, even if it’s halal, they will refuse to 
eat it’. 
 
The construction of symbolic borders or boundaries is a mechanism through 
which a society defines and maintains its identity and keeps purity within and 
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symbolic pollution outside (Douglas 1996). These ideas of pollution serve to 
protect the social system from boundary transgression and are thus inseparable 
from issues of control and power relations. Although Douglas (1986) associates 
the attempt to keep transgressor out with minority groups who are anxious 
about their relatively weak status within a larger society, the boundary pollution 
nexus applies to Malays who see themselves as rectifying their ‘underdog’ 
status that they held throughout the colonial period and to redress the socio-
economic inequalities that emerged as a consequence. Respondents pointed 
out that although Chinese resent Malays for the state’s affirmative action, 
‘Malays became angry at the injustice of having the Chinese becoming more 
prosperous. It was always our country and it was unfair that we are not enjoying 
any of the privileges’.  
 
Although what matters most are our choices and values, it is best to 
avoid situations in which you can become tainted. For example, if you 
are at the supermarket and someone buys wine and then the cashier 
has change left over from that purchase, in terms of choice – you 
have no control over it because you would not know that the source of 
the money was haram. However, if it can be avoided by going to a 
completely halal supermarket where customers will be mainly Muslim 
is always the best. 
 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to demonstrate that family and peers constitute an 
important part of Islamic banking practices. Islamic banking cannot be 
unravelled from everyday social life with family and peers and signs of 
confidence communicated by trusted family members and peers play an 
important role in shaping Islamic banking practices. Contrary to perspectives 
that view economic action as hostile to social life, the experience of the 
respondents suggests that their social surroundings constitute and facilitate 
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Islamic banking practices. Whilst generalised trust underpins the Islamic 
banking system, confidence (in Islamic banking) is sustained through the 
personalised trust that characterises social interaction within close family and 
friends.  
 
Despite the intensification of individuality and fluidity of modern society, the 
consumption of credit is embedded in the social ties of the consumer. Rather 
than total displacement of family and peers, there is evidence of a recalibration 
of the social space to include the influence of abstract systems and expertise as 
well as kin and peer, on consumer choice. Traditional social ties and modern 
institutions coexist in a fragile dependency. People’s reliance on shariah 
regulation and expertise is bolstered by confidence in the sector that is signalled 
by family and friends. More specifically, peer and family were useful ‘proxies of 
confidence’ (Swedberg 2010) in Islamic banking. Thus by signalling confidence 
in the sector, family and peer are unwitting ‘allies’ or ‘stand-ins’ (Swedberg 
2010) of the state and bank. The family in particular is valued by respondents 
and the state as a site of consumption of credit and halal commodities and an 
important vehicle of confidence transmission. The functionality of strong social 
ties and confidence manifests itself in the following ways: 
 
1. It reduces existential anxiety by indicating the socially acceptable choice 
for their particular social form or group; 
2. It mediates uncertainty of choice related to financial risk; 
3. It provides a shortcut through information gathering and knowledge 
processing; 
4. It can problematise conventional banking by signalling negative 
confidence and thus creating space for other practices such as Islamic 
banking. 
 
This confidence was not manifested or processed in a homogenous manner. 
Each ideal type was on the look-out for confidence that correlated with their own 
interests. The Virtuoso sought confidence in the Islamicity of the Islamic 
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banking products. Purity and reassurance of the impermeability of the halal 
boundaries enacted by shariah regulation were a priority. The Pragmatists’ 
concern was a ‘modern’ compromise between ideal and financial values. For 
this type, finding the balance between the values that are authentic to Malay 
identity within the parameters set by modernity was an expression of his or her 
belonging to a moderate group of Muslim-Malays.  
 
Last, I spoke about the Sceptic. Not all types accepted the halal boundaries of 
shariah regulation. Despite his use of Islamic banking, the Sceptic seeks no 
confidence in its Islamic social-use value. Economic interests are his only 
concern. In his case, the diversity of his social ties exposed him to a mixture of 
confidence signals. He either accepted as a proxy the negative confidence of 
the shariah value of Islamic banking by his family and peers or he completely 
rejected the proxy signs of the ones who sent positive signals. 
 
However, not all types accepted the halal boundaries of shariah regulation. 
Despite his use of Islamic banking, the Sceptic seeks no confidence in its 
Islamic social-use value, economic interests being his only concern. The 
diversity of his social ties exposed him to a mixture of confidence signals. He 
either accepted as a proxy the negative confidence of the shariah value of 
Islamic banking by his family and peers or he completely rejected the proxy 
signs of the ones who sent positive signals. 
 
However, the confidence in Islamic banking practices, underpinned by 
boundaries based on shariah regulation, is accompanied by a caveat.  
Whilst it is true that strong social ties can be functional in contributing to the 
growth of Islamic banking practices, there is a dysfunctional side that cannot be 
ignored. The evidence supports Granovetter’s (1985) warnings that the social 
solidarity created by thick social ties can enable an intragroup insularity and 
thus provoke wider fragmentation of society. The thick social ties have served to 
turn the symbolic halal/haram or permissible/forbidden binary into a social 
reality. Due to a fear of contagion from social pollution (Douglas 1996) or dirt 
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(Hacking 2003), the ideal types who value the confines set by the shariah 
retreat from others outside the community due to a fear of symbolic contagion 
from the non-Malay and non-Muslim ‘others’ in Malaysian society, particularly 
the Chinese. 
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8. Islamic banking in contemporary Malaysia: unique 
but theorisable  
 
 
In the introduction I posed the question: how can we explain the growth in 
everyday Islamic banking practices amongst Muslim-Malays in Kuala Lumpur? 
In addressing this question, this study sought to explore the Malaysian state 
and banks’ success in conveying the economic advantage with the added halal 
social-use value of Islamic banking products to a critical mass of receptive 
consumers. In order to do so, the study developed a socio-historical framework 
that predominantly consisted of the tools of economic sociology. This framework 
sought to follow sociological traditions that aim to explain the development and 
growth of Islamic banking in terms that are not principally about religion. As 
Halliday (1995:75) always insisted:  
 
‘For all its claims to prescribe for social and individual as well as political 
behaviour, the variety of practices in Islamic countries suggests that ‘Islam’ as 
such cannot explain how Muslims behave, or how they might/ought to behave. 
Other factors outside ‘Islam’ must be invoked. The resort to an all-explanatory 
‘Islam’ is therefore circular….The study of Islamic communities cannot be based 
on a ‘sociology of religion’ alone; it must, rather, involve a sociology of how 
religion interacts with other ethnic, cultural and political forces’. 
 
The spectacular growth of Islamic finance in the Kingdom of Malaysia 
underscores the country as a paradigmatic case. Islamic banking assets 
accounted for 25 per cent of the Malaysian banking system’s assets in 2013, up 
from 19.6 per cent in 2009, Islamic financing accounted for 27.5 per cent of total 
banking financing in 2013, up from 21.6 per cent in 2009. In addition, Islamic 
banking is expected to account for 40 per cent of total financing by 2020. 
 
In this study, I argue that that the development and growth of Islamic banking is 
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a result of a concerted effort by the state and banks to create a mass Islamic 
financial market. As I explained in the introduction, following the crisis of trust in 
the political economy, the government turned to Islamic banking as a political 
and economic fix. I argue that Islam’s vast repertoire of symbols, language and 
ideas are a powerful basis of an alternative ‘cultural tool-kit’ that could provide a 
‘world-view’ which simultaneously problematised conventional banking and also 
offered a solution. Through Islamic banking, the state and banks offered a new 
‘justification’ (Weber 2005) based on an ideology, ‘a system of cultural meaning’ 
that felt authentic to ordinary people’s moral universe (Swidler 1986:279). In 
times of crisis, ‘ideologies – explicit, articulated, highly organised meaning 
systems’ (Swidler 1986:278) forge new practices. This niche financial sector 
was the ideal solution to assuage the Malaysian state’s political and economic 
pressures at a unique historical conjuncture. From an economic perspective, 
Islamic banking provided a competitive advantage by accommodating global 
finance. It also offered an unprecedented influx of credit – a relief to the middle 
classes suffering from wage suppression and a welcome consumption-driven 
stimulus to the stalling economy. Politically, it renewed the political elite’s 
commitment to its Muslim-Malay constituency by acknowledging Islam as an 
authentic source of Malaysia’s vision.  
 
Therefore, Islamic banking is the result of a top-down strategy driven by the 
economic and political interests of Malaysia’s ruling group (the state and the 
political elite on the one hand, and finance capital and specifically the banking 
elite on the other). Nevertheless, as the challenges Islamic banking is facing in 
other Muslim countries, has shown, Islamic banking practices are not given and 
cannot be taken-for-granted. In order to direct their choice away from the 
conventional, and towards the Islamic banking sector, the state and banks have 
to convince people of the added value of Islamic banking.  
 
Discovering people’s motivation in choosing Islamic banking over the 
conventional required an interpretative approach that prioritised the point-of-
view of the Malay consumer. In Chapter 3, the methodological orientations of 
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the project were discussed. The aim of the study was to interpret and convey 
the meanings behind the everyday practices of ordinary people who possess 
neither the power, nor the expertise to constitute Islamic banking ‘from above’.  
 
As I discovered during fieldwork in Malaysia, trust and confidence are the 
common threads that intermesh Islamic banking practices within these broader 
interdependent processes. In Chapter 2, I explain why the point of departure is 
the Polanyian (2001) notion of embeddedness. It serves as a useful analytical 
tool that captures the anchoring of the Islamic banking system in normative 
frameworks. Thus, I suggest that the growth of Islamic banking practices must 
be understood in reference to its embeddedness in its broader social 
surroundings. Islamic banking practices are both anchored within and 
constitutive of broader historically determined, closely intertwined, social, 
economic, cultural and political circumstances.  
 
This project is based upon a theoretical approach that views the 
aforementioned circumstances as being endogenous to his economic practices. 
Thus, this study follows in the work of sociological perspectives that seek to 
interpret economic action in relation to its social context as opposed to the 
asocial and ahistorical individualist and utilitarian economic man of neo-
classical economic theory. The shared values of a culture as understood, both 
‘from below’ through people’s association with each other, and ‘from above’, as 
institutionalised traditions, can explain how one choice was selected over 
another. Although the term embeddedness became popular sociological 
currency several decades after Weber’s death, his perspectives on the 
economy also correspond to embeddedness. For Weber (2005), the economic 
function of the capitalist system is supported by the ‘spirit of capitalism’ – the 
ideology that justifies the involvement with capitalism. In other words, for Islamic 
banking system to function, and Muslim-Malays to trust the value of the 
products, they must feel an “elective affinity” to the values of the banking 
system.   
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8.1 Islam as a repertoire of economic strategies 
 
This argument was developed through three sets of research questions that 
each aimed to address specific aspects of Islamic banking practices. The first 
set of questions were concerned with understanding the ethos and values of 
Islamic banking by analysing the: crystallisation of Islamic banking as an 
objective category of finance.  
 
In Chapter 5, I outlined the contours and ideological undercurrents, as 
expressed through the definitional debates and controversies, of the Islamic 
banking ‘tradition’ (Hobsbawm 1983). I argue that Islam’s vast repertoire of 
symbols, language and ideas are a powerful basis of an alternative ‘cultural 
tool-kit’. I illustrate how the dexterity of this cultural tool-kit is partly the result of 
its adaptation to a variety of institutional, cultural and geo-political contexts 
throughout history. Besides investigating the original meanings of the its main 
precepts, the legitimacy of the sector’s claims were investigated through an 
examination of its theoretical standards against its practices, as explained by its 
practitioners. The main tension arises from the sector’s use of debt-based 
products instead of equity. Consumers are still subject to a credit risk 
assessment and the risk of the transaction is not shared equally, instead it is 
borne by the consumer. The second half of the chapter explains how the sector 
operates through a set of shariah-inspired rules, which filter out undesirable 
elements and promote desirable practices. Its standardisation system is similar 
to other halal commodities, the symbols and language of which it also adopts. 
The standards which produce the symbolic added Islamic-value that results 
from the shariah scholar’s regulation of the products according to the 
boundaries of halal, are communicated via Arabic calligraphy, the use of Arabic 
terminology and middle-eastern motifs.  
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8.2 Trust in Islamic banking  
 
After established the concrete parameters and points of reference as set by the 
‘supply’, the focus shifted to ‘demand’. The rest of the study sought to 
investigate the meaning of Islamic banking from the perspective of consumers, 
ordinary Muslim-Malays resident in Kuala Lumpur. The second set of questions 
focused on: generalised trust, shariah regulation and expertise and the 
regulation of everyday Islamic banking practices. 
 
In Chapter 6, I developed the analysis on the development and growth of 
Islamic banking practices by examining how it is shaped by the dynamics of 
trust in shariah regulation and expertise as Islamic banking is unique in its 
reliance on formal regulation informed by religious norms and rules. My findings 
reveal that for Islamic banking consumers’ trust in shariah regulation and its 
experts is a primary embedding mechanism of everyday Islamic banking 
practices. Trust has a significant purpose: it is the ‘glue’ underpinning Malays’ 
everyday Islamic banking practices. I argue that, quite simply, for those who 
perceive social use-value in Islamic banking, trust in the shariah regulation is 
the first condition to their choice of Islamic banking. Consumer trust in shariah 
regulation, depends on two main factors: trust in the workings and underlying 
values of the shariah regulatory regime, and trust in the ‘competence and 
cognitive intensions’ (Nooteboom 2007: 35) of the shariah scholars. The role of 
these experts is to engage in the symbolic production of the added social use 
value of Islamic banking value as defined by halal boundaries. By 
simultaneously regulating supply and demand, these experts are ‘flesh-and-
blood’ intermediaries (Giddens 1990) between the sector and the consumers 
and function as conduits of trust. Trust reduces the complexity faced by 
consumers in a complex world marked by a number of choices, and it functions 
as a coping mechanism to the risk that the expectations of Islamic banking 
products are not met. For most respondents, the state’s underwriting of the 
Islamic banking sector was viewed as part of the state’s responsibility to care 
for and safeguard the cultural interests of the Malay community. 
	  	   316	  
8.3 Confidence in Islamic banking  
 
The last set of questions focused on another fiduciary aspect of Islamic 
banking: the role of family and peer relations in creating confidence in Islamic 
banking practices amongst consumers. 
 
In Chapter 7, the aim of this chapter was to demonstrate that family and peers 
constitute an important part of Islamic banking practices. Contrary to 
perspectives that view modern money as inherently hostile to social life, the 
experience of the respondents suggests that their social surroundings constitute 
and facilitate Islamic banking practices. Whilst generalised trust underpins the 
Islamic banking system, confidence (in Islamic banking) is sustained through 
the personalised trust that characterises social interaction within close family 
and friends. Although, as I explained above, Islamic banking practices are 
underpinned by trust in shariah regulation and its experts, people’s practices 
cannot be unravelled from everyday social life with family and peers. In effect, 
by promoting confidence in Islamic banking, family and friends are inadvertent 
allies of the state and banks.  
 
Signs of confidence communicated by trusted family members and peers play 
an important role in shaping Islamic banking practices. Family and peers 
function as useful ‘proxies of confidence’ (Swedberg 2010) in Islamic banking. 
Thus by signalling confidence in the sector, family and peer are unwitting ‘allies’ 
or ‘stand-ins’ (Swedberg 2010) of the state and bank. The family in particular is 
valued by respondents and the state as a site of consumption of credit and halal 
commodities and an important vehicle of confidence transmission as it: reduces 
existential anxiety by indicating the socially acceptable choice for their particular 
social form or group; mediates uncertainty of choice related to financial risk; 
provides a shortcut through information gathering and knowledge processing; 
problematise conventional banking by signalling negative confidence and thus 
creating space for other practices such as Islamic banking. 
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8.4 Ideal Types 
 
As I illustrated in Chapter 6 and 7, through the three ideal types that emerged 
from the data, trust is underpinned by a range of interests, the various 
combinations and permutations of which are detailed below. This types serve as 
a caveat. First, trust is neither homogenous nor even. The trust that underpins 
everyday Islamic banking practices is characterised by heterogeneity. Second, 
although generalisations are being made about Islamic practices, these types 
remind us that even through such a small sample, it would be incorrect to 
essentialise one type of Islamic practice as universally representative of all 
Muslims.  
  
The Virtuoso is characterised by reflexive trust. His trust is based on a high 
degree of monitoring back and forth from Islamic ideals to Islamic banking 
practice. Therefore, the interests of this type are focused on living out the ideal 
values of Islam. His reflexivity allows him to observe the inconsistencies of the 
sector and as a result an ambiguity towards the state and Islamic banks is 
sometimes observed. Nevertheless, due to his ultimate reliance on shariah 
expertise, mainly driven by his acknowledgement of the asymmetry of 
knowledge and authority, between himself and experts, he chooses Islamic 
banking over the conventional. His choice is also bolstered by signs of 
confidence from his close social ties. Their use and rating of Islamic banking 
practices communicate reassurance of the impermeability of the halal 
boundaries as defined by shari’ah regulation, and therefore the purity of Islamic 
credit.  
 
The Pragmatist is characterised by routine trust. It is based on a conscious 
predisposition towards habit, not mindless routinisation. Low levels of reflexivity, 
about the social use-value of Islamic banking, were observed in this type. Very 
little effort was spent evaluating whether it was Islamic or not. Crucially, routine 
is chosen as a means to efficiently locate the most socially acceptable choice of 
banking products. Since he is already routinised and confident in the ways of 
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halal, his efforts can be focused on locating the best deal within the Islamic 
banking sector. For, the Pragmatist seeks a balance between ideal and material 
interests as the main concern is to practice a ‘modern’ compromise between 
ideal and financial values. Indeed, Islamic banking reflects this type’s belonging 
to a self-described ‘moderate’ and ‘modern’ group of Muslim-Malays. In light of 
their need to balance values perceived as authentic and integral to Malay 
identity within the exigencies of modern life, Islamic banking fulfils all the 
requirements.  
 
The Sceptic is characterised by reflexive distrust. Although distrust is often 
considered dysfunctional, in this case it opens up a space for critical thinking 
about the sector specifically and the state’s involvement in the production of 
halal boundaries and shariah regulation.  This type does not reject the social-
use value of halal boundaries because he does not identify as Muslim. The 
added-shariah value of Islamic banking is (a priori) rejected due to the 
underlying loyalty to the state that accepting this added-value implies. The 
motivation in choosing between conventional and Islamic banking is economic. 
Despite his choice of banking products, the sceptic seeks no confidence in its 
Islamic social-use value. Indeed, he is the only type to actively consider 
conventional and Islamic as potentially equally valid choices.  
Unlike the other two types, his immediate social types, either signal a negative 
confidence of the shari’ah value of Islamic banking. Or he rejects the signs of 
confidence from family and peers who value its added-Islamic value. 
 
 
8.5 The dysfunction of trust and confidence in shariah regulation 
 
Although the focus of the study is on the growth of Islamic banking and 
therefore the functional aspects of trust and confidence, in so far as they 
‘function’ by enabling the proliferation of Islamic banking practices, there is a 
flipside to Islamic banking (in Malaysia) that cannot be ignored. Shariah 
regulation has corollary effects: it is both functional and dysfunctional. Whilst it 
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generally engenders the trust of Muslim-Malays in Islamic banking, it 
contributes to creating an atmosphere of distrust between ethnic groups and 
creates fragmentation with the broader Malaysian society 
 
My analysis revealed that shariah regulation, which enforces boundaries of 
halal/haram and thus the dichotomy of pure/impure increases solidarity and 
order within these boundaries, but distrust towards others outside these 
boundaries. In Chapter 7, I explain how thick social ties which signal confidence 
in Islamic banking, also serve to compound the symbolic boundaries set by the 
shariah into a social reality. As Granovetter (1983) warned about thick social 
ties, they can foster an intragroup insularity, which in this case ‘aids’ Islamic 
banking, but it also accentuates the wider fragmentation of society are 
evidenced.  Due to a fear of contagion from social pollution (Douglas 1996) or 
dirt (Hacking 2003), the ideal types who value the confines set by the shariah 
retreat from others outside the community due to a fear of symbolic contagion 
from the non-Malay and non-Muslim ‘others’ in Malaysian society, particularly 
the Chinese. 
 
 
8.6 The preconditions of contemporary Islamic banking in Malaysia 
 
Although the focus is on the growth of Islamic banking practices in 
contemporary Malaysia, Chapter 4 provides a historical analysis of the various 
junctures that contextualise the respondents’ trust and confidence in Islamic 
banking and thereby their choice of banking products. The focus of the chapter 
is on the political, cultural and economic dynamics: challenges and responses 
that led to the creation of the Islamic banking sector on the one hand, and for 
Islamic banking practices to gain salience amongst the Muslim-Malay 
community on the other.  
 
The preconditions to the development and growth of Islamic banking in 
Malaysia, were illustrated through five vignettes. The first concerned the 
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colonial legacies of the ethnic division of labour which initiated the reification of 
Malay identity as fixed and eternally Muslim and instigated anxieties between 
the ethnic groups. The second examined the political economy of the 
postcolonial state. The state would initiate an affirmative policy that alleviates 
the Malay community out of poverty, based on an ethnic definition that would 
redeploy the aforementioned colonial ‘knowledge’. This policy would be the 
basis of the social contract forged between UMNO and the Malay community. 
The state would protect their economic and political interests under a cultural 
banner and they would reciprocate with their loyalty and trust. The third vignette 
focused on the Islamisation of the state. It illustrated how the insitutionalisation 
of Islamic knowledge and expertise, as exemplified by the state’s use of the 
shariah and ulema for its own ends is based on a legacy of bureaucratisation of 
Islam, spurred by the challenges raised from the Islamic opposition and 
movements. In the fourth vignette I suggested that political and social events, in 
particularly the dakwah Islamic revivalist movement(s) ‘from below’, also 
contributed to the salience of Islam as an expression of solidarity, identity and 
community amongst the Malays. Last, I explain the events leading up to the 
1998-1998 financial crisis. In particular, how the state opened up the economy, 
restricted to the business sphere to the capital markets, and how it would invoke 
Islamic discourse to entice Malaysians to save and work like Protestants but 
consume like Catholics. 
 
 
8.7 Concluding Remarks: Islamic banking practices as cement today and 
as solvents of a socio-political development model tomorrow?   
 
In Chapter 2, I sought to make explicit the theoretical framework, or rather the 
research programme, within which I developed my observations for four months 
in 2012 of the experiences of ordinary Malays in contemporary Kuala Lumpur, 
in their dealings with Islamic banks. I went to Kuala Lumpur with the cultural and 
theoretical baggage of a graduate student whose Bachelor’s and Master’s 
degrees were a not always coherent and consistent mixture of sociological, 
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political economic and anthropological notions from various sources (sociology 
of development, sociology of religion, anthropology of Islam, political sociology 
and international relations, post-colonial studies, political economy and 
economic sociology). That experience confirmed what anthropologists of Islam 
were finally beginning to admit, namely that one could not “assume a single 
object called ‘Islam’.” (Bowen 2012: 2). 
 
I had already come to terms with the fact that Islamic banking practices are not 
an unmediated and inevitable consequence of a society wherein Muslim 
religious practices predominate. In fact in my short Master’s dissertation, I had 
argued that a ‘Muslim society’ was neither a necessary condition for the 
development and growth of Islamic banking practices (Islamic banking could 
well succeed in any international financial hub) nor a sufficient one (Islamic 
banking is not flourishing in all Muslim societies).  
 
Until then, however, my research experience had been limited to Arab countries 
where power was firmly – or so it seemed then, Mubarak and Gaddafi were still 
in control of Egypt and Libya respectively – in the hands of political leaders with 
little or no real sympathy for Islamic banking. My own research showed that 
although they were wary of banning it outright, they were warier of it serving as 
a possible vehicle of fundamentalist subversion from their authoritarian state. In 
the Egyptian case, the ethical dimension of Islamic banking could conceivably 
have embarrassed the moral and religious laxity of the rasmalia al mahassib, 
the crony entrepreneurs that drove and apparently continue to drive the lumpen-
development generated by the country’s “connivance capitalism” (Amin 2012). 
In the Libyan case, Gaddafi’s regime – whose development path was less clear 
than Egypt’s but the excesses of whose ruling families were openly considered 
as shameful by Libyan Muslims – was never comfortable under  the stern gaze 
of shariah scholars. The rebukes of Imam Sadeq al-Gheryani and Sheik Ali 
Mohammed al-Selabi in the run-up to the uprising of 2011 (Mekay 2011) 
reflected a long standing though generally muted resistance. 
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My interest in the Malaysian experience of Islamic banking stemmed from the 
need to look at a country led politically by non-Arab Muslims who not only did 
not seem to fear the potentially ‘subversive’ potential of Islamic banking as an 
agent of mobilisation of popular discontent (of mobilisation from below), but, on 
the contrary, appeared to have seen in it a vehicle of mobilisation and 
integration ‘from above’ for an economic development project that was 
simultaneously capitalist and Islamic.  
 
The conclusion of the range of my research in the varying fortunes of Islamic 
banking practices in the Muslim world was that their success or failure cannot 
be causally reduced in an essentialist manner to a simple relation between 
Islamic banking and Islam. Nor can be attributed to the specific form of capitalist 
development underway in an Islamic country. After all, it may be argued that 
there are significant similarities between the close personal links between 
political leaders and captains of finance in Malaysia and the in-your-face crony 
capitalism of Mubarak’s Egypt. There is, then, no alternative to a concrete 
analysis of each historically determined case, such as this study. Does this 
mean that each case is so specific and unique that, logically, no generalisations 
are at all possible and that, therefore, the development and growth of Islamic 
banking practices in a predominantly Muslim country are simply beyond the 
epistemological grasp of any sociological theory? The answer is no. Although 
there is no alternative to an analysis of the concrete social, economic, political 
and cultural circumstances, an overarching theoretical dimension is necessary 
in order to define the limits beyond which socially effective and institutionally 
entrenched culture (in this case Islam) and economic practices (in this case 
everyday Islamic banking practices) may be said to be causally unrelated to 
each other. 
 
The Malaysian case is enlightening from this point of view. The Muslim Malay 
ruling alliance has and continues to attempt to mobilise and integrate the 
Muslim-Malay population for and into its economic development project by 
appealing to the latter’s Muslim beliefs – especially the socially effective notion 
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of preferential trust in one’s fellow believers. But the downside of this strategy is 
that it strengthens the social role of Islam and, thereby, strengthens its potential 
as critic of the ethical standards of the political and economic elites. At that 
point, what is an element supporting the powers that be, may well become an 
element of popular scepticism, distrust, censure or even outright discontent 
against these elites. As I explained in Chapter 1 and 4, there are recent 
precedents, in Malaysia, of Islam serving as a powerful vehicle of political 
resistance. It is my hypothetical view that the tipping point – when the gradual 
erosion of trust in Islamic banking and the state that promotes it goes beyond 
the critical thinking that characterises the religiously lukewarm sceptic ideal type 
identified in Chapters Six and Seven to reach a potentially catastrophic political 
situation – is more likely to occur when the economic growth stalls.  
 
Another financial crisis of the same intensity as that of the 1997-1998 Asian 
crisis described in Chapter 1 will, is more likely to occur when the 
developmental trajectory stalls. In such circumstances, even those social 
groups that approximate the other two ideal types of Islamic banking 
consumers, the religiously staunch virtuoso and pragmatist types, will be 
motivated, by their ideal and ideal and material interests respectively, to distrust 
the state’s much vaunted religious credentials. 
 
Once again, the trust underpinning the political economy will not only be 
attenuated by Islam but, on the contrary, will be exacerbated by it. The ‘fix’ 
provided by the Islamic banking sector will unravel. Such a circumstance would 
tear asunder the delicate “convergence of ideology and reality” that Burawoy 
(1989: 24) observed in his study of a situation that is culturally and politically far 
removed from Malaysia in the beginning of the second decade of the 21st 
century: Hungary in the 1980s. In my ethnographic work in Kuala Lumpur I also 
observed that: “Paradoxically, not only despite but also because of their 
disbelief, rulers and ruled partake in rituals that underline all that the world could 
be yet isn’t.” (Burawoy 1989: 24). Even amongst those that strongly believed 
and trusted (reflexively or routinely) Islamic banking, I could not but detect a hint 
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of conscious effort to go along ‘with the rituals’ as option of least resistance. It is 
this that comforts me in my view that an economic crisis could precipitate a 
crisis of trust, not in Islam (that is only likely amongst those I identified at the 
ideal typical sceptics) but in a political and economic leadership that at that 
point will be seen to have callously exploited religious belief. This is what I 
consider to be this study’s contribution to the sociological approach to economic 
practices in ‘Islamic societies’ and particularly Malaysia, today. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	   325	  
References 
 
Abaza, M. (1994) ‘Islam in South-East Asia: Varying Impact and Images of the 
Middle East’, in H. Mutalib and T. Hashmi (eds), Islam, Muslims and the Modern 
State (139-151). Macmillan Press. 
Abdullah, N and Dusuki, A (2006) ‘Customers’ Perceptions of Islamic Hire‐
Purchase Facility in Malaysia: An Empirical Analysis. IIUM Journal of 
Economics and Management. Vol. 12 No. 2  
Abbott, J and Gregorios-Pippas, S (2010) Islamization in Malaysia: 
processes and dynamics, Contemporary Politics, 16:2, 135-151 
 
Aitken, R. (2005) ‘“A Direct Personal Stake”: Cultural Economy, Mass 
Investment and the New York Stock Exchange’, Review of International Political 
Economy, 12(2): 334–63. 
 
Aldridge, A. (1998) ‘Habitus and Cultural Capital in the Field of Personal 
Finance’, The Sociological Review, 46(1): 1–23. 
 
Aristotle (n.d.) Politics, Part X. Available at: 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html. Accessed on 6th November 
2014. 
 
Arrighi, G. (1994). The long twentieth century: Money, power, and the origins of 
our times. Verso. 
 
Arrighi, G. (2005) ‘Hegemony Unravelling’, New Left Review, 32, March–April: 
23–80. 
 
Asad, T. (2009) ‘The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam’, Center for 
Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Washington DC. 
 
	  	   326	  
Aspers, P., and Beckert, J. (2011) ‘Value in Markets’, in J. Beckert and P.  
 
Aspers (eds), The Worth of Goods: Valuation and Pricing in the Economy, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
 
Avishai, Orit, Gerber, Lynne, and Randles, Jennifer (2013), ‘The Feminist 
Ethnographer’s Dilemma: Reconciling Progressive Research Agendas with 
Fieldwork Realities’, Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 42: 394–426. 
 
Al-Azmeh, A. (2010) ‘Postmodern Obscurantism and “The Muslim Question”’. 
Available at: www.jsri.ro/old/html%20version/index/no_5/aziaalazmeh-
articol.htm. Accessed on 8th May 2013 
 
Baskan, F. (2004). ‘The political economy of Islamic finance in Turkey: the role 
of Fethullah Gülen and Asya Finans’. The Politics of Islamic Finance. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd. 
 
Barbalet, J. (2009) ‘A Characterization of Trust, and its Consequences’, Theory 
and Society, 38: 4, Special Issue: Emotion and Rationality in Economic Life 
(July): 367–82. 
 
Barry, A. (2002) ‘The Anti-Political Economy’, Economy and Society, 
31(2): 268–84. 
 
Baxter, P. and Jack, S. (2008) ‘Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study 
Design and Implementation for Novice Researchers’, Qualitative Report, 13(4): 
544–59. 
 
Bauman, Z. (1992). Mortality, immortality and other life strategies. Stanford 
University Press. 
 
Bauman, Z. (2000). Liquid modernity. Polity, Cambridge. 
	  	   327	  
Beck, U. (1992) Risk society: towards a new modernity. Sage Publishers 
 
Becker, H. S. (1970) Sociological Work: Method and Substance, Aldine 
Publishing Co., Chicago. 
 
Becker, W. (2004) ‘Economics for a Higher Education’, International Review of 
Economics Education, 3(1): 52–62. 
 
Beckert, J. (2007a) ‘The Great Transformation of Embeddedness: Karl Polanyi 
and the New Economic Sociology’, MPIfG Discussion Paper 07/1, Max Planck 
Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne.  
 
Beckert, J. (2007b) ‘The Social Order of Markets’, MPIfG Discussion Paper 
07/15, December Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne. 
Available at: www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp07-15.pdf. Accessed on 
29th May 2010. 
Bennett, A. and Elman, C. (2006) ‘Qualitative Research: Recent Developments 
in Case Study Methods’ Annual Review of Political Science (9) 455–76. 
Benthall, J., (2001). ‘Speculations on Islamic financial alternatives’, 
Anthropology today, 17(3), 28-29. 
 
Biernacki, P., and Waldorf, D. (1981) ‘Snowball Sampling: Problems and 
Techniques of Chain Referral Sampling’, Sociological Methods and Research, 
10: 141-163. 
 
Black, J. (2003) ‘Mapping the Contours of Contemporary Financial Services 
Regulation’, Discussion Paper No.17, ESRC Centre for Analysis of Risk and 
Regulation. 
 
Block, F. (2003) ‘Karl Polanyi and the Writing of the Great Transformation’, 
Theory and Society, 32: 275–306. 
	  	   328	  
 
Botterill, J (2010) Consumer Culture and Personal Finance: Money Goes to 
Market. Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Bourdieu, P. (2005) The social structures of the economy. Polity press. 
 
Bowen, G. A. (2009) ‘Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method’, 
Qualitative Research Journal, 9(2): 27–40. 
 
Bowen, J. R. (2012). A new Anthropology of Islam. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Braudel, F. (1992) The Perspective of the World: Civilization and Capitalism, 
15th–18th Century, Vol. III, translated by Siân Reynold, University of California 
Press.  
 
Browne, K. (2005) ‘Snowball Sampling: Using Social Networks to Research 
Nonheterosexual Women’, International Journal of Social Research 
Methodology, 8(1), February: 47–60.  
 
Bryant, T. and Charmaz, S. (2007) The SAGE Handbook of Grounded Theory 
Sage Thousand Oaks. 
 
Burawoy M. (1989) ‘Reflections on the Class Consciousness of Hungarian 
Steelworkers’. Politics and Society 17(1), pp.1-34. 
 
Busch, L. (2006) ‘Grades and Standards in the Social Construction of Safe 
Food’, in M. E. Lien and N. Brigitte (eds), The Politics of Food (136-178). Berg, 
Oxford. 
 
Callon, M. (1988) ‘The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics’ in 
The Laws of the Markets. Ed. M Callon. Oxford. Blackwell (p 1-57). 
	  	   329	  
Carr, E. H. (1961) What is History?, Penguin Books, London (Second Edition 
1987). 
 
Carr, E. H. (1987). What is History?. edited by RW Davies. Harmondsworth. 
Middlesex. 
 
Carruthers, B. (2005). ‘The Sociology of Money and Credit’ The Handbook of 
Economic Sociology, 2nd edn, Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg eds. 
(355—78) Princeton: Princeton University Press 
 
Carruthers, B.G., and Chul-Kim, J-C. (2011) ‘The Sociology of Finance’, Annual 
Review of Sociology, 37: 239–59. 
 
Case, W. (2005). ‘Political Mistrust in Southeast Asia’. International Studies in 
Sociology and Sociology Anthropology, 96, 81. 
 
Chan, C. (2009) ‘Creating a Market in the Presence of Cultural Resistance: The 
Case of Life Insurance in China’, Theory and Society, 38(3): 271–305.  
 
Charmaz, C. (2006) Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through 
Qualitative Analysis, SAGE Publications, London and Thousand Oaks, CA.  
 
Choudhury, M. (2007) ‘Development of Islamic economic and social thought’  
In (eds. Kabir H and Lewis M ). 21-37 in Hassan, K. and Lewis, M. Handbook of 
Islamic Banking, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, England and Northampton, 
Massachusetts, 2007.   
 
Cohen, L. (2003) A consumers’ republic: The politics of mass consumption in 
postwar America, Random House LLC . 
 
Coleman , J. S. (1990) Foundations of Social Theory, Harvard University Press. 
 
	  	   330	  
Comaroff, J., & Comaroff, J. L. (Eds.). (2001). Millennial capitalism and the 
culture of neoliberalism. Duke University Press. 
 
Communities and Local Government Summary Report (2009), Understanding 
Muslim Ethnic Communities in England, Department for Communities and Local 
Government. Available at: 
http://cdn.preterhuman.net/texts/religion.occult.new_age/Islam/Understanding%
20Muslim%20Ethnic%20Communities%20-%20Summary%20Report%20UK-
Gov.pdf (accessed on 2 February 2012). 
 
Corbin, J. & Strauss, A. (2008). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and 
procedures for developing grounded theory (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. 
 
Cook, K. S., and Gerbasi, A. (2005) ‘Trust in the Economy’, International 
Encyclopedia of Economic Sociology (eds Jens Beckert, Milan Zafirovski ), 
Routledge, pp. 690–96.  
 
Dalacoura, K. (2011) Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East, 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Dale, G. (2011) ‘Lineages of Embeddedness’, American Journal of Economics 
and Sociology, 70(2): 306–39.  
 
De Goede, M. (2008) ‘Money, Media and the Anti-Politics of Terrorist Finance’, 
European Journal of Cultural Studies, 11(3): 289–310. 
 
Demortain, D. (2007) ‘Standardising Through Concepts: Scientific Experts and 
the International Development of the HACCP Food Safety Standard’, 
Discussion Paper No.45, ESRC Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation.  
 
	  	   331	  
DiMaggio, P., and Louch, H. (1998) ‘Socially Embedded Consumer 
Transactions: For What Kinds of Purchases Do People Use Networks Most?’, 
American Sociological Review, 63: 619–37. 
 
DiVanna,B. and DiVanna, J. (2010) ‘Top 500 Islamic Financial Institutions’ 
(Special supplement focusing on current developments in Islamic financial 
institutions), The Banker, 160(1018): 1–64. 
 
Dodd, N. (1994) The Sociology of Money: Economics, Reason & Contemporary 
Society Continuum International Publishing Group 
 
Dodd N. (2014) The Social Life of Money, Princeton University Press. 
 
Doraisami, A. (2005). The political economy of capital flows and capital controls 
in Malaysia. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 35(2), 249-263. 
 
Douglas, M. (1996) Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and 
Taboo, Routledge, London and New York.  
 
Durkheim, E. (2013). Professional ethics and civic morals. Routledge. Chicago 
 
Dusuki, A, and Abdullah, N (2007) Why Do Malaysian Customers Patronise 
Islamic Banks? International Journal of Bank Marketing Vol. 25, No.3. Emerald 
ISSN: 0265‐2323 (Published by Oxford Brookes University, U.K.) 
 
Dusuki (2011) Islamic Financial System: Principles and Operations, 
International Shari’ah Research Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA). 
Eaugier, J., and Sargeant, M. (1997) ‘Sampling Hard-To-Reach Populations’, 
Journal of Advanced Nursing, 26: 790–97.  
 
	  	   332	  
El-Gamal, M. A. (2006). Islamic finance: Law, economics, and practice. 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
El Ghalfy and Khiyar (2012) ‘Islamic Banking And Economic Growth: A Review’, 
The Journal of Applied Business Research, 28(5): 943–56. 
Embong, A. R. (2001a) ‘Introduction’, in A. R. Embong (ed.), State-led 
Modernization and the New Middle Class in Malaysia, Palgrave Macmillan, New 
York. 
 
Embong, A. R. (2001b) ‘Melayu Baru and the Modernization of Malay Society’, 
in C. Barlow (ed.), Modern Malaysia in the Global Economy: Political and Social 
Change Into the 21st Century (157-166), Edward Elgar Publisher. 
 
Endut, N., and Hua, T.G. (2009) Household Debt in Malaysia, Bank for 
International Settlements. Available at: www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap46l.pdf 
(accessed on 4 March 2012). 
 
Epstein, C. F. (1992) ‘Tinker-bells and Pinups: The Construction and 
Reconstruction of Gender Boundaries at Work’, in M. Lamont and M. Fournier 
(eds), Cultivating Differences: Symbolic Boundaries and the Making of 
Inequality, (232-256). University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 
Eriksen, JM. and Stjernfelt, F. (2012) The Democratic Contradictions of 
Multiculturalism, Telos. 
 
Erturk, I., & Solari, S. (2007). ‘Banks as continuous reinvention’. New political 
economy, 12(3), 369-388. 
 
Faugier, J., & Sargeant, M. (1997). Sampling hard to reach populations. Journal 
of advanced nursing, 26(4), 790-797. 
 
	  	   333	  
Fereday, J., and Muir-Cochrane, E. (2006) ‘Demonstrating Rigor using 
Thematic Analysis: A Hybrid Approach of Inductive and Deductive Coding and 
Theme Development’, International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 5(1): 80–92.  
 
Filiz, B. (2004) ‘The Political Role of Islamic Finance in Turkey: The role of 
Fethullah Gülen and Asya Finans’, in C. M. Henry and R. Wilson (eds), The 
Politics of Islamic Finance, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.  
 
Fischer, J. (2008) Proper Islamic Consumption: Shopping Among the Malays in 
Modern Malaysia, Nias Press, Copenhagen.  
 
Fischer, J. (2011). The halal frontier: muslim consumers in a globalized market. 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Flick, U. (2009), An Introduction to Qualitative Research, Sage Publications, 
London. 
 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006) ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’, 
Qualitative Inquiry, 2(2): 219–45. 
 
Froud, J., Johal, S., and Williams, K. (2002) ‘Financialisation and the Coupon 
Pool’, Capital and Class, 78(2): 119–52. 
 
Gambetta, D (ed.) (1988) Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative 
Relations. Blackwell, New York. 
 
Geertz, C. (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures 
Hutchinson London New York.  
 
Gerrard, P., & Cunningham, J. B. (1997). ‘Islamic banking: a study in 
Singapore’. International Journal of Bank Marketing, 15(6), 204-216. 
 
	  	   334	  
Gerring, J. (2006) Case Study Research Principles and Practices, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Ghazanfar, S. M. (2000) ‘The Economic Thought of Abu-l Hamid Al-Ghazali and 
St. Thomas Aquinas: Some Comparative Parallels and Links’, History of 
Political Economy, 32(4): 857–88.  
 
Giddens, A. (1990) The Consequences of Modernity, Polity, in association with 
Blackwell, Cambridge. 
 
Gillette, M. B. (2000) Between Mecca and Beijing: Modernization and 
Consumption among Urban Chinese Muslims, Stanford University Press, 
Stanford. 
 
Glaser, B. G. (1962) Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis: Emergence Vs. 
Forcing, Sociology Press, Mill Valley, CA. 
 
Glaser, B., & Strauss, A. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory. 1967. 
Weidenfield & Nicolson, London. 
 
Glaser, B. and Strauss, A. (1968) The discovery of grounded theory: strategies 
for qualitative research. Weidenfeld and Nicolson London. 
 
Glaser, B. G. (1998) Doing Grounded Theory. Issues and Discussions, 
Sociology Press, Mill Valley, CA.  
 
Glassman, J. W. (2003) ‘The Spaces of Economic Crisis: Asia and the 
Reconfiguration of Neo-Marxist Crisis Theory’, Studies in Comparative 
International Development, 37(4): 31–63. 
 
Goldman, R. and Papson, S. (1996) Sign Wars: The Cluttered Landscape of 
Advertising, Guildford Press. 
	  	   335	  
 
Goode, E (1999) ‘Sex with informants as deviant behavior: an account and 
commentary’ Deviant Behavior : An Interdisciplinary Journal, 20: 301–324, 
Taylor & Francis 
 
Gomez, E. T., and Jomo, K. S. (1997) Malaysia’s Political Economy: Politics, 
Patronage and Profits (First Edition), Cambridge University Press.  
 
Gomez, E.T. and Jomo, K.S. (1999), Malaysia’s Political Economy. Politics, 
Patronage and Profits, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Graeber, D. (2011) Debt: The First 5000 Years, Melville House Publishing,  
 
Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American journal of 
sociology, 1360-1380. 
 
Granovetter, M. (1983). The strength of weak ties: A network theory revisited. 
Sociological theory, 1(1), 201-233. 
 
Granovetter, M. (1985) ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness’, The American Journal of Sociology, 91(3): 481–510. 
 
Granovetter M and Swedberg R eds. (2001)The Sociology of Economic life 
Boulder, CO : Westview Press 
 
Greene, G. (1955) The Quiet American. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth. 
 
Guseva, A. (2008) Into the Red: The Birth of the Credit Card Market in 
Postcommunist Russia, Stanford University Press, Stanford. 
 
Gauvain, R. (2005). Ritual Rewards: A Consideration of Three Recent 
Approaches to Sunni Purity Law. Islamic Law and Society, 333-393. 
	  	   336	  
 
Hacking, I. (2003) ‘Risk and Dirt’, in R. V. Erickson and A. Doyle (eds), Risk and 
Morality, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, pp. 22–47.  
 
Halkier, B. (2006) ‘Handling Food-related Risks: Political Agency and 
Governmentality’, in M. E. Lien and N. Brigitte (eds), The Politics of Food, (21-
38). Berg, Oxford. 
 
Halliday, F. (1995) ‘Islam is in Danger: Authority, Rushdie and the Struggle for 
the Migrant Soul’, in J. Hippler and A. Lueg (eds), The Next Threat: Western 
Perceptions of Islam, (71-81) Pluto Press, London, with Transnational Institute, 
Amsterdam. 
 
Hammersley, M. (1992). What's wrong with ethnography?: Methodological 
explorations. Psychology Press. 
 
Hammersley, M., and Atkinson, P. (2007) Ethnography Principles in Practice, 
Routledge, London. 
 
Haron, S., and Azmi, W. N. (2008) ‘Determinants of Islamic and Conventional 
Deposits in the Malaysian Banking System’, Managerial Finance, 34(9): 618–
43. 
 
Hart, K. (1988). ‘Kinship, contract, and trust: The economic organization of 
migrants in an African city slum’. In Trust: Making and breaking cooperative 
relations, (ed. Gambetta, D). 176-193. Oxford University Press. 
 
Hart, K. (2001) Money in an Unequal World: Keith Hart and his Memory Bank,  
Texere, New York and London. 
 
Hart, K. (04-09-2003) Contemporary Research on the Anthropology of Money 
and Finance, The Memory Bank. Available at: 
	  	   337	  
http://thememorybank.co.uk/2013/09/04/contemporary-research-on-the-
anthropology-of-money-and-finance/. Accessed on 6th June 2014.  
 
Hart, K. (2005) ‘Money: One Anthropologist’s View’, in J. Carrier (ed.), 
Handbook of Economic Anthropology, (160). Edward Elgar Publisher.  
 
Hart, K. (2009) ‘Cultural Critique in Anthropology’, The Memory Bank. Available 
at: http://thememorybank.co.uk/papers/cultural-critique-in-anthropology/ 
Accessed on 6th June 2014 
 
Hart, K. and Oritz, H. (2014) ‘The Anthropology of Money and Finance: 
Between Ethnography and World History’, Annual Review of Anthropology, 43 
(October): 465–82.  
 
Hassan, K. M., and Mahlknecht, M. (2012) Islamic Capital Markets: Products 
and Strategies, Wiley, Chichester.  
 
Hays, S. (2000) ‘Constructing the Centrality of Culture – And Deconstructing 
Sociology?’, Contemporary Sociology, 29(4) (July): 594–602. Published by 
American Sociological Association. 
 
Haque, A. K. M. (2010) ‘Islamic banking in Malaysia: a study of attitudinal 
differences of Malaysian customers’. European Journal of Economics, Finance 
and Administrative Sciences 18 (2010): 7-18. 
 
Hefner, R. (1998) ‘Society and Morality in the New Asian Capitalism’, in R. 
Hefner (ed.), Market Cultures, Society and Morality in the New Asian 
Capitalisms, (1-16). HarperCollins, Colorado. 
 
Hirsch, P., Michaels, S. and Friedman, R. (1990) ‘ “Clean Models” versus “Dirty 
Hands”: Is Sociology in Danger of Being Seduced by Economics?’, Theory and 
Society, 16(3): 317–36. Reprinted in: S. Zukin and P. DiMaggio (eds), 
	  	   338	  
Structures of Capital: The Social Organization of the Economy, Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Hirschman, C. (1986) ‘The Making of Race in Colonial Malaya: Political 
Economy and Racial Category’, Sociological Forum, 1:330-61 
 
Hirschman, C. (1987) ‘The Meaning and Measurement of Ethnicity in Malaysia: 
An Analysis of Census Classifications’, Journal of Asian Studies 46(3): 555–82. 
Available at: 
https://csde.washington.edu/~glynn/c/pubs/MeaningandMeasurementofEthnicity
inMalaysia.pdf (accessed on 20th January 2011). 
 
Hobsbawm, E. (1983) ‘Introduction: Inventing Traditions’, in E. Hobsbawm and 
T. Ranger (eds) The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
 
Hoffstaedter, G. (2009a) ‘Islam Hadhari: A Malaysian Islamic Multiculturalism or 
Another Blank Banner?’, Contemporary Islam, 3(2): 121–41. 
 
Hoffstaedter, G. (2009b), ‘Secular State, Religious Lives: Islam and the State in 
Malaysia’, Asian Ethnicity, 4(4), 475-489. 
 
Hourani, A. (1990). A History of the Arab Peoples. Faber and Faber, London. 
 
Huntingon, S. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order, Simon & Schuster, New York. 
 
Hutter, B. (2006) ‘The Role of Non-State Actors in Regulation’, Discussion 
Paper No.37, ESRC Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation.  
 
	  	   339	  
Hutter, B., and O’Mahony, J. (2004) ‘The Role of Civil Society Organisation in 
Regulating Business’, Discussion Paper No.26, ESRC Centre for Analysis of 
Risk and Regulation. 
Ingham, G. (1996) "Money is a Social Relation," Review of Social Economy, 
54(4): 243- 75. 
Ingham, G. (2004) The Nature of Money, Polity Press. 
 
Inglehart, R. (1990). Culture shift in advanced industrial society. Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic, and 
political change in 43 societies (Vol. 19). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Chicago  
 
Jackson, T. (2006) ‘Challenges for Sustainable Consumption Policy’, in D. 
Southerton, A. Warde and M. Hand (2005) (eds) The Limited Autonomy of the 
Consumer: Implications for Sustainable Consumption.  
 
Johnson, S., and Mitton, T. (2003) ‘Cronyism and Capital Controls: Evidence 
From Malaysia’, Journal of Financial Economics, 67(2): 351–82.  
 
Jones, S. (2004) ‘Indepth Interviewing’, in C. Seale (ed.), Social Research 
Methods: A Reader, (465-478). Routledge, London.  
 
Hassan, K., and Mahlknecht, M. (2011). Islamic capital markets: products and 
strategies (Vol. 609). John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Kaleem, A. and Lewis, M (2014) ‘Non-interest financing arrangements in three 
Abrahamic religions’ in Lewis, M. K., Ariff, M., & Mohamad, S. (Eds.). (2014). 
Risk and Regulation of Islamic Banking. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
	  	   340	  
Kazarian, E. G. (2008) Islamic Versus Traditional Banking Financial Innovation 
in Egypt, Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco.  
 
Kennell, N. M. (2013) ‘Boys, Girls, Family and the State at Sparta (381–395)’, in 
J. E. Grubbs and T. Parkin (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Childhood and 
Education in the Classical World.  
 
Khoo, B. T., and Hadiz, V. R. (2010) ‘Critical Connections: Islamic Politics and 
Political Economy in Indonesia and Malaysia’, Institute of Developing 
Economies (IDE) Discussion Paper No 239, JETRO Chiba Japan. Available at: 
www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/pdf/239.pdf  Acessed on 10th May 
2012. 
 
Knight, F. H. (1921). Risk, uncertainty and profit. New York: Hart, Schaffner and 
Marx. Chicago 
 
Krippner, G. R. and Alvarez, A. S. (2007), ‘Embeddedness and the Intellectual 
Projects of Economic Sociology’, Annual Review of Sociology, 33(2): 219–40. 
 
Krippner, G. R. (2011) Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of 
Finance, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Krippner, G., Granovetter, M., Block, F., Biggart, N., Beamish, T., Hsing, Y., ... 
& O’Riain, S  (2004) ‘Polanyi Symposium: A Conversation on Embeddedness’, 
Socio-Economic Review, 2: 109–35. 
 
Kopytoff, I. (1986). The Cultural Biography of things In A. Appadurai’s (ed.) The 
Social Life of Things. 
 
Kumari, J. (2014) The White Woman’s Other Burden: Western Women and 
South Asia during British Colonial Rule, Routledge, Oxford 
 
	  	   341	  
Kuran, T., (2001). ‘Speculations on Islamic financial alternatives’, Anthropology 
today, 17(3), 28-29. 
 
Kuran, T. (2004) Islam and Mammon: The Economic Predicaments of Islamism, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
 
Lai, S.-C. (2001) ‘Extra-ordinary and Ordinary Consumption: Making Sense of 
Acquisition in Modern Taiwan’, in J. Granow and A. Warde (eds), Ordinary 
Consumption, Hardwood Press, Reading, pp. 75–92. 
 
Lakatos, I. (2001) The methodology of scientific research programmes. 
Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lamont, M. (2012) ‘Toward a Comparative Sociology of Valuation and 
Evaluation’, Annual Review of Sociology, 38(21): 201–21.  
 
Lamont, M., and Molnár, V. (2002). The study of boundaries in the social 
sciences. Annual review of sociology, 167-195. 
 
Langley, P. (2008) The Everyday Life of Global Finance: Saving and Borrowing 
in Anglo-America, Oxford University Press.  
 
Langley, P. (2014) ‘Consuming credit’, Consumption Markets & Culture, 17:5, 
417-428, 
 
Layder, D. (2006) Understanding Social Theory, Sage, London (Second 
Edition).  
 
Lazarsfeld, P. F., and Merton, R. K. (1954) ‘Friendship as a Social Process: A 
Substantive and Methodological Analysis’, in M. Berger, T. Abel and C. H. Page 
(eds), Freedom and Control in Modern Society, Van Nostrand, pp. 18–66.  
	  	   342	  
 
Lee, R. L. (1990). ‘The state, religious nationalism, and ethnic rationalization in 
Malaysia’. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 13(4), 482-502. 
Neeley, S. (2005). ‘Influences on consumer socialisation’ Young Consumers: 
Insight and Ideas for Responsible Marketers, 6(2), 63-69. 
 
Lee, R. L. M., and Ackerman, S. E. (1997) Sacred Tensions : Modernity and 
Religious Transformation in Malaysia , University of South Carolina Press. 
 
Lewis, J. D., and Weigert, A. (1985) ‘Trust as a Social Reality’, Social Forces, 
63(4) (June): 967–85.  
 
Lewis, M., and Algaoud, L. M. (2001). Islamic banking. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar. 
 
Lewis M. (2007). ‘Comparing Islamic and Christian attitudes to usury’ in 
Hassan, K., & Lewis, M. (Eds.). (2007). Handbook of Islamic banking. Edward 
Elgar Publishing. 
 
Lewis M. (2009) ‘In What Way Does Islamic Banking Differ From Conventional 
Finance?’, Journal of Islamic Economic, Banking and Finance, 4(3): 9–24. 
 
Lewis, M (2014) ‘A theorertical perspective on Islamic banking and financial 
intermediation’, in Lewis, M. K., Ariff, M., & Mohamad, S. (Eds.). Risk and 
Regulation of Islamic Banking. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
Lin N. (2006) ‘Social Capital’, International Encyclopedia of Economic 
Sociology, (eds Jens Beckert and Milan Zafirovski ), Routledge, pp. 690–96.  
 
Liu L. (2008) ‘Filial Piety, Guanxi, Loyalty, and Money: Trust in China’, 
in I. Marková and A. Gillespie (eds), Trust and Distrust: Sociocultural 
Perspectives, (51). Information Age Pub., Charlotte, NC.  
	  	   343	  
 
Lochman, Z. (2004) Contending Visions of the Middle East, The History and 
Politics of Orientalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Lofland, J., and Lofland, L. H. (1995) Analyzing Social Settings, Sage, 
California.  
 
Lofland, J. and Lofland, L. (2006) Analyzing social settings: a guide to 
qualitative observation and analysis. Wadsworth 2006 (4th edition) 
Luhmann, N. (1979) Trust and Power: Two works by Niklas Luhmann. Brisbane: 
John Wiley and Sons. 
MacKenzie, D. (2006). Is economics performative? Option theory and the 
construction of derivatives markets. Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 
28(1), 29-55.  
 
McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Cook, J. M. (2001). Birds of a feather: 
Homophily in social networks. Annual review of sociology, 415-444. 
 
McQueeney, K. (2013) ‘“Ethnographer's Dilemma”: Doing Ethnography in a 
Sexist World – A Response to “The Feminist Ethnographer's Dilemma”’, Journal 
of Contemporary Ethnography, 42 (originally published online). 
 
Martin, R. (2002) Financialization of Daily Life, Temple University Press, 
Philadephia.  
 
Marx, K. (1990) Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. I, trans. Ben 
Fowkes, Penguin, New York.  
 
Mason, J. (1996) Qualitative Researching, Sage, London. 
 
	  	   344	  
Maurer, B. (2005) Mutual Life, Limited: Islamic Banking, Alternative Currencies, 
Lateral Reason, Princeton University Press, Princeton.  
 
Maurer, B. (2006) Pious Property: Islamic Mortgages in the United States, 
Russell Sage Foundation, New York.  
 
Maurer, B. (2012) ‘The Disunity of Finance: Alternative Practices to Western 
Finance’, in K. K. Cetina and A. Preda (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the 
Sociology of Finance, (413) Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Mead, G. H., & Mind, H. (1934). Self and society. Chicago: University of 
Chicago. 
 
Mehmet, A. (2007) ‘Conceptualisation of the Second Best Solution in 
Overcoming the Social Failure of Islamic Finance: Examining the Overpowering 
of Homoislamicus by Homoeconomicus’, IIUM Journal of Economics and 
Management, 15(2): 1–17. 
 
Mehmet, A. (2011) ‘The Socio-ethical Failure of Islamic Banking and Finance’, 
New Horizon: Global Perspective on Islamic Banking and Insurance. Available 
at: 
www.newhorizonislamicbanking.com/index.cfm?section=lectures&id=11252&ac
tion=view (accessed on 2nd May 2012). 
 
Menger K. (1982) ‘On the Origins of Money’, The Economic Journal, 2: 239–
477.  
 
Merriam, S. B. (1988) Case Study Research in Education: A Qualitative 
Approach, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco. 
 
Merton, R. K., & Kendall, P. L. (1956) ‘The Focused Interview’, American 
Journal of Sociology, 51(1): 541–57.  
	  	   345	  
 
Meuser, M., and Nagel, U. (2009) ‘The Expert Interview and Changes in   
Knowledge Production’, in A. Bogner and B. L. Wolfgang Menz 
(eds),  Interviewing Experts, (17-42). Palgrave Macmillan, New York. 
 
Mignione, E. (2006) ‘Embeddedness’, in J. Beckert and M. Zavirovski (eds), 
International Encyclopaedia of Economic Sociology, Routledge, Abingdon. 
 
Miller, D. (1998) A Theory of Shopping. Cambridge: Polity Press/Cornell 
University Press. 
 
Miller, D. (2002) ‘Turning Callon the Right Way Up’. Economy and Society. 
31(2):218-233. 
 
Mills, C. W. (2000). The sociological imagination. Oxford University Press. 
 
Mistzal, B. A. (1996) ‘Trust in Modern Societies: The Search for the Bases of 
Social Order’, Polity Publishers. 
 
Mohamed, S., and Shaairi, N. A. (2013) ‘Determinants of Demand on Family 
Takaful in Malaysia’, Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research, 
4(1): 26–50. 
 
Mokhzani , A. (1973) ‘Credit in a Malay Peasant Economy’, London School of 
Economics and Political Science, Unpublished PhD thesis.  
 
Mollering, G. (2001) ‘The Nature of Trust: From Georg Simmel to a Theory of 
Expectation, Interpretation and Suspension’, Sociology, 35(2): 204–420. 
 
Mollering, G. (2006) Trust, Reason, Routine, Reflexivity, Elsevier, Kidlington. 
 
Montgomerie, J. (2006). ‘The financialization of the American credit card 
	  	   346	  
industry’. in Competition & Change, 10(3), 301-319. 
 
Molyneux, P., and Munawar, I. (2005) Thirty Years of Islamic Banking: History, 
Performance and Prospects, Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
 
Muscat, M. (2009) ‘Why the Camel is Tied. Towards a Political Sociology of 
Islamic Finance in the MENA Region: The Egyptian Case’. Unpublished MSc 
Thesis. The London School of Economic and Political Science. 
 
Mutalib, H., (1993). Islam in Malaysia, from revivalism to Islamic state. 
Singapore: Singapore University Press. 
 
Mutalib, H. (1994). ‘Islamisation in Malaysia: between ideals and realities’. 
Mutalib, H. and Hashmi, T. eds. Islam, Muslims, and the Modern State: Case 
Studies of Muslims in Thirteen Countries, 152-73. 
Nagata, J. A. (1980) ‘Religious Ideology and Social Change: The Islamic 
Revival in Malaysia’, Pacific Affairs, 53(3): 405–39.  
Nasir, K. M., & Pereira, A. A. (2008). Defensive dining: notes on the public 
dining experiences in Singapore. Contemporary Islam, 2(1), 61-73. 
Neeley, S. (2005) ‘Influences on Consumer Socialisation’, Young Consumers, 
6(2): 63–69.  
 
Ng, K. S. (1998) ‘Family Therapy in Malaysia: An Update’, Contemporary 
Family Therapy, 20(1): 37–45.  
 
Nooteboom, B. (2007) ‘Social Capital, Institutions and Trust’, Review of Social 
Economy, Beyond Social Capital, 65(1) (March): 29–53.  
 
Orwell, G. (2001) Burmese Days, Penguin Modern Classics. (Re-issue edition).   
 
	  	   347	  
Othman, N. (1998). ‘Islamization and modernization in Malaysia: 
Competing cultural reassertions and women's identity in a 
changing society’. In R. Wolford & R.L. Miller (Eds.), Women, 
Ethnicity and Nationalism (pp. 170−192). London: Routledge. 
 
Owen, R. (2004) State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle 
East, Routledge, New York. (Third edition). 
 
Pamuk, S. (2000). A monetary history of the Ottoman Empire. Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Parker, M. (2012) ‘Bank Negara’s New Master Plan Charts Future Direction of 
Financial System’, McClatchy-Tribune Business News, 2 January. 
 
Payne, G., and Williams, M. (2005) ‘Generalizations in Qualitative Research’, 
Sociology, 39(2): 295–314. 
 
Perec G. (2008) Species of Spaces and Other Pieces (Penguin Classics) 
 
Pepinsky, T. B. (2010) ‘The Demand for Islamic Banking: Piety, Class, and 
Global Identity’, Paper for presentation at the International Political Economy 
Society, Cambridge, MA. Available at: 
http://ncgg.princeton.edu/IPES/2010/papers/F1150_paper3.pdf (accessed on 
May 11th 2012). 
 
Pietrykowski, B. (2009). The political economy of consumer behavior: 
Contesting consumption. Routledge. 
 
Pitluck, A. Z. (2013) ‘Islamic Banking and Finance: Alternative or Façade?’, in 
K. K. Cetina and A. Preda (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of 
Finance, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
	  	   348	  
Pixley, J. (2010) ‘Behavioural finance issues and the bank client’ in The Finsia 
Journal of Applied Finance. Available online at 
http://www.finsia.com/docs/default-source/jassa-new/jassa-
2010/36_40.pdf?sfvrsn=6 (accessed on 1st March 2014). 
 
Plato, Laws, Book I: section 633 b- Available at: 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=plat.+laws+1.630a (accessed on 
26th November 2014). 
 
Polanyi, K. (1968) Primitive, Archaic, and Modern Economies: Essays of Karl 
Polanyi, edited by Dalton, G., New York, NY, Anchor Books, pp. 120–22. 
 
Polanyi, K. (2001) ‘The Great Transformation’, (2001) in The Political and 
Economic Origins of Our Time (Foreword by J. Stiglitz), Beacon paperback 
edition.  
 
Pollard, J. S., and Samers, M. (2007) ‘Islamic Banking and Finance: 
Postcolonial Political Economy and the Decentring of Economic Geography’, 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 32(3): 313–30. 
 
Pollner M 2006 ‘Reflexivity’ in Beckert, J., & Zafirovski, M. (Eds.). (2013). 
International encyclopedia of economic sociology. Routledge. 
 
Putnam, Robert D. (1995). "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital". 
Journal of Democracy 6 (1): 65–78. 
 
Ray, N. D. (1995) Arab Islamic Banking and the Renewal of Islamic Law, 
Graham & Trotman Ltd.  
 
Rethel, L. (2010) ‘Financialisation and the Malaysian Political Economy’, 
Globalizations, 7(4): 489–506. 
 
	  	   349	  
Rethel, L. (2011) ‘Whose Legitimacy? Islamic Finance and the Global Financial 
Order’, Review of International Political Economy, 18(1): 75–98. 
 
Rodinson, M. (2007), Islam and Capitalism, Saqi Publishers, London.  
 
Rogan, E. (2011) The Arabs: A History, Penguin Books, London. 
 
Ross, S. (2011) Everyday economics: ideas new and old from lay theories of 
economic life. Unpublished PhD thesis, The London School of Economics and 
Political Science 
 
Rudnyckyji, D. (2013) ‘Wall Street or Halal Street? Malaysia and the 
Globalization of Islamic Finance’, Journal of Asian Studies, 72(4): 831–48.  
 
Saat, N. (2011) ‘Islamising Malayness: Ulama Discourse and Authority in 
Contemporary Malaysia’, Contemporary Islam, 6(2): 135–53.  
 
Said, E. (1995) Orientalism, Penguin Books, London.  
 
Scott, A. (2012). Capitalism as culture and statecraft: Weber–Simmel–
Hirschman. Journal of Classical Sociology:1468795X12461411. 
 
Shad,F. (2003) ‘Is Malaysia an Islamic State?’ in Is Malaysia an Islamic State?: 
Secularism and Theocracy, a Study of the Malaysian Constitution, edited by 
Abdullah, A. Baginda, A and Schier, P. (13–75). Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian 
Strategic Research Centre & Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation, 2003. 
 
Shaharuddin, A. (2012) ‘The Bay al-Inah Controversy in Malaysian Islamic 
Banking’, Arab Law Quarterly, 26(13): 499–511. 
 
Shamsul, A. B. (2001) ‘A History of an Identity, an Identity of a History: The Idea 
and Practice of “Malayness” in Malaysia Reconsidered’, Journal of Southeast 
	  	   350	  
Asian Studies, 32: 355–66.  
 
Sherif, M., & Shaairi, N. A. (2013). ‘Determinants of demand on family Takaful in 
Malaysia’. Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research, 4(1), 26-50. 
Simmel, G. (2005). The Philosophy of Money. Edited by David Frisby. 
Translated by Tom Bottomore and David Frisby. London and New York: 
Routledge. 
Simmel, G. (1950). The Sociology of Georg Simmel. New York: Free Press.  
Stark. D October (2000). ‘For a Sociology of Worth’ Working Paper Series, 
Center on Organizational Innovation, Columbia University. Available online at 
http://www.coi.columbia.edu/pdf/stark_fsw.pdf. (accessed on 13th February 
2013). 
 
Sitkin, S. B., and Stickel, D. (1996) ‘The Road to Hell: The Dynamics of Distrust 
in an Era of Quality’, in R. M. Kramer and T. R. Tyer (eds), Trust in 
Organizations, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, pp. 196–215.  
 
Soliman, S. (2004) ‘The Rise and Decline of the Islamic Banking Model in 
Egypt’, in C. M. Henry and R. Wilson (eds), in The Politics of Islamic Finance, 
Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh. 
 
Stake. R. (1995), The Art of Case Study Research.  
 
Starrett, G. (1995) ‘The Political Economy of Religious Commodities in Cairo’, 
American Anthropologist, 97(1): 51–68. 
 
Stenning, A., Smith, A., Rochovská, A., & Świątek, D. (2010). ‘Credit, Debt, and 
Everyday Financial Practices: Low‐Income Households in Two Postsocialist 
Cities’. Economic Geography, 86(2), 119-145. 
 
	  	   351	  
Stiansen, E. (2004) ‘Interest Politics: Islamic Finance in the Sudan, 1977–2001’, 
in C. M. Henry and R. Wilson (eds), The Politics of Islamic Finance, Edinburgh 
University Press, Edinburgh. 
 
Stivens, M. (2006, August). ‘Family values’ and Islamic revival: Gender, rights 
and state moral projects in Malaysia. In Women's Studies International Forum 
(Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 354-367). Pergamon. 
Stix, H. ‘Why do people save in cash? Distrust, Memories of Banking Crises, 
Weak Institutions and Dollarization. Deutsche Bundesbank Publications. 
Available at 
http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/Tasks/Cash_management
/2012_02_27_eltville_04_stix_paper.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (Acessed on 
4th June 2014). 
Stiglitz, J. E. (1993) Economics, W. W. Norton, New York. 
 
Sonn, T. (2006). Islamic fundamentalism and political Islam. History Compass, 
4(1), 181-185. 
 
Strauss, A. & Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and 
procedures for developing grounded theory (2nd ed.). London: Sage. 
 
Subhani, A (2006) ‘Divine Law of Ribā and Bay': New Critical Theory’, McGill 
Institute of Islamic Studies. (Unpublished Phd thesis.) 
Available at: http://digitool.library.mcgill.ca/R/?func=dbin-jump-
full&object_id=102847&local_base=GEN01-MCG02 (accessed on 8th April 
2012). 
 
Swedberg et al. (1990) ‘The Paradigm of Economic Sociology’ in Structures of 
capital : the social organization of the economy eds. Zukin S and DiMaggio P 
(57-86) 
 
	  	   352	  
Swedberg, R. (2003) Principles of Economic Sociology, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton. 
 
Swedberg, R. (2004). ‘The Toolkit of Economic Sociology’ (Rep. No. 22). 
Cornell University: Center for the Study of Economy and Society. 
Available at: http://www.economyandsociety.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/wp22_swedberg_toolkit04.pdf (accessed on 26th 
December 2014). 
 
Swedberg, R. (2005) The Max Weber Dictionary: Keywords and Central 
Concepts, Stanford University Press, Stanford. 
 
Swedberg, R. (2010) ‘The Structure of Confidence and the Collapse of Lehman 
Brothers’, in M. Lounsbury and P. M. Hirsch (eds), Markets on Trial: The 
Economic Sociology of the U.S. Financial Crisis: Part A (Research in the 
Sociology of Organizations, Volume 30 Part A), Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited, pp. 71–114.  
Swedberg, R. (2012) ‘The Role of Confidence in Finance’ (529-45) in Karin 
Knorr Cetina and Alex Preda (eds.), Handbook of the Sociology of Finance. 
New York: Oxford University Press.  
Swidler, A. (1986) ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies’, American 
Sociological Review, 51(2) (April): 273–86. 
 
Tajuddin, A (2012) Malaysia in the world economy (1824-2011): capitalism, 
ethnic divisions, and "managed" democracy. Lexington Books. 
 
Talib, R. (2002) ‘Malaysia: Power Shifts and the Matrix of Consumption’, in B-H. 
Chua (ed.) Consumption in Asia: Lifestyle and Identities, (35-60) Routledge, 
London. 
 
	  	   353	  
Thambiah, S., Eze, C.  Santhapparaj, A and Arumugam, K (2011) ‘Customers’ 
Perception on Islamic Retail Banking: A Comparative Analysis between the 
Urban and Rural Regions of Malaysia’, International Journal of Business and 
Management, 6(1): 187–98. 
 
Theret, B. (1999). The Socio-political Dimensions of the Currency: Implications 
for the Transition to the Euro. Journal of Consumer Policy, 22(1-2), 51-79. 
 
Tripp, C. (2006) Islam and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capitalism, 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Turner, B. S. (1974) Weber and Islam: A Critical Study, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, London. 
 
Turner, B. S. (2008). Introduction: the price of piety. Contemporary Islam, 2(1), 
1-6. 
 
Turner, B. S. (2010). ‘Islam, capitalism and the Weber theses’. The British 
Journal of Sociology, 61(s1), 147-160. 
 
Turner, B. S. and Arslan, B. Z. (2011) ‘Shari’a and Legal Pluralism in the West’, 
European Journal of Social Theory, 14(2): 139–59.  
 
United States General Accounting Office, Program Evaluation and Methodology 
Division, Case Study Evaluations, November 1990. Available at: 
www.gao.gov/special.pubs/10_1_9.pdf (accessed on 14th May 2013). 
 
Uzzi, B. (1996) ‘The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the 
Economic Performance of Organisations: The Network Effect’, American 
Sociological Review, 61(4): 674–98. 
 
Uzzi, B. (1997) ‘Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The 
	  	   354	  
Paradox of Embeddedness’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(1): 35–67.  
 
Valsiner, J. (2008) ‘The Basics of Trust: How Culture Matters’ (Series Editor’s 
Introduction), in I. Marková and A. Gillespie (eds), Trust and Distrust: 
Sociocultural Perspectives, (ix-x). Information Age Pub., Charlotte, NC 
 
van der Zwan, N. (2014). ‘Making sense of financialization’. Socio-Economic 
Review, 12(1), 99-129.  
 
Verter, B. (2003) ‘Spiritual Capital: Theorizing Religion with Bourdieu against 
Bourdieu’, Sociological Theory, 21(2) (June): 150–74.  
 
Vithiatharan, V., & Gomez, E. T. (2014). Politics, Economic Crises and 
Corporate Governance Reforms: Regulatory Capture in Malaysia. Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, 44(4), 599-615. 
 
Vogel, F. E., and Hayes, S. L., III (1998) Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, 
Risk and Return, Kluwer Law, The Hague and Boston. 
 
Waever (1996) ‘European Security Identities’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 34(:1): 103–-32. 
 
Warde, A. (1994) ‘Consumption, Identity-Formation and Uncertainty’, Sociology, 
28: 877–98.  
 
Warde, I. (2000) Islamic Finance in the Global Economy, Edinburgh University 
Press, Edinburgh. 
 
Warde, I. (2004) ‘Global Politics, IF and Islamist Politics Before and After 11 
September 2001’, in C. M. Henry and R. Wilson (eds), The Politics of Islamic 
Finance, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh. 
 
	  	   355	  
Watkins  J. W. N. (1952) ‘Ideal Types and Historical Explanation’, The British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 3(9) (May): 22–43. 
 
Weber, M. (1947) The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated 
by A. M. Henderson and T. Parsons, edited with an introduction by T. Parsons, 
Free Press, New York.  
 
Weber, M. (1978) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology 
(eds. C. Roth and C. Wittich), University of California Press, Berkeley.  
 
Weber, M. (2001). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: The 
relationships between religion and the economic and social life in modern 
culture. Anthony Giddens, trans. Talcott Parsons. Routledge Classics. 
 
Weber, M. (2003) ‘Introduction to the Economic Ethics of World Religions’, in S. 
Whimster (ed.), The Essential Weber: A Reader, Routledge, pp. 55–80.  
 
Weber, M. (2005) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism Routledge 
New York  
 
White, H. (2001) ‘Where Do Markets Come From?’ American Journal of 
Sociology 81(1976):730-380; and Harrison White, Markets from Networks: 
Socioeconomic Models of Production, Princeton University Press, 2001. 
 
White, H. (2002) ‘Markets and Firms: Notes Toward the Future of Economic 
Sociology’, (13) in M. Guillen, R. Collins, P. England and M. Meyer (eds), The 
New Economic Sociology. Russell Sage Foundation.  
             
Wilson, R. (1997) ‘Islamic Finance and Ethical Investment’, International Journal 
of Social Economics, 24(11): 1325–42. 
 
	  	   356	  
Wilson, R. (1998) ‘Islam and Malaysia’s Economic Development’, Journal of 
Islamic Studies, 9(2): 259–76. 
 
Wilson, R. (2004) ‘Introduction’, in H. Clement and R. Wilson (eds),The Politics 
of Islamic Finance, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.  
 
Wilson, R. (2009) ‘The Development of Islamic Finance in the GCC’, The Kuwait 
Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation. 
Available at: 
www.lse.ac.uk/government/research/resgroups/kuwait/documents/Wilson.pdf 
(accessed on 8th August 2009). 
 
Yanov, D., and Schwartz-Shea, P. (2006) Interpretation and Method: Empirical 
Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn, M. E. Sharpe Inc., New York.  
 
Yeoh, T. (2012) ‘Malaysia after Regime Change’, New Mandala (hosted by 
Australian National University (ANU) College of Asia and the Pacific), 24 March. 
Available at: 
http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2012/03/24/malaysia-after-regime-
change-tricia-yeoh/? Accessed on 26th August 2013. 
 
Yeung, H. W. C. (2009). Under siege? Economic globalization and Chinese 
business in Southeast Asia. Economy and Society, 28(1), 1-29. 
 
Yin, R. (2003) Case study Research: Design and Methods, Sage Publications, 
Thousand Oaks, CA. 
 
Zelizer, V. A. (1978). ‘Human values and the market: The case of life insurance 
and death in 19th-century America’. American journal of sociology, 591-610. 
 
Zelizer, V.A. (1994). The Social Meaning of Money, Basic Books (Online 
edition). 
	  	   357	  
 
Zelizer, V. A. R. (1997) The Social Meaning of Money, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton. 
 
Zelizer, V. A. R. (1985). Pricing the priceless child: The changing social value of 
children. Princeton University Press 
 
Zelizer, V. (2001). Culture and consumption. The handbook of economic 
sociology, 2, 331-355. 
 
Zelizer, V. A. (2010). Economic lives: How culture shapes the economy. 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Zelizer, V. A. R. (2013) Economic Lives: How Culture Shapes the Economy, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
 
Zelizer, V. A. R. (2012) ‘Culture and Consumption’,  in N. J. Smelser and R. 
Swedberg (eds),The Handbook of Economic Sociology, (331-255) Princeton 
University Press, Princeton. (Second edition.) 
 
Zubaida, S. (2003) Law and Power in the Islamic World, I. B. Tauris, London. 
 
Zubaida, S. (2011) Beyond Islam. A New Understanding of the Middle East, 
I. B. Tauris, London. 
 
Zygmunt, B. (2000). Liquid Modernity. Polity, Cambridge.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	   358	  
Online Multimedia Sources 
 
Abidin, MZ (2011) ‘Squeezed between stagnating wages and rising prises’  
In The Edge (78-80) 
Available at www.isis.org.my/attachments/833_MZA_TheEdge_18July2011.pdf 
(accessed on 8th October 2013). 
 
Agencia Islámica de Noticias (AIN) (2011) ‘Islamic Banking the Solution to the 
Global Economic Crisis’, 17 August. Available at: 
www.pressenza.com/2011/08/islamic-bankingx-the-solution-to-the-global-
economic-crisis/) (accessed on 7 September 2012). 
 
Amin S., ‘Liberal Capitalism, Conniving (Crony) Capitalism and Lumpen 
Development. The Case of Egypt.’ Accessible on Third World Forum  
Available 
at:www.forumtiersmonde.net/fren/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=321:liberal-capitalism-conniving-capitalism-qcronyq-and-lumpen-
development-what-are-the-immediate-answers-&catid=3:newsflash&Itemid=73. 
(accessed on 2nd January 2015). 
 
 
Bank Negara (2001) ‘Financial Sector Master Plan’ 
Available at: www.bnm.gov.my/files/publication/fsbp/en/04_Financial_Sector.pdf 
(accessed on 10th June 2011) 
 
Bank Negara Malaysia (2013) ‘Annual Report 2013’  
Available at: www.bnm.gov.my/files/publication/ar/en/2013/ar2013_book.pdf 
(accessed on 4th November 2014) 
 
BBC News (2011) ‘Islam and Capitalism – Sex before the Sexual Revolution’ 
[radio programme].  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00yjcnt (accessed on 17 February 2013). 
	  	   359	  
 
Brant, R. (2009) ‘Is Islamic Finance the Answer?’, BBC News. Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8025410.stm (accessed on 10th June 
2011). 
 
Catechism of the Catholic Church (Vatican City 1993)  
Available at: http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM (accessed 
on 4th December 2014). 
 
DiVanna and Hancock (2013) ‘Islamic Finance enters new phase: Top Islamic 
Financial Institutions’ The Banker November 2013  
http://www.mifc.com/index.php?ch=28&pg=72&ac=55&bb=uploadpdf 
 
Ernst and Young (2014) 2013-2014 World Islamic Banking: Competitiveness 
Report. http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_-
_World_Islamic_Banking_Competitiveness_Report_2013–14/$FILE/EY-World-
Islamic-Banking-Competitiveness-Report-2013-14.pdf Accessed on 26th 
December 2014. 
 
El Diwany, T. (2009) ‘Should Religion Regulate Markets?’ [radio programme], 
BBC Radio 4. Broadcast on 3 February 2009  
Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_7866000/7866731.stm (accessed 
on 11 November 2012).  
 
Financial Times (2010) ‘The Muslim Consumer’, 5 January. Available at: 
http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/01/05/the-muslim-consumer-building-
your-brand-for-a-fast-growing-segment (accessed on 7 August 2012). 
 
Keating JE 2011 Money Market: How the West was won – In the Middle Ages  
Foreign Policy  
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/money-market/ 
	  	   360	  
 
Imaduddin, A. (2011) ‘What if the World had Been Following Islamic Financial 
Practices?’ The Guardian. Available at: 
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2011/jan/07/islam-fairer-finance-
moral-risk (accessed on 23 February 2013). 
 
INCEIF, (2014) ‘An investigation on household debt in Malaysia’ 
http://www.inceif.org/research-bulletin/investigation-household-debt-malaysia/ 
 
Halliday, F. (2008) ‘Islam, Law and Finance: The Elusive Divine’, 
openDemocracy. Available at: 
www.opendemocracy.net/article/globalisation/global_politics/islamic_law. 
Accessed on 19th January 2011. 
 
Hart, K. (2013) ‘Contemporary research on the anthropology of money and 
finance’  
Available at: http://thememorybank.co.uk/2013/09/04/contemporary-research-
on-the-anthropology-of-money-and-finance/ (accessed on 28th October 2014) 
 
Landau, C. (2009) ‘Can Religion Help the Economic Crisis?’, BBC News. 25th 
September. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8275498.stm 
(accessed on 13 January 2013).  
 
Landon, T., Jr. (2007) ‘Islamic Finance and its Critics’, The New York Times, 9 
August. Available at: 
www.nytimes.com/2007/08/09/business/09trust.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
(accessed on 8 November 2012). 
 
Malaysia International Islamic Finance Centre (MIFC) (2014) ‘The Halal 
Economy. Huge Potential for Islamic Finance’  Published on 30th September 
2014. Available at: 
	  	   361	  
http://www.mifc.com/index.php?ch=28&pg=72&ac=90&bb=uploadpdf (accessed 
on 7th Octover 2014). 
 
Mekay E., (2011) ‘Too Late, Qaddafi Seeks the Aid of Muslim Clerics’, The New 
York Times, March 2, 2011. Accessed on 2nd January 2015. 
 
Mitton, R. (2000) ‘Asian Dilemma: Mahathir on Globalization and the Post-Crisis 
Order’, CNN Asia Now. Available at:  
http://cgi.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/99/0723/feat1.html (accessed on 12 
October 2012). 
 
Moore, M. (2011) ‘US Feared British Sharia Banks Would Finance Terrorist 
Groups’, The Daily Telegraph, 15 March. Available at: 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/8382544/US-feared-
British-sharia-banks-would-finance-terrorist-groups.html (accessed on 8 
November 2012). 
 
Power, C. (2009) ‘Faith in the Market’, Foreign Policy, 5 January. Available at: 
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/01/05/faith_in_the_market?page=0,1 
(accessed on 28 April 2013). 
 
Property Guru (2012) ‘Help Buyers of Abandoned Housing Projects: PPIM’. 
Available at: www.propertyguru.com.my/property-news/2012/10/6326/help-
buyers-of-abandoned-housing-projects-ppim (accessed on 13 May 2013). 
 
Rammell, B. (2003) ‘The Financial War Against Terrorism: The Contribution of 
Islamic Banking’ in the RUSI Journal, Jun 2003, Vol. 148, No. 3 
www.rusi.org/go.php?structureID=articles_journal&ref=J40c1f7d85079b#.UV6o
JY5H2_t 
 
 
 
	  	   362	  
Reuters (2007) ‘Islamic Banking Fails to Make a Dent in Egypt’, 9 August. 
Available at: http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/07/08/10/10145416.html 
(accessed on 17 October 2011). 
 
Siddiqi, M. N. (2012) ‘Faith and Finance’, New Horizon, April/June. Available at: 
www.islamic-
banking.com/resources/7/NewHorizon%20Previouse%20Issues/New%20Horizo
n%20Issue%20183%20red.pdf (accessed on 19 November 2014). 
 
The Economist (2013a) ‘Banking on the ummah’, 5 January. Available at: 
www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21569050-malaysia-leads-
charge-islamic-finance-banking-ummah (accessed on 2 February 2013). 
 
The Economist (2013b) ‘Food and Religion, A Meaty Question’, Published on: 9 
February. Available at: http://www.economist.com/news/international/21571419-
who-should-regulate-kosher-and-halal-food-meaty-question) (accessed on: 9th 
June 2012). 
 
The Economist (2013c) ‘Household debt in Asia’ 
Published on: November 2nd 2013 Available at 
www.economist.com/news/economic-and-financial-indicators/21588882-
household-debt-asia (accessed on 25th December 2014). 
 
Tripp, C. (2011) ‘Islam and capitalism – sex before the sexual revolution’ 
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00yjcnt 
First broadcast and accessed on Wednesday 16 Feb 2011 
 
Totaro, L. (2009) ‘Vatican Says Islamic Finance May Help Western banks in 
Crisis’ Available at: 
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aOsOLE8uiNOg&refer
=italy (accessed on 23th January 2012). 
 
